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Preface 
 
A long journey has ended. What started off as a simple question out of curiosity 
became a long and fascinating inquiry into everyday inter-ethnic interaction in a 
context of violent conflict in the region known as Kottiyar Pattu in Trincomalee 
District, Sri Lanka. For six years, I have been able to read anything I could lay my 
hands on, and speak to hundreds of people in Sri Lanka, India, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and the United States about irrigation and paddy cultivation (the 
topic that the inquiry started off with), Gods and their temples and festivals, politics 
and violence, the tsunami, labour migration and its culinary consequences for the 
husbands who stay behind, birth control, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
history, saints and villains, fish, caste and cattle brands, a magical vegetable garden 
on a rock, and many other things. From this jumble a story emerged that crystallised 
into this dissertation. 
Once, when I showed her a book by Mark Whitaker that I had just bought, my 
mother-in-law asked me “Now why do you fellows study the East Coast? I can 
imagine people doing research in Jaffna, but why such godforsaken places like 
Mandur or Muthur?” Apart from the fact that I have a soft spot for Muthur and its 
surroundings, I hope this book is sufficient proof that remote places can very well be 
a source of valuable insights. 
As Michel de Certeau has written, “we never write on a blank page, but always on 
one that has already been written on” (De Certeau 1988: 43). I owe a great debt to 
many people who have been sources of inspiration when doing my research and 
writing this book; a debt that goes way beyond a mere “borrowing that can be 
exorcized by homage or acknowledgement” (id.: 44), and thus remains in existence 
despite me expressing thanks in the next few paragraphs. There will be many whose 
names I forget to mention here: I beg your forgiveness. 
 
Without the initial positive reactions of Linden Vincent and Georg Frerks, this 
research would have remained an interesting question, shelved in my mental drawer 
for questions worth asking but never elaborated on. Thank you for that and for your 
continued enthusiasm and support, even when at times my research ran wildly off 
course. 
Financially, my research was made possible by a grant from the CERES-Wageningen 
Programme for Innovative PhD Research (CEPIP-W), which I am grateful for. Thank 
you Georg, for hiring me at Disaster Studies for the last stretch. That made it 
possible to have substantial amounts of time dedicated for focusing on my 
dissertation.  
The practical implementation of my research would have been impossible without 
my Sri Lankan research assistants, who will remain anonymous on the request of 
one of them because unfortunately I do not know how dangerous it is to mention 
their names. If there are any people whom I need to say ‘thank you’ to, it is this 
group of people. I also had an important research assistant in the Netherlands: my 
father. Pa, thanks for your unrelenting support and encouragement, and for the 
many hours of painstakingly pouring over ancient Dutch texts as well as over the 
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different texts that I produced over the years. In 2006, Erik Dekker came to Sri Lanka 
for an MSc research on water delivery in the Allai Extension Scheme. Unfortunately, 
a renewed outbreak of violence upset his plans and forced him to abandon his field 
site and his measurements. Nevertheless, the observations that he was able to make 
before leaving Kottiyar Pattu, and his eventual thesis proved very helpful for my 
own research, particularly for chapter 6. 
I am grateful to ZOA Refugee Care for letting me use the office in Muthur (and, 
every now and then, in Trincomalee, Malaimunthal and Kilivetti) as research base, 
and for allowing considerable flexibility in my work scheduling after I returned to 
the Netherlands and combined a part-time job at ZOA’s headquarters with my 
research. My colleagues in ZOA Trincomalee and the colleagues of my wife in 
Trincomalee deserve a big thank you for all the discussions that we had over the 
years. Your insights have enriched my insight considerably. Anneke van Eijk, 
Bertien Bos, and Nithya and Anton: thank you for letting me stay at your places 
when I was in Trincomalee. 
Archival research would not have been possible without the generous hospitality 
that was offered by the people at the Nadesan Centre For Human Rights Through 
Law. I would also like to express my appreciation to the people working at the Sri 
Lankan National Archives in Colombo, and at the Dutch National Archives in The 
Hague. 
In India, I owe thanks to the people attached to Discipleship Centre, particularly 
George Samuel and Kolappan Thamilkumar, for their support in my inquiries 
during three consultancies that officially had nothing to do with Kottiyar Pattu but 
generated valuable insights on caste dynamics and the historical links between 
South India and Sri Lanka. I am grateful to Tear Netherlands and Tearfund UK for 
giving me the opportunity to do these consultancies in the first place. 
The Asia Foundation made a consultancy with the Foundation for Co-Existence 
(FCE) possible. Thanks for the permission to re-use a lot of what I learnt there in 
section 7.5 and 7.6. I am particularly grateful to Dinidu Endaragalle, Priyan 
Senevirathne and Jeya Murugan for their insightful comments. 
Google EarthTM mapping service is gratefully acknowledged for giving permission to 
use imagery for this dissertation. 
Over the years, a group of academics studying Sri Lanka has been a great source of 
ideas, reflection, and friendship. An article by Mark Whitaker was the first 
anthropological article on Sri Lanka’s east coast that I ever read (years before I even 
thought of writing this thesis), and his intriguing perspectives on things have been a 
source of ethnographic inspiration throughout. Dennis McGilvray’s enthusiastic 
response to my first tentative mail with questions about caste triggered off a 
conversation that is still ongoing. Thanks for taking so much time to write what 
amounts to about two hundred pages of emails, thanks for hosting me in Boulder 
twice, and for letting me spend days sniffing through the treasure chest of your 
bookshelves, but perhaps most of all thanks for bringing me in touch with a very 
experienced research assistant. ‘Aunty’ Pat Lawrence: thanks for being such a 
wonderful friend and for all your academic and personal encouragement. Jonathan 
Spencer: thanks for your inspiring feedback, thanks for getting me to Edinburgh and 
on the panel in Chicago, and thanks for introducing me to Becky. 
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Rajan Hoole: thank you for having been a patient and endless source of information 
on violence and conflict in Sri Lanka, and on many other topics. 
Jonathan Goodhand, Tudor Silva, and Hasbullah: thank you for fruitful and 
stimulating discussions. 
My research started in dialogue with the work of Benedikt Korf. Benedikt, thank you 
for taking the time to sit down with someone who initially did not agree with you. 
Through your thoughtful way of putting things in perspective, I have come to 
deeply respect you as an academic and as a person.  
Becky Walker, Sharika Thiranagama, Mirak Raheem, Bhavani Fonseka, Martijn 
Koster, Bart Klem, Evan Ekanayake, Vijitha Krishnamoorthy and a number of people 
working in Kottiyar Pattu whose names I cannot mention have shared valuable 
insights. Thanks for that, and thanks for your friendship. Becky, thanks for your 
hospitality in Edinburgh, and Martijn (and Jenneke of course!), thanks for your 
hospitality in Wageningen. 
Kathrin Thurnheer: thanks for making it possible for me to attend the workshop in 
Bern, and thanks for the great discussions we had there. 
Then there is my family. Ma, Pa, Dorothea (†) and Christian with Saskia, Yannick 
and Lieve: thanks for being the wonderful family which groomed me, and thanks for 
all your love, support, patience and encouragement when ideals and distant shores 
pulled me away from the Netherlands. It was you who taught me the importance of 
having your roots in people rather than places. 
Oom Piet Oosterom: your PhD research sparked in me the desire to one day conduct 
my own PhD research. Thanks for that, and thank you and Tante Heleen for your 
support and hospitality over the years, particularly after we moved back to 
Wageningen. 
Mama and Dada; Marsha and Daniel with Athaliah and Asher; Hushard and 
Malevika with Sean; Sushan and Fazna: thank you for being such great in-laws. 
While technically not in-laws, Rajo Akki and Nishantha with Mehara and Thehara, 
and Vino have been very much part of our lives and need to be included in this list. 
All of you, but particularly Mama and Marsha: thank you for explaining so much 
about Sri Lanka, and for the critical discussions we had over the past years.  
The people dearest to me in the entire world are my wife Natasha and our sons 
Ryan, Joel and Boaz. Thank you for meaning the world to me, and thank you for 
being so patient with me over the years that I had much less time for you than you 
deserved. I love you to the moon… and back. It is to you that I dedicate this book. 
Finally, I want to thank the people of Kottiyar Pattu, about whom I have written this 
book. Thank you for taking the time to talk, and for sharing so much about your own 
lives with me. May peace – not just the absence of war, but genuine reconciliation – 
prevail in Sri Lanka, and may happiness return to the beautiful piece of earth that is 
called Kottiyar Pattu. 
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Glossary 
 
Ampattar  Tamil caste of barbers  
amunam  (also avanam) a measure for weight, and equals about 5 to 6 bushels of 
paddy, or 140 to 168 kilograms of unhusked paddy; one amunam of 
seed paddy is equivalent to a sown area of about 2½ acres, which is 
about one hectare 
anicut inlet weir 
appa father  
aru river  
balasthanam   ritual to mark the start of the renovation and purification of a Hindu 
temple  
boru false, lie 
bo tree  (also bodhi tree) ficus religiosa; the kind of tree under which the Buddha 
is claimed to have attained enlightenment 
Buddha Dharma law of truth of Buddha 
cadjans coconut fronds 
Chakkiliyar Tamil caste of cobblers  
chaitiya Buddhist or Jain shrine including a dagaba  
chena  slash and burn cultivation; term used both for the practice and for the 
fields  
Chetty Tamil caste of traders and jewellers 
crore 10,000,000 (100 lakh) 
dagaba  bell-shaped shrine holding relics  
dargah a Sufi shrine built over the grave of a revered religious figure, often a 
Sufi saint 
Deepavali  Hindu festival of light 
dissava feudal title associated with high office in the Kandyan kingdom; a 
dissava headed the administration of a large province of the Kingdom 
known as a Dissava and was the king's personal representative and tax 
collector in that area. 
Dhobies  Tamil caste of washermen  
Durava  Sinhala caste of toddy-tappers 
Fathiha Sura Al-Fathiha ("The Opening") is the first chapter of the Qur'an; this 
chapter has a special role in daily prayers, being recited at the start of 
each unit of prayer  
ganga   river 
ganja  marijuana 
gansabhawa  village council of elders 
goni billa “ghost covered in a sack” - a mythical monster that comes and snatches 
(naughty) children away in his gunny bag   
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goonda lower-ranking ruffian with a thug as leader 
Goviya  Sinhala caste of farmers  
Grama Niladhari also Grama Sevaka  - lowest-level government official in Sri Lanka 
Hali or Hannali  Sinhala caste of tailors  
hartal a shut-down of public life in protest against a perceived injustice  . 
hamuduru Buddhist monk 
hondai  good  
Id-Ul-Fitr Muslim festival to celebrate the end of the fasting month of Ramadhan 
iluppai-pāl  ‘the milk of the iluppai tree’, a kind of oil that was used for burning the 
lamps in the temple 
Iyakkam ‘movement’, a colloquial term used to describe the LTTE 
jihad struggle in the way of God  
jumma  Muslim Friday prayers   
kalvettu stone inscription; term is also used for chronicles 
Kammal  Sinhala caste of carpenters  
kandoori annual celebration of the death of a Muslim saint, involving a public 
feast  
Karaiyar  Tamil caste of sea-fishermen 
Karava  Sinhala caste of fishermen  
kiramath miracles   
Kollan Tamil caste of blacksmiths 
kotiya  one crore, or ten million 
kottai fort 
kotti  a kind of flower 
Kovilar also Koviyar – Tamil caste of temple labourers  
kovil   Hindu temple  
kudi  generic term for an exogamous matrilineal clan among the Tamils and 
Muslims of eastern Sri Lanka; the kudi is the largest unit of matrilineal 
descent organisation, with local strength in specific areas  
kulam (irrigation) reservoir; term is also used for caste 
kumbh abishekam ritual to re-dedicate a Hindu temple 
Kuravar  Telugu-speaking gypsies 
Kurukkal  Tamil caste of non-Brahmin Hindu priests  
Kuyavar  Tamil caste of potters 
lakh 100,000 
larijnen Ancient Dutch currency unit: 1 larijn = 10 stuiver 
Lascorin Javanese and Malay soldier in Dutch military service in Ceylon (from 
Arab lashkar = army) 
maha  great; term also used for the major cultivation season (October-March) 
Malabars term used in colonial documents to denote the Tamil ethnic group until 
well into the 19th century 
Malayali an ethnic group originating from the Indian state of Kerala 
maravar padai Tamil vigilantes, trained by the LTTE  
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Moors  older term for Tamil-speaking Sri Lankan Muslims, derived from the 
Portuguese word for North African Muslims, mouro 
moulavi   Muslim cleric  
Mukkuvar  Tamil caste of Kerala origin  
mulam measure of length, indicating the distance from fingertips to elbow; 
roughly equal to 1’6” (45 cm) 
mulastanam  the ‘holy of holies’ of a Hindu temple, the shrine in which the main idol 
is kept. The roof of the mulastanam is often covered with statues  
murid  disciple (arab.)  
nele  also nely – rough rice; paddy 
Negati  Sinhala caste of drummers  
nikaya   congregation of Buddhist monks 
Pachchan  Tamil caste 
Pallawilli Tamil caste of seafarers and fishermen (see also Paravar) 
pandal ceremonial platform or gate 
pansala Buddhist temple  
Paravar Tamil caste of boatmen 
Paraiyar  Tamil caste of funeral drummers 
perahera procession 
pooja temple ritual 
poosari ritual specialist, presiding over poojas 
Pradeshiya Sabha  municipal-level local authority in rural areas 
pulavan poet 
purana original 
Quraish the dominant tribe of Mecca when the Muslim religion emerged; its 
prophet Muhammad belonged to this tribe 
Rada  Sinhala caste of washermen  
rajakariya   compulsory unpaid labour as a service to the King (abolished in 1832) 
reddi  washerwoman   
samanera young recruit to the Buddhist monkhood 
sari six-yard-long cloth worn as a traditional women’s garment throughout 
South Asia  
sathyagraha  philosophy and practice of nonviolent resistance  
Shawwaal   six days of Islamic fasting after the obligatory fast of Ramadhan  
Sufi practitioner of Sufism - generally understood to be the inner, mystical 
dimension of Islam   
taanattaar  temple administrators, originating from Marunkur  
Thai Pongal  Tamil harvest festival (14-15 January) 
thaikka  Muslim prayer hall where no jumma prayers are said  
Thaththar  Tamil caste of goldsmiths   
thero Buddhist priest 
Thimilar   from thimil (a kind of boat) or thimir (strong, courageous or stubborn) - 
Tamil caste found today mainly in the region just south of Trincomalee, 
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where they claim legendary origins as people from Sindh (Sindhunadar 
Thimilar)  
theertham  water-cutting ritual 
thiruvila Hindu temple festival  
thoppu orchard 
vannimai feudal divisions that were ruled by petty chiefs south of the Jaffna 
peninsula in the present-day Northern, North Central and Eastern 
Provinces of Sri Lanka  
vanniyar  title of a feudal chief in medieval Sri Lanka  
Valiullah ‘Friend of Allah’ – honorific term used for Sufi saints; in colloquial use, 
the term Avuliya (‘Friends’) is also used 
varipattaar temple labourers, originating from Karaikal   
vayupurana Hindu religious text, dedicated to the god Vayu (the wind god) 
Vedar ‘hunter’ - Veddas 
Velaikkarar guards’ regiment or king's regiment in the Chola army 
Velalar Tamil land-owning caste 
Vesak  the most important full-moon day in the Buddhist calendar; on this 
day, the birth, enlightenment and death of the Buddha are remembered 
vidane government servant 
wattai vidane  irrigation headman  or ‘tract headman’; a tract usually has an extent of  
300-500 acres  
vihara Buddhist temple   
wannichee female chieftain  
yala minor cultivation season (April-September) 
yakkha demon 
yakkhini demoness  
yodhaya   bodyguard  
yojana Vedic measure of distance between 6 to 15 km (4 and 9 miles). 
ziyaram  tomb-shrine for a Muslim saint 
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Note on transliteration 
 
Since Sinhala and Tamil have alphabets that are different in shape and structure 
from the English alphabet, some form of transliteration is necessary. The problem is 
that there are no commonly agreed upon transliteration systems. For readability’s 
sake, I have avoided the use of diacritics except in the case of citations from other 
texts. Where possible, I have tried to stick as closely as possible to the spelling of 
words in their original language. While for example Mutur and Muttur are 
commonly found spellings, I have stuck to Muthur for the name of the main town in 
Kottiyar Pattu. For bigger places around the research area and for people’s names, I 
have used spellings as they are commonly found in English-language maps and in 
English-language newspapers, respectively.  
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1 Introduction 
 
“Despite a wealth of information on ethnic violence, we actually know very little 
about the micromechanics of coexistence – about the neighborhoods and 
colonies that achieved and maintained intergroup peace in the midst of civic 
strife. There is a pressing need for scholarly analysis of the day-to-day poetics of 
intergroup cooperation. But even more pointedly, we cannot view this everyday 
life, this peaceful coexistence, as the static context or backdrop against which 
“things” (like riots, violence, or “breakdown”) happen. Rather, peace itself is the 
product of a relentless creative labour. Coexistence, as much as conflict, needs to 
be explained” (Ring 2006: 3). 
 
1.1 Problem statement: extraordinary ordinariness 
This is a book about ordinary people doing ordinary things in extraordinary 
circumstances. Based on fieldwork that was carried out between 2003 and 2008, it 
describes and analyses everyday forms of inter-ethnic interaction in Kottiyar Pattu, a 
multi-ethnic region in Sri Lanka’s north-eastern war zone (map 1.1). Through case 
studies on inter-ethnic interaction in the day-to-day pursuit of (agricultural) 
livelihoods, during periods of acute violence and tension, and in inter-ethnic 
marriages, contextualised in the complex past and present of the area they live in, I 
bring out how people who are separated from each other by ethno-nationalist 
discourse and violent boundary maintenance continue to live in the same area and 
try to maintain a form of normalcy.  
This focus on the ordinary aims to enrich the literature on violent conflict in Sri 
Lanka, but has wider implications. In the study of conflict and disaster, the focus is 
often either on agony, suffering and survival, or on wider political, economic and 
social causes, implications and discourses. In the process, people are reduced to 
pitiful victims, skilful survivors or mere pawns on the chess-board of larger actors. 
However, there are many aspects of normalcy that continue during crisis and that 
need to be accounted for (Hilhorst 2007). I have come to believe that the mundane 
practices of everyday life are crucial in helping people to disengage from contexts of 
violence and disaster and build up fragile islands of normalcy, peace, and sanity.  
The topic of everyday inter-ethnic interaction is also relevant for those interested in 
dynamics of (ethnicised) conflict and peace. If, despite the context of conflict, people 
still interact across ethnic boundaries, then the question arises how deeply ethno-
nationalist discourse has been internalised by ‘people on the ground’, and to what 
extent these forms of inter-ethnic interaction can inform peace-building 
interventions.  
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Map 1.1. Sri Lanka, with Kottiyar Pattu demarcated by dotted line (source: UN-OCHA 2009) 
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1.1.1 Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims: a triptych of ethnic categories 
When, in May 2006, my (Sri Lankan) wife delivered our first child and I went with 
my mother-in-law to register his birth, the form asked for the nationality of the 
father and mother. For me, this was easy: I am Dutch. For my wife however, there 
proved to be a problem. Initially, I simply wrote ‘Sri Lankan’ in the box, but the form 
was returned with a rather terse comment that I should add my wife’s ethnicity. 
Protests that the form clearly asked only for ‘nationality’ were to no avail. The 
Sinhala word on the form is ‘jatiya’, an ambiguous term that can mean nationality, 
ethnicity, and caste all at the same time. To the lady processing the form (as to many 
others in Sri Lanka) ethnicity was the dominant one among the possible translations 
of the term. This led to another problem: my wife is of mixed ethnic background. 
Her father belongs to the Malay community1, her mother is Tamil, and they brought 
up their children as distinctly multicultural people, using English rather than Malay 
or Tamil as the language in the home2. We ended up filling in ‘Malay’ just to get the 
form processed, and now we face the interesting situation that our children on the 
one hand have no ethnicity at all, and on the other hand they fit perfectly into yet 
another ethnic category: that of the Burghers, descendants of unions between 
Europeans and inhabitants of Sri Lanka.  
Ethnicity is big in Sri Lanka: so big, that (except during international cricket 
tournaments) patriotism and nationalism tend to be phrased in ethnic, rather than 
national terms. The relevant ‘others’ to most Sri Lankans are not the Indians, 
Chinese, or for that matter the Dutch, but those within the country who belong to 
another ethnic group. There are three main ethnic groups in Sri Lanka: Sinhalese, 
Tamils and Muslims. Sinhalese form about three quarters of the population, speak 
the Sinhala language, and are largely Buddhist (though about 7% are Christian, 
predominantly Roman Catholic). Tamils form slightly less than a fifth of the 
population, speak the Tamil language, and are largely Hindu (though about 20% are 
Christian, half Roman Catholic and half Protestant). Among Tamils, a distinction is 
made between Sri Lankan Tamils, whose ancestors settled in Sri Lanka many 
centuries ago, and Indian Tamils, who came to the island in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries to work on the British coffee, tea, and rubber plantations. Muslims 
form about 7% of the population, speak Tamil and often also Sinhala, and are 
Muslim by religion. Apart from these, there is a range of tiny ethnic groups: Veddas, 
who are considered the aboriginal population of Sri Lanka in common discourse, 
Burghers and Malays (whom I mentioned earlier), and a number of South Asian 
trading communities. 
                                                 
 
1 The Malays are a small community of descendants from troops and exiled royalty brought 
by the Dutch and British colonial administrators from what is now known as Malaysia and 
Indonesia 
2 Multiculturality runs wide and deep in her family. I have Tamil, Sinhala, Muslim, Malay, 
Indian and Nepali in-laws, who speak all sorts of languages (most are bi- or trilingual), and 
have all sorts of religions: Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian (both Protestant and 
Roman Catholic). 
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In line with what people like Thomas Hylland Eriksen have written, I see ethnicity 
as an “emic category of ascription” (2002: 12), rather than as an in-born part of a 
person’s identity. This means that ethnic identities are continuously developed and 
reaffirmed by ordinary people in their day-to-day life, as much as this is done by 
external sources like politicians, the media, religious leaders, academics. Ethnicity is 
a constructed set of claims to essential and unique qualities, separating those 
belonging to that ethnicity from the rest of the world (idem: 10). This separation is 
given shape by (1) the name of the group, (2) a belief in common ancestry, (3) a belief 
in shared historical experiences, (4) a shared culture – which may include elements 
of “language, religion, laws, customs, institutions, dress, music, crafts, architecture, 
even food”, (5) a territorial attachment, and (6) a self-perception among the members 
of being a group (Brown 2001: 210). However, the process of developing a story of 
ethnic purity involves the necessary ambiguity. The example of Vijaya, the founding 
father of the Sinhalese according to their myth of origin, is instructive. According to 
the myth, Vijaya originated from somewhere around Orissa in East India. Due to his 
unruly character, he was banned from his father’s palace, and ended up in Sri Lanka, 
where he took two wives. His first wife was a demoness from the island, and her 
descendants are claimed to have become the Veddas. His second wife, whose 
descendants are claimed to have become the Sinhalese, was a Tamil princess from 
Madurai in South India3. On top of that, as Steven Kemper (1991) has documented, 
large groups of Sinhalese have no ancestral link with Vijaya whatsoever. Most of the 
castes present along the south-western fringe of the country settled there in the 
course of the last millennium, originate from the regions that are now known as 
Kerala and Tamil Nadu, and some groups spoke Tamil until well into the 20th 
century4. 
The ambiguity goes beyond origin stories: where cultural practices (except for 
religious expressions) are concerned, Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims are very 
similar. Between Sinhalese and Tamils, language is a clear differentiating element. 
As I have shown above, both groups have origins in South-East India, and neither 
can make any serious claim to aboriginality. In Sinhala nationalist discourse, the 
Buddhist religion is often invoked as a distinctive element, but there are also 
                                                 
 
3 This sort of post-mortal allocation of an ethnic identity to a ‘founding father’ is by no 
means unique. To give a Dutch example: William of Orange, the Dutch ‘father of the 
fatherland’, was a German prince who ruled over a fiefdom in France, and grew up at the 
court of the Spanish king… which was located in Belgium. For any serious Dutch ethno-
nationalist the national anthem must be a horror, with lines like ‘William of Orange / Am I 
of German blood’ and ‘The king of Spain / I have always honoured’. 
4I encountered a contemporary example of extreme ethnic ambiguity in Kottiyar Pattu. One 
man whom I interviewed one day told me that his father was Malayali (from Kerala, in 
South India), and his mother was Sinhala. When I asked him what his own ethnic identity 
was, he told me – without a trace of confusion – that he was Tamil. 
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substantial minorities of Christians among both Sinhalese and Tamils. Besides, 
Buddhists and Hindus alike worship Hindu gods, and a lot of Hindus do have 
respect for the Buddha. Muslims distinguish themselves from Sinhalese and Tamils 
by religion. With exception of a fairly recent territorial discourse laying claim to the 
south-eastern region of Sri Lanka, territory was never a topic; neither was language, 
since Muslims speak either Tamil or Sinhala as their mother tongue, and many are 
bilingual. While some Muslims claim Arab or Indian ancestry, the initial growth of 
the community was due to intermarriage with (particularly Tamil) wives, who 
subsequently converted to Islam.  
While every person obtains an ethnic classification at birth (depending on the ethnic 
identity of his or her parents), a person’s having of an ethnic identity depends on 
ascription by those around him- or herself, as much as on self-ascription. 
Importantly however, one can generally have only one ethnic identity at any given 
time. This in turn makes it relatively easy for me to operationalise the concept of 
ethnicity in my research. I use ethnicity as consisting of a limited repertoire of 
classifications (Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim5), from which people are given one at birth 
(generally the ethnic classification that applies to their father), and which in most 
cases they retain and confirm as they grow up, though it is possible to take on 
another ethnic identification.  
 
1.1.2 The rise of violent conflict in Sri Lanka 
What is often called the ‘ethnic conflict’ in Sri Lanka can be benchmarked as having 
started with a militant attack and subsequent widespread rioting in July 1983, and 
ended with the annihilation of the leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) in May 2009. The conflict has discursive and mythical roots in ancient 
Buddhist chronicles that at times, though definitely not always, portray ‘Damilas’ 
(Tamils) as enemies of Sinhalese Buddhists. Its direct roots lie however in the ethnic 
bias that entered Sri Lanka’s nationbuilding practice in the run-up to independence. 
When, in preparation for independence, the British colonial government introduced 
universal suffrage, politics (which until then had been the preserve of a small elite) 
became dependent on large numbers of votes. Where earlier the main ethnic groups 
had had equal representation, group size suddenly became directly linked to access 
to power: this was a threat for over-represented minority groups, and an 
opportunity for the under-represented Sinhalese. Apart from this, particularly 
Tamils (who had access to good missionary schools in Jaffna, while Sinhalese had 
not wanted such schools and thus had much less access to English education) were 
                                                 
 
5 Other ethnicities like Vedda, Malay and Burgher are hardly found in Kottiyar Pattu. 
Parallel to the process that Jon Dart has described for Vakarai (Dart 1985), Veddas and 
Burghers in Kottiyar Pattu have by and large become identified as Tamils, and Malays as 
Muslims. 
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heavily represented in the civil service and the professions. Attempts at achieving a 
more proportional representation of Sinhalese in the civil service and the professions 
were easily construed as being anti-Tamil in intent by Sinhala and Tamil ethno-
nationalists alike.  
While this was still largely a problem of elites vying for a share of power, a 
landmark change happened in 1956. After a hotly contested election, the newly 
elected S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike made Sinhala the official language of the country 
overnight, without leaving adequate room for the Tamil language. Suddenly, the 
impact of Sinhala nationalism (fired up by the fact that 1956 was also the year in 
which Buddhists celebrated 2,500 years since the enlightenment of the Buddha) was 
felt in the everyday lives of non-Sinhalese in the country. This was underscored by 
riots in 1956 and 1958 which were distinctly anti-Tamil in nature. While a large part 
of the (English-speaking) Burgher community left to Australia and the United 
Kingdom after the adoption of the ‘Sinhala Only’ law, Tamils responded with their 
own version of ethnonationalism and a long campaign of nonviolent protests that 
were suppressed increasingly harshly and counterproductively. The longer the 
protests and their suppression lasted, the stronger the support for Tamil nationalist 
discourse became. In this discourse, adequate representation at the national level 
was one topic; the safeguarding of a ‘Tamil homeland’ was another. This second 
point had become an issue after the availability of funding and technology 
(particularly the introduction of anti-malaria spraying just after World War II) made 
the rehabilitation of ancient irrigation infrastructure in the malaria-infested plains of 
the North and East possible from the 1930s onwards. Sri Lankan leaders framed this 
as a reclaiming of the old Sinhala kingdoms (Senanayake 1985 [1935]), and began 
settling Sinhalese from the densely populated South and West of the country in the 
newly developed areas (among which was Kottiyar Pattu). Sparsely inhabited 
though these areas may have been, they had been predominantly inhabited by 
Tamil-speaking people for centuries. Tamil nationalists thus saw the redevelopment 
of what is known as the ‘Dry Zone’ as a deliberate attempt by the state to undermine 
Tamil claims to territory. 
 
Though Sri Lanka’s economy stagnated soon after independence was attained in 
1948, other developments did generate significant changes. By the late 1960s, 
educational institutions had spread across the country. The post-independence and 
post-malaria babyboom generation graduated from secondary school en masse, only 
to find that there were not enough jobs for them. In synchrony with other socialist 
and communist youth protests across the world, many of which were partially about 
jobs for the new generation, the originally maoist (and largely Sinhala) Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, or People’s Liberation Front) staged an uprising against 
the state in 1971. The uprising failed, and the JVP was ruthlessly hunted down; 
estimates of the numbers killed vary between 12,000 and 20,000 (Senaratne 1997). In 
the same year, Bangladesh successfully waged a war for independence from 
Pakistan, which strengthened Tamil nationalists in their conviction that they had the 
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right to determine their own fate. When, a year later, an overtly Sinhala and 
Buddhist constitution was adopted, Tamil youth in the north of the country decided 
that the nonviolent protests that had been staged thus far had not brought enough 
improvement, and formed the first of many Tamil militant groups. In 1976 the Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF), a Tamil nationalist coalition of political parties, 
adopted what became known as the ‘Vaddukottai Declaration’, which advocated the 
establishment of a separate state of Tamil Eelam. This declaration further reinforced 
the militant mood among a section of Tamil youth. Over time, the militancy 
gathered strength, particularly after catastrophic anti-Tamil riots in July 1983 that 
had widespread support from government officials. What began with assassinations, 
bank robberies and ambushes of police and military personnel soon escalated into an 
orgy of massacres, counter-massacres and terrorist attacks, and then ‘graduated’ into 
full-scale warfare.  
Neither the government nor the Tamil militants (among whom the LTTE had 
become the dominant group by 1987) were capable of sustaining intense conflict for 
very long. In 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2002, cease-fires were called during which peace 
talks were held and both sides prepared for a next round of fighting. In 1987, the 
Indian government intervened by sending the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to 
patrol the North-East, forcing the Sri Lankan military to stay in their barracks, and 
pushing a programme of devolution of powers to the provincial level down the 
throat of the Sri Lankan government. In response, the revitalised JVP launched a 
second anti-state uprising in the south of the country that was to last for three years 
and cause the deaths of about 60,000 people (Senaratne 1997). While the state took on 
the JVP, the LTTE took on the IPKF (with, bizarrely enough, state support), and by 
early 1990 the IPKF was forced to abandon its mission. A brief ceasefire between the 
government and the LTTE in 1990 ended with an orgy of violence; the same thing 
happened on a smaller scale after a ceasefire in 1995.  In 2002, amidst an economic 
crisis that badly hit the Sri Lankan government and the post-9/11 tightening of the 
noose on the LTTE’s international funding channels, a new ceasefire was declared 
that formally held until early 2008, but had in fact already been scrapped by mid-
2006 when the Sri Lankan armed forces launched a massive offensive to recapture 
LTTE-controlled territory, starting from Kottiyar Pattu. By mid-2007 the LTTE, 
which had been weakened by the defection of a large faction from the Eastern 
Province in 2004, was routed from the east. The war ended in May 2009 with the 
annihilation of the LTTE (including its entire senior leadership) in the north of Sri 
Lanka. Though the war has ended, peace is still elusive as the arrogance of the 
victors determines the current political agenda, rather than a genuine desire to find a 
political solution for valid grievances over language, education, land and political 
power that have fuelled the conflict right throughout. 
As far as casualty figures are concerned, the estimate that was commonly in use in 
2007 and early 2008 was in the range of 70,000, half of whom were civilians. Nobody 
knows how many people died in the last five months of fighting. The British 
newspaper ‘the Times’, basing itself on an internal estimate by UN staff, claimed that 
there were about 20,000 civilian casualties, mostly by artillery fire from the Sri 
Lankan Army. The Sri Lankan government denied this and the only civilians who 
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had died were killed by the LTTE while they were trying to escape the fighting (‘The 
hidden massacre: Sri Lanka’s final offensive against Tamil Tigers’, Times, 29-05-
2009). UTHR(J), based on a detailed analysis of available information, puts the 
number of civilian casualties as high as 40,000 (2009b: 115).  
Apart from those who died in the years of conflict, there are thousands who 
disappeared without a trace, and thousands who were physically or mentally 
scarred for life. Virtually every person in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri 
Lanka has been displaced (many more than once); over half of the houses have been 
damaged, looted or destroyed at some point during the conflict; and hundreds of 
thousands of Tamils have permanently left the country to find new lives in Canada, 
the United States, the United Kingdom and a range of other European countries, 
India and Malaysia. 
While the conflict has always been ethnicised in the sense that it was ethnic in its 
representation, I would be reluctant to call the Sri Lankan conflict an ethnic conflict. 
It is undeniable that many people have been targeted for harassment and violence 
simply because of their ethnic identity, but (with possible exception of a number of 
cases in the early 1980s) those who perpetrated the violence were not random mobs. 
By and large, the perpetrators of violence were soldiers, paramilitaries, militants or 
mobs that were deliberately organised by people with vested interests. So while the 
conflict can be represented as ethnic, it can equally be represented as a conflict 
between the state and separatist groups, or as a conflict over access to resources 
between a politico-economic core (centered in Colombo) and its periphery (Frerks 
and Klem 2004; Goodhand and Klem 2005). 
 
1.1.3 Kottiyar Pattu 
Home to about 90,000 people of mostly Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim origin, the region 
that is known to its inhabitants as Kottiyar Pattu covers the divisions of Muthur, 
Seruwila and Eechchilampattu in the southern part of Trincomalee District (maps 1.2 
and 1.3). Kottiyar Pattu is bounded by sea on the north and east and by two arms of 
the Mahaweli River on the south and west. It consists of a central plain of paddy 
fields irrigated by the Allai Extension Scheme (AES), surrounded on three sides by a 
fringe of shrub jungle, interspersed with villages, small irrigation tanks, and a few 
lagoons. The northern edge of the plain is punctuated by the town of Muthur, which 
functions as a business centre (together with the small towns of Thoppur and 
Serunuwara that are located in the middle of Kottiyar Pattu). Apart from agriculture, 
fishing is a key source of livelihoods in the coastal settlements.  
Centuries-old remains of earlier greatness as well as its more recent colonial and 
post-colonial history tell a story of a frontier region, oscillating between strategic 
investment and utter neglect. As a consequence of this fluctuating existence on the 
fringe of Sri Lanka, different population groups have moved into and out of the area; 
all current inhabitants are immigrants whose ancestors settled within the last 
millennium (see chapter 2).  
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Map 1.2. Trincomalee District, with Kottiyar Pattu demarcated by dotted line (source: UN-HIC 2006b) 
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Map 1.3. Sketch map of Kottiyar Pattu 
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Kottiyar Pattu forms a complex social arena. Apart from ethnicity, social life is 
structured by a range of other, intersecting realities: (among others) caste, class, 
employment, religion, gender, age, length of stay, political affiliation and – until 
recently – military frontlines (see chapter 3).  
The area has had more than its fair share of violence since the early 1980s: about 5% 
of the pre-war population has been killed, over half of the houses have been 
destroyed at least once, and almost everybody has had to flee his or her village two 
or three times (see chapter 4). 
It was in this context that one day I noticed something interesting when I visited the 
village of Sivapuram, in the heart of Kottiyar Pattu. 
 
1.1.4 A surprise observation in Sivapuram 
Sivapuram was established in the 1950s as a farmers’ colony in the Allai Extension 
Scheme, which provides some 7,000 hectares of prime paddy land with year-round 
irrigation. It is home to about 80 Tamil families, who live in small houses along the 
village’s single main road and two side-lanes. There is one small temple for Pillaiyar, 
the Hindu ‘God of Beginnings’, and (since 2002) a pre-school and a community hall, 
but not a single shop. Most of the families belong to two matriclans of the high-
status Velalar (cultivator) caste. They mostly originate from the ancient Velalar 
village of Sampoor, but there are historical family ties with the ancient Velalar 
villages of Kilivetti, Kankuveli and Menkamam. A few families belong to service 
castes: potters, washermen, barbers; they live(d) on the fringes of village society. 
Sivapuram is bordered by two villages: the ancient Tamil village of Menkamam to 
the north-east, and the Sinhala colony of Dehiwatte to the south-west. The 
Menkamam tank, a largely defunct small irrigation reservoir, bounds the village to 
the north-west. Although there are family links between Menkamam and 
Sivapuram, some farmers from Menkamam resent the fact that Sivapuram and all 
the other new colonies ate up all the available arable land. This led to a sharp 
reduction in average land holding sizes as the population grew, and in turn has led 
to landlessness and out-migration of some of the youth. 
When I visited Sivapuram for the first time in May 2000, relationships with the 
people in Dehiwatte were tense. In June 1985, Sivapuram and every other Tamil 
village within walking distance from the Sinhala colonies in the area had been 
burned to the ground in an orgy of violence that was repeated on a smaller scale in 
1987 and 1990. A string of massacres of Tamil civilians in the area and the ever-
present threat of harassment or arrest by the security forces made most people very 
cautious. Farming was a difficult affair because the army did not allow Tamils to buy 
urea (which could be used for making bombs), and every visit to the market 
involved negotiating a range of checkpoints. At the same time, several dozen 
inhabitants of Dehiwatte had been killed by Tamil militant groups since 1985, the 
Sinhala farmers were routinely ‘taxed’ by the militants, and the people of Dehiwatte 
suspected that the militants received support from Tamil villagers.  
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Because the Sinhala farmers had better access to farming inputs and had access to 
reasonably well-paid jobs as home guards, they were generally better off 
economically than their Tamil neighbours, but from about the mid-1980s 
landlessness was becoming an issue. Among Tamils and Sinhalese alike, there were 
many frustrations about the lack of available options. 
Even though, economically speaking, Sivapuram was better off than some of the 
other Tamil villages in the area, the pervasive atmosphere of despair (underlined by 
rampant alcoholism and a high number of suicides) was the reason that it was 
selected for a psychosocial pilot project by ZOA Refugee Care, the humanitarian 
NGO that I was working with at the time. The staff attached to the project wanted to 
look at addressing sources of stress in the widest sense of the word. Therefore, when 
villagers listed near-annual flooding as an important problem, the issue was 
included in the project6. Since I had been trained in irrigation engineering and had 
some experience in the field, I was asked in to look for possible solutions.  
During one of my visits to Sivapuram, I asked a colleague who worked there if she 
knew of any research literature on the area, because I wanted to learn more about 
the context. She gave me a paper produced by a German-funded development 
project (Devarajah et al. 2001), that describes a conflict between Dehiwatte and 
Menkamam over the Menkamam tank. Sinhala settlers had encroached on the land 
inside the reservoir, and had broken the tank bund to prevent their fields from 
flooding. This in turn deprived paddy fields cultivated by Tamil farmers from 
Menkamam of irrigation water, triggering a stand-off that had been going on for 
decades7. As I re-read the paper a while later, it suddenly struck me that despite the 
strongly “ethnicised” conflict that had visibly caused a lot of damage in the area (idem: 5), 
Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim farmers were still sharing sharing irrigation water from the Allai 
Extension Scheme. The paper even contained hints of active cooperation across ethnic 
lines (which received no attention in the analysis section): Sinhalese farmers 
employing Tamil farm labourers on outlying fields, and Tamil cattle owners sending 
their milk out of the area through Sinhalese milk collectors (idem: 11, 13). This 
triggered my curiosity: a research project was born.  
                                                 
 
6 The village got flooded because a reservation area for a natural drain along the edge of the 
village had been encroached upon and turned into paddy fields, thus blocking the flow of 
the water. Even after I made a design for a drainage channel, it took a further two years 
before it was constructed because one of the encroachers, a man who was known as a 
sorcerer, refused to give up part of his field, and the villagers were afraid of magical 
retribution.  
7 This paper documents part of the fieldwork that was used by Benedikt Korf for his PhD 
research on property rights and the political economy of war in Sri Lanka, focusing on 
Trincomalee District. Korf presents an insightful game-theoretical analysis of this conflict in 
his dissertation (2004: 115-144). I return to this case in section 6.6.1. 
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1.1.5 Structure of the chapter 
The rest of this chapter consists of four parts. Section 1.2 elaborates on the research 
design: the objective of the research, the research questions, my own positionality, 
and a chronology of the research. This is followed in section 1.3 by a discussion of 
four inter-related conceptual lenses that I looked through when looking at everyday 
inter-ethnic interaction: violence and everyday normalcy; intersecting social realities; 
agency, subversion and tactics; and arenas as intermediary interactional settings. The 
methodology is discussed in section 1.4, and in section 1.5 the overall structure of the 
book is presented. 
 
1.2 Research design 
1.2.1 Research objective and research questions 
The initial focus of my research was on understanding how farmers of different 
ethnic backgrounds and irrigation department staff had been able to keep the AES 
functioning to a reasonable extent despite the context of ethnicised conflict and 
ethnic “unmixing” (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2004: 46). While this has remained a 
topic of interest for my research, I came to realise that in order to understand the 
functioning of the AES, I needed to understand an underlying issue: everyday inter-
ethnic interaction in a context of violent ethnicised conflict. Bookshelves full have been 
written about Sri Lanka’s conflict, about its history, about its post-colonial 
development, and about a range of topics of sociological and anthropological 
interest. Most is however focused on the entire country or, in the case of much 
research on irrigation-related topics, ignores ethnicity altogether. Locally grounded 
ethnographic research generally studied ethnically defined communities in isolation 
or in parallel, and not in integration. A notable exception is Dennis McGilvray’s 
work on Muslims and Tamils in the region around Akkaraipattu, in the east of Sri 
Lanka (McGilvray 2003 and 2008). However, even McGilvray has primarily focused 
on historical links and structural parallels between the communities rather than on 
everyday interaction between Muslims and Tamils. Nur Yalman’s work on the 
mixed Sinhala-Tamil village of Panama, not far south from Akkaraipattu (Yalman 
1971), is another exception, but his research predated the conflict and focused on an 
exceptional (and already disintegrating) community that had formed a distinct 
hybrid between both ethnic identities. 
In the literature on Sri Lanka, there are quite a number of hints about the existence of 
everyday inter-ethnic interaction and (rather idyllic) claims about past or even 
present (but very localised) harmonies8. There are also detailed studies of the sharing 
                                                 
 
8 See for example Rajasingham-Senanayake 2001a, 2001b and 2004; Montani 1999; Dewaraja 
1994; Kottegoda 2004; Niriella 2005; Silva 2004; Fuglerud 2003; Schrijvers 1998, and Skinner 
2005. 
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of gods and the appropriation and ethnic purification of the worship of these gods 
by Sinhala Buddhists and Tamil Hindus (Obeyesekere 1984; Goonasekara 2007). 
Nevertheless, I found there to be a near total lack of detailed analysis of the how, 
when and why of what Laura Ring calls “the micromechanics of coexistence” and 
“the day-to-day poetics of intergroup cooperation” (2006: 3). This therefore became 
the focus of my own research. In my work, I prefer to use the term ‘interaction’ as a 
middle way between ‘coexistence’ (which merely assumes people sharing the same 
space irrespective of whether or not they interact with each other) and ‘intergroup 
cooperation’ (which implies (a) that the interaction is between groups of people, thus 
excluding interaction between individuals, and (b) that there is always something to 
cooperate about, thus excluding interaction for no other reason than the interaction 
itself, like a chat between friends or lovers).  
 
As my research has been highly exploratory in nature, its objective is rather broad: to 
come to an understanding of everyday inter-ethnic interaction in a context of violent 
ethnicised conflict, its implications for the everyday lives of those living with conflict, and its 
implications for peace-building interventions. 
 
The main research question is therefore how can everyday inter-ethnic interaction in a 
context of violent ethnicised conflict be understood, and what are its consequences for 
people’s everyday lives and for peace-building interventions?  
 
To be able to answer the main research question, a range of underlying questions 
needs to be answered: 
How is everyday life in Kottiyar Pattu shaped by history, geography, social complexity and 
violence? 
Who engages in everyday forms of inter-ethnic interaction? 
How do people shape everyday inter-ethnic interaction? 
Why do people engage in everyday inter-ethnic interaction? 
What are the implications of inter-ethnic interaction in a context of violent conflict for 
people’s everyday lives? 
 
In order to answer these questions, I have studied three cases of everyday inter-
ethnic interaction. The first case, already presented, deals with inter-ethnic 
interaction relating to irrigated paddy cultivation, which is the primary source of 
income for the majority of Kottiyar Pattu’s population. Irrespective of the conflict, 
people need to manage resources (of land, water, labour and money) for cultivating 
paddy and making a living. Apart from the questions mentioned above, a specific 
question that comes up in this case is:  
How was it possible that the Allai Extension Scheme continued functioning to a reasonable 
extent during over two decades of violent ethnicised conflict, despite the fact that the scheme 
is shared by Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim farmers? 
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Where in the first case violence and tension are threats that are always there but 
generally in the background, the second case focuses on periods of acute tension and 
violence: riots and almost-riots. Additional questions that come up in this case are: 
What happens to inter-ethnic interaction under acute tension and violence? 
To what extent and how does inter-ethnic interaction have a mitigating influence on acute 
tension and violence? 
 
The last case deals with the most intimate form of inter-ethnic interaction: inter-
ethnic marriages. Where co-operation over resources and acts of goodwill in times of 
acute crisis can to some extent be kept distant from the self, the deliberate choice to 
marry someone from outside the own group brings the ethnic boundary within the 
threshold of the home, and renders its crossing permanent. Additional questions 
that come up in this case are: 
How have mixed-ethnic couples managed to live as a mixed couple in a context of ethnicised 
violent conflict? 
To what extent do mixed couples, positioned as they are between two ethnic communities, 
perform a bridging function, especially given the violent context? 
 
A secondary objective of this research is to fill in a white spot on the ethnographic 
map of Sri Lanka. So far, no in-depth ethnographic description exists of Kottiyar 
Pattu in the English language. In order to fill this gap, I have (particularly in chapters 
2-4) provided more detail than strictly necessary for meeting the primary objective of 
this research.  
 
1.2.2 Research chronology 
The research started officially in September 2003, though I had regularly visited 
Kottiyar Pattu since May 2000. The first year was spent reading whatever literature I 
could find, getting familiar with Trincomalee District, and making the odd 
exploratory visit to Kottiyar Pattu. My fieldwork started in earnest in September 
2004. Over the next 20 months (up to April 2006), I spent about two thirds of my 
research time in Kottiyar Pattu.  
The 2004 Boxing Day tsunami and its aftermath interrupted my fieldwork for two 
months because I got involved in emergency response (Gaasbeek 2010). A further 
disruption was caused by a period of Muslim-Tamil tensions in December 2005 and 
January 2006 that made it impossible to conduct fieldwork. During these periods, I 
did spend about half of my time in Trincomalee, and continued to learn about 
Kottiyar Pattu. From late April to September 2006, violence in Kottiyar Pattu 
escalated to such levels that I was not able to visit the area at all. Although it was 
virtually impossible to visit Kottiyar Pattu during this period, it was possible to 
gather a lot of information through conversations with friends, colleagues and 
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acquaintances in Trincomalee town9. In August 2006, virtually the entire population 
of Kottiyar Pattu fled to safer areas. A week of direct involvement in ZOA’s 
emergency response operations meant that I was able to visit people in their sites of 
displacement, and – albeit briefly – speak with a number of people about their 
experiences. From September 2006 until July 2007 I spent about one week every 
other month in Kottiyar Pattu because the security situation was still unstable; from 
then until October 2008 I focused on analysis of secondary sources and writing, and 
only visited the area once in a way to investigate specific issues that came up while 
writing. After I left the country, my research assistant conducted a final series of 
interviews in Kottiyar Pattu in August 2009. 
Throughout the time that it took to complete the field research, I have worked about 
one third of my time as free-lance consultant with ZOA and various other 
humanitarian agencies in Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Liberia, Ethiopia and India. Some of 
these consultancy missions were about conflict, others about irrigation and water 
management, and yet others were about the tsunami. While this took time away 
from the fieldwork, it also provided many moments of inspiration and broadening 
of insight. Particularly three consultancy missions to tsunami-affected villages in 
Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry were enriching, because they offered me the 
opportunity to learn about Tamil culture in India, to buy piles of useful books, and 
to visit the Brihadeeswara Temple in the former Chola capital of Thanjavur, which 
contains the only known inscription in India that mentions Kottiyar Pattu. About a 
third of the work that I did in Sri Lanka was in Trincomalee (both with ZOA and 
with other agencies), and this enabled me to get to know more people, gather further 
knowledge about Trincomalee District and its people, and look at the district from a 
range of different perspectives. 
 
1.2.3 My own positionality 
No research is independent of the researcher. It is therefore important to elaborate a 
little bit on my own positionality. My study background is in irrigation engineering, 
which at Wageningen University is taught with deep attention to its 
interdisciplinary context. Together with a pre-existing fascination with ethnography, 
this focus on the importance of contextual embeddedness has clearly shaped my 
current research. In the meantime, four years of intensive involvement in university 
politics taught me about the crucial importance of individual agency within a 
context of (institutional) structures. 
When I began my research, Sri Lanka and its conflict were not new to me. Right after 
I graduated from university, I found a job with ZOA Refugee Care, a humanitarian 
NGO that works with conflict-affected people. This took me first to Cambodia and 
                                                 
 
9 Between April and December 2006, I replaced ZOA’s Programme Manager in Trincomalee 
for about a week per month so that she could take a break from the very tense situation that 
she was working in. This meant that I had ample opportunity for participative observation 
in the humanitarian scene of Trincomalee. 
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then to Sri Lanka, where I spent a little over eight years. In Sri Lanka, I was 
originally based in Batticaloa, but – particularly from February 2002 onwards – I 
spent extensive amounts of time all over the conflict zone in the north and east of the 
country, as well as in Colombo. I also knew Kottiyar Pattu: it was the first part of the 
conflict zone that I saw when, on my way back from Cambodia to the Netherlands in 
May 2000, I stopped over in Sri Lanka for three days to see if I would be interested in 
working there. In December 2000, I was asked to be in charge of ZOA’s emergency 
response operations after a cyclone had hit Trincomalee District, and I spent ten 
intense days criss-crossing the area. Then, over the course of 2001 and 2002, came the 
visits to look at Sivapuram’s drainage problem that triggered this research. 
My wife forms a further element in my positionality. She is Sri Lankan, and in the 
“day-to-day poetics” of being married to her (and thus, by happy extension, to my 
in-laws!) I have learnt a great deal about the country and its people. Her professional 
involvement in first the psychosocial field, and then the field of peacebuilding and 
reconciliation, has been a source of great inspiration, long discussions, and contacts 
with others in the same fields. 
 
1.3 Conceptual framework 
In order to get a grip on everyday inter-ethnic interaction in a context of violent 
conflict, I have taken a social constructionist perspective, looking at how people 
“engage with and thus co-produce their own (inter)personal and collective social 
worlds” (Long 2001: 3). As my research was exploratory in nature, I did not set out 
with a preconceived conceptual framework. Rather, as I was doing my research and 
reflected on my findings, four conceptual lenses emerged through which I could 
look at my findings. The first of these looks at violence and everyday normalcy as 
interlinked realities. Interethnic interaction in a context of violence is a form of 
everyday life that continues in, and is shaped by, the context of conflict. Both 
everyday normalcy and violence occur at the same time, and neither can be 
understood without looking at the other or by only foregrounding one of them. The 
second lens looks at identities, and views people’s identities as composed of a wide 
range of intersecting social realities apart from ethnicity. Inter-ethnic interaction 
cannot be understood by looking only at ethnicity; other social realities also need to 
be considered when studying it. The third lens is closely linked to my social 
constructionist perspective, and views inter-ethnic interaction as expressing agency 
to the degree of even subverting prevailing hegemonic ethnicised discourse. Even 
though the context of violence and ethnicised conflict in which people live is 
extremely constraining, inter-ethnic interaction indicates that people are not entirely 
determined by their contexts, and remain capable of engaging with what happens 
around them. Thus violence and normalcy can co-occur, and thus people 
continuously shift and move between a wide range of social realities. The last lens 
looks at the setting in which interaction takes place as an arena. This notion helps in 
placing interethnic interaction in more specific contexts that incorporate forms of 
both contestation and cooperation. In what follows, I describe each of these 
conceptual lenses in more detail. 
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1.3.1 Violence and everyday normalcy 
It is impossible to look at everyday inter-ethnic interaction in Kottiyar Pattu without 
taking into account the agony and suffering that the inhabitants have gone through 
over the past decades of ethnicised violence. This violence was a radical break with 
the past: records confirm that at least in the 100 years before the war broke out, 
Kottiyar Pattu was largely free of communal violence. As I show in chapter 4, the 
initial violence in Kottiyar Pattu was organised by external actors (the state and 
Tamil militants).  
After a number of massacres of Sinhala settlers about 70 km north of Kottiyar Pattu 
by Tamil militants in late 1984, the government distributed weapons to Sinhala 
farmers in settlement areas all over the North and East of Sri Lanka, including the 
Allai Extension Scheme. Following another massacre, in which over a hundred 
Sinhala pilgrims were killed at one of Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist sites, an orgy of 
violence was orchestrated in Kottiyar Pattu that culminated in the destruction of 
every single village within walking distance from a Sinhala village by a mob 
comprised of soldiers from outside and local villagers. Suddenly the violence 
became intimate, and for some people revenge became a motive for further violence: 
local dynamics of violence evolved that became to some extent self-sustaining. 
Under the influence of violence and omnipresent ethno-nationalist propaganda, 
local disagreements were increasingly rephrased in ethnic terms (Korf 2004).  
Although actual violence was mostly concentrated in comparatively brief and very 
intense periods, and the periods in between were considerably calmer, an 
atmosphere of fear and tension became pervasive. This is because the experience of 
violence incorporates much more than actual violence: it is a mixture of remembered 
past violence, intermittent actual violence, and the threat of potential future violence. 
Apart from that, the militarisation of public discourse and of the landscape (through 
round-ups, checkpoints and frontlines that required careful negotiation whenever 
encountered) made sure that the war was never far from people’s minds. 
Despite this pervasiveness however, a focus on violence by itself is not enough for 
understanding everyday life in Kottiyar Pattu. As Paul Richards has said, 
“[f]oregrounding war risks disabling precisely the strategies and tools of social 
organisation, culture and politics through which violence can be reduced and its 
adverse effects mitigated” (2005: 3). No matter how dominant the violence was in 
shaping life in Kottiyar Pattu, the violence has always been “one social project 
among many competing social projects” (ibid.). Throughout the decades of war, 
everyday life in Kottiyar Pattu has been about a lot more than just violence and 
survival. No matter how pervasive the violence and fear are, and no matter how 
constraining the environment is, life goes on relentlessly, and most of the time that 
means that food is cooked, shops and markets are open, couples get married, babies 
are born, spouses quarrel, people try to find an income, and children (at least in Sri 
Lanka) play cricket. These mundane acts together create a form of normalcy that 
makes it possible to live and stay more or less sane. How ‘normal’ this normalcy is, 
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is another question. For an outsider who has not experienced life in war or disaster, 
there is very little that is normal about people’s everyday lives because the 
constraints of violence, fear and deprivation are overwhelming. What is important 
for me at this point is not this normative discussion, but the simple fact that people 
continue to do a wide range of things that they would anyway do, war or no war, 
and that they deliberately strive to do so (Hilhorst 2007) 10. I contend that it is in 
normalcy that people find ways for “re-inventing peace” (Richards 2005: 5). In this 
dissertation, I look at how people maintain normalcy in three situations of inter-
ethnic interaction: the normalcy of engaging in livelihoods, attempts to maintain 
normalcy when it is acutely threatened by violence, and the normalcy of family life. 
These three widely different situations were chosen pragmatically: they were the 
ones that came up when I looked around for different situations that could teach me 
about inter-ethnic interaction. 
 
1.3.2 Intersecting social realities 
The ambiguous co-occurrence of war and peace draws attention to another element 
of ambiguity and complexity in the way people’s social life is organised. Even 
though discourses of ethnic separation dominate public life in much of Sri Lanka, 
there are other social realities as well. And just like the everyday realities of violent 
conflict can only be understood by looking at its social context, the everyday realities 
of ethnicity (and inter-ethnic interaction) can only be understood by looking at other 
social realities as well:  
 
‘There are a million possible Earths with a million possible histories, all of which 
actually exist simultaneously. In the course of one’s daily life, one weaves a 
course between them, if you like, but that does not destroy the existence of pasts 
or futures we choose not to enter’ (Rushdie 1996: 53) 
 
Everyday life is “messy” (Gardiner 2000:16) and consists of “multiple realities” 
(Long 2001: 19). Nobody in Kottiyar Pattu is simply Tamil, Muslim or Sinhalese. 
Gender, caste, religion, class and a whole range of other categories of identification 
all are part of people’s repertoires of social realities. People use these realities to 
“improvise and experiment with ‘old’ and ‘new’ elements and experiences, and react 
situationally and imaginatively, consciously or otherwise, to the circumstances they 
encounter” (Long 2001: 3). This ambiguity is important for understanding social 
                                                 
 
10 Note that I use the term ‘normalcy’ in a different meaning than Maček’s use of the term 
‘normality’ (2005). Maček focuses on how abnormal war realities are reworked as ‘normal’ 
by warring parties, states and other interested parties in their propaganda. What I call 
‘normalcy’ refers to a wide range of elements of everyday life under peaceful circumstances 
that continue to exist, more or less similarly, under conditions of war. 
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interaction. In their article on interethnic co-operation, Fearon and Laitin start with 
the useful premise that sustained co-operation is more likely if people know each 
other, see longer-term benefits to co-operation, and/or have reputations to uphold, 
and less likely in situations of anonymity11:  
 
“if you know nothing more than that the person facing you is a Serb, then you 
cannot condition your behaviour on how the person acted in the past, but only 
on the fact that the other person is a Serb. Moreover, ‘the Serb’ may have no 
individual reputation to worry about protecting in interactions with non-Serbs” 
(1996: 719).  
 
Where I disagree with Fearon and Laitin is in their singular focus on the overlap 
between ethnic otherness and anonymity. Because of the limited size of the social 
arena that is Kottiyar Pattu, geographical proximity and the small population sizes 
of each ethnic group make inter-ethnic acquaintance a lot more likely than in the 
segregated cities that provided the empirical data for Fearon and Laitin’s article. 
Apart from that, non-ethnic group differences can be equally important sources of 
anonymity and animosity. 
Fearon and Laitin are not alone in falling in the trap of declaring one category of 
identification dominant over other categories. In their overview article on the study 
of boundaries in the social sciences, Lamont and Molnár (2002) do give examples of 
researchers who explain intra-group differentiation by looking at other categories of 
identification than the one that defines the main group that is looked at (generally 
ethnicity or race). In all their examples however, the other categories of identification 
are treated as secondary, hierarchically ranked below the primary category. This 
way of presenting things obscures the fact that different categories of identification 
(ethnicity, class, gender etcetera) in social life intersect rather than have a hierarchical 
ranking (Sen 2006: xii-xiv)12. The key to understanding social life in such a context is 
to understand the ways in which people manage the “multiplicity” of their 
identifications (Siebers 2004: 81, see also Maček 2005: 65). For this, it is a prerequisite 
                                                 
 
11 This link between cooperation and acquaintance obviously does not mean that relations 
between known people are necessarily peaceful: spouses, relatives and friends may even 
fight more with each other than with strangers. 
12 The simplest way of graphically depicting such a situation would be a (multi-dimensional) 
Venn-diagram. To give an example: there are men and women among Tamils, just as there 
are men and women among Sinhalese and among Muslims. Similarly, there are children, 
youth and adults among all ethnic groups, and among both genders, though not necessarily 
in the same proportions. Some boundaries do overlap to a large extent: by and large, every 
person in Sri Lanka who is Muslim by ethnicity is Muslim by religion (though I know at 
least two people who are exceptions to this rule), and the vast majority of Sri Lankans who 
are Muslim by religion are also Muslim by ethnicity (but there are also Malay Muslims, and 
small numbers of Muslims belonging to other ethnic groups). 
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to find out which identifications people themselves use. Chapter 3 documents nine 
of the more prominent locally used identifications other than ethnicity that I came 
across during my fieldwork. 
I contend that it is this intersection of boundaries that makes inter-ethnic interaction 
(and cross-boundary interaction in a broader sense) possible: in Kottiyar Pattu, 
people mostly interact positively across ethnic divides with other people whom they 
somehow relate to as ‘in-group’ members in some other category of identification 
(see also Lee and Gudykunst 2001: 375).  
In a study on inter-ethnic interaction in post-war Bosnia that I came across as I was 
finalising this dissertation, Paula Pickering (2006) found that people who interact 
with each other across ethnic lines do so because they perceive a form of similarity in 
employment, a shared history of staying in a neighbourhood or mixed-ethnic family 
ties (which are mentioned but not analysed at all), or because the establishment of 
inter-ethnic links is seen as necessary for being able to live a normal life.  She uses 
the notion of bridging social capital to explain what she observed. Social capital, “the 
ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or 
other social structures” (idem: 80), comes in two forms: bridging social capital and 
bonding social capital. Bonding social capital refers to interaction between people 
who consider each other to be similar, while bridging social capital refers to 
interaction between people who consider each other to be different (see also Prakash 
and Selle 2004). If, however, categories of identification are not ranked hierarchically 
and definitions of similarity and otherness are variable, then the distinction between 
bridging and bonding social capital becomes highly ambiguous. A clear example of 
this can be found in Pickering’s paper. While she focuses on ethnicity as a dominant 
category of identification, for many people in the two Bosnian cities that she studied, 
the divide between those who had been living in the towns before the war and 
newcomers from rural areas who moved in during or after the war seems to be an 
equally important source of distinction. 
Another point that I will show is that a lot of inter-ethnic interaction in Kottiyar 
Pattu occurs between individual people, and not in networks. I have therefore 
avoided the use of the term social capital. 
 
1.3.3 Agency, subversion and tactics 
An important debate in the social sciences revolves around the question to what 
extent people can shape their own lives (agency), and to what extent people’s lives 
are determined by physical, social, political, and economic factors outside their 
control (structure). The answer, quite obviously, lies somewhere in the middle: 
nobody is entirely free to do as he or she likes, and at the same time nobody is a 
mere dice in the hands of structure (Rapport and Overing 2004: 1-9). For 
understanding people, you need to understand the structural context they live in, as 
well as the way they play around within the room for manoeuvre that is open to 
them. Everyday inter-ethnic interaction is in itself an expression of agency, and to 
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understand it it is important to look at the actors who engage in it. At the same time, 
it can only be understood within the structural contexts of violence, social 
complexity, history and geography, which I describe in chapters 2, 3 and 4.  
Given the oppressive context of violence and dominant discourses of ethnic 
separation, everyday inter-ethnic interaction is more than just an example of 
people’s capacity to act: it has a subversive quality to it. In that perspective, valuable 
insights are offered by De Certeau’s notion of “tactics”: “clandestine forms taken by 
the dispersed, tactical, and makeshift creativity of groups or individuals already 
caught in the nets of ‘discipline’” (De Certeau 1988: xiv-xv). This notion represents 
subversion not as an act of angry counter-oppression, but as an act of creativity and 
improvisation, an act of stretching up people’s room for manoeuvre which is 
threatened by dominant and dominating manifestations of power. 
 
1.3.4 Arenas as intermediary interactional settings 
Any kind of social interaction takes place between specific (groups of) people in 
specific settings. For understanding interaction and interactional settings, the 
analogy with arenas is useful. Arenas are bounded sites of interaction, contestation 
and co-operation (Long 2001: 242)13, with actors on the centre stage, with an audience 
watching the actors, and placed within a wider context. For the actors, an arena is a 
source of power (or agency) and identity. Within the arena actors (re)interpret and 
(re)negotiate the way things are organised; what is outside the arena is however 
largely beyond the direct control of the actors. The intermediary nature of arenas is 
therefore important: they are not just self-contained contexts for interaction, but also 
sites where the external context is interpreted, given meaning, and reworked into the 
internal reality formed by the arena. 
Some forms of interaction are public, while other forms of interaction are private in 
nature. The capacity to define how private or public a form of interaction is (to 
control who the audience on the seats of the arena is, so to say) is an important 
element of any interaction. 
Arenas can have any shape or size; a meeting room or a family compound can be as 
much an arena as an entire country. This dissertation focuses on Kottiyar Pattu as 
such an arena, set within the wider contexts (or ‘meta-arenas’) of Trincomalee 
District, the war zone, and Sri Lanka as a whole. Interaction within Kottiyar Pattu is 
structured by its physical, social, economic, military and political situation. At the 
same time, the wider contexts have their undeniable influence and are mediated, 
                                                 
 
13 Note that I stretch up Long’s concept of arena, which focuses on “contests” and “struggle”, 
to include neutral and positive forms of negotiation, interaction and co-operation. While 
struggle is very real in many people’s lives, there is also a lot of interaction that has little to 
do with struggle. 
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interpreted and negotiated in order for people to make sense of them within the 
specific setting of Kottiyar Pattu.  
The case studies focus on arenas within Kottiyar Pattu. In chapter 6, I focus on the 
Allai Extension Scheme as an arena within which farmers, farmer representatives 
and government officials interact, contest and co-operate with regard to irrigated 
paddy cultivation. In so doing, I have taken a sociotechnical perspective: irrigation 
“is socially constructed, has social conditions of use, and has social effects” (Vincent 
2001: 69). The first half of chapter 7 largely focuses on the area around Muthur town 
as an arena for Muslim-Tamil interaction during a riot; the second half of the chapter 
focuses on the area around the small town of Serunuwara as an arena for Tamil-
Sinhala interaction. This chapter is informed by the wider literature on riots, their 
patterns and participants (Horowitz 2001; Varshney 2002; Brass 1998; Tambiah 1996; 
Scott 1985 and 1990; Kalyvas 2006). In chapter 8, the arena is more conceptual rather 
than geographical: here, I look at people’s (mixed) marriages as a setting for 
interethnic interaction. I base myself on a wide body of literature on mixed 
marriages, and compare findings from Kottiyar Pattu with patterns identified in this 
literature. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Research methods 
From the start, this research has been an in-depth exploratory case study (Yin 1993). 
Everyday inter-ethnic interaction in a context of conflict was largely uncharted 
terrain, and so particularly the first years of my research were focused on capturing 
as much of the complexity of life in Kottiyar Pattu as possible. Paraphrasing the 
character Trinity in the movie ‘The Matrix’, “it was the question that drove me”, 
rather than a pre-set research plan. Though chaotic, this initial lack of structure 
proved invaluable for gaining in-depth understanding of what was going on in 
Kottiyar Pattu (and in Sri Lanka as a whole). As time wore on, more and more 
structure evolved in the research. Within the overall case study of Kottiyar Pattu, I 
selected three topical case studies: the functioning of the Allai Extension Scheme, 
inter-ethnic interaction during ‘everyday’ periods of acute violence, and inter-ethnic 
marriages.  
In studying Kottiyar Pattu, I have used a variety of research methods. The core of my 
research has consisted of semi-structured interviews, unstructured conversations 
over endless cups of very sweet tea, and plain observation (Bernard 1988). Where 
possible, I have analysed texts and quantitative data to triangulate findings and to 
enrich the picture. I have not used structured interviews and questionnaires, other 
than for a survey of marriage practices that was carried out towards the end of my 
fieldwork. There were two reasons for this. Many of the topics that I raised were so 
personal that people would only talk about them in an informal setting, and surveys 
would not have yielded any valuable information. Apart from that, a wide range of 
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humanitarian NGOs was active in Kottiyar Pattu (particularly after the 2004 
tsunami), and together they conducted surveys and assessments so often that many 
people knew exactly which answers to give and which kinds of interventions to ask 
for. In order to avoid unrealistic expectations, I have deliberately avoided anything 
that might even remotely identify me as someone preparing another rehabilitation 
project14. Whenever relevant issues came up however, I did pass these on to different 
agencies so that they could improve their programming. 
An issue that I ran into when I started with my fieldwork is that using the technique 
of participative observation is not possible when studying a situation in the past, as I 
was doing in the early stages of my field research, when a ceasefire was in place. It is 
technically impossible to observe things that happened in the past in real-time. 
Another problem with historicity is that memories are complicated (Bernard et al. 
1984), and narratives that are already coloured by discourses and ideology become 
re-coloured as new experiences come to pass, and as people forget things. I was 
forcefully confronted with this when in early 2007 I started talking with a number of 
people about the violence that hit Kottiyar Pattu in April 2003 (see chapter 7). In 
2003, many Muslims and Tamils told me that the ‘April violence’ was the worst 
period of tension that hit Muthur during the entire history of the conflict with 
exception of the violence of 199015. This was significant, because – in terms of 
numbers of casualties – there was not really that much to write home about. To my 
surprise however, the incidents were almost forgotten when I started re-inquiring 
about the incidents in 2007. When I asked people if they could tell me about what 
happened in April 2003, most people either started talking about periods of Muslim-
Tamil tension in October 2001 and June 2002 or about the battle that had taken place 
in Muthur in August 2006. When people did recount the violence of April 2003, only 
very few were able to go into any amount of detail.  
To some extent, ‘the past caught up with me’ when from late 2005 onwards violence 
increased and a new ‘conflict phase’ developed, giving me the opportunity to study 
a pre-conflict situation (or more accurately, an in-between-conflicts situation), an in-
conflict situation and to some extent a post-conflict situation16 in the present tense. 
                                                 
 
14 A very effective additional measure to minimise the chances of being identified as an NGO 
staff member was the use of a motorbike rather than a car when moving around the research 
area. Apart from a few run-down passenger vans and a few government vehicles, the only 
passenger vehicles in the area are NGO vehicles, and expatriates are rarely seen moving 
around Kottiyar Pattu in anything other than airconditioned four-wheel drive vehicles. 
Being on a bike made it easier also to randomly stop along the road and chat with people. 
15 The violence that raged in Kottiyar Pattu in 1985 was even worse than the violence of 1990, 
but did not affect Muthur town very much. 
16 The situation in Kottiyar Pattu at the time that I ended my fieldwork – autumn 2008 – can 
be described as ‘post-conflict’ in the sense that the military offensive to capture those parts 
of Kottiyar Pattu that were controlled by the LTTE (as part of an offensive to recapture the 
entire Eastern Province) had been completed, open fighting had ended, and many of the 
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1.4.2 Data collection 
In order to collect information, I have largely used what is euphemistically called the 
technique of ‘snowball sampling’: picking up leads wherever one comes across them, 
then interviewing people who are suggested as interesting, and so spreading out 
until the added value of further interviews becomes so comparatively small that it is 
more worthwhile to sit back, reflect, and see what other leads are interesting to 
follow. I would hardly call this serious sampling in the scientific sense, but it is 
definitely a valuable way of quickly gaining in-depth understanding of key issues. A 
key weakness of this sampling method is that the researcher runs the risk of getting 
stuck within one among several available discourses, because people tend to refer to 
others who follow similar lines of thinking. I have therefore combined ‘snowball 
sampling’ with random conversations with anyone I came across who was willing to 
talk. Most of these conversations were brief, but some suddenly opened up a new 
line of ‘snowball inquiry’, and sometimes the people whom I spoke to had so much 
that they wanted to share that we ended up spending hours talking. 
 
1.4.3 Research assistants 
Over the course of my fieldwork, I have worked with three research assistants: two 
Tamils and one Muslim; all were male. Two were living in Trincomalee town, and 
the third, while originating from the Eastern Province, is now based in Colombo 
(where he did a yeoman’s service in translating Tamil documents and going through 
most of the newspaper clippings in the archive at the Nadesan Centre). All three 
were familiar with the district but (almost) new to Kottiyar Pattu, all three speak 
Tamil and English, and two also speak Sinhala. Apart from these three, my wife and 
a friend (who are both trilingual) have also occasionally acted as translators. 
I have tried hard to find a Sinhala research assistant to prevent any ethnic bias in my 
research, but I was unable to find someone who was familiar with Trincomalee 
District, willing to work in Kottiyar Pattu, and sufficiently fluent in English. Some 
Sinhala texts were translated by an acquaintance of one of my research assistants. 
Particularly during the latter part of my research when violence between the LTTE 
and the Sri Lankan military escalated again, having a Muslim research assistant 
made a big difference, because Sinhalese and Muslims visibly perceived him as 
being more neutral than my Tamil assistants. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
civilians who were displaced had been allowed to resettle. However, this had not brought 
peace to the area. Many Tamil families who used to live in what had become the Sampoor 
High Security Zone remained displaced, occasional incidents of violence still took place, and 
particularly the Tamil population still lived in fear. 
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In the Netherlands, my father conducted research at the National Archives, locating 
a range of relevant Dutch colonial reports and maps, and transcribing a number of 
these reports.  
Apart from my research assistants, I have also been helped by Erik Dekker, an MSc 
student (Irrigation and Water Management) from Wageningen University, who 
conducted his thesis research on the Allai Extension Scheme under my co-
supervision.  
 
1.4.4 Gender bias in my data collection 
As noted, all my research assistants were men. I have felt this to be a serious issue, 
because it complicated interviewing women and learning from their perspectives. In 
the rural areas of Sri Lanka, men and women live in largely separate worlds (see 
section 3.6), and it is generally not considered appropriate for women to speak 
elaborately with unknown men. Though I did end up having quite a few in-depth 
conversations with women (generally in a situation where either their husbands or 
more women were present), most of my conversations were with men. Even if I had 
had a female research assistant (which would have made interviews with women 
easier), it would have been highly culturally inappropriate for me to be riding 
around Kottiyar Pattu on a motorbike with a lady who is not my wife.  
I have tried to reduce this gender bias in several ways. Once, I spent a weekend with 
my wife in Kottiyar Pattu, during which we conducted a long string of interviews, 
many of them with women. Also, my wife had female acquaintances from Kottiyar 
Pattu who visited us regularly when they came to Trincomalee or Colombo. During 
such visits, we often spoke about the area, and I learnt a lot from their observations. 
Some of these acquaintances are involved in a local NGO, and once in a way they 
asked me to help them with funding applications. Preparing these applications 
together provided excellent opportunities for learning about their perspectives on 
issues related to conflict and development in the area. Lastly, both my wife and 
myself had female colleagues from Trincomalee District with whom I was able to 
have elaborate conversations on things that went on in the district.  
 
1.4.5 Doing research in a context of conflict 
My fieldwork took place in a wider context where the 2002 cease-fire slowly 
disintegrated and where in 2006 open warfare resumed, starting in Kottiyar Pattu. 
This had several implications for my research. 
First of all, quite a few people were reluctant to venture opinions on potentially 
sensitive issues, particularly if others were present. As many Sri Lankan friends have 
told me, it is generally uncommon for Sri Lankans to speak about personal feelings 
and opinions with strangers. The return to open violence made this worse as it 
became dangerous to let unknown others know what you think. You never knew 
when someone was going to use things against you, or even inadvertently say things 
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that others could use against you. Patricia Lawrence succinctly described this self-
censorship when she said that a key to survival in Sri Lanka’s conflict zones is “to 
know what not to know” (comment made at the South Asia Conference, Madison, 
October 2006). Combined with the presence of humanitarian agencies conducting 
countless surveys and assessments and the strategic ‘wish-lists’ that this generated 
(see section 1.4.1), this strengthened my conviction that to get to know anything 
serious about people’s opinions, anything that reeks of formal data collection 
methods must be avoided. Rapport was essential, but what also helped was 
familiarity with the area, with the wider social, economic and political context of Sri 
Lanka, and with the Tamil (and to some extent Sinhala) languages that deepened 
over the eight years that I spent in the country. This familiarity made it possible to 
interpret more accurately what people did and did not say. I would have been 
unable to do this research if I had had only the 12 to 18 months of in-country 
presence that is common for much current PhD research. 
The context of violence also had consequences for personal safety. Because violent 
incidents along the roads generally happened under the cloak of darkness, I 
generally avoided being outside the village or town where I spent the night after 
dusk and before about half past eight in the morning, by which time most roads had 
been cleared17. Exceptions to this were nights when there were large crowds on the 
road, particularly during temple festivals. Only very late in my field research did I 
realise that this did create a bias in my observations. I interviewed a lot of farmers, 
but I rarely saw them in the field outside land preparation and harvesting periods. 
That was because between land preparation and harvest, farmers mostly go to their 
fields during the cool parts of the day around dawn and dusk. When the security 
situation improved in the very last stages of my fieldwork, I have tried to counter 
this somewhat by going out early, having a break in between, and going out again in 
the evening. 
During periods of open violence, the fieldwork was put on hold for safety reasons, 
but also because I did not want to bother people with my questions when they had 
other, much more urgent things on their mind. Instead, I focused my attention on 
interviews with relevant people in Trincomalee and on literature study in libraries 
and archives. Now and then, I did get involved in emergency response with ZOA 
Refugee Care, which made it possible to observe what was going on from up close 
and, while implementing relief work, still get a chance to talk to some people. 
As the violence escalated, it became increasingly important to keep track of what 
was going on and avoid potential trouble spots. From April 2006 onwards, 
humanitarian agencies set up ‘security trees’ through which they passed on 
                                                 
 
17 When entering or leaving Kottiyar Pattu by road via Kantale, there was another reason to 
be cautious: late evenings and early mornings are the times that elephants come out of the 
jungle near the Mahaweli River to drink and bathe. I was advised that solitary elephants 
should be avoided at all times. 
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information about security incidents by SMS; I was included in three such trees. This 
mechanism worked well until an overkill of major incidents drowned out reporting 
on the smaller incidents that were equally important in local situations. This went to 
the point where in late August 2006 I received a message saying that “shelling 
towards LTTE controlled areas in Trinco happens every morning and evening but 
unless it's particularly heavy or prolonged it is not reported on now through the 
security tree as, sadly, it has become the norm”. Over time, the security trees faded 
into irrelevance: where in mid-2006, I received over 200 messages per month, this 
had reduced to about 20 per month by mid-2007. 
 
1.5 Structure of the book 
The structure of this book is graphically depicted in figure 1.1. 
Taken together, chapters 2, 3 and 4 provide a detailed description of Kottiyar Pattu, 
the research area. These chapters are deliberately very detailed, because I believe 
that a detailed understanding of the setting in which the people in Kottiyar Pattu 
live their lives is fundamental for understanding the everyday forms of inter-ethnic 
interaction documented later on in this book. Those readers who are constrained in 
their time availability can limit themselves to reading the opening and closing 
sections of each of these chapters to get the gist of each chapter. 
Chapter 2 consists of two parts. The first part presents a description of the present-
day geography of Kottiyar Pattu: the administrative setting, demography, economy, 
land use, infrastructure and climate. The second part contains an elaborate historical 
analysis of how the area became what it is today. Insight into the history of the area 
is important not just for understanding the physical present, but also for 
understanding the different socio-political perspectives that people have on the area. 
Figure 1.1. Structure of the dissertation 
Introduction (Chapter 1) 
Background  
• History and geography of the research area (Chapter 2) 
• Social complexity in the research area (Chapter 3) 
• Chronology of violence in the research area (Chapter 4) 
Intermezzo 
• Local narratives (Chapter 5) 
Case studies 
• Irrigation (Chapter 6) 
• Riots and almost-riots (Chapter 7) 
• Mixed-ethnic marriages (Chapter 8) 
Conclusion (Chapter 9) 
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In chapter 3, I describe the complex structure of social life in Kottiyar Pattu. This is 
done through a description of nine categories of identification (apart from ethnicity, 
which I discussed in section 1.1.2) that people from the area used in the 
conversations that I had with them, to distinguish themselves from others. These 
categories, presented in random order, are caste, class, employment, religion, 
gender, age, length of stay, political affiliation, and military control. The aim of this 
chapter is not to discuss the concepts underlying these categories of identification, 
but to describe which groups are commonly identified within each category, and 
how these groups relate to other groups. In this multitude of identifications, 
sameness and otherness often coexist between individuals. As I will show in the case 
study chapters, shared non-ethnic sameness creates room for manoeuvre for people 
to interact with ethnic others. At the same time, ethnic sameness does not necessarily 
mean intra-ethnic harmony. 
Chapter 4 rounds off the block of background chapters with a reconstruction of the 
chronology of violence in Kottiyar Pattu. The aim of this chapter is to impress upon 
the reader the extent of violence that the people in Kottiyar Pattu have had to live 
through for so many years, and to underscore the extraordinariness of the continued 
existence of everyday forms of inter-ethnic interaction. 
Between the background chapters and the case studies, I have inserted an 
intermezzo. Chapter 5 provides four local narratives about Kottiyar Pattu, which are 
bewilderingly different from each other. Each in its own way, the narratives form 
integrations of the background information presented in the previous chapters. On 
the other hand, the diversity among the narratives shows how much people’s own 
perspectives on life in Kottiyar Pattu vary, and have strong potential to keep people 
separated from each other.  
The next three chapters describe case studies on everyday forms of inter-ethnic 
interaction, and form the core of the thesis. Chapter 6 deals with inter-ethnic 
interaction revolving around irrigated paddy cultivation in the Allai Extension 
Scheme, and looks at how Irrigation Department officials, farmer representatives, 
and ordinary farmers managed to keep the irrigation scheme functioning to a 
considerable extent throughout most of the conflict. 
Chapter 7 deals with inter-ethnic interaction in situations of acute (threats of) 
violence. It opens with an in-depth analysis of what happened during a Muslim-
Tamil riot in and around Muthur in April 2003, and draws further lessons from a 
period of Sinhala-Tamil tensions in 2005 and 2006. 
Chapter 8 looks at mixed-ethnic couples. Through a description of who they are, 
how they met, and how they manage their married life, I look at how such couples 
negotiate the ethnic boundary that runs through them in their everyday life, and to 
what extent they perform a bridging function between the ethnic groups they 
represent. 
In the last chapter, I return to the research objectives and the research questions with 
a discussion on what the findings of this research can teach us about everyday inter-
ethnic interaction. This is followed by a discussion on the wider academic 
implications of the research, a discussion of topics that are worthy of further study, 
and a discussion on how everyday inter-ethnic interaction can inform outside 
interventions aiming at peace-building. 
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2 Kottiyar Pattu – the study area 
 
“Cottiar (Cottiarum), a small province of Trincomalee, extending along the east 
coast of the Island from the north bank of the Virgel ganga to the frontiers of 
Tambalagam. It is about 27 miles long from north east to south west, and 15 
miles broad from east to west. It contains 28 villages, and according to the census 
of 1814, a population of 1757 souls; of which two thirds are Malabars, and the 
remainder Moors. The country, from Anetivoe to Topore is almost level, 
diversified with extensive plains, interspersed with thick jungles, and intersected 
by several nullahs, most of which are fordable; but from Topore to the 
northward, it assumes an elevated aspect, and abounds with high rocks and 
hills. The soil is generally sandy. The low lands yield fine crops of paddy, and 
the high grounds all the varieties of dry grain. The forests supply almost all sorts 
of timber, and harbour a vast number of wild animals, amongst which elephants 
prove a great pest to the inhabitants. The province was originally the hereditary 
domain of a female chieftain styled Wannichee; and one of her descendants still 
nominally presides over it:–  her husband is allowed to bear the title of Assistant 
or Adjutant Wanniya. […]  In 1803 PANDARA WANNIA, the famous rebel chief, 
took possession of the province; but it was almost immediately recovered by the 
light company of H. M. 19th regiment, which had been detached for that 
purpose from Trincomalee. (Cordiner.) 
 
Cottiar, the principal village of the above province, situated on the south side of 
the inner harbour of Trincomalee, was anciently a place of some importance; and 
KNOX states that at the time he was residing in the interior, it was frequented 
every year by twenty or thirty sail of small vessels from the opposite coast, and 
the customs derived from it, formed a considerable part of the king’s revenue. It 
is very populous, occupied by Malabars, and the country around is well 
cultivated; cattle abound, and the pasture is extremely good. It is remarkable in 
the Singhalese history as the port where the princess, who afterwards became 
the wife of Wijaya, landed from Madura with her numerous attendants. 
(Philateles.) 
[…] 
Topore, a very pretty village in the province of Cottiar, situated amidst rich 
paddy fields, interspersed with tamarind trees of very majestic size and 
imposing appearance. It is 34 miles distant from Trincomalee, and is inhabited 
by Malabars and Moors. 
[…] 
Virgel, a river branching off from the Mahawelli ganga at Kurinjamoone, falls 
into the sea 25 miles southward of Trincomalee, and separates that district from 
Batticalo. Near the mouth of this river there is a village of the same name, where 
the Malabars have a very large temple, with extensive paddy fields attached to 
it.” (Casie Chitty 1834: 79-81, 211, 217)  
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2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 What’s in a name? 
Kottiyar Pattu is an old name that local people use for the southern part of 
Trincomalee District, in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. It covers 654.4 square 
kilometres (Trincomalee Kachcheri 2003: 3), and is bounded on all sides by water: to 
the north, there is the Kottiyar Bay; to the east, there is the Indian Ocean; to the west, 
the Mahaweli River forms the boundary, and to the south, there is the Verugal River, 
which branches off the Mahaweli River. Until 1972, it was the name of an 
administrative subdivision. After that, the area has been divided into three separate 
divisions: Muthur, Seruwila and – since 1988 – Eechchilampattu (see map 2.1 for 
more details). While no longer used administratively, inhabitants still commonly use 
the term Kottiyar Pattu to designate the area.  
A late 10th century inscription in Thanjavur (Tamil Nadu) is proof that the name has 
been in use for at least a millennium (Hultsch and Venkayya 1992 [1916], part IV, 
inscription no. 92). Almost as a metaphor for the situation in Kottiyar Pattu however, 
even the meaning of its name is contested. While the term ‘Pattu’ is an old term for 
an administrative division, Kottiyar has several meanings ascribed to it. The first 
meaning is very straightforward. Taken together, the Tamil words kottai 
(fortification) and aru (river) mean “the river near the fortification”. Different rulers 
have kept garrisons stationed at the mouth of the river Mahaweli since at least the 
late 10th century, and it was only in the early 20th century that the last remains of a 
Dutch fortalice next to the river were demolished18. I consider this the most likely 
original meaning of the name Kottiyar. A second meaning has a more mythical 
flavour to it. Some Buddhists living in the area claim that once upon a time there 
were as many as one kotiya (= one crore, or ten million; Rajavaliya: vii) temples in the 
area. While several very old ruins are indeed proof of the existence of Buddhist 
temples in Kottiyar Pattu, their number must be counted in the dozens rather than in 
the millions. The third meaning is poetic: kotti is apparently a kind of flower (Samad 
2003: 2). I have been unable to verify which kind of flower it is, and whether or not it 
is found in Kottiyar Pattu. 
 
2.1.2 Structure of the chapter 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part (section 2.2), I describe aspects 
of Kottiyar Pattu as I encountered them in 2008: administrative set-up, public 
services, demography, infrastructure, economy, land use and climate. In the second 
part (section 2.3), I  have tried to distil a more or less cohesive historical narrative 
about how Kottiyar Pattu came to be what it is today. Together, these descriptions 
                                                 
 
18 The site retains some strategic value: during the time of my fieldwork, the Sri Lankan 
Army maintained a small outpost right next to where the old Dutch fortalice had been. 
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form the backdrop for two much more detailed chapters discussing social 
complexity in Kottiyar Pattu (chapter 3) and a chronology of violence in the area 
(chapter 4). 
 
2.2 Kottiyar Pattu in 2008 
2.2.1 Administrative set-up 
Sri Lanka is divided into 8 provinces, each headed by an appointed governor. The 
provinces are subdivided into 25 districts, each headed by an appointed District 
Secretary, formerly known as Government Agent (GA)19. The districts are 
subdivided into Divisional Secretariat (DS) divisions, which are headed by 
appointed Divisional Secretaries (DS), formerly known as Additional Government 
Agent (AGA). Finally, each DS division is subdivided into between about 10 and 50 
Grama Niladhari (GN) divisions, also known as Grama Sevaka (GS) divisions. GN 
divisions generally have a population of between 400 and 2,000 people, and may 
cover one or more villages or hamlets. Towns and big villages may be spread over 
more than one GN division. In every GN division there is an appointed Grama 
Niladhari (GN), formerly known as Village Headman.  
The public administration function of the state is located at district, DS division, and 
GN division level, and not at the provincial level; the GA reports directly to the 
central government. 
Local government is organised at the provincial level through elected Provincial 
Councils, headed by a Chief Minister. Below the provincial level, there are elected 
Municipal Councils. In smaller towns (to which category Muthur and Kinniya 
belong) these are known as Urban Councils, and in rural areas these are known as 
Pradeshiya Sabhas (literally ‘regional councils’). The boundaries of most Pradeshiya 
Sabha territories are parallel to DS Division boundaries; Urban Councils and 
Municipal Councils may cover territories that are smaller, equal or bigger than DS 
Divisions. To make things more confusing, line ministries each have their own 
structures. Some ministries have structures at provincial level (sometimes under the 
Provincial Council20, and sometimes directly under the national level), and others at 
                                                 
 
19 In order to avoid confusion, I will use the abbreviation GA throughout this book to 
indicate the person in charge of the district. 
20 The Eastern Province currently has four provincial ministries: (1) the Ministry of Health 
and Indigenous Medicine, Social Welfare, Probation and Child Care Services, Women 
Affairs, Youth Affairs, Sports, IT Education, Cooperative Development, Food Supply and 
Distribution; (2) the Ministry of Education, Cultural Affairs, Lands and Land Development 
and Transport; (3) the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Production and Development, Rural 
Industries Development and Fisheries, and (4) the Ministry of Road Development, 
Irrigation, Housing and Construction, Rural Electrification and Water Supply 
(www.ep.gov.lk). Under each ministry, there are line departments. 
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district level; below these levels, sub-divisions may or may not run parallel to 
administrative boundaries. 
Together with Batticaloa and Ampara Districts, Trincomalee District forms the 
Eastern Province. The first elections for the Provincial Council were held in 1989, 
when the province was provisionally merged with the Northern Province. This 
council became dysfunctional in 1990, and instead the North-Eastern Province was 
run by a Chief Secretary and his administrative staff, who were answerable to the 
provincial governor. In 2007, the Northern and Eastern Provinces were demerged, 
and, following elections, a new Provincial Council was installed under the 
leadership of Pillaiyan, a former insurgent who broke ranks with the LTTE in 2004. 
At least since 1989, the governors of the (North-)Eastern Province have always been 
retired military officers. 
The strategic importance of Trincomalee District can be seen in the fact that since the 
1950s, every single GA for Trincomalee District has been Sinhalese, despite Tamils 
and Muslims being the dominant population groups. In late 2005, President 
Rajapakse appointed a retired army general as GA for Trincomalee, further 
militarising the administration. Not long after, a retired navy rear admiral was 
appointed co-ordinator for rehabilitation in the district. 
Trincomalee District consists of 11 DS divisions; three of these (Muthur, Seruwila 
and Eechchilampattu) cover the area known as Kottiyar Pattu. From the mid-1940s 
onwards, the DSs of Kottiyar Pattu (and, from 1972 onwards, of Muthur DS 
Division) have alternately been Tamil and Muslim. It has been common practice that 
the deputy DS was Muslim if the DS was Tamil and vice versa. Since Seruwila DS 
Division was established in 1972, the DS has always been Sinhalese, and since its 
establishment in 1988, the DS of Eechchilampattu DS Division has always been 
Tamil. Within Muthur DS Division, there are attempts to split the division into two 
or three: one division centered around Muthur, one centered around Thoppur, and 
possibly one centered around Kilivetti. The comparatively large number of GN 
divisions within Muthur DS Division is a valid argument in this case (many DS 
divisions only have about 12 GN divisions). However, local rivalries between 
Muthur and Thoppur also play a role. 
GN divisions are generally subdivided when the population increases beyond the 
levels that are manageable for one GN. In 2008 Muthur DS Division had 42 GN 
Divisions, Seruwila DS Division had 17, and Eechchilampattu DS Division had 8 
(EPC 2008: 23-4). GNs are mostly from the area, but do not always originate from the 
GN division that they are responsible for. A sizeable number of the GNs in Kottiyar 
Pattu reside in Trincomalee Town, and only visit their area once a week. 
There are eleven Pradeshiya Sabhas and two Urban Councils in Trincomalee District 
(EPC 2008: 190). In Kottiyar Pattu, there are three Pradeshiya Sabhas, with parallel 
names and boundaries to the three DS divisions in the area. However, both the 
Seruwila Pradeshiya Sabha and the Eechchilampattu Pradeshiya Sabha are 
dysfunctional, with the DS functioning as representative instead of a council of 
elected members. The history of these local authorities goes back to 1935, when five 
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Village Councils were established in Kottiyar Pattu: one each at Muthur, 
Kattaiparichchan, Sampoor, Thoppur, and Kilivetti.  After 1945, two more Village 
Councils were established in Eechchilampattu and Mallikaithivu. In 1965, the 
Muthur Village Council was upgraded to the status of Town Council. The six council 
areas in Muthur DS Division were merged into one Pradeshiya Sabha in 1994 (Samad 
2003: 434, 439, 450). Separate Pradeshiya Sabhas were established in Seruwila and 
Eechchilampattu. 
 
2.2.2 Demography 
In 2005, the estimated population of Kottiyar Pattu was 89,499. Broken down by DS 
division and ethnicity, the situation was as follows: 
 
DS Division Total 
population 
Tamil Muslim Sinhala Other 
Muthur 63,690   (71.2%) 28,199    (44.3%) 35,319 (55.5%) 172   (0.3%) 0 (0%) 
Seruwila 13,886   (15.5%) 3,516    (25.3%) 1,956 (14.1%) 8,414 (60.6%) 0 (0%) 
Eechchilampattu 11,923   (13.3%) 11,923 (100.0%) 0      (0%) 0      (0%) 0 (0%) 
Total  89,499 (100.0%) 43,638    (48.8%) 37,275 (41.6%) 8,586   (9.6%) 0 (0%) 
Table 2.1. Population of Kottiyar Pattu by DS Division and ethnicity (source: UN HIC 2007; data from 
the Trincomalee District Planning Secretariat) 
 
In maps 2.2 to 2.4, the ethnic breakdown of the population is given for each GN 
division in Kottiyar Pattu. As can be seen, the geographical spread of the population 
is not equal. Tamils are concentrated in three clusters (one in the purana part of the 
Allai Extension Scheme (including Menkamam, Kilivetti, Mallikaithivu and 
Kankuveli), one around Eechchilampattu, and one around Sampoor). Muslims are 
concentrated in two clusters (one around Muthur, and one around Thoppur). 
Sinhalese are concentrated in the colony areas (with a small concentration in 
Muthur). While not all GN Divisions are ethnically homogeneous, hamlets and 
neighbourhoods are pretty much ethnically segregated. On the other hand, it is near 
impossible to live ethnically segregated lives: there are always ethnic others living in 
close proximity. 
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Map 2.2. Percentage Tamil population by GN division in Kottiyar Pattu (source: CIRM 2004a, b, c) 
  Kottiyar Pattu – the study area 
37 
   
Map 2.3. Percentage Muslim population by GN division in Kottiyar Pattu (source: CIRM 2004a, b, c) 
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Map 2.4. Percentage Sinhala population by GN division in Kottiyar Pattu (source: CIRM 2004a, b, c) 
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The population of Kottiyar Pattu has changed dramatically over the past century, 
after a century of stability before that. The oldest available population count for 
Kottiyar Pattu is from 1786, when Van Senden counted 616 male inhabitants, after 
the region had been devastated by epidemics and storms not long before (Van 
Senden 1786b). This would give a total population of about 1,200 people. The census 
of 1814 yielded a population of 1757 people (Casie Chitty 1834: 79). In 1871, the 
recorded population had increased to 3,73921. That would mean an annual 
population growth over this entire period of only about 1.4%22. Over the following 
75 years, the population almost quadrupled: the recorded population in 1946 was 
13,637. Still, the average annual population growth rate was not more than about 
1.7%. In the 17 years between 1946 and 1963, the population nearly tripled to 33,021 – 
an average annual growth rate of 5.3%. Two factors contributed to this. Firstly, there 
was a significant reduction in mortality due to improved health care and anti-
malaria spraying23, while birth rates did not yet reduce correspondingly (see section 
3.8). Secondly, the development of the Allai Extension Scheme during this period 
saw an influx of settlers. Subsequent censuses show a reduction in population 
growth as the influx of new settlers ended and birth rates started to drop. In 1971, 
the population was 42,460 (an annual increase of 3.2%), and in 1981 the population 
was 60,160 (an annual increase of 3.55%). Between 1981 (which was the last census 
before the war started) and 2005 (when a lot of the displaced who wanted to return 
after the ceasefire had already returned), the average annual population growth was 
only 1.67%.  
                                                 
 
21 If the average household consisted of five people, this means that there were still less than 
800 households by this time. This is significant information for a discussion on caste and 
historical marriage practices. If the caste communities in Kottiyar Pattu were really as 
endogamous as is claimed, the largest caste groups would have consisted of 200 households 
at most, and the smallest ones of less than 100 households. In order to prevent inbreeding, 
caste endogamy would thus have required long-distance marriage relationships, in a period 
when hardly any road transport was possible due to the absence of roads. 
22 Note however Peebles’ caveat that the data for the 1814 census are not fully reliable as 
“neither the methods of enumeration nor the dates are known”, and the “hastily prepared” 
census of 1871 seems to have suffered from underenumeration (Peebles 1982: 26). Sarkar 
(1957: 19) adds that in 1871 a widespread rumour that the census was intended to forcibly 
recruit young men to “make good the depletion in manpower caused by the Franco-
Prussian war” caused panic and saw many people fleeing into the jungle. In his book, Sarkar 
expresses serious reservations regarding the quality of more recent census data as well. 
Given these caveats, I have used census data as indicative estimates only. What matters for 
my research are not the detailed percentages, but the larger trends. 
23 For comparison, the average annual population growth for Sri Lanka as a whole was 1.5% 
between 1931 and 1946, 2.8% between 1946 and 1953, 2.7% between 1953 and 1963, and 2.2% 
between 1963 and 1971 (Kearney n.y.: 5). 
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Apart from the general reduction in birth rates due to the spread of family planning, 
a large part of this reduction was caused by people permanently fleeing the war. I 
estimate that about 7,500 Sinhalese settlers moved back to their original villages and 
never returned, about 1,500 Tamils moved to Trincomalee, Colombo and Canada in 
roughly equal proportions, and several hundred Muslims moved to Kinniya, 
Trincomalee or Colombo. Another part of the reduction in population growth was 
caused by the death or disappearance of about 2,450 people from Kottiyar Pattu 
during the conflict: about 400 Sinhalese, about 1,800 Tamils, and about 250 Muslims. 
Between 2005 and the end of the war, I estimate that another 650 people died or 
disappeared: about 50 Sinhalese, 500 Tamils and 100 Muslims (see chapter 4 for more 
details). In total, this brings the war-related death toll to about 3½%, 8½% and 2% of 
the pre-conflict population of Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims respectively. And 
finally, there was the tsunami that killed about 200 Muslims and 150 Tamils. 
Figure 2.1 shows estimates for the population by ethnicity and year, based on 
population figures for 1981 and 2005 estimates for demographic changes during the 
period in between.  
 
2.2.3 Economy 
The economy of Kottiyar Pattu centres on paddy cultivation and fisheries. Apart 
from this, cultivation of highland crops, vegetables and fruit, and livestock 
production are reasonably important sources of income. However, because there are 
no processing facilities for fish, meat or crops, and because there are no big rice mills, 
Figure 2.1. Estimated population of Kottiyar Pattu by ethnicity, 1981-2005 (source: 1981 census, UN 
HIC 2007, own estimates) 
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very little value adding takes place. In Muthur and to a lesser extent in Thoppur and 
Serunuwara, there are shops and markets.  
In 2004 the Centre for Information and Resources Management (CIRM), a semi-
government institute linked to the North-East Provincial Council, collected a wide 
range of data for each village in the entire North and East, with the objective of 
establishing vulnerability profiles for every village (CIRM 2004a, b and c). Data 
enumeration was done via a village questionnaire by the Samurdhi development 
officers, who are the grassroots level officers in Sri Lanka’s official poverty reduction 
programme. According to data collected in this survey, almost 1,600 of the roughly 
22,000 heads of households in Kottiyar Pattu were self-employed, nearly 2,000 were 
employees of government agencies or private companies, and about 1,000 were 
abroad. The rest, about 17,400 heads of households, were involved in agriculture or 
fisheries. Because only one source of income per family was registered, the total 
numbers of self-employed people, government or private sector employees, and 
people working in the Middle East have probably been underestimated. 
Poverty is widespread in Kottiyar Pattu. According to the CIRM data, 42% of the 
households survived on less than 3 meals per day, and 60% of the households 
received food stamps or dry rations. Since several people told me that it is quite 
possible to bribe your way into the food stamp beneficiary lists, I consider the first 
indicator the most reliable. A breakdown by ethnicity is given in table 2.2.  
  
Ethnicity Total number of 
households 
Households eating less 
than three meals per day 
(%) 
Households entitled to 
food stamps or dry 
rations (%) 
Sinhala 2,251 388 (17.3%) 952 (42.3%) 
Muslim 8,842 3,065 (34.7%) 5,209 (58.9%) 
Tamil 10,576 5,485 (51.9%) 6,762 (63.9%) 
Total 22,063 9,266 (42,0%) 13,253 (60.1%) 
Table 2.2. Indicators for the extent of poverty in Kottiyar Pattu by ethnicity (source: CIRM 2004a, b 
and c) 
 
An important conclusion that can be drawn from the table is that the distribution of 
poverty across ethnic groups is considerably skewed due to a differential access to 
income. A key source of income for between a quarter and half of the roughly 2,300 
Sinhala families and for several dozen Muslim families in Kottiyar Pattu are the 
security forces. While not many have joined the police, army, navy or air force, many 
hundreds have enlisted as ‘home guards’, to protect their own villages against 
attacks by Tamil militants. With a salary of about Rs. 9,000 (US$ 90 at 2005 prices) 
per month, this part-time job ensures the home guards a steady source of cash 
income in addition to what they earn from paddy cultivation or from daily labour. In 
comparison: an agricultural labourer earns Rs. 200-300 (US$ 2-3) per day, but is 
rarely able to work more than 15 days a month – this comes to a monthly income of 
Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 4,500 (US$ 30 to US$ 45). A farmer with 3 acres of double-cropped 
paddy land can earn about Rs. 150,000 (US$ 1,500) per year in a very good year – this 
comes to Rs. 12,500 (US$ 125) per month. 
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2.2.4 Land use 
Of Kottiyar Pattu’s total surface area of 654.4 km2, some 380 km2 is state land, largely 
covered by more or less dense shrub jungle, and some stretches of grassland. Almost 
125 km2 is registered to be in use as paddy land: about 8,500 ha under irrigation, and 
some 4,000 ha under rainfed conditions. The balance 150 km2 is occupied by roads, 
water bodies, and 128 villages and hamlets, several of which have been clustered 
into the towns of Muthur and Thoppur (Trincomalee Kachcheri 200324). Not 
specifically quantified in the statistical handbook, there are several hundred hectares 
of legal and illegal fields of chena (rainfed upland crops) on private land and state 
land (largely in Eechchilampattu DS Division and the eastern half of Muthur DS 
Division). The dominant crops in these fields are maize, chilli and groundnuts.  
The irrigated paddy lands are fed by two schemes that are classified as ‘major 
irrigation schemes’ – which means that the command area is over 200 acres (80 ha): 
the Allai Extension Scheme (formally a little over 7,000 ha) and the Ilakkantai tank (a 
little over 140 ha). The rest of the paddy lands is irrigated from ‘minor tanks’ with 
command areas below 200 acres (Trincomalee Kachcheri 2000: 59). In 2000, half of 
the 82 minor tanks in the area were registered as abandoned. Several dozen have 
subsequently been renovated by various agencies, while tanks that fall within the 
High Security Zone around Sampoor are currently not accessible. 
                                                 
 
24 Except where other sources are mentioned, the figures given in this section are from the 
Statistical Handbook of Trincomalee District for 2003 (Trincomalee Kachcheri 2003). 
Figure 2.2. Typical landscape in the irrigated plain of Kottiyar Pattu (own photograph) 
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The actual extent of paddy fields is significantly larger than officially registered. All 
around the Allai Extension Scheme, areas of state land (in the jungle around the 
main channel, reservations along channels, and bordering the formal command area) 
have been encroached upon. Dekker (2007), basing himself on conversations with 
Irrigation Department staff, concluded that about 2,000 ha have been taken into use 
in this way. On the other hand, a similar extent of paddy fields on the fringes of the 
Allai Extension Scheme have been abandoned during the war because cultivation 
became too dangerous (see section 6.5). 
Much of the western half of Kottiyar Pattu is flat, with elevations not exceeding 10 
metres above sea level. This area has alluvial clay soil that is excellent for paddy 
cultivation (see figure 2.2). Those areas that do not fall under the Allai Extension 
Scheme are to a large extent covered by rather dense forest vegetation.  
In the eastern half of Kottiyar Pattu, the landscape is more elevated (with elevations 
up to about 60 metres above sea level) and has an undulating topography, 
interspersed with rocky outcrops. It is cut in two by the Ullakkalli lagoon, which 
once upon a time may have been the mouth of (a branch of) the Mahaweli river. The 
soils in this area are a mix of noncalcic brown soils, soils on old alluvium and 
solodized solonetz (Panabokke 1996:81). This area is a patchwork of small irrigation 
tanks with small command areas, rainfed paddy fields, chenas, and thorny scrub 
jungle. Saline soils occur along the northern and eastern coastline, where there is a 
seasonal influx of seawater into a string of small lagoons and creeks which form 
important breeding grounds for fish. 
Human settlements have traditionally been founded on elevated pieces of land near 
paddy fields or near the coast. As roads developed in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century, new villages were 
established near these roads. In order to house the settlers who were brought into 
the Allai Extension Scheme in the 1950s, colony villages were established on suitable 
places along the main channels. In many of these villages, small but old ruins seem 
to indicate earlier inhabitation. 
As of December 2008, an area of 37.4 km2 bordering the Kottiyar Bay east of Muthur 
was a so-called ‘High Security Zone’ (HSZ), and was entirely off-limits to its original 
inhabitants. This zone was declared in May 2007 with the aim of protecting Sri 
Lanka’s primary naval base at Trincomalee from attacks by the LTTE; it was reduced 
in size in October 2008 (Gazette no. 1573/19, 2008; map 2.5). The people who used to 
live in the villages inside the HSZ are now staying in squalid camps around Kilivetti. 
Even though the war ended in May 2009, it is unlikely that these people will be 
allowed to return: not long after the declaration of the HSZ, the Sri Lankan 
government decided to construct a coal power plant in the area, of which 
construction has since commenced (CPA 2009). 
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Map 2.5. High Security Zone around Sampoor (source: UN OCHA 2008) 
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2.2.5 Infrastructure 
There are four routes to get into the area, none of which are very easy.  
To the north-east, the A15 (Batticaloa-Trincomalee) highway towards Kinniya and 
Trincomalee involves the crossing of four river mouths by ferry. For many years, a 
part of this road was closed to traffic due to the conflict situation, and over time it 
became badly degraded. The road reopened in 2007, largely with a laterite surface. 
In 2008, a bridge was finally being constructed at Kinniya, which will substantially 
reduce travel time. From Trincomalee, it takes about 1½ to 2 hours to reach Muthur 
by this road. 
To the south, the A15 highway leads towards Batticaloa. Going along this route 
involves the crossing of the Verugal River by ferry, and the crossing of two lagoons 
in Vakarai by causeways that get flooded in the rainy season. Much of the road has 
been tarred, but between Muthur and Verugal the road was still in very poor 
condition in 2008. From Batticaloa, it takes about two hours to reach Verugal, and it 
takes another hour to reach Muthur from Verugal. In both directions along the A15, 
checkpoints needed to be negotiated, which could be very time-consuming. On my 
last visit to Muthur in August 2008 I saw a vehicle with Chinese contractors who, I 
was told, were going to reconstruct the entire A15. 
To the west, a long tarred road leads to Kantale from Kallar/Somapura. This former 
Irrigation Department road has only been in public use since the mid-1960s. From 
Trincomalee, it takes about three hours to reach Muthur using this road. 
The last access route is by ferry from Trincomalee. There is one big ferry with a 
capacity of about 150 people and about a dozen motorbikes. If the ferry is not 
undergoing repairs, the twice-daily trip across the Kottiyar Bay takes about 45 
minutes one way. Apart from the big ferry, there are small launches that tend to get 
dangerously overcrowded25, and which take a little over an hour. As a back-up, it is 
possible to go to Kinniya in a 20-foot open fishing boat; a distinctly unpleasant trip 
during the rainy season because of the high waves. 
After the Sri Lankan military regained control over the entire Trincomalee District, 
the Army Engineers started building the “Trincomalee Circular Road”, a massive 
ring road that is intended to link the entire district. When I last visited the area, the 
road was still under construction. 
Within Kottiyar Pattu, travel is not very easy either. There are only a few tarred 
roads: the A15 stretch from Verugal via Serunuwara, Palathoppur and Muthur to 
Upparu; a road from Serunuwara to Seruwila along the Right Bank main channel of 
the Allai Extension Scheme; a road from Serunuwara to Kallar/Somapura; a road 
from Kallar/Somapura to Neelapola along the Left Bank main channel; a road along 
                                                 
 
25 In 1993, an overcrowded launch sank after it capsized in rough seas. Estimates for the 
number of people killed vary between about 50 and about 125 (Ubaidullah 2008: chapter 5; 
‘Request for sittings at Muttur and Thopur’, Daily News, 10-3-1993; ‘Capsized ferry 3 times 
overloaded’, Daily News 24-5-1993) 
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the so-called ‘Muthur Channel’ from its start in Dehiwatte until the point where the 
channel meets the A15 at Bharatipuram; a road from the A15 at Manalchenai via 
Mallikaithivu to Menkamam; and a road from Palathoppur to Thoppur. The other 
roads are covered with either laterite or clay, and some get very muddy in the rainy 
season. 
Public transport is limited. Two to four buses each go every day to Trincomalee, 
Batticaloa, Kantale and Colombo from Kottiyar Pattu. Some leave from Muthur, 
others from Thoppur or Serunuwara. Apart from this, a small number of passenger 
vans (locally known as ‘route vans’) drives to different destinations. 
In 2007, there were close to 140 threewheelers in Muthur town, and maybe two or 
three dozen in the rest of Kottiyar Pattu. This was a steep increase from just seven 
threewheelers in Muthur town in 1993 (interview with a threewheeler driver, 
Muthur town, April 2007). 
Very few people own cars or vans in Kottiyar Pattu. Motorbikes are more common: I 
would estimate that in 2008 there were perhaps 5,000 to 7,000 motorbikes. Apart 
from this, there were probably about 2,000 two-wheel tractors (“landmasters”), 200 
tractors, and 100 lorries in the area. When I started my research in 2003, the number 
of vehicles was less than half of what it was five years later. Improved credit 
facilities, aggressive marketing, and increasing wealth levels clearly contributed to 
this. The use of oxcarts has visibly reduced over the last couple of years. Despite the 
improvement in the situation, most people still move around on bicycles or by foot. 
Motorised vehicles are not equally spread across the area. Particularly in the Tamil 
villages that were under LTTE control until 2006, hardly any vehicles could be found 
due to poverty and fuel restrictions. 
 
2.2.6 Climate 
Kottiyar Pattu falls within Sri Lanka’s so-called ‘Dry Zone’. This zone covers roughly 
the northern half of the island and the strip of land east of the central mountain 
massif, all the way down to Hambantota. The line separating the ‘Wet Zone’ (which 
covers the south-west of the country) and the ‘Dry Zone’ coincides “more or less 
with the line of 75 inches [1,900 mm] rainfall” per year (Brohier 2006: 26; Farmer 
1957: 5). Apart from receiving much less rain than the ‘Wet Zone’26, it also receives 
rain in a different time of the year. While the ‘Wet Zone’ gets most of its rainfall 
during the South-West monsoon (May-September), The ‘Dry Zone’ receives most of 
its annual rain during the North-East monsoon, which lasts from about November to 
January. There are three rainfall stations in and near Kottiyar Pattu for which I had 
access to long time series of monthly rainfall data: one in the Trincomalee fort (1869-
                                                 
 
26 Rainfall is as little as 900 mm per year in Mannar and Hambantota as compared to over 
4,000 mm per year in the interior areas just south-east of Colombo (Farmer 1957: 23) 
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2004), one on the Allai Tank (1879-2004), and one in the Irrigation Department 
compound at Kallar (1941-2004). For my analysis, I have used the following data27: 
 
Rainfall 
station 
Period for which reliable 
monthly data are 
available 
Number of complete 
hydrological years in the 
series28  
Trincomalee 1901-1910; 1930-2004 80 
Allai Tank 1901-1970; 1978-2004 85 
Kallar 1941-2004 50 
Table 2.3 Available monthly rainfall data for Kottiyar Pattu (source: Meteorology Department) 
 
Annual rainfall is highly variable, and varies between a little under 900 mm to 
almost 3,100 mm. Average annual rainfall for the last 30 years in the series (1975-
2004) is about 1,500 mm; median annual rainfall is about 1,400 mm. While there does 
not seem to be a specific pattern between wet and dry years, there does seem to be 
an overall trend of reducing rainfall. This is shown in figure 2.3, which depicts 
median annual rainfall per decade (for those periods where 8 or more values are 
available). As can be seen, median annual rainfall over the period 1981-2004 is about 
400 mm less than for the first half of the 20th century – a reduction of over 20%!29  
This means that all irrigation designs before about 1980 (which covers pretty much 
all the major irrigation schemes of Trincomalee District) were based on assumptions 
about rainfall quantity that have become unrealistic. Therefore, problems in 
irrigation water distribution may have been caused as much by long-term climate 
variability as by inefficient institutions. To give an indication of the average pattern 
of rainfall throughout a year, figure 2.4 presents the average monthly rainfall (in 
mm/month) for each of the three stations, in contrast with monthly 
evapotranspiration. 
                                                 
 
27 In all three series, there are some months for which data are not available. In those cases, I 
have left the entire year out of the analysis. Up to 1901, the recorded annual rainfall at 
Trincomalee is regularly much less (up to 1,300 mm!) than at Allai Tank. Because I have no 
third set of data to triangulate with, I have decided to leave all data before 1901 out of the 
analysis. Also, there are no rainfall data for Trincomalee from 1911 to 1929. Comparison of 
the data for the various stations shows that for the years 1970 to 1977, the rainfall recorded at 
Allai Tank is unusually low, and much lower than the rainfall at both Kallar and 
Trincomalee. As it seems like something is wrong with these data, I have decided to leave 
those data out of the analysis. 
28 In line with common practice in Sri Lanka I have used hydrological years, which run from 
October through to September, rather than calendar years as the basis for my analysis of 
climatological data. 
29 I am not sure whether this is a ‘permanent’ decline, or merely a long-term oscillation such 
as has been documented for several sites in Asia by Kripalani and Kulkarni (1997). In the last 
case, rainfall will probably start increasing again within the next decade or so. 
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As can be seen, rainfall exceeds evapotranspiration for four months a year (from 
October to January), and the reverse is the case in the other eight months. The 
average patterns are similar for all three stations: there is heavy rainfall in November 
and December, after which the rain gradually reduces until March. In April and 
Figure 2.3. Median annual rainfall per decade, 1901-2004 (source: Meteorology Department) 
Figure 2.4. Monthly rainfall and evapotranspiration (source: Meteorology Department and FAO 
CLIMWAT database). 
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May, the inter-monsoon brings thunderstorms, after which the weather calms down 
again. During the South-West monsoon between June and September, some rain 
may spill across Sri Lanka’s central mountain range. Before the North-East monsoon 
sets in, the inter-monsoon in October again brings thunderstorms. 
Apart from short- and long-term temporal variability, rainfall is also spatially 
variable. Between the rain gauges at Trincomalee, Allai Tank and Kallar, annual 
rainfall may vary by as much as 40%. The spatial variability in monthly and daily 
rainfall data is even greater. Because most rain showers are comparatively limited in 
extent, a single shower may give a very high rainfall figure in one station, while 
hardly anything falls in another station. 
Temperatures have a slight seasonal variation. During the dry season, the average 
day-time temperature is about 35°C; in very hot periods the temperature exceeds 
40°C. During the rainy season, the temperature drops to a little under 30°C. Average 
night-time temperatures vary between 25°C in the rainy season and 28°C in the dry 
season. Humidity varies between 60% in the dry season and as much as 90% in the 
rainy season. 
 
2.3 A history of Kottiyar Pattu 
2.3.1 Making sense of history  
Since the history of the development and settlement of Kottiyar Pattu kept coming 
back in the narratives of people who tried to explain the present to me, I am of the 
opinion that a reconstruction of the area’s history is essential background 
information for this thesis. However, as Nandini Sundar (2004) has described in her 
insightful analysis of the multiple histories of an Indian village, historical narratives 
(both written and oral) are by definition incomplete and often inconsistent with each 
other. They are also sometimes violently contested. While chronicles, legends, and 
physical remains may provide additional bits of information, they often complicate 
this picture.  
 
Written contemporary accounts 
Written contemporary accounts (particularly the older ones, but, as I will show in 
chapters 4 and 7, also contemporary newspaper articles) have generally been 
produced by either outsiders or by members of local elites, and tend to ignore 
perspectives of ordinary people. Quite regularly, these accounts have been written 
by people who were not very familiar with the place, or who had never visited it. 
While such accounts may contain very valuable observations, they need to be 
viewed critically – particularly where descriptions of local social dynamics are 
concerned.  
During my research, I was able to obtain access to three (sets of) contemporary 
accounts written by residents of Kottiyar Pattu. The first is a very elaborate social 
geography of the area by M.A. Samad, a retired school teacher (Samad 2003). 
Though Samad’s version of the early history of the area needs to be viewed critically, 
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the rest of the book is a veritable goldmine for anyone interested in learning more 
about Kottiyar Pattu and the changes it went through in the 20th century.  
The second set of contemporary accounts consists of short stories, written by a 
number of Muslim and Tamil authors, most prominent among whom was V.A. 
Rasaratnam, a Catholic teacher from Muthur (Rasaratnam 1962, 1996a, 1996b and 
1999; Amanullah 2007; Ubaidullah 2008)30. Most of these stories are about Kottiyar 
Pattu, and span a period of nearly seven decades, from the 1930s right up to the 2004 
tsunami. The value of the stories for my research is that they provide a series of 
historically situated snapshots of Kottiyar Pattu. Though the characters in the stories 
are fictitious, the events, places and issues described are real. By placing the stories 
in chronological order of first publication, one gets a fair sense of what were the hot 
topics over the years. 
Lastly, there is a book describing the Seruwila temple that was written by two 
resident monks, Seruwila Saranakiththi Thero and Kotapola Amarakiththi Thero 
(2002). This book mostly describes the founding, renovation and further 
development of the Seruwila temple, but here and there also gives background 
information on broader developments in Kottiyar Pattu. 
 
Chronicles 
Sri Lanka is peculiar in having been blessed (or cursed, depending on one’s 
perspective) with a tradition of chronicle-writing that goes back to at least the fourth 
century AD. The most prominent chronicles are the 4th-century Dipavamsa, the 6th-
century Mahavamsa, and the Culavamsa (which is a continuation of the Mahavamsa), 
produced in several stages from 12th century AD onwards – the last expansion was 
written in the late 1970s, on orders of President Jayawardene. Apart from the main 
chronicles there is a range of minor chronicles, among which are the Dathavamsa 
which describes the arrival of the Tooth Relic in Sri Lanka, the Dhatuvamsa which 
pays elaborate attention to the temple at Seruwila, and the Rajavaliya, a fairly hard-
line Sinhala-Buddhist rendition of the history of the Sinhala royal lineages31. In the 
Eastern Province, a range of local chronicles developed in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Among these are the Konesar Kalvettu (Nevill 1887b; Akilesapillai 2000), Dakshina 
Kailasapuranam and Thirukonasala Puranam (Pathmanathan 2006b), which deal with 
                                                 
 
30 I am grateful to Mr. Rasaratnam’s daughter for telling me about the stories, to his son 
(who lives outside Kottiyar Pattu) for giving me photocopies of most of Mr. Rasaratnam’s 
remaining books (many were lost in the violence of 1990), and to my research assistant for 
translating the texts. Regretfully, a follow-up interview that I had wanted to conduct with 
Mr. Rasaratnam’s daughter was not possible, as she was killed in the violence of August 
2006.  
31 Dipavamsa, Mahavamsa, Culavamsa and Dathavamsa have a subdivision in chapters and 
verses. Mahavamsa, chapter 12, verse 12 is therefore referred to as (Mahavamsa XII: 12). The 
Rajavaliya and the translation that I have of Dhatuvamsa have no such subdivision. In these 
cases, I refer to page numbers in the 1900 English edition of the Rajavaliya and the 1946 
Sinhala edition of the Dhatuvamsa. 
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Trincomalee District, and the Mattakalappu Manmiyam (Kamalanathan and 
Kamalanathan 2005; McGilvray 2008: 55-96) which deals with present-day Batticaloa 
and Ampara Districts). 
While the chronicles do describe historical events and historical people, and 
therefore have value for historians, the texts should be treated with utmost caution. 
The chronicles are not neutral annals; they were very much intended to present own 
glory at the expense of the ‘other’, irrespective of whether the ‘other’ was a rival 
monks’ order, a rival monarchy from South India or from another part of Sri Lanka, 
a colonial power, or a rival caste. Own virtues and opponents’ vices were 
highlighted, and poetic freedom allowed for mythical embellishments to further 
strengthen the author’s argument. The problem for the historian is that descriptions 
of actual events and embellishments are never separated, and it is thus impossible to 
fully separate history from myth (Kemper 1991; Trainor 1997; McGilvray 2008: 55-96; 
Gunawardana 1990 and 1995; Obeyesekere 1984: 361-380; Goonasekera 2007). Still, it 
is possible to triangulate the chronicles with other archaeological and historical 
evidence and distill a core chronology. Secondly, casual details outside the main 
storyline can be highly informative – such as the reference to copper mined in 
Seruwila being used for the construction of a dagaba in Anuradhapura in the 2nd 
century BC (see section 2.3.2). Thirdly, the chronicles can tell us much about the 
socio-political context in which they were written – such as about inter-caste rivalry 
and Muslim-Mukkuvar relationships in the case of the Mattakalappu Manmiyam 
(McGilvray 2008).  
 
Physical remains 
While physical remains (buildings, ruins, statues, inscriptions) can give very useful 
clues about an area’s history, they should not be looked at uncritically. Statues can 
be moved, buildings and ruins re-designated, and inscriptions can be faked or 
tampered with. Estimating the age of ruins, statues and inscriptions can be very 
difficult, because the harsh climate can cause anything to weather almost beyond 
recognition within a matter of months. Shortly after the Sri Lankan military had 
chased the LTTE out of Kottiyar Pattu, a group of government officials and religious 
dignitaries visited a hill 5 km south of Muthur in an attempt to resolve competing 
ethno-religious claims to the significance of the place (see section 3.5 for a more 
detailed description). During the visit, an inscription was found which the Sinhala 
Buddhists among the group claimed to be proof of ancient Buddhist roots. However, 
one of the non-Buddhists in the group later told me that the dust and rock chips of 
the carving of the inscription were still lying around; this man claimed that the 
inscription was a fake. I do not know which of the claims is correct. Several years 
earlier, people working in the adjoining rock quarry site had told me there was an 
inscription; my research assistant and I made a sweaty, and ultimately failed attempt 
to get to the top of the hill to see it. This may have been a different inscription: the 
people who told us about the inscription insisted that the inscription was in European 
lettering. They could read the characters, but were unable to understand what it 
said. Similarly, a number of temples in the area (both Buddhist and Hindu) display 
carved stones that seem very ancient, but the age of which is hard to estimate. 
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Oral accounts 
In contrast to other sources of information, oral accounts can be told by ordinary 
people, and may provide both elite and subaltern perspectives on the past. However, 
oral accounts are complicated because they “represent the sedimentation of memory 
in selective and often unconscious ways”, and are “entrammeled within the thickets 
of local cunning and subterfuge” (Sundar 2004: 154). More fundamentally, oral 
accounts depend on the availability of narrators to tell the story. That this premise is 
of crucial importance in Sri Lanka’s war zone was driven home forcefully one day 
when I was interviewing the key-holder of an old Hindu temple in 
Thampalakamam, a part of Trincomalee District that has historical links with 
Kottiyar Pattu (see section 2.3.6): 
 
One morning, looking for information on the history of the Thampalakamam 
area and on caste links with Kottiyar Pattu, my research assistant and I visit the 
beautiful, three centuries old, Adhi Konesar temple in Thampalakamam. As we 
make some conversation with the few people (all elderly men) who are present 
in the temple, one of them suggests that we should meet the key-holder of the 
temple, as he will be able to tell us the stories we are looking for. One of the men 
gets on his bike and shows the way to one of the many islands of trees and a few 
houses that dot the landscape that otherwise consists of bright green paddy 
fields. The key-holder is at home, and he invites us in. Seated on a wooden bench 
in one of three buildings that form a compound, my assistant and myself are 
treated to a cup of tea. Three people live here: the key-holder (who is 87 years 
old), his wife, and their sixty-year old, unmarried son. After my assistant 
introduces us and explains that I’m very interested in the history of the area, the 
old man starts talking enthusiastically. All sorts of subjects are touched upon: 
how his father used to go hunting in the nearby jungles; how his grandfather 
built the oldest house in the compound (a little over a century ago); how, about 
fifty years ago, a paddy store was built as a kind of attic on top of the house that 
we are sitting in, but how it is not used anymore since the paddy is now taken 
straight to the mill and storage is no longer necessary; and how the family used 
to own 75 acres of paddy land, but has given most of it away because the father 
and his son do not have the energy anymore to cultivate all the land. We also 
talk about the history of the temple, and his own role as key-holder. The wife 
and son join in the conversation every now and then to add some details, to 
explain some things, or to repeat a question (the old man is rather deaf). 
Regularly, when I ask a question about things that happened a longer time ago, 
the man indicates that he’s getting old and he has forgotten the details, “but if 
you ask so-and-so, he will be able to tell you in much more detail than I can”. 
Invariably, the son replies with “Appa, the man you refer to is dead”. After this 
has happened a few times, the key-holder sighs that he is then the only one left 
who knows about certain things. The younger generation (he says this referring 
to his not-so-young son) is not interested in the history of the area, so it will die 
with him (field notes, February 2006). 
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This was a pattern that I came across frequently. When asking around who could tell 
me about the history of a village or an area, I was generally referred to some of the 
oldest people around, because (with the exception of a few interested younger 
people, generally members of a village-level elite) the younger people only know 
basic summaries of the popular narrative of local myths of origin. “In a South Asian 
context, knowledge, skills, and institutions do not survive from age to age through 
the unembodied transmission of ideas and practices. They are recited by one 
generation, […] and learned by the next” (Kemper 1991: 31). While I agree with 
Kemper, I argue that the problem is in the transmission. Put bluntly, history is 
knowledge transferred from the ‘almost-dying’ to those who will be ‘almost-dying’ 
in the near future. With the exception of a small elite, everybody else is too busy 
staying alive to bother. This also means that in times of disturbance (such as war or 
massive epidemics) the risk is that those who will be ‘almost-dying’ in the near 
future are too busy surviving to have time to listen to the stories of the ‘almost-
dying’, or that they die at the same time as the ‘almost-dying’. In the process, 
(hi)stories literally die out. In an area as littered with ruins and political meaning as 
Kottiyar Pattu, a subsequent process that occurs is the re-invention of history. Once, 
I was talking to an old man at the site of a small Pillaiyar shrine near Kilivetti that is 
marked as ‘ruin’ on the one inch to a mile topographical map (Survey Department 
1988). I asked him about the history of the shrine. He told me that his parents had 
told him that when their parents came to settle in the area with some others (this 
must have been somewhere in the late nineteenth century), they came across an old 
irrigation reservoir, a bo tree and a bunch of ruins, and nobody whom they asked 
knew what it was. “So they thought up a (hi)story”, to give meaning to the 
landscape that the settlers encountered (conversation, Kilivetti, October 2004). 
Following the settlement of Sinhalese in the Allai Extension Scheme in the 1950s, 
alternative interpretations of the encountered landscape developed. These 
interpretations became increasingly competitive and politically charged, particularly 
from the early 1970s onwards, when Sinhala nationalist discourses claiming the 
North-East as originary Sinhala-Buddhist territory gathered momentum (with open 
support from influential members of successive governments), and Tamil counter-
discourses about a ‘Tamil homeland’ equally gained in strength. At this point, some 
people in Kilivetti decided to neutralise the contesting (hi)story by removing the 
only element that was being claimed as Buddhist (and thus as Sinhala). In 1976, the 
bo tree disappeared (idem: 148-160, see also section 4.2.1). 
What follows below is my interpretation of all the bits and pieces of information that 
I came across, and an attempt to put them into a more or less cohesive narrative on 
Kottiyar Pattu’s history. In order to do justice to the wide variety in contemporary 
local narratives that exists, I present and contrast four such narratives in chapter 5. 
Note that I do not discuss the recent history of violent conflict here; that is dealt with 
in chapter 4. 
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2.3.2 Early history: copper mining, dagabas and Sinhala myths of origin 
Copper 
Kottiyar Pattu was an area of some importance from very early on in Sri Lanka’s 
documented history. The oldest written reference to the area is made in the 
Mahavamsa. In chapter 28, passing reference is made to copper being mined in the 
area during the reign of king Dutugemunu (161-137 BC), who is credited with 
having been the first to establish control over the whole of Sri Lanka. One of the 
things that Dutugemunu did after capturing the throne in Anuradhapura was to 
order the construction of the Ruwanweliseya dagaba (Mahavamsa XXVIII:1 – XXXIII:5; 
Nāuyana Ariyadhamma Maha Thera 2002). The copper that was required for the 
dagaba came from a place called Tambapittha, “seven yojanas East of Anuradhapura, 
on the other side of the river” (Mahavamsa XXVIII: 16,17). There is no doubt that 
Tambapittha refers to Seruwila, where copper ore can still be found32. This would 
mean that people were working, and probably living, there at the time, and that 
there were existing logistical links with Anuradhapura.  
Because Seruwila was the only place where copper ore was found south of Madhya 
Pradesh in India, regional powers may have had some strategic interest in the place 
from very early on. During excavations in the ancient port town of Mantota (present-
day Mantai, just north of Mannar on the north-west coast of Sri Lanka), some slag 
(refuse from the melting of copper ore) was found among material that was dated to 
around 1,800 BC. According to Siran Deraniyagala (n.d.), this might mean that 
copper was already mined at Seruwila almost four thousand years ago, and shipped 
to India via Mantota. If this hypothesis is correct, there was a fairly developed 
society present in Sri Lanka at least a millennium before Vijaya, the mythical genitor 
of Sinhala civilisation, is claimed to have landed in Sri Lanka. 
 
The temple at Seruwila 
More elaborate attention to Seruwila is given by the Dhatuvamsa, a chronicle that was 
originally written in the early 13th century. According to this chronicle, Kavanthissa 
(Dutugemunu’s father) built a dagaba at Seruwila in order to fulfil a prophecy that he 
would enshrine the forehead relic of the Buddha there. Seruwila, the chronicle 
claims, was one of the sixteen places that the Buddha visited on his three trips to Sri 
Lanka, and is therefore of particular sanctity.  
                                                 
 
32 A yojana is an ancient Indian measurement of distance, equivalent to something between 
13 and 16 kilometres (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yojana). Seven yojanas would thus be 
something between 90 and 113 km. As the crow flies, the distance between Anuradhapura 
and Seruwila (centre of dagaba to centre of dagaba, measured using Google Earth) is about 
102 kilometres, and the direction is almost perfectly dead east. The “river” that is referred to 
must be the Mahaweli Ganga.  
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While this claim is not uncontested33, the Seruwila described in the Dathuvamsa does 
seem to be the same as present-day Seruwila34. Monk’s caves around the temple with 
inscriptions dating back to the second century BC (Dias 1991: 25, 26, 68) lend 
chronological credence to such a hypothesis.  
Because the story of the temple’s founding has been an important element in local 
Sinhala narratives over the past decades, I treat it in some detail. 
At the time that the temple was built, Kottiyar Pattu formed the northern extremity 
of the kingdom of Rohana, with its capital near present-day Tissamaharama. The 
Mahaweli River formed a natural boundary between Rohana and the Anuradhapura 
kingdom, which was controlled by Elara, a wise but foreign (South Indian) king who 
                                                 
 
33 Kemper (1991: 149, n.34) notes that other traditions do not include Seruwila among the 16 
places visited by the Buddha, and that these traditions locate the forehead relic in 
Tissamaharama instead of in Seruwila.  
34 Quite separate from whether or not the forehead relic was enshrined in Seruwila, I do not 
share Kemper’s scepticism regarding the identification of the Seruwila temple as the temple 
described in the Dhatuvamsa. The alternative site that he refers to is far away from the mouth 
of the river, where ships laden with treasures were discovered that helped to cover the 
construction expenses (Dhatuvamsa: 40). 
Figure 2.5. The temple at Seruwila during the annual temple festival, August 2007 (own photograph) 
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would later be fought and killed by Dutugemunu. Over time, this boundary had 
become marked by religious edifices that may have served to visualise claims to 
space: the Dhatuvamsa credits Kavanthissa’s father Gotabhaya with building 500 
temples on one side and 500 temples on the other side of the Mahaweli River 
(Dhatuvamsa: 23). Kavanthissa is subsequently credited with positioning military 
guards at the fordable places across the river (Mahavamsa XXIII:16), in order to stop 
incursions by troops from Anuradhapura. The construction of the temple at Seruwila 
must be seen in this context of ongoing (and increasing) tensions that escalated into 
full-scale war within years after the relics were enshrined in the temple. It is 
interesting to note the contrast in the description of Kavanthissa’s actions between 
the Mahavamsa and the Dhatuvamsa. The Mahavamsa (which does not mention the 
Seruwila temple at all) depicts Kavanthissa as a coward who refused to engage 
Elara: Dutugemunu sent his father a set of women’s clothes to let him know how he 
thought about him, and subsequently fled to Malayarata, the mountainous region in 
the centre of Sri Lanka (Mahavamsa XXIV:3-7), where he remained until after his 
father’s funeral (Mahavamsa XXIV:16-17). According to the Dhatuvamsa, Dutugemunu 
was sent to a place called Girinuwara by his father, to stay with Kavanthissa’s sister 
Soma Devi and her husband (Giri) Abhaya (Dhatuvamsa: 32). No mention is made of 
any conflict between father and son. Since the name Girinuwara means something 
like ‘rock city’, it might well refer to a place somewhere in the mountains, and thus 
both chronicles may have documented the same journey. While Dutugemunu was in 
Girinuwara, a conflict developed between him and Abhaya. In order to avoid a fight, 
Abhaya and his wife moved to stay with his friend king Siva of Serunuwara, 
together with a full complement of soldiers. Siva welcomed them, and built a new 
settlement for them “on a beautiful land beside a lake”, which was called 
Somanuwara after the queen (Dhatuvamsa: 33). Foreseeing that Kavanthissa did not 
have much longer to live, a monk reminded him of a prophecy by the Buddha 
himself, namely that a king called Kavanthissa would enshrine his forehead bone 
relic in a temple near the banks of lake Seru on the right bank of the Mahaweli river. 
Kavanthissa thus called Dutugemunu back to Mahagama, handed over royal 
authority to his son, and went to Seruwila. There, he got the support of Abhaya, Siva 
of Serunuwara, and a certain Mahanaga (or Mahanama) of Lonanuwara.  
In the version of history as re-told by the University of Ceylon History of Ceylon 
(UCHC; vol. I, part I: 150, cited in Kemper 1991: 150), Kavanthissa is neither a 
coward nor simply a religious old man, but a very strategic operator. Having put his 
son in charge of day-to-day operations in the kingdom, Kavanthissa proceeded to 
the kingdom of Seru with his army in order to ensure the regional king’s allegiance 
in the upcoming war against Elara. Publicly announcing the plan to build a temple 
and enshrine relics of the Buddha with the (requested) help of the people of Seru 
was a mere ruse to ensure obedience: nobody wants to be accused of opposing a 
benign act of religiosity, particularly if some of the most important relics of the 
Buddha are involved. In this way, Kavanthissa established his control over this 
strategic border region without having to fight for it.  
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Unfortunately, I do not know on which sources the authors of the UCHC based their 
version of events. While the analysis sounds plausible, I am therefore a little 
reluctant to accept it unhesitatingly. 
After the site for the dagaba was miraculously pointed out by bulls, horses and an 
elephant, preparations for construction began (Dhatuvamsa: 37-8). Kavanthissa’s next 
worry was how to get the required materials without unduly burdening the people 
living in the area. Fortunately for him, the gods were in his favour, and organised a 
pile of bricks on the land of a poor Brahmin, who was promptly rewarded with 
many treasures for passing them on to the king (Dhatuvamsa: 39). Subsequently, four 
ships laden with gold mysteriously appeared at the mouth of the river. The guard 
who found them, was rewarded with many treasures, and the gold was used to 
finance the construction of the temple and to make a wealth of decorations for the 
relic chamber (Dhatuvamsa: 40)35. With divine help, the temple was finished quickly. 
The Dhatuvamsa’s narrative ends with a description of an elaborate inauguration 
ceremony (Dhatuvamsa: 40-3).  
Apart from the obvious importance of the Seruwila temple as marker of the start of 
Buddhism in Kottiyar Pattu, there are three other conclusions that can be drawn 
from the early references to the area. First of all, Kottiyar Pattu was sufficiently 
strategically important to warranta visit by king Kavanthissa himself. Secondly, 
Kottiyar Pattu was already inhabited by non-Buddhists: vide the claim of queen 
Soma Devi that there was no Buddhist temple in the area (Dhatuvamsa: 33), the 
reference to a Brahmin owning the field where the bricks were found (Dhatuvamsa: 
39), and the fact that both regional kings who are mentioned (Siva and Mahanaga) 
have Hindu names (Dhatuvamsa: 38). Thirdly, the fact that copper from Seruwila was 
used to build the Ruwanveliseya dagaba within decades after the construction of the 
Seruwila temple seems to hint at a reasonable extent of incorporation into the larger 
economy and administrative organisation of Sri Lanka. 
 
Ilankaithurai/Lankapatuna 
The second major site of current (Buddhist) politico-religious value in Kottiyar Pattu 
can be found in the hamlet of Seenanveli36, on the north shore of the lagoon mouth 
near Ilankaithurai (Tamil for “Port of Lanka”, or “Ceylon Jetty” as someone once 
poetically translated it for me).  The fame of the place comes from the claim that it 
was once a major port with the name Lankapatuna (Sinhala for “Port of Lanka” or 
                                                 
 
35 Note the similarities with the Mahavamsa’s description of the construction of the 
Ruwanveliseya Dagaba: the king not wanting to tax the people, first bricks and then 
precious metals being miraculously provided, and divine assistance with the logistics of the 
construction. 
36 Seenanveli means “the field of the Chinese” in Tamil. The origin of the name is shrouded 
in mystery. A Chinese armada did visit Sri Lanka several times in the thirteenth century 
(Viviano, 2005), but I did not come across any local narratives referring to these events. 
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“Place of Lanka”). It was here that the Tooth Relic of the Buddha (now housed in 
Kandy) arrived in Sri Lanka somewhere around the year 370 AD, en route from a 
port town somewhere in India to Anuradhapura (Dathavamsa IV:41, IV:56, V:3). The 
description of the journey given in the Dathavamsa is conducive to such an 
interpretation, which was first pronounced after a visit by the Archaeological Survey 
Department in 1962 (Solheim and Deraniyagala 1972: 4, 21). 
I first visited the place in 2001, when it was still under LTTE control. At the time, it 
was merely a rocky outcrop on the outskirts of a hamlet called Seenanveli. There was 
a small Murugan temple next to it, and – so I was told – some small old statues on 
top. On the other side of the lagoon mouth, there was another Hindu temple, 
perched on what is arguably one of Sri Lanka’s most beautiful beaches. Not long 
after the 2002 ceasefire, a group of about 20 Sinhala Buddhist architects and 
engineers suddenly showed up, and started working out plans for a pansala in front 
of a startled group of Tamil villagers. They were so offended by the arrogance of the 
group, that the statues were smashed up no sooner the Sinhalese left, with obvious 
support of the local LTTE leadership (conversation with NGO staff working in 
Seenanveli at the time, 2002).  
After the Sri Lankan army captured the area from the LTTE in late 2006, Sarath N. 
Silva (Sri Lanka’s Chief Justice at the time, and a prominent member of the Society 
for the Development of the [Seruwila] Mangala Maha Chaitiya) was taken on an 
Figure 2.6. The newly constructed shrine at Lankapatuna, August 2007 (own photograph) 
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inspection tour, during which he ‘discovered’ the site of the Lankapatuna 
Samudragiri vihara. Subsequently, the army built a small dagaba, and a place for a 
monk to stay. Since then, the place has seen a steady trickle of pilgrims (see figure 
2.6). The Hindu temple next to the rock on which the dagaba was built has been 
destroyed. Another Hindu temple on the other side of the lagoon mouth was fenced 
off with barbed wire and inaccessible when I visited the place in August 2007. 
Apart from the ruins at Seruwila and Seenanveli, almost every Sinhala village, as 
well as a few non-Sinhala villages, in Kottiyar Pattu has some kind of ruin: an earth 
mound that looks like a dagaba, some carved rocks, or a Buddha statue. In the rocky 
outcrops in Eechchilampattu DS Division, a few man-made caves can be found that 
seem to have been inhabited at some point in time. Little is known about these 
remains.   
 
2.3.3 Chola influence (1017-1070) and Kulakkottan 
Trading port between Polonnaruwa and Thanjavur 
In the first millennium AD the town of Trincomalee, also known as Gokarna, seems 
to have seen quite some trade with other ports in the Bay of Bengal. According to the 
Mahavamsa (XXXVII: 40-1), Mahasena destroyed a Hindu temple in Gokarna and 
replaced it with a Buddhist vihara37 in the third century AD. Two centuries later, the 
Vayupurana documents the existence of “a great temple of Sankara named Gokarna” 
on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka (Pathmanathan 2006b: 59). In the seventh century, 
the Indian sage Sampanthar described Trincomalee as a “spacious and prosperous 
[town] supporting a large population” (idem: 61). Together with Manthai in the 
north-west (which served trade with Madurai and long-distance trade with Europe 
and China), Trincomalee seems to have been a key trading centre for the 
Anuradhapura kingdom. 
Towards the end of the tenth century the kingdom that was centred in 
Anuradhapura collapsed, and the capital shifted to Polonnaruwa. Not long 
afterwards, the Cholas from South India (who, as well as the Pandiyans – another 
South Indian kingdom – had been making brief forays into Sri Lanka since the 
middle of the ninth century but always retreated again) annexed large parts of Sri 
Lanka. They remained in charge until 1070 (De Silva 2003: 61). Because the Mahaweli 
river flowed right past Polonnaruwa, Kottiyar at the mouth of the river was a key 
port. The quickest way to travel between Polonnaruwa and the Chola capital 
Thanjavur was to sail down the Mahaweli River to Kottiyar, then cross the sea, land 
at one of the towns in the Cauvery delta, and sail up the Cauvery River to Thanjavur 
                                                 
 
37 This reference was used as justification for the construction of a Buddhist temple in the 
fort of Trincomalee, despite the total lack of archaeological evidence. Hoole contends that 
there were other places with the name Gokarna, and this particular reference may refer to 
another place with the same name (Hoole 2001: 75-77). 
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(map 2.6). Copper from Seruwila may have been shipped to the Chola kingdom for 
use in some of the intricate brass statues that can still be seen in the National Art 
Gallery in Chennai. 
During the period of Chola domination, Kottiyar Pattu seems to have had a 
somewhat special position. Among many inscriptions documenting tax obligations 
of foreign territories to the Rajarajesvara temple in Thanjavur, there is only one that 
refers to Sri Lanka (figure 2.7). This inscription (no. 92) documents that five villages 
from the areas of Mappisumbu-Kottiyaram (also called Rajaraja-valanadu) and 
Kanakkan-Kottiyaram (also called Vikrama-Chola-valanadu), identified as together 
covering the area that later was called Kottiyar Pattu, were paying tributes to the 
temple during the reign of Rajaraja I, who reigned from 983 to 1014 AD (Hultsch and 
Venkayya 1992 [1916]; de Silva 2003:25). Unfortunately, except for one (Masar – 
which does not sound like any contemporary village in the area), the names of the 
villages cannot be identified because the inscription has been damaged. The 
inscription does however underscore that the area was of some importance to the 
Chola kings. Of further interest is the fact that the tributes were to be paid partly in 
Map 2.6. Key places and shipping routes in mediaeval Sri Lanka and South India 
Thanjavur 
Madurai 
Karaikal 
Manthai 
Polonnaruwa 
Anuradhapura Kottiyar 
Mahaweli River 
Cauvery River 
Bay of Bengal 
Gulf of Mannar 
Palk Strait 
Indian Ocean 
  Kottiyar Pattu – the study area 
61 
   
paddy, partly in cash, and partly in iluppai-pāl (“the milk of the iluppai tree”, a kind 
of oil that was used for burning the lamps in the temple), whereas most villages 
mentioned in other inscriptions were to pay in gold or money. From this, it might be 
possible to infer that significant amounts of paddy were produced in Kottiyar Pattu. 
Since Kottiyar was a key trading port, the alternative interpretation that there was 
not enough cash in circulation seems unlikely. 
  
Kulakkottan 
The fact that villages in Kottiyar Pattu were tributable to the temple in Thanjavur 
gives the impression that they most probably were not tributable to any major 
temple in the area itself, which brings me to the starting point of local Tamil myths 
of origin: the rule of a king called Kulakkottan. Documented in the 17th-century 
Konesar Kalvettu38, the myth explaining the arrival of Tamils in Trincomalee District 
states that Kulakkottan, a man of royal (Chola) blood, renovated the Koneswaram 
temple in Trincomalee. After doing so, he brought settlers: thirty tanattaar families 
                                                 
 
38 This chronicle was probably written after Rajasinha II had supported the construction of a 
new Konesar temple in Thampalakamam, following the destruction of the original Konesar 
temple in Trincomalee town (Velupillai 1990). 
Figure 2.7. Inscription about Kottiyar Pattu, Thanjavur (own photograph) 
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from Marungur39, north of the Cauvery river, who were to administer the temple 
and perform ritual roles (Pathmanathan 2006b: 70 mentions only six families), and 
twenty-one varipattaar families from Karaikal (nowadays part of Pondicherry), south 
of the Cauvery river, who were to perform menial chores in the service of the 
temple. In order to supply the temple with income, he renovated irrigation 
infrastructure, and brought the irrigated fields under the ownership of the temple. 
Kulakkottan assigned to each village in the district the tributes it was to pay to the 
temple: rice, oil, flowers, milk, and so on. Kottiyar Pattu was assigned to annually 
provide the temple with 100 amunam (roughly 10 metric tonnes) of rice40, as well as 
fruit, flowers, plantains, milk and curd.  
In addition, Kulakkottan is claimed to have brought down a vanniyar from either 
Madurai or the Chola kingdom, to serve as local ruler for what is now Trincomalee 
District (Nevill 1887b; Veluppillai 1990; Pathmanathan 2006b; McGilvray 2008: 80).  
The administrative system that Kulakkottan put in place seems to have largely 
survived until the arrival of the Portuguese (De Queyroz 1992 [1930/1687]: 736), and 
was replaced by a similar system after the Portuguese destroyed the Koneswaram 
temple in 1624 (see section 2.3.6). To this very day, some caste communities in 
Kottiyar Pattu claim to be descendants from the settlers brought by Kulakkottan, and 
place names like Mallikaithivu (“Jasmine island”) and Sandanavettai (“Plot with 
sandalwood trees”) refer to particular items that were to be supplied to the Konesar 
temple. 
While nobody seems to doubt that Kulakkottan was a historical person, there is 
much debate about who this Kulakkottan was and when he lived. Staunch Tamil 
nationalists date him to a period before the arrival of Vijaya. Others date him to the 
                                                 
 
39 Marungur has not been identified. Veluppillai (1990) has suggested that it may be the 
same as the present-day town of Marunkapuri, in Trichy District. I have found two places in 
Tamil Nadu that are still called Marungur: one, which has an old temple, is located not far 
from Nagarcoil in the deep south of Tamil Nadu (which disqualifies it as a possibility). The 
other is an insignificant hamlet near Cuddalore, north of the Cauvery delta. Geographically, 
this hamlet fits the description perfectly. Just before I finalised this dissertation, Dennis 
McGilvray sent me a newspaper article about ancient remains that have been found at this 
place (‘Tamil Brahmi potsherds found at urn burial site’, The Hindu, 05-03-2010). According 
to the article, an ancient habitational mound is evidence that this Marungur has been 
inhabited by people since the first century BC; the potsherds are evidence that some of them 
were literate. 
40 An amunam is a measure for weight, and equals about 5 to 6 bushels, or about 105 to 125 
kilograms of unhusked paddy. The term has been in use for centuries as a measure of 
cultivated area: an amunam of paddy fields equals the area that can be cultivated using an 
amunam of seed paddy. One amunam equals 2 ½ acres or about one hectare 
(http://www.mnlaw.lk/pages/MEASURES.html, accessed 9-11-2009). This makes sense; 
farmers whom I asked how much seed paddy they use generally told me they use 2 bushels 
per acre.  
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middle of the first millennium AD (a few hundred years before Aggabodhi II whom 
I will return to later), while yet others identify him as a contemporary of Magha of 
Kalinga, who overran Sri Lanka in the first quarter of the thirteenth century 
(Veluppillai 1990; Pathmanathan (ed.) 2006a). Veluppillai identifies him as Chola-
Lankeswara (this means ‘the Chola lord of Lanka’). This man was the viceroy in 
charge of the Chola possessions in Sri Lanka in the middle of the 11th century, 
“before he was called upon to assume the Imperial crown as Vira Rajendra in 1063 
AD” (Veluppillai 1990:97). Pathmanathan stresses the point that the Konesar Kalvettu 
should not be seen as a rigidly chronological document (interview, Kandy, Octiber 
2008; see also Pathmanathan 2006b:72). It is very well possible that things that 
happened earlier or later in time were ascribed to Kulakkottan. Still, with regard to 
the formal settlement of people from the Chola kingdom, Veluppillai’s dating of 
Kulakkottan seems to make sense. I doubt that Kottiyar Pattu would have been 
made tributable to both the temple in Thanjavur and the Koneswaram temple at the 
same time. Perhaps a form of decentralisation took place after Rajendra Chola I 
(1012-1044) shifted the capital to Gangaikonda Cholapuram. On top of this, the 
available legends subsequently credit king Gajabahu II, who ruled from 1132 to 1153 
and who subsequently retired to Kantale, with “invit[ing] service castes to come and 
settle in Trincomalee. Five families each of blacksmiths, potters, barbers, washermen 
and drummers were settled with house sites and cultivable land, and were 
designated as service castes of Kōnēsvaram temple” (ibid.). Settling service castes 
without first settling high castes makes no sense. 
As with many other kings, Kulakkottan is claimed to have been involved in the 
construction of irrigation reservoirs. The reservoir that he is most often associated 
with is the tank at Kantale, which has been a Brahmin agricultural settlement since at 
least the Chola period (Pathmanathan 2006c: 199). This association is contested: 
according to the Sinhala chronicles, this reservoir was built during the rule of king 
Aggabodhi II (606-618 AD), and later rehabilitated during the rule of king 
Parakkamabahu I (1153-1186 AD)41. It may well be that Kulakkottan was involved in 
repair works or extension works, but I doubt that he constructed the entire tank. 
                                                 
 
41 In May 2006, this claim was visualised by the construction of a statue of king Aggabodhi II 
on the reservoir bund under the leadership of the Member of Parliament for Kantale, a 
member of the Sinhala nationalist JVP, and chairman of the irrigation committee for the 
Kantale irrigation scheme. The construction of the statue was evidently a slap in the face of 
the Tamil population of Trincomalee District. At the same time, a group of nationalist 
Sinhala Buddhists set up a Buddha statue on the Trincomalee bus stand. This generated 
much controversy, and was the cause of many months of tension, hartals and violence in 
Trincomalee. A court case to get the statue removed ran into a stalemate when the order was 
given to remove all illegal religious structures in Trincomalee – most of which were Hindu 
shrines, and some of which had been put up by powerful Tamil leaders. The leader of the 
Tamil opposition to the statue, Mr. Vigneswaran, was killed in April 2006, presumably by 
forces linked to the state. Note that the location of the Buddha statue was entirely 
inappropriate: it is next to the fish market (where living beings are being killed), and very 
close to a bar. No orthodox Buddhist would think of putting up a place of worship in such a 
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In the Konesar Kalvettu, Kulakkottan is linked to the Allai tank in Kottiyar Pattu: 
 
“In the fourth year [after the Koneswaram temple was finished], the great tank 
was made, and the waters of the Maha Vili river, where the Sêr fish leap, 
conducted to it, and distributed in five directions.  
He invoked as guardian of the sluice Paravi Vênthan, the Green Mâl who sleeps 
on the Milky Ocean, and the Vênthan,  Mâyan who slept on the Pântal (serpent) 
awoke, and opened the sluice, and said, ‘you have laboriously made a tank, in 
Ilankai Tivu for the Konai Linkar of the perfume-wafting Red Hair-lock One, 
and thus gained boundless felicity.’ 
Circling the five-handed Pulleâr, the king then saw the beauty of the waters that 
filled up the hollows, and finding it sufficient as an endowment, he thanked the 
gods that he was permitted to see the ever-full Sêr-fish skimmed tank.  
[…] 
The Manar-manan thus irrigated 2,700 amunams of land, and greatly extended 
the flower forests that yielded honey.” (Nevill 1887b:173-174) 
 
Nevill identifies this as the Allai tank, on account of the water originating from the 
Mahaweli River (I do not know if Nevill knew that there actually is an ancient 
channel connecting the Mahaweli to the Kantale tank). Apart from this, he interprets 
the mention of the “Sêr-fish” as a mistaken attempt by the kalvettu’s author to 
establish an ethymological explanation for the lake’s old name of “Sêru-wâ-wila” 
(idem: 176). I agree with Nevill’s interpretation for an entirely different reason. The 
command area of the tank is mentioned to be 2,700 amunam, which is about 2,700 ha. 
This was about the command area of the Allai tank before the Allai Extension 
Scheme was implemented, while the Kantale tank had a much larger command area. 
De Queyroz claims that “in two fields alone […] called Tambalagâma and Gantale 
they sowed in those days [prior to the destruction of the Koneswaram temple in 
Trincomalee in 1624 – TG] in each of them 10,000 amanões of nele […], and that twice 
a year. “ (Queyroz 1992 [1930/1687]:68,69). 
This link is interesting, because it is the only reference I know of that links 
Kulakkottan to the Allai tank, and because the Dutchman Van Senden, writing 
around the time that the chronicle was written, explicitly links Kulakkottan to the 
Kantale tank, but has nothing to say about the origins of the Allai tank which he also 
visited (Van Senden 1786b). If there is any historical truth in the story, this would 
directly link Kulakkottan to Kottiyar Pattu and confirm local myths of origin. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
defiled place, and that is what makes many Tamils believe there are other, political forces 
behind the whole issue. Due to the tensions over the ‘Trincomalee Buddha statue’, the 
construction of the statue of Aggabodhi II was kept on hold for several months, but it has 
since been completed. 
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2.3.4 Between the Cholas and the Portuguese (1070-1620) 
By the year 1070, the Cholas had been expelled from Sri Lanka. Polonnaruwa was 
the capital of an independent kingdom until Magha of Kalinga dealt it its death blow 
about 180 years later (De Silva 2003: 60-4). As long as Polonnaruwa was the capital of 
Sri Lanka, Kottiyar (or Kotthasāra as it is called in the Culavamsa) remained an 
important port (Pali Dictionary n.y., entry for Kotthasāra). Because of its strategic 
importance, the Sinhala rulers of Polonnaruwa maintained a garrison of elite 
Velaikkarar mercenaries (of Chola origin) and mercenaries from Kerala in Kottiyar. 
During times of internal conflict, both Vikkamabahu I and Gajabahu II (who 
converted to Hinduism, actively supported the spread of Hindu teaching by 
bringing in people from South India, and ended his days in the Brahmin settlement 
at Kantale) sought refuge in Kottiyar, which could be reached easily from 
Polonnaruwa, and from where – in case of extreme emergency – it was possible to 
escape to India (Culavamsa LXI: 43, LXX: 355, LXXI: 6, 11, LXXIV: 44).  
There is only one reference to the presence of Sinhalese in the area, dated to 
somewhere around 1155 AD. Around this time, the “Sihala and Kerala (mercenaries) 
dwelling in Kotthasara banded themselves together with the Velakkara force” 
(Culavamsa LXXIV: 44-9), and decided to capture Polonnaruwa while 
Parakramabahu I had sent most of his troops out to conquer Rohana. After he had 
put down the uprising, Parakramabahu I withdrew the local ruling rights from the 
mercenaries, granted autonomous status to some villages, and declared other 
villages to be royal property. 
Several years later, the “Damila kings, Maghinda and Jayabahu,” built fortifications 
in Kottiyar and Kantale, as in many other places (Culavamsa LXXXIII: 15, 20). Tamil 
and Kerala soldiers were stationed there, until a Sinhala army chased them away. If 
Geiger’s identification of these kings as Magha of Kalinga and Vijayabahu III is 
correct, the construction of these fortifications took place around 1230 AD.  
It may well be that the Seruwila temple was abandoned during the reign of Magha, 
who is claimed to have destroyed a wide range of Buddhist temples (Rajavaliya: 62), 
and who local traditions closely associate with turmoil in Batticaloa District, where 
the Mukkuvar rose to power around the same time (McGilvray 2008). The 
Dhatuvamsa, which was probably composed not long after Magha’s rule, is the last 
description that was made of the Seruwila temple for a long time. One of its 
objectives may have been to preserve the tradition of a temple that had been 
destroyed, just like the Konesar Kalvettu did for the Koneswaram temple (Veluppillai 
1990). The Sri Lamkadvipaye Kadaim, a detailed description of the geography of Sri 
Lanka and its important places that was written sometime around 1344 AD 
(Abeyawardana 1999: 47), mentions Kotthasara as a separate administrative unit, but 
makes no mention of the temple at Seruwila. The same is true for two fairly detailed 
descriptions of Trincomalee District that were written by VOC officials in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (De Graauwe 1676; Van Senden 1786b). 
Bridging troubled waters?  
66 
 
After the reign of Magha, the Polonnaruwa kingdom disintegrated. Over the next 
two centuries, the capital was shifted southwestward in several steps. By the middle 
of the fifteenth century, three separate kingdoms had developed in Kotte (near 
Colombo), Kandy and Jaffna. It seems that at this time, Kottiyar Pattu was part of a 
more or less autonomous region that roughly overlapped with present-day 
Trincomalee District. It was ruled by vanniyars who paid tribute to whichever of the 
three kingdoms was dominant42. A fourteenth-century inscription that was found at 
the Agasthiyar Stabanam, near Kankuveli43, indicates that the Trincomalee vanniyar 
had control over Kottiyar Pattu. It records the granting of grazing land (or grazing 
rights) by the vanniyar of Trincomalee to temple of Konainathan in Kankuveli, in the 
presence of the seven adappar (the priests who served in the Koneswaram temple), 
the tanattar and the varipattar – precisely the groups that Kulakkottan was said to 
have brought into the area (interview with prof. Pathmanathan, Kandy, August 
2008; see also Nevill 1888: 26; Pathmanathan 1976: 544). 
The loss of Polonnaruwa as a hinterland for trade must have caused a significant 
economic backlash in Trincomalee District. Nevertheless, when the Portuguese 
arrived, they found a thriving agricultural society. As indicated by Farmer (1957:17), 
the theory that society in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka collapsed rapidly following the 
abandonment of Polonnaruwa (De Silva 2003: 81-4) is flawed. While the collapse of 
the Polonnaruwa kingdom did mean that many irrigation schemes in north-central 
Sri Lanka were no longer maintained and collapsed after bunds and channels 
disintegrated, some reservoirs had been built so solidly that they continued 
functioning for a long time. The large reservoir at Kaudulla (built in the 3rd century 
AD) only broke around 1680 (Pybus 2001 [1958/1762]: 36), and the Minneriya tank 
(built in the 3rd century AD) remained operational right until it was renovated in the 
1930s (Brohier 1998 [1941]: 18-39). Around Trincomalee, the Kantale tank and the 
Allai tank suffered from lack of maintenance and from periods of displacement, but 
remained operational to some extent until they were thoroughly renovated in the 
1860s (De Graauwe 1676; Van Senden 1786b, AR 1867). As mentioned above, De 
Queyroz even claimed that the Kantale tank irrigated 20,000 amunam (about 20,000 
ha) twice a year, right until the Portuguese intervention caused the displacement of 
the population. 
                                                 
 
42 De Queyroz (1992 [1930/1687]: 32) claims that all the regions of Sri Lanka paid tribute to 
the king of Kotte. This may have been a ruse to make the Portuguese believe that Kotte was 
more important than it actually was, thus preventing the Portuguese from dealing with the 
king of Jaffna or Kandy instead. 
43 Kankuveli means “field near the [Mahaweli] Gangai”. Being the largest river in the island, 
and definitely the largest river in the region, it is often simply referred to as “Gangai” (in 
Tamil) or “Ganga” (in Sinhala). 
44 Van Senden (1786b) included a transcript of this inscription in his diary, and recorded a 
(very poor) translation that someone gave him.  
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2.3.5 Portuguese presence (1621-1639) 
When, in 1505, the Portuguese established a presence in Sri Lanka, they limited their 
presence to the coastal areas of the kingdom of Kotte, up to the port town of Mannar. 
Jaffna, which was then an independent kingdom, and the east coast, which by then 
fell under the kingdom of Kandy, were not touched. Kottiyar was an important port 
for Kandy, as “clothes, opium, saltpetre and lead” were imported through it (De 
Queyroz 1992  [1930/1687]: 65). For almost a century, the Portuguese in Sri Lanka 
had no competition from other Europeans. The first time that rivalling traders from 
Europe set foot on the island was in 1602, when a small Dutch fleet under the 
leadership of Cornelis Boschhouwer landed in Batticaloa. Over the next couple of 
years, the Dutch visited Sri Lanka several more times, and established contact with 
the king of Kandy. Boschhouwer returned to Sri Lanka in 1611, when he landed in 
Kottiyar. While he was negotiating a treaty with the king in Kandy, Portuguese 
troops ambushed the troops he had left behind in Kottiyar, only to be ambushed 
themselves by Kandyan troops a few days later (Baldaeus 1996 [1703/1672]: 687). 
Trade, however, does not seem to have picked up very much. Boschhouwer, who 
saw trading potential, wanted to return to Sri Lanka. As the Vereenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie (VOC, or United East Indies Company) had its resources tied up in 
warfare in Indonesia and was not willing to fund another expedition, he linked up 
with the king of Denmark. A Danish merchant fleet landed in the Kottiyar Bay in 
1620, but Boschhouwer had died on the way. The Danish dispatched an emissary to 
meet the king of Kandy and started building a small fortress. They were not very 
lucky. The king does not seem to have been very welcoming, and as soon as the 
Portuguese heard of the arrival of the Danes, they sent troops who captured 
Trincomalee and chased the Danish fleet away (idem: 699-700; Pieris 1995 [1918] and 
1999 [1920]). After Jaffna had been conquered in 1619 (Abeyasinghe 2005), it 
suddenly became important to close off the east coast, which functioned as a ‘back 
door’ to Kandy, to competing European fleets. Fortifications were built and small 
troop concentrations were established in Trincomalee and Batticaloa: 
 
“The objective for which this fort [Trincomalee] was built at this place and for 
which it is maintained is to prevent European enemies from putting up a fort on 
this side of the island and then contact the king of Kandy and from having 
communications with him through Kottiyarama. No less important are the land 
which this fort commands [in Thampalakamam] and which could be cultivated 
if there were people enough. Nor should we fail to mention the excellent 
facilities of navigation to all ports of Bengal, Pegu, Malacca and the entire 
southern region starting from as well as returning to the Bay of Bows45” (Bocarro 
1996 [1635]: 53). 
                                                 
 
45 The Bay of Bows (Bahia dos Arcos) is the name the Portuguese gave to the Kottiyar Bay. The 
shore of this bay indeed consists of a string of small bays that look like arches. This name 
may have survived to the present day. Someone in Trincomalee once told me that China 
Bay, which covers the interior part of this bay, is a corrupted version of “Chain of bays”. 
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Apart from this, the Portuguese realised that the Trincomalee harbour is the only 
harbour in the entire Bay of Bengal where ships can be sheltered from wind and 
waves right throughout the year (ibid.). It was therefore a kind of safety net for 
anyone engaged in naval trade in the region.  
Kottiyar Pattu was of strategic value for another reason: there were salterns near 
Ilankaithurai, that provided some of the best salt in the country46. One of the key 
strategies to force Kandy into negotiations was by blocking access to sources of salt, 
which was considered a crucial resource (De Queyroz 1992 [1930/1687]: 66, 1153). As 
the salterns in Kottiyar were not captured, this strategy failed. 
The Kandyan king was not amused by the actions of the Portuguese, and neither 
were the Dutch. In 1638, the Dutch signed an agreement with king Rajasinha II to 
chase out the Portuguese from Ceylon. In the onslaught, Kottiyar and Trincomalee 
were captured in 1639, a mere 18 years after the Portuguese first set foot in 
Trincomalee. The Portuguese struck back one last time in 1640 with a raid against 
the Dutch fortification in Kottiyar, in which they massacred those present, only to be 
ambushed themselves on their way back to the west coast.  
Brief though their reign may have been, the Portuguese fundamentally altered the 
socio-political landscape of Trincomalee District. With the brashness that he became 
reputed for, Constantine de Sa de Noronha, the Portuguese captain-general of 
Ceylon, planted his fortification in Trincomalee right across the heart of local society. 
The Koneswaram temple, around which the religious, political and economic 
organisation of society in the district revolved, was destroyed and re-used as 
building material for the fort that was built right next to it. By doing so, De Sa cut the 
ritual heart out of the vanniyar-ship of Trincomalee47. As the constituent 
vanniyarships of Kottiyar Pattu, Kattukulam Pattu and Thampalakamam Pattu had 
no more obligations to the temple, the political connectedness of the district 
disintegrated. 
Not long afterwards, the Kantale tank and its paddy fields in Kantale and 
Thampalakamam were abandoned, and the population fled to Kottiyar Pattu. 
Whether this was in response to the collapse of Trincomalee, in response to attacks 
by Portuguese, or in response to a strategic decision of the king of Kandy to deprive 
                                                 
 
46 This area, a salty marsh, is known as Uppural (Tamil for ‘saltern’) to this very day, even 
though no salt is collected anymore. The distance from Kottiyar is given as 2½ leagues 
(about 15 km), which fits neatly. De Queyroz’ initial identification of the place as 
“Tamâncauarê” (Tamankaduwa) is mistaken (De Queyroz 1992 [1930/1687]: 66). De 
Graauwe’s description (1676) and several Dutch maps do show that Tamankaduwa 
stretched all the way to the coast, but this was at Vakarai. 
47 According to de Queyroz, Koneswaram even had islandwide significance as “the 
honoured sepulchre of the Kings of Cota and of the others in Ceylon, or the Urn of their 
ashes” (1992[1930/1687]: 736). If true, the desecration of the royal cemetery would have 
added significant insult to injury. 
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the Portuguese of a food-producing hinterland is not clear48. What is clear, is that by 
the time Bocarro wrote his report (less than two decades after the destruction of the 
temple), the Portuguese could only dream of harnessing the vast productivity of the 
area (Bocarro 1996 [1635]: 52). After the Kantale tank was abandoned, 
  
“the lands […] became unhealthy on account of the swamps and the water 
stagnating in those extensive plains. And for want of a garrison and ships of war, 
the [Trincomalee fort] became a cage, looking on at what entered or left for the 
profit of the Candiot [sic] without being able to do him any injury or to prevent 
him from doing any”(De Queyroz 1992 [1930/1687]: 1153). 
 
Over time, Kottiyar Pattu came firmly under the control of the Kandyan kingdom. 
Kottiyar suddenly became one of the most important ports for international trade, as 
Kandy’s access to other ports was cut off. In parallel with the decline of Trincomalee, 
Kottiyar Pattu bloomed. 
 
2.3.6 The ‘Dutch period’ (1639-1796) 
After the Dutch took control of Trincomalee in 1639, the town remained in their 
control pretty much uninterrupted until the end of the 18th century. Dutch control 
over the hinterland (including Kottiyar Pattu) varied over time. As mentioned 
above, the Dutch outpost in Kottiyar was raided in 1640, and it was not until 1668 
that control over the area was re-established under Governor van Goens the Elder. 
The cash-strapped Council of the VOC in Batavia disagreed with Van Goens’ fairly 
successful but expensive strategy aimed at colonising the entire country (De Silva 
2003: 137-141). Under Van Goens’ successor, Dutch interests shifted back from 
controlling territory to controlling trade. The areas outside the forts of Trincomalee 
and Batticaloa were given back to the king of Kandy, though small garrisons were 
maintained at Thampalakamam and Kottiyar. The second and final phase of Dutch 
control started in 1766 when, following a successful Dutch offensive, the Kandyans 
ceded control over large stretches of the coastline to the Dutch. Thirty years later, the 
Netherlands ceased to exist, having become a colony of France, and the British won 
the tussle over who should take control over the Dutch colonies. 
In 1676, during the first period of Dutch control over Kottiyar Pattu, Pieter de 
Graauwe (commander of Batticaloa, Panama, Kottiyar and Trincomalee), wrote a 
handing-over document for his successor. In it, he describes Kottiyar Pattu in four 
pages. Kottiyar Pattu consisted of “1649 villages and towns which are ruled by great 
                                                 
 
48 Pybus 2001 [1958/1762]: 25) and De Queyroz (1992[1930/1687]: 1153) seem to have thought 
that the latter possibility was the most likely one. 
49 Note that the reported number of villages is three less than the 19 reported by De Queyroz 
(1992 [1930/1687]: 65). 
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and small chiefs, and populated by 11 lineages” (De Graauwe 1676 f. 12; my 
translation). In the document, the service obligations that each caste had to the “lord 
of the land” (probably referring to the dissava who was appointed by the king of 
Kandy to govern the area) are described, followed by a description of the people’s 
obligations to the VOC: catching two elephants a year and feeding them as long as 
they are in the stables, and supplying salt as tax. The limited taxes that were levied 
do not seem to have been in line with the flourishing state of the area: a year before 
De Graauwe wrote his report, Governor Rijckloff Van Goens the Elder described 
Kottiyar Pattu as  
 
“full of people, cattle and food, and since long a famous trading port, where one 
can find 80 to 100 ships of all sorts, who call on it from Coromandel with fabrics 
and other goods, like arrack, sugar, planks, timber etc. 
This region of Kottiyar is a very fertile island, which is surrounded by the River 
on the land-side, and otherwise by the sea. 
It is full of villages, and all over it is endowed with flat meadows and paddy 
fields. Because of this, commonly some 200 to 300 lasts of rice50 are exported 
annually to Coromandel and Jaffna.  
It was inhabited by Malabars, Sinhalese, Moors, and Chetties from the opposite 
coast [i.e. Tamil Nadu], who are the most powerful here.  
In this well-sited region all the roads of the entire island [of Ceylon], both from 
the highlands and the lowlands, come together, which generates a lot of activity 
and traffic, and makes everyone prosper. 
From the King’s customs books it has appeared that over 100,000 pagodas of 
import duty has been collected on cloth, and it is important to note that only a 
minor part of it has been declared for duty. This is why we try to have the trade 
there proceed, why we have established an earthen fortress at the first place 
where one arrives and that the vessels must pass, near a populous village called 
Erkelenchene51, and why we have established another guard house on the beach 
in the Outer Bay of Trincomalee, although that fortalice will only be needed for 
one or two years, until the trade has truly picked up, after which the guard 
house can be used just for the lascorins, and then Kottiyar will be an exquisite 
granary for Trincomalee […]” (Valentijn 1726: 221, my translation). 
 
By this time, Kottiyar Pattu thus was clearly well-integrated into the national and 
regional economy through its trading port and transport network, as well as through 
its significant paddy production. This was however not to last. 110 years after De 
                                                 
 
50 A last (Dutch for “load”) initially was equal to 1,250 kg; in later years, it was equal to 2,000 
kg. The annual rice export from Kottiyar Pattu thus was somewhere between 250 and 600 
metric tons. 
51 A map of this fortalice (which could hold a maximum of several dozen people) can be 
found in the Dutch National Archives (de Graaff, ca. 1695). The map indicates that a plan 
existed to upgrade the defensive walls from earth to stone. 
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Graauwe and Van Goens wrote their reports, and nine years before the end of Dutch 
rule in Trincomalee, Junior Merchant Jacques Fabrice Van Senden wrote a very 
detailed description of the district. Van Senden was the VOC’s representative in 
Trincomalee at the time, and kept a beautifully written diary on an inspection tour 
through the entire Trincomalee district (van Senden 1786b; see Schrikker 2006 for an 
analysis of the context in which Van Senden wrote his diary). Van Senden’s 
description is one of decay, epidemics and displacement. The population of Kottiyar 
Pattu had been devastated by disease and natural disaster, and several villages had 
already been abandoned. The remaining people mostly clung on to a precarious 
existence as subsistence farmers, and there was hardly any trade with Kandy or with 
South India. 
What seems clear from these descriptions is that Kottiyar Pattu flourished during 
periods that other ports were blocked by the VOC. Around the time that the Dutch 
took control of Trincomalee, two groups of people moved into the village of Muthur. 
According to their own remembered history, the first Muslims came to Muthur 
around the year 1638; they were sent to Muthur by Rajasinha II, the king of Kandy 
with the objective of improving trade (Samad 2003: 33). In the second half of the 17th 
century (after the Dutch started persecuting Catholics on the west coast of Sri 
Lanka), a group of Roman Catholic seafarers of the Pallawilli Paravar caste settled in 
Muthur, and engaged in fishing and regional trade with other parts of Sri Lanka and 
with the coast of Tamil Nadu; when the first Catholic missionary visited Muthur in 
1697, he found a congregation of about 100 Catholics (Rasaratnam 1992; Samad 2003: 
95; De Graauwe 1676 f.14). Before they were displaced from Sri Lanka’s west coast, 
they originated from Tuticoryn52; it is quite well possible that trading links with the 
South Indian coast still existed when these people settled in Muthur.  
As the area became more and more important for the kingdom of Kandy, the king of 
Kandy increasingly staked his claims to the area. As with the Seruwila temple and 
the Koneswaram temple, this was done through the sponsoring of politico-religious 
                                                 
 
52 The Paravar of Tuticoryn were a seafaring caste. They converted to Catholicism en masse 
around 1536 in exchange for Portuguese support in a conflict over trade with a group of 
Muslim merchants. When the Dutch set up a trading post in Tuticoryn, they established a 
substantial trade in cloth. This enabled a group of Paravar to take cloth trading as their new 
hereditary occupation (Casie Chitty 1837). According to Van Senden (1786b), the Paravar of 
Muthur belonged to the Pallavilli subcaste. I am not sure whether this subcaste was one 
engaged in fishing, maritime trade, or cloth trade. Given the location of Muthur as a fishing 
village and a key port for international trade of the Kandy kingdom (with cloth being a 
particularly important product being imported through Muthur), all options are open. Note 
that Casie Chitty (1834: 55, 232) identifies Paravar and Pallavilli as separate castes. An 
inquiry into the names and hereditary occupations of Paravar subcastes during a visit to a 
number of Paravar villages near Kanniyakumari in Tamil Nadu (summer 2008) generated so 
much embarrassment among the people whom I asked that I had to abandon my quest for a 
more definite answer.  
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set-ups revolving around temples. As, by this time, the vast majority of the 
population in Kottiyar Pattu and in Thampalakamam was Hindu, the supported 
temples were Hindu temples, despite the Kandyan kings being Buddhists 
themselves.  
Within decades after the Dutch established firm control over Trincomalee, king 
Rajasinha II sponsored the construction of the Adhi Konesar (Siva) temple in 
Thampalakamam and what seems to have been a fairly elaborate renovation and 
expansion of the Cittiravelayutham (Murugan) temple in Verugal53. Both of these 
temples are regional temples, just like the temple in Mandoor that has been 
described by Mark Whitaker (1999). Rather than being served by just one village or 
one caste, these temples are linked to complicated patronage networks, in which 
different castes and villages have their specific roles, responsibilities, and 
hierarchical rankings. By presenting himself as the restorer (or builder) and 
supporter of these temples and the religio-political networks surrounding them, the 
king of Kandy assured himself of the allegiance of the population in both areas, 
without having to send his troops to enforce allegiance. This strategic move is very 
reminiscent of what Kavanthissa did with the Seruwila temple. But where the claim 
to authority of the Seruwila temple was based on the presence of relics of the 
Buddha, the authority of the temples at Thampalakamam and Verugal rested in their 
(reinterpreted) continuation of the politico-religious structure that had existed before 
the destruction of the Koneswaram temple.  
In the case of the temple at Thampalakamam, this was visualised by the fact that the 
statues of the principal deities in the temple (Siva and his wife Parvathi) were 
claimed to have been salvaged from the original Konesar temple in Trincomalee. 
With the construction of the Adhi Konesar temple, the king resettled the people who 
had fled to Kottiyar Pattu in the area around Kantale and Thampalakamam 
(Varathasuntharam 2006). Paddy cultivation under the Kantale tank was restarted, 
and a 10% tax was levied on the harvest. He subsequently gave half of the tax back 
for the maintenance of the temple, thereby perpetuating his role as benefactor 
without having to pay a cent for it (van Senden 1786b, entry for June 7). The religio-
political network that was set up around the temple was very closely modelled on 
the system that Kulakkottan was said to have instituted, and to prove these links a 
chronicle (the Tirukonacala Puranam) was commissioned (Varathasuntharam 2006; 
Veluppillai 1990). Links with the people’s temporary hosts in Kottiyar Pattu were 
                                                 
 
53 The oldest map mentioning the “Virgel Pagood” that I have come across dates back to 
around 1695 (Toorzee, ca. 1695). A diary that was maintained by Governor Falck during a 
tour that he undertook in 1767 mentions the temple. On his tour, Falck and his entourage 
“arrived at Suamikoil or Wirgel-koi (verukal), a large stone built heathen (Hindu) temple” 
(Sinnathamby 1976: 3). In 1843, Bennett declared the Verugal temple an attraction for 
tourists travelling through the area: “The pagoda upon the left or north bank is of great 
antiquity, and worth examining” (Bennett 1998 [1843]: 247). 
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also maintained: the bards at the temple festival are still brought in from Sampoor 
(where one can still find a pulavankudi [“clan of poets”]), the festival flag is painted 
by someone from Kilivetti, and a ritual sacred thread is worn by a Sindhunadar 
Thimilar from Eechchilampattu (Varathasuntharam 2006: 109).  
The Verugal temple had no formal link with Koneswaram, but here also the caste 
hierarchy is justified with reference to a local myth of how Kulakkottan settled seven 
castes in Kottiyar Pattu and gave each of them a specific task. The myth of origin of 
the temple is instructive:  
 
A certain Nallainathan, an Indian merchant of the Chetty caste, used to trade 
between India and Sri Lanka and had based himself in Trincomalee. Once, when 
he was in Sri Lanka, he contracted a skin rash. No matter what doctors he 
consulted, the disease could not be cured. In the end, he decided to go to 
Katharagama on a pilgrimage. He had to walk, because there were no roads yet 
at the time, and also no vehicles. As he made his way through the jungle, he 
came at the river crossing where the temple is found today, and stopped for the 
day. There were Veddas living in that area, but they could not communicate as 
they did not understand each other’s language. The Veddas gave him deer skins, 
meat and honey as gifts. He ate and fell asleep under a tree where the Veddas 
worshipped a vel, Murugan’s sacred lance.  
As he was sleeping, Murugan came to him in a dream and told him: ‘Do not go 
to Katharagama. Build a temple here.’  
Nallainathan Chettiyar said: ‘I have no money and I am sick. How can I build a 
temple?’  
‘Build the temple tomorrow. Your sickness will change, it will disappear from 
half of your body’. 
The next morning, Nallainathan Chettiyar woke up and looked at himself. Half 
of his body was clean. Because of this, he decided to stay another night. 
The second night, Murugan appeared in a dream again, and again said: ‘Do not 
come to Katharagama. Go to Arippu; there you will find gold coins54. To prove 
that I am right, the rest of your body will be clean.’ 
When Nallainathan woke up, he saw that he was completely cured. He got up 
and went to Arippu. There he found the gold coins, which he took to build the 
temple. The gold that he had found was however not enough to properly finish 
the temple, so Nallainathan went to Kandy to ask king Rajasinha for assistance. 
Verugal was part of the Kandy kingdom at that time. During his time in Kandy, 
Nallainathan worked as a jeweller. One day, he took a pearl necklace that 
belonged to the king, because he wanted to offer it to Murugan in Verugal55. The 
king found out, had him arrested, and ordered Nallainathan to be executed by 
                                                 
 
54 The place where this pot is supposed to have been is now called Thanganagar, “gold 
settlement”. Somewhere cast away along the road, there is a large stone with a perfectly 
round hole in it, which is said to have contained the pot of gold. 
55 In some versions of the myth, Nallainathan was falsely accused. What saved him there 
was not only his devotion to Murugan but also his genuine innocence. 
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letting an elephant trample his skull. When the elephant was brought out, it 
refused to kill Nallainathan. Instead, it knelt down and worshipped the man. 
Seeing this, the king repented. He realised that Nallainathan had genuinely 
wanted to honour Murugan. Rajasinha set Nallainathan free, and gave him gems 
and money. The money was used to pay for the ceremony in which the statue of 
the god was ritually ‘brought through the gate’ and installed in the temple, and 
the gems were used to decorate the statue. 
Nallainathan invited the king to come for the opening of the temple, which he 
did. Rajasinha donated paddy land and orchards to the temple (it is not known 
anymore where these lands are, it has all become jungle.) 
At that time, the wealthiest village in the surroundings was Eechchilampattu; it 
was inhabited by the Sindhunadar Thimilar. Nallainathan Chettiyar gave the 
people of Eechchilampattu the key of the temple, and gave them the 
responsibility for its maintenance. After that, he stepped into the holy of holies to 
worship, and mysteriously disappeared. There is still a statue of him on the 
mulastanam56: it is the statue of the man with the turban. 
Because the people could not perform pooja due to their poverty, Murugan gave 
them ‘golden rice’: grains of gold. There was still a lot of gold in the temple 
before the war broke out, but it has all disappeared during the years that the 
temple was closed57.  
(field notes, October 2004, December 2004, August 2005, and April 2007; see also 
Navaratnam 1964: 78) 
 
A few elements in the story deserve attention. First of all there is Nallainathan’s 
identity as a Chetty merchant. Nallainathan’s presence in Kottiyar Pattu, which is a 
long way off from Katharagama, indicates the presence of more than incidental 
trading links between South India and the Kandy kingdom that passed through 
Kottiyar Pattu (as confirmed in the description by Van Goens cited earlier). The 
existence of a very similar myth of origin (involving Chetty pilgrims on the way to 
Katharagama) for the temple at Kokkaddicholai (Theyvanayagam 2006: 282-283) is a 
further hint that the pilgrims’ route to Katharagama along the east coast is centuries 
old. The location where Nallainathan is said to have found the pot of gold may be 
more than a coincidence: Thanganagar adjoins Kilivetti, which was the main market 
in the area in Kottiyar Pattu, and the person in charge of this market was… a Chetty 
(De Silva et al. 1995: 406). It is thus possible to read the ‘pot of gold’ metaphorically.  
                                                 
 
56 The mulastanam is the ‘holy of holies’ of a Hindu temple, the shrine in which the main idol 
is kept. The roof of the mulastanam is often covered with statues, generally of gods; the 
mulasthanam of the Verugal temple is covered with some peculiar statues, including one of 
the temple’s mythical founder, and one of a group of stark naked women with highlighted 
genitals (see figure 2.8). 
57 Note however Nevill’s comment that the temple “used to have very valuable jewels, and 
some rubies, given by Gajabâhu, king of Ceylon, according to tradition. These were all robbed, 
and the temple looted some years ago” (Nevill 1887a: 163, emphasis mine). 
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A last, and very important detail is the claim that the king of Kandy participated in 
the inauguration of the temple. For the king to attend this inauguration of what is, 
by any standard, not a very elaborate temple, one could surmise that he had a 
strategic, rather than merely a religious reason to do so. Ensuring allegiance of a 
frontier population may have been this reason. 
Towards the end of the 18th century, Kottiyar Pattu sank into a deep hole of neglect, 
disease and disaster. When the Englishman Pybus passed through the area in 1672, 
he hardly saw any paddy in the fields, and was told that most of the paddy fields 
had been abandoned due to three years of drought. As a consequence, the village of 
“Temmungalay” (Thirumankalai) had been abandoned and most of the population 
of “Malledeve” (Mallikaithivu) had left (Pybus 2001 [1958/1762]: 33-35)58. Epidemics 
in the early 1780s59 and a famine that hit Sri Lanka in 1782 and 1783 ravaged the 
                                                 
 
58 Note however that Pybus travelled through the area at the peak of the dry season; it may 
have been the case that the yala cultivation had failed, but that there was some maha 
cultivation. 
59 These epidemics quite possibly included smallpox, which was rampant in Ceylon during 
the end of the Dutch period. Though smallpox was earlier sufficiently prevalent to warrant 
Figure 2.8. Statues on the mulasthanam of the Verugal temple (own photograph) 
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population (van Senden 1786b, entry for June 3). A cyclone in April 1786 added to 
the people’s woes (van Senden 1786a). When Van Senden described the area in May 
1786, Kottiyar Pattu had pretty much hit rock bottom. Most of the population had 
either died or moved away, agriculture had been devastated, and with the slow but 
steady disintegration of the kingdom of Kandy, international trade had largely 
collapsed, which had further undermined the economy of the area. An alternative 
hypothesis that is worth exploring is that Kottiyar Pattu may have been deliberately 
depopulated by the king of Kandy, thus creating an inhospitable buffer on the 
boundary of his kingdom in order to discourage incursions by foreign armies (see 
Nevill 1886 for a description of the deliberate depopulation of the Sabaragamuwa 
region between Colombo and Kandy). 
 
2.3.7 The ‘British period’ (1795-1948) 
Limited revival in the 19th century 
After the British took over control of Trincomalee District from the Dutch in 1795, 
Trincomalee was used as a naval base and garrison town, and an unhealthy one at 
that: it had the reputation of being “the worst station on the whole Island” (Thomas 
1994 [1940]: 29). Outside the town, the British do not seem to have paid much 
attention to the district until well into the nineteenth century.  
Within years of the British take-over, Kottiyar Pattu experienced a revival of its local 
economy, even though its role as a regional port had ceased forever. People 
returned, and cultivation started to pick up again, though not everywhere. In 1802 
the Governor of Ceylon, Frederic North, passed through the area on a tour of 
Ceylon. One of his companions described the journey as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
the development of a cult for a smallpox goddess, it “was in fact so rate in the 16th and 17th 
centuries [in among others Ceylon], that some of the Portuguese navigators believed that no 
such disease had ever existed there” (Moore 1815: 37). In 1811, “Dr. Christie, a judicious 
physician, who resided many years in this island, state[d] that the Small Pox, according to 
the most moderate calculation, carried off a sixth part of the population; yet no attempt was 
made by the Dutch Government to lessen this destruction” (idem: 238). People were 
apparently so afraid of the smallpox “that, when it appeared, husbands were wont to 
forsake their wives, and parents their children, leaving them only a little drink and food. 
When villages were thus abandoned, wild hogs, bears, panthers, and elephants, often issued 
from the woods and jungles; broke down the enclosures, and ravaged the gardens and 
orchards. Every sweet-smelling flower and esculent herb was rooted up; the plantain and 
cocoanut trees were levelled with the earth, the cottages unroofd, and not even the bones of 
the deserted sick were afterwards to be found” (ibid.). It is thus not entirely surprising that, 
just south from Kottiyar Pattu, Jon Dart (1985) encountered a cult among the Coast Veddas 
that indirectly linked the smallpox to the spirit of a European who had arrived on a ship. 
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“[April 25th.] At half past one P.M. we left Ganga choultry [Gangai, a landing 
place near Muthur], and at three passed Malladew [Mallikaithivu], a very pretty 
village. At five P.M. we arrived at Topore [Thoppur], a populous village, where 
there were good pandals erected for our accommodation. All the road this 
afternoon was through very rich paddee fields, interspersed with beautiful and 
majestic tamarind trees. This formed a charming scenery, but the road was 
excessively bad, as we were obliged to travel on the embankments of the paddee 
fields, which were uneven, and interrupted. 
[April] 26th.  We this morning visited an extensive tank at Topore, where the 
water is collected in a valley, and confined by mud-banks, which are in want of 
repair. At seven o’clock A.M. we left Topore, and at half past ten arrived at 
Anadyve [Anaithivu], a small village where pandals had been erected for the 
governor. The road this morning was very good, through a beautiful flat 
country, though but little cultivated. […] Within two miles of Anadyve is the 
Wergel [Verugal] Ganga, a broad, deep, and rapid river […]. On the north bank 
of the Wergel there is a pagoda of considerable extent and antiquity, which is 
much esteemed by the natives” (Cordiner 1983 [1807]: 131-2). 
 
Despite the initial revival, Kottiyar Pattu remained a neglected and near-empty 
backwater until the late 1860s. Note the comment that the paddy fields between 
Muthur and Thoppur were in good shape, but there was no road. The paucity of 
British attention for the area was such that minor repairs to the Allai tank in 1812 
were still remembered as a significant event 55 years later. The repairs, organised by 
a certain Mr. Lusignan, included the fixing of stoplogs in the sluices of the tank60. 
However, as the inflow into the tank came straight from the Mahaweli river during 
periods of high rainfall, the sluices were not strong enough to withstand the floods, 
and the stoplogs needed frequent replacement (AR 1867:104).  
Kottiyar Pattu’s role as a grain-exporting region might have come to an end, but the 
area was not entirely without economic relevance. An entry on Kottiyar Pattu in the 
‘Edinburgh Gazetteer’, published 27 years after the British took control over the area, 
reads “[b]eside cinnamon, the principal produce of the district are beetel nuts [sic], 
cocoa nuts, and timber: salt is also made, and fish cured with it for exportation” 
(1822: 655). 
 
Irrigation 
Under the governorship of Henry Ward (1855-1860), irrigation development became 
a priority in Ceylon. Among the first irrigation schemes that were taken up for 
rehabilitation were the Allai irrigation scheme and the Kantale irrigation scheme. 
Both were schemes that required comparatively limited investment. The 
                                                 
 
60 After Lusignan’s repairs, the tank seems to have been neglected again. In 1843, J.W. 
Bennett wrote “[a]t Tapootorré [Thoppur] there is a very extensive tank; but want of capital 
unfortunately prevails, or this country would produce a thousand—fold where it now does 
one” (1998 [1843]: 246). 
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rehabilitation of the Allai tank and of the Periyakulam (which was connected to the 
Allai tank by a feeder channel) commenced in 1868 and was completed the next year, 
restoring the irrigable area from about 800 acres to about 3,100 acres (AR 1870:159). 
In 1870, work commenced on the extension of what was to become the Muthur 
channel, with the objective of bringing a further 1,000 acres under irrigation. A 
massive flood in January 1871 caused a breach of the Allai tank bund, and 
necessitated further repair works. 
In the first three decades of the twentieth century, various plans were made to 
further expand the Allai irrigation scheme, because both land and water were still 
available in excess. Particularly the situation of having excess water available was 
very rare in Sri Lanka, where most irrigation schemes depend on streams that are 
pretty much seasonal, and have small catchment areas. A chronic lack of budget 
however delayed the further development of the scheme. Very sluggish sales of 
newly developed lands were not helpful either: if there was nobody who wanted to 
buy the land, further development would be pointless. Ultimately, a limited 
expansion was implemented in the 1930s. This included the construction of an anicut 
(an inlet weir) in the Verugal River, the construction of a flood protection bund 
along the Mahaweli River, and the construction of the first part of what was to 
become the Left Bank Main Channel (AR 1925: E23). 
 
Infrastructure 
Access remained a big problem throughout the 19th century. When, in 1870, the Duke 
of Edinburgh visited Thoppur and Kilivetti for an elephant hunt, an “impromptu 
road […] [t]hrough elephant-jungle, thorny and thick, over long tracts of fallow 
fields, through pretty Moor villages, with their neat gardens and corn-ricks, across 
dried-up beds of streams” had to be cleared for the occasion, to enable the duke and 
his hunting party to travel from Muthur to Kilivetti (Capper 1871: 113).  
An all-weather road connection between Trincomalee and Colombo was only 
developed in the 1870s (Bastiampillai 1968: 52), and the project of turning the path 
from Trincomalee via Kinniya and Muthur to Batticaloa into an all-weather road was 
still ongoing by the turn of the century (AR 1901: F4). It was not until well into the 
20th century that easy road access became a reality. 
 
Land development 
Around 1911 the government alienated jungle land in two places, each of which 
would have far-reaching consequences. The first was a stretch of land between 
Thoppur and the seashore at Uppural, which was alienated to Muslims from 
Thoppur. Over time several small tanks and the bigger Ullaikulam were developed. 
Some Muslim families settled in Uppural, and were later joined by a group of Tamil 
squatters. After the LTTE took control over the area in 1990, access was denied to the 
Muslims who thus lost access to hundreds of acres of good paddy land. This became, 
and still is, a very contentious issue (Kohlee 2002). 
The second land alienation covered a stretch of land between Thoppur and Muthur. 
This stretch of jungle land was transformed into irrigated paddy fields by Roman 
Catholic missionaries, who settled a group of people of the Pachchan caste in a new 
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village that was called Iruthayapuram (‘Sacred Heart Village’), but which is also 
known as Pachchanoor (‘Place of the people of the Pachchan caste’). The sudden 
access that these people got to irrigated land meant a huge jump in status, which 
was not appreciated by the traditional land-owning castes in the area (see section 
3.2.1). It also meant that the area between Muthur, Mallikaithivu, Pallikudiyiruppu 
and Thoppur rather suddenly became a contiguous stretch of paddy fields, which in 
the long run imposed limits on the expansion possibilities for older paddy-
cultivating villages.  
By the 1930s, population pressure in existing villages led to the development of new 
settlements at Thanganagar, Palathadichenai and Palathoppur. While Palathoppur is 
clearly a satellite of Thoppur, the inhabitants of the other villages came from various 
villages and castes. Palathoppur, located on the junction where the road to Thoppur 
branches off from the Batticaloa-Muthur road, developed a bazaar function apart 
from its agricultural function. Thanganagar and Palathadichenai, on the other hand, 
have always remained villages of farmers and labourers, without much other 
economic activity. Apart from these places, a number of smaller settlements 
(including places like Ithikulam and Sinnakulam) were established in the jungles 
around Eechchilampattu and Pallikudiyiruppu. 
 
Seruwila 
An event that proved very important for the future of Kottiyar Pattu was the 
restoration of the Seruwila temple in the 1920s under the charismatic leadership of 
the Buddhist monk called Dambagasare Sumedhamkara thero (Kemper 1991: 152-3, 
Saranakiththi and Amarakiththi 2002). Though local narratives credit 
Sumedhamkara with discovering the site in the jungle, it had in fact already been 
surveyed half a century earlier61. In 1909, “the Trincomalee assistant government 
agent inspected the ruins and found ‘a mound of earth 25 feet high and comprising 
the remains of a square platform, flights of steps, large pillars, and a single door-
frame still held in place’” (Kemper 1991:152, citing from an article in the Observer 
newspaper of 15-4-1979). 
Though the temple was abandoned for centuries, it was never entirely forgotten. In 
1797, the new king of Siam (Thailand) sent a request to the king of Kandy, asking 
him for the relic that was said to be buried in the Soma dagaba, near Seruwila62. King 
                                                 
 
61 Sheet G/4 3A of the 16 chains to one inch map of 1956 (Survey Department, 1956) gives the 
reference number P.P. 596 for the site of the temple. According to the register accompanying 
the map, the site with this reference number was surveyed in 1872, just after the renovation 
of the nearby Allai Tank. The temple itself was resurveyed in 1925, under reference number 
P.P. 6033. 
62 Kevin Trainor (1997: 145) states that other than the Dhatuvamsa, the only other Pali 
chronicle that mentions Seruwila is the Jinakalamali, a sixteenth-century Thai chronicle. The 
Thai king may have got his inspiration from this text. Note that the search was conducted in 
the wrong place. The dagaba referred to is not the Seruwila dagaba, but one built nearby by 
queen Soma. Nowadays, this temple is often assumed to be the Somawathie dagaba, about 33 
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Rajadhirajasimha readily obliged and sent out a small team to Kottiyar Pattu, which 
had just fallen into British hands, to dig up the relic. However, “[p]erceiving their 
undertaking impracticable with so small a party, they returned to Kandy, and made 
no further attempt to penetrate to the relic” (Forbes 1848, vol. II: 223)  
After the surveying of the site in 1872, news of the presence of a large temple ruin 
must have trickled down to the south-west of Sri Lanka. This fired the imagination 
of those engaged in the Buddhist revival movement that developed around the same 
time. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Buddhist reformer Anagarika 
Dharmapala was campaigning for the restoration of the Seruwila temple (Hellman-
Rajanayagam 2004: 78); in 1909, Henry Parker wrote that “some Sinhalese of other 
parts of the island still make pilgrimages in order to worship at this time” (Parker 
1999 [1909]:331).  
By 1930 the temple was completed. In order to provide for maintenance of the 
temple and the resident monks, Sumedhankara’s “first major supporter”, D.D. 
Weerasingha, “purchased 500 acres of nearby land and gave it to the monkhood” 
(Kemper 1991: 153). Excitement over the reconstruction of the temple led to a 
temporary surge in the number of pilgrims, as can be seen in table 2.4.  
 
Year No. of pilgrims in the entire year 
1928 8,000 
1929 10,000 
1930 20,000 
1931 3,000 
1932 2,500 
1933 2,300 
Table 2.4. Annual numbers of pilgrims to the Seruwila temple, 1928-1933 (source: Saranakiththi and 
Amarakiththi 2002: 70)  
 
The annual temple festival drew about three to four thousand pilgrims by 1936 (AR 
1936: E17); a year later, the crowd was estimated at four to five thousand people (AR 
1937: E18). By 1939, the last year for which I have found attendance figures, 
enthusiasm seems to have waned somewhat: only about 1,250 people visited the 
festival (AR 1939, part I: E19).  
 
2.3.8 Kottiyar Pattu after independence 
The first three decades after Sri Lanka attained independence in February 1948 saw 
massive change in Kottiyar Pattu, by and large centered around the Allai Extension 
Scheme. In the late 1940s, the ideas that existed for a significant expansion of 
irrigation in Kottiyar Pattu were turned into project plans and detailed designs. 
From a national perspective, the choice for this area as one of the first post-
                                                                                                                                                        
 
km southwest of Seruwila. Nearer to Seruwila, there are also ruins of small temple mounds 
at Dehiwatte (Samagipura) and at Neelapola. 
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independence irrigation-cum-settlement schemes makes a lot of sense: for a 
comparatively low investment, the project was likely to show a good output. No 
expensive reservoirs needed to be constructed, and there was a fairly reliable and 
ample supply of water that made an expansion of the irrigated area possible. 
Construction work on the Allai Extension Scheme started in 1951. The first settler 
families took up residence on their plots a year later. Things were however not easy 
for these families: before they could start farming, they needed to clear the jungle on 
their fields. Soon, some fairly serious design flaws also came to light:  in several of 
the colonies, housing plots and paddy fields were flooded regularly because 
drainage facilities were insufficient (AR 1954: A168; AR 1963-64: A17). By 1957, the 
bulk of the work was completed, and cultivation had come up to speed. 
Unfortunately, that year saw the worst floods in living memory, when following 
days of heavy rain the Mahaweli broke its banks. Much of Kottiyar Pattu was under 
several feet of water, and everywhere people were marooned on patches of high 
land. Luckily, a British or American aircraft carrier happened to be in the 
Trincomalee harbour. The helicopters it was carrying were used to ferry relief 
supplies to the affected population. Many houses were damaged, as was much of the 
irrigation infrastructure. The subsequent years saw a massive recovery effort, and 
from about 1962 things seem to have been normal again (Wijayatilleka 2000; AR 
1960-1961: A11). However, a further setback followed when a cyclone hit 
Trincomalee district in December 1964, causing severe damage in and around 
Muthur (AR 1964-1965: A17).  
Most of the settlers were Sinhalese from Kurunegala, Hambantota and from the 
south coast. Two of the colonies (LB3/Lingapuram and LB6/Sivapuram) were 
opened up for Tamils, who were largely drawn from Sampoor, Kilivetti and 
Kankuveli – all high-caste Velalar villages.  
In the mid-1960s, a new string of colonies was developed along the Muthur-
Batticaloa road: the largely Tamil settlement of Bharatipuram, and the Muslim 
settlements of Azathnagar (58th Milepost), Jinnanagar (59th milepost), and Sirajnagar 
(Koorkandam). Bharatipuram accommodated a population overflow from a range of 
villages and castes in the area. The Muslim settlements attracted landless families 
from as far away as Batticaloa, as well as some population overflow from Thoppur 
and Palathoppur. Muthur saw a further expansion with the founding of 
Hairiyanagar and Shafinagar, and Thoppur saw the founding of Allainagar. 
 
The settlement of Sinhalese in the Allai Extension Scheme became politically 
controversial when the Federal Party (by then the dominant Tamil political party) 
alleged that the government was planning to divide the ‘Tamil homeland’ by settling 
Sinhalese. These allegations were first made in 1956, when Sri Lanka saw a flurry of 
ethnonationalist activity, including the election of the populist SLFP under S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike, the adoption of Sinhala as the national language (at the exclusion of 
Tamil), and the subsequent riots in Colombo and Ampara. It also coincided with the 
celebration of 2,500 years having passed since the Buddha attained enlightenment. 
While there may be some truth in the allegation, there is another side to the coin. The 
son of a Tamil leader who worked in land clearing in the Allai Extension Scheme 
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told me that at the time Tamils from Jaffna were simply not interested in settling as 
paddy farmers in Trincomalee District – a problem which had delayed irrigation 
development in the area since the British first started their rehabilitation works.  
 
The 1950s saw the slow introduction of mechanisation: a few buses were running 
from Muthur and Thoppur to Batticaloa and Trincomalee, and the first two-wheel 
tractors (commonly called ‘landmasters’) were introduced. The number of lorries 
could be counted on two hands. Most of the transport was still done by oxcart, by 
pushbike or by foot. The main road was tarred, and other roads were slowly 
upgraded.  
As the population increased and the country developed, government services – 
especially schools – were developed in the area, particularly from about 1970 
onwards. This period also saw the introduction of green revolution technology, 
which was to have a profound impact on society in Kottiyar Pattu (section 6.3.1). 
Over a period of a few years, the local economy became thoroughly monetised. As a 
consequence, successful farmers had increasing amounts of cash to spend, which 
had a spin-off effect on local traders. On the other hand, many people became 
indebted and the gap between poor and rich in the area became increasingly wide. 
The outbreak of violence in 1985 (see section 4.2.2) brought further development of 
the area to a near standstill until about 2000. 
 
2.4 Reflection: oscillation between frontier and backwater 
Throughout its recorded history, Kottiyar Pattu has oscillated between being a 
frontier region and being a rural backwater. As a consequence, the area has seen 
periods of strategic investment, followed by periods of utter neglect. That is the same 
to this very day: political interest in the area is highly intermittent and strategic, not 
structural. A second consequence of this oscillation has been population movement. 
Over the centuries, whoever was in charge of the area brought settlers into the area. 
Because of this, many different versions of history, each with its own claim to 
prominence, have developed (I reproduce four of these stories in chapter 5). In a 
context where the population has dramatically expanded since the 1950s and where 
pressure on resources has increased, competition over claims to the area has 
intensified significantly. 
The third consequence is that, though investments in for example infrastructure 
have been made, in between such periods of investment the people in the area are 
pretty much left to fend for themselves. This has produced a strange paradox: on the 
one hand, much of Kottiyar Pattu’s economy is subsistence-focused, while on the 
other hand, people have fended for themselves by establishing links with other 
areas, thus firmly integrating the area into the wider national, and even global, 
economy. 
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3 Social complexity in Kottiyar Pattu 
 
“The hope of harmony in the contemporary world lies to a great extent in a 
clearer understanding of the pluralities of human identity, and in the 
appreciation that they cut across each other and work against a sharp separation 
along one single hardened line of inpenetrable division” (Sen 2006: xiv). 
 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 L’enfer, c’est les autres 
During my time in Sri Lanka, I was thrice told, with slight variations, a peculiar joke. 
Without taking into account the context in which it was said, the joke seems rather 
racist; its peculiarity is the only reason why I find it acceptable to reproduce it here: 
 
A man dies and finds himself at the gates of heaven. St. Peter, who holds the key 
to heaven, looks in his books and says “Dear sir, your files are in order, so 
welcome to heaven. However, if you like, we can organise a little tour of hell for 
you before you enter, just so that you know what you are missing.” 
The man agrees, and is taken for a tour of hell. He soon finds out that hell is a 
rather odd place: it is a large plain, dotted with deep pits that all have been 
fenced off with barbed wire and other nasty means to make it impossible for 
those inside the pits to escape. The angel who acts as a tour guide explains that 
each pit is for a specific group of people: “This one is for the Dutch; that one is 
for the Americans; the one behind that is for the Germans”, and so on, and so 
forth. But then the man notices something strange. One of the pits has no fencing 
at all.  
“Who is in there?”  
“Oh, that pit is for the Sri Lankans. No fence is needed for them, because they 
keep each other in the pit.” 
 
The first time I was told the joke, it was by a Jaffna Tamil who was proud of his 
Jaffna roots. In his version, the pit without fencing was for the Jaffna Tamils. The 
second time, I was told the joke by a Tamil of mixed regional origin, who was proud 
of being a Tamil. In her version, the pit without fencing was for the Tamils. The third 
time, I was told the joke by a mixed-married and convincingly multicultural Sri 
Lankan. This time, the pit without fencing was for the Sri Lankans in general. “Hell” 
may be “the others” (Sartre 1947: 75), but in this case hell is not not just everybody: 
the problem is with the in-group members who are divided among themselves. 
Every time the joke was told, it was told as a form of self-criticism63. 
                                                 
 
63 Steven Kemper has reproduced another version of the same joke. This time, it was told by 
Gamini Dissanayake, a powerful UNP minister at the time, and the joke was used as a self-
criticism of the “most visible weakness” of the Sinhalese: “lack of unity” (1991:207, citing 
from ‘The Island’, 18-4-1986).  
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As illustrated by the joke above and the various contexts in which I heard it, Sri 
Lanka is a country divided along many different boundaries. Each boundary 
separates people into groups that are identified within particular categories of 
identification, and between the groups within each category of identification there 
may be fierce competition. Within the ethnic category of identification, boundaries 
separate Muslims, Sinhalese, Tamils, Burghers, Veddas, Malays and members of 
other small ethnic groups; within the gender category of identification, boundaries 
separate men and women; within the caste category of identification, boundaries 
separate people belonging to different castes. Each category of identification is 
constituted of a finite (and in most cases limited) number of groups, but the 
relationships and rankings among the groups within each category vary by place 
and time, and may be viewed very differently by members of different groups. 
These categories of identification are not rigidly structured in relation to each other. 
The consequence is a jumble of parallel, crosscutting and hierarchical boundaries, 
some more and some less contested, some clear and some more vague. 
 
3.1.2 Structure of the chapter 
As I have stated in chapter 1 and show in more detail in chapters 6, 7 and 8, focusing 
on ethnicity alone and treating ethnic groups as homogeneous is insufficient to 
explain everyday life in Kottiyar Pattu (or in the rest of the world for that matter). In 
chapter 1, I have described the ethnic category of identification as it is encountered 
in Kottiyar Pattu. In this chapter, I describe (in random order) a further nine 
categories of identification that the people whom I spoke to used when describing 
social realities in Kottiyar Pattu: caste, class, employment, religion, gender, age, 
length of stay, political affiliation, and military control. I am interested not so much 
in the conceptual nature of the different categories of identification, but more in 
which identity groups within each category of identification are defined in people’s 
representations of their lives. In describing these categories, I hope to show some of 
the complexity and multi-interpretability of the social world that is Kottiyar Pattu, 
and within which people live their everyday lives64. The stress on the word ‘some’ is 
important. This chapter is not intended to replace a one-dimensional (ethnic) 
explanatory model of social life in Kottiyar Pattu by a ten-dimensional model. Even 
though it captures a lot more detail, such a bounded model is still constraining by its 
very nature. There are many other identities that people can choose for themselves 
                                                 
 
64 My inspiration for writing this chapter (and, for that matter, this thesis) comes to a large 
extent from Mark Whitaker’s seven-fold description of the temple festival at Mandoor 
(Whitaker 1999, chapter VII). Precisely because of his attention for complexity, multi-
interpretability, and the way people deal with it in ‘amiable incoherence’, Whitaker sets a 
very high standard for what ethnographic understanding and description of complex 
contexts should look like.  
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(for example as fans of particular Indian movie stars), and – given for example the 
number of Rajani Kanth lookalikes that one encounters on a random walk through 
the area – quite strongly so. If there is to be any value in the model, it must be open-
ended and allow room for the many other identities that exist. 
 
3.2 Caste 
Caste is a controversial and often rather embarrassing topic that has long been the 
“central symbol for India”, and is an obsession for Indian anthropology, history and 
literature alike (Dirks 2008:3). Something similar was true for Sri Lanka before 
particularly the topics of ethnicity and violence pushed caste to the background.  
Between independence and the country-wide escalation of violence in 1983, the 
workings of caste were studied in great detail by many social scientists65. It was also 
a key topic in literature during the same period: “the arrogance of caste” was a 
mandatory topic for members of the Progressive Writers’ Association, along with 
“the evils of poverty and the haughtiness of authority” (Rasaratnam 1996a, “my 
discourse”). 
So what is caste? In his PhD dissertation on the Coast Veddas of Vakarai, Jon Dart 
settled for the following definition: “[a caste is] a named group that exists in 
exclusive contrast to, and in a ranked relationship with, other groups of the same 
kind” (Dart 1985:64). Though in some quarters caste is increasingly ignored, all 
Sinhalese and Tamils belong to one caste or another, whether they are Buddhist, 
Hindu, or Christian. This is not the case for Muslims (including members of small 
ethnic communities of foreign origin such as Malays, Bohras and Memons) and 
Burghers. Caste is an ascribed identity: everyone who is born to parents with a caste 
identity will be given the caste identity of the parents. In case the parents are not of 
the same caste or if one of the parents is either a Muslim or a foreigner, and thus has 
no caste, a pragmatic solution will need to be found. It is virtually impossible to 
change one’s caste, and it is impossible to have more than one caste identity at the 
same time – hence Dart’s use of the expression “exclusive contrast”. Linked to this is 
a strong ideology of caste endogamy. 
Caste identities are generally linked to hereditary occupations, though nowadays it 
is very well possible to have a very different occupation. Another important element 
of castes is that they are hierarchically ranked, though – as McGilvray (2008) has 
shown, the precise ranking of castes within clusters of roughly similar status is 
ambiguous and to some extent variable over time and place. The ranking of the 
castes has its reflection in ritual roles and responsibilities regarding Hindu and 
Buddhist temples: to some extent, ideas of purity and pollution play a role here, but 
                                                 
 
65 Among them are Ryan (2004 [1953]); Yalman (1971); Pfaffenberger (1982); McGilvray 
(1982, 1983 and 2008); Dart (1985); Whitaker (1999) and Roberts (1997 and 1998a). 
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local (and colonial) political dynamics are equally important (McGilvray 1982; Dirks 
2008; Whitaker 1999). 
The Sinhala and Tamil caste systems have pretty much the same structure. The 
upper stratum is formed by a small group of religious specialists and a large group 
of cultivators; fishermen and a range of artisanal castes form the middle stratum; 
and service castes like washermen, barbers and drummers form the lowest stratum. 
The priestly castes and the princely castes, which dominate the Indian caste system, 
are virtually absent, as are so-called ‘untouchables’ (Ryan 2004 [1953]; Pfaffenberger 
1982; McGilvray 1982 and 2008). 
There is only one way in which a Tamil person’s caste can be established with near 
certainty: through the markings on his cattle. Most cows owned by Tamils and 
Muslims are branded with three markings: the initials of the owner on the flank, the 
first letter of the name of the village on the hip, and a symbol marking the caste on 
the thigh (there is one symbol for all Muslims). Particularly among Muslims 
however, it is increasingly common to see cattle without the caste brand, with the 
village initial and the initials of the owner in English lettering, and with a number. In 
very rare cases, cows that have been sold to someone of another caste will have the 
original markings cancelled with a large ‘x’, and new markings branded on the other 
side of the cow66. Some cattle owners hire someone to do the branding, and others do 
it themselves. This leads to considerable variation in details of the cattle brands. 
Rivalry and discrimination between (groups) of castes comes in three different 
forms. The first is rivalry among high castes. This is largely an elite problem that has 
to do with status and control over temples, but also with control over (local) politics. 
The long drawn-out battle between the Velalar of Kankuveli and the Thimilar of 
Mallikaithivu over the Kankuveli Sivankovil is an example of this. Since high-caste 
status is linked to cultivator status, this battle is also one over ‘who are the originary 
farmers in the area’. The second form revolves around upward claims to status by 
middle-level castes, and disparaging attempts by high castes to keep the upwardly 
mobile at bay. Michael Roberts (1998b) has written extensively about such processes 
that took place around the rise to prominence of the Karava, Durava and Salagama 
castes along Sri Lanka’s south-west coast. I personally came across an example in the 
autumn of 2006, when I asked a high-caste (Velalar) colleague what he knew about 
the background of President Mahinda Rajapakse and his brothers. The man merely 
snickered, and said “huh, fishermen…” Rajapakse and his brothers might have been 
the most powerful people in Sri Lanka, but in the eyes of my colleague they would 
never be able to leave their middle-level caste status behind them. The third form is 
                                                 
 
66 To what extent cattle branding is an indigenous custom is not clear. It became compulsory 
in the Cattle Ordinance of 1898, which was repealed in 1936 (AR 1936: E26). Implementation 
of the branding by the village headmen was not always done very thoroughly (AR 1925: 
E23). Despite the repeal of the Cattle Ordinance, branding became common practice in the 
North-East, possibly in order to reduce the risk of cattle theft. 
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discrimination against members of the service castes by high- and middle-caste 
people, which at times turned violent when the low-caste people were considered to  
be insubordinate (Pfaffenberger 1990).  
Particularly among Tamils, but to a lesser extent also among Sinhalese and Muslims, 
animosities and exclusionary behaviour between caste(-like) groups seriously 
undermine impressions of ethnic homogeneity. 
While caste hierarchies with their related status competitions (and, to some extent, 
caste discrimination) are very much alive, their salience has weakened considerably 
over the last half century. The caste-related conflicts described above are thus mostly 
relevant for middle-aged and elderly people. Urbanisation and increasing contacts 
with the ‘modern’ outside world through radio, television and increased mobility 
further contributed to this (Ryan 2004 [1953]). In the 1950s, low-caste people in some 
areas would not be allowed to sit at the same level as high-caste people, and they 
could be beaten off the road if they did not pay the proper respect and step aside 
when a high-caste person passed (interview with high-caste man, Mallikaithivu, 
December 2004). Fairly straightforward modernisations such as the expansion of the 
public transport system however undermined this: in a bus everybody sits at the 
same level, and (with very few exceptions) anyone who can pay is welcome as a 
passenger. The land alienations of the early 20th century and the development of the 
Allai Extension Scheme further undermined the local Tamil caste hierarchy as also 
some Tamils of lower castes were given land, and the highest castes could no longer 
claim to be the sole landowners among the Tamils. In the war-affected areas of the 
country, displacement further undermined the separation between the castes. After 
people had to flee, they were all roughly in the same desparate situation, and it was 
hard to maintain status differences. Also, life in the cramped conditions of IDP 
camps meant that it suddenly became much easier for youth of different castes to 
meet and fall in love, leading to a surge in intercaste ‘love marriages’. In the study 
area, I frequently heard elderly people complain that “before 1985 (the year of the 
first big displacement), our youth stuck to traditions, but now they just run away 
with whoever they like”.  
In the following sections, I describe what I have picked up on caste dynamics among 
Tamils and Sinhalese in Kottiyar Pattu. The last section deals with Muslims, who 
very explicitly do not acknowledge caste but who in practice have a subdivision that 
in some respects comes close.  
 
3.2.1 Caste dynamics among Tamils in Kottiyar Pattu 
The Tamil (and Muslim) population of Kottiyar Pattu belong to a larger cultural 
region that covers the entire east coast between Muthur and Panama, and that is 
distinct from the Tamil-speaking cultural region of northern Sri Lanka in two ways: 
the political dominance of non-Velalar castes (Mukkuvar, Seerpathar and Thimilar) 
in the Tamil caste hierarchy, and the existence of exogamous kudis or matriclans 
among both Muslims and Tamils (McGilvray 2008).  
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As I mentioned in section 2.3.6, Pieter de Grauwe wrote one of the oldest remaining 
detailed descriptions of the people who lived in Trincomalee District. The opening 
sentences of the paragraphs on Kottiyar Pattu and Thampalakamam Pattu (covering 
present-day Thampalakamam, Kantale and Kinniya DS Divisions) are revealing: 
 
“We will shift our attention to the division of Kottiyar in which the former king 
Kannakkapillai Maijlevou Perumal is the Vidane67; the river Mahaweli makes 
from this area an island, and it consists of 1668 villages and towns which are 
ruled by great and small chiefs, and populated by 11 lineages, namely the 
Thimilar, Velalar, Karaiyar, Moors, Veddas, Kovilar, Aandies69, Chetties, 
Paraiyar, Pachchan and Pallawelles70 and besides 5 Vidanes who are carpenters, 
potters, washermen and barbers.  Among all these, the Thimilar are the highest 
in rank. 
[…] 
Thampalakamam Province is populated by seven lineages and nations, namely 
Thimilar, Karaiyar, Thamilar71, Warrepattes72, Veddas, Pallas73 and Velalar, who 
are always struggling to be the most important, but as far as [I] have been able to 
observe until now, the Thamilar should be the most important, since the pagoda 
of Trincomalee and the great and famous reservoir of Kantale and 
[surrounding]74 countries have been founded, governed and cultivated by the 
Thamilar (after whom that lineage was named).” (De Graauwe 1676: f.12-13,16; 
my translation, emphasis mine) 
 
For the purpose of my analysis, De Graauwe’s description reveals four important 
details. Firstly, the inclusion of the Moors and the Thamilar (Tamils) in the caste lists 
indicates that De Graauwe was writing about endogamous communities that were 
not, as they are now, bound by their Tamil ethnic identity. The fact that the 
Thamilars are mentioned separately as a royal lineage (and not as an overarching 
ethnic identity) indicates something similar to what happened to the Sinhala 
identity:  
                                                 
 
67 Vidane means something like ‘chief’ 
68 It is not clear whether 16 or 96 has been written here, but as later counts of the numbers of 
villages are below 20 until at least 1900, I assume the correct number should be 16. 
69 Not clear which caste is referred to. 
70 Casie Chitty (1837) describes this caste as Pallawilli and identifies them as fishermen. Van 
Senden (1786b) uses the term ‘Parewea Pallemilij’, and locates these people in Muthur town. 
As far as I know, their descendants are all Roman Catholics, and currently identify 
themselves as Paravar.  
71 There is still a group of people who claim to be direct descendants of king Kulakkottan, 
the man whom many Tamils from Trincomalee claim built the Kantale tank and who 
repaired the Koneswaram temple.  
72 Not clear which caste is referred to. 
73 Not clear which caste is referred to; possibly Pallar. 
74 Probable translation. The manuscript has the partly illegible ‘ge[…]’. 
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“contrary to popular belief, in ancient times the Sinhala identity was associated 
primarily with the dynasty which ruled Anurâdhapura. Thus the term Sinhala 
would bear comparison with other South Asian dynastic names like Moriya, 
Gupta, Pallava and Côla. In a secondary sense this identity denoted the leading 
families in the kingdom politically linked to the dynasty. […] at that early stage, 
the term represented a political identity which excluded lower rungs of society” 
(Gunawardana 1995: 25). 
 
While I cannot imagine that a small group with claims to royal descent in an obscure 
corner of Sri Lanka has been the source of the present-day Tamil ethnic identity 
(rather, I think that the source for both Tamil identities must be found in Tamil 
Nadu), fact is that colonial documents used the term ‘Malabar’ (which, curiously, is a 
part of Kerala rather than Tamil Nadu), rather than ‘Tamil’ to denote the Tamil 
ethnic group until well into the 19th century. 
The second point is the explicit link between caste hierarchies and struggles over 
power, which can still be found today (McGilvray 2008, Whitaker 1999). 
 Thirdly, the top of the caste hierarchy (at least among Tamils) is the same today as it 
was in De Graauwe’s time. Whatever the earlier dynamics between the different 
communities may have been, the fact that the Dutch granted legitimacy to the claims 
of the Thimilar, Thamilar (and, in Batticaloa, the Mukkuvar – see McGilvray 2008) 
contributed to solidifying the top of the pecking order through the generation of 
differential access to positions in colonial institutions for local government.  
Lastly, the Moors (Muslims) do not acknowledge castes among themselves, but as 
they had their own claims to status and were endogamous, this posed no threat to 
the overarching model of a political, rather than religious, caste system: the Moors 
were simply included as a separate caste in themselves. 
 
120 years after De Graauwe, Van Senden compiled a census of the male population 
of Trincomalee District. In table 3.1, the castes that Van Senden found in Kottiyar 
Pattu are presented, ranked by size.  
 
Caste Number of males  Silversmiths 10 
Sindhunadar 193  Carpenters 6 
Moors 143  Washermen 5 
Velalar 119  Panneassena 4 
Paravar 48  Tannekasaa 4 
Kanneasena 31  Chetty 1 
Pachchan  25  Temple priest 1 
Potters 12  Unspecified 2 
Smiths 12  Total 616 
Table 3.1. Male population by caste in Kottiyar Pattu, 1786 (source: Van Senden 1786b)  
a Not clear which caste this refers to. 
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As mentioned in chapter 2, Van Senden conducted his census around what was 
probably Kottiyar’s lowest point in the last millennium, but after Van Senden’s 
census, the population of Kottiyar Pattu remained very small for at least another 
century. The extremely small size of the various caste groups an important issue: 
despite the importance of endogamy in the ideology behind the caste system, 
maintaining endogamy would have been extremely difficult. This raises a range of 
questions that are worthy of further exploration, but fall outside the scope of my 
dissertation. If endogamy among small groups was seriously practiced, did 
inbreeding cause the population to be more vulnerable to the epidemics that hit the 
area in the late 18th century than larger groups? If endogamy was practiced, to what 
extent were people able to communicate with fellow caste members in other parts of 
the country, and how mobile were people to facilitate long-distance marriages? And 
lastly, if endogamy was not enforced, how were caste distinctions maintained, and 
when and why did endogamy become the norm?  
By and large, the same castes that Van Senden and De Graauwe mentioned can still 
be found in Kottiyar Pattu today; I briefly describe them in the rest of this section. 
 
Sindhunadar Thimilar  
From at least the late seventeenth century until about 1970, the Sindhunadar or 
Thimilar, who mostly live in Mallikaithivu, Pallikudiyiruppu and Eechchilampattu 
and their satellite villages, have been the politically dominant (land-owning) caste in 
Kottiyar Pattu. The origin stories of this caste are the most confusing of all castes in 
Kottiyar Pattu.  
While De Graauwe spoke of the Thimilar, Van Senden described them with a 
different name: Sindhunadar (“those from the country of Sindh”). Both names are 
currently in use, but while people of other caste describe this community as 
Thimilar, the Thimilar themselves prefer the more honourable epithet Sindhunadar 
as an addition to a claimed Velalar caste status. From Van Senden’s account, it is 
clear that Velalar and Thimilar are different castes: the villages where Van Senden 
came across Velalar are still Velalar villages today. However, as Velalar are more 
broadly recognised as a respectable caste, the Thimilar are currently claiming Velalar 
status, despite the fact that this constitutes, in fact, a step down on Kottiyar Pattu’s 
caste ladder as it has existed for centuries. 
In the Chola empire, there was a community of boatsmen called Thimilar75 (as 
indicated in a list of castes that can be found in the museum for Rajaraja Cholan in 
Thanjavur); in Jaffna, there is a low-ranking fishing caste that is called Thimilar, and 
in the mytho-history of Batticaloa, there is talk of a community of Thimilar who were 
                                                 
 
75 As thimil is the Tamil name for a kind of boat, Thimilar literally means ‘boatmen’. Another 
etymological interpretation links the name to thimir, which is Tamil for ‘strong’, 
’courageous’ or ‘stubborn’. To be called thimir is generally not very positive, except perhaps 
in the case of warriors. 
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chased out of Jaffna and subsequently settled near Batticaloa until the Mukkuvar 
(who can be found in the southern tip of Tamil Nadu and Kerala, and who are also 
found as a low-ranking fishing caste in Jaffna and all the way down to Puttalam) 
took power and chased the Thimilar north of Vakarai, to precisely the area where 
they can be found today: Kottiyar Pattu (Kamalanathan and Kamalanatan 2005, 
McGilvray 2008, Lewis 1923). If McGilvray’s argument that the Mukkuvar came to 
Batticaloa as mercenaries for Magha of Kalinga is correct, then it is quite possible 
that the Thimilar came with an earlier invading army: the Cholas. This makes sense 
in the light of Kulakkottan legend and in the light of the Culavamsa’s comments that 
there were Keralas and Velaikkarar (soldiers and/or mercenaries) stationed in 
Kottiyar Pattu during the time of Gajabahu II, just after the Chola incursion and just 
before Magha’s invasion. If all the different references to the Thimilar are correct, 
then the Thimilar were part of the Chola navy who stayed behind in Jaffna and 
around Trincomalee. While in Jaffna they assumed a lower-middle ranking in the 
local caste hierarchy, the Thimilar became a dominant community south of 
Trincomalee, and even took control over a part of Batticaloa District, only to be 
confined to Kottiyar Pattu (and to a lesser extent, Thampalakamam Pattu) when the 
Mukkuvar took over around the fifteenth century76. 
The Sindhunadar epithet adds glamour to this story, and may have been a strategic 
act of self-aggrandisement with the objective of claiming local political status from 
the Dutch, such as McGilvray (2008) has documented for the Mukkuvar. The 
Sindhunadar claim to originate from Sindh, “somewhere in India” (but most 
Sindhunadar whom I asked do not really know where exactly in India this region is). 
There is a region called Sindh in the south of modern-day Pakistan, but I never heard 
anyone associate this Sindh with the Sindh that gave the Sindhunadar their name. 
One Sindhunadar whom I spoke to actually claimed that his caste originated from 
the Indian cradle of civilisation in Harappa and Mohenjodaro in the valley of the 
Indus River. This river is also known as the Sindh River in the second book of the 
Mahabharata (telephone conversation with Prof. Philip Lutgendorf, Boulder, 
October 2007). If the argument about a division between Aryans and Dravidians 
holds any water at all, this would make the Sindhunadar more Aryan than the 
Sinhalese, who claim descent from a prince from Orissa (Vijaya) and his Tamil, thus 
Dravidian, wife!  
Somewhere in the now-forgotten shrouds of history, the Sindhunadar moved to the 
town of Marungur, north of the Cauvery River in the Chola kingdom77, and from 
                                                 
 
76 Not far from Batticaloa Town, there is a village with the name Thimilaithivu (‘Island of 
Thimilar’). On my request, Patricia Lawrence asked around about the history of the Thimilar 
when she visited the village for other work. An old friend whom she spoke to told her that 
indeed there had been Thimilar fishermen living in Thimilaithivu once upon a time, but that 
there were no more Thimilar in Batticaloa District these days (e-mail, 18-7-2008). 
77 As I have mentioned in section 2.3.3 (fn. 39), the location of Marungur has not been 
identified and remains a mystery. 
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there Kulakkottan brought them over to take command over Kottiyar Pattu. While 
the hypothesis of strategic self-aggrandisement makes sense, there is one detail that 
undermines it.  In the first half of the 19th century, Casie Chitty found that the 
mythical area of origin of the Thimilar in Jaffna, with whom the Thimilar of Kottiyar 
Pattu have had no marriage links for a very long time, is Sindh (1834: 232, 235). This 
means either that the link to Sindh was already part of the Thimilar myths of origin 
before a group of Thimilar were expelled from Jaffna to Batticaloa (which must have 
happened before the 15th century to fit the Mukkuvar story), or that the Thimilar of 
Jaffna (and a small group who can still be found in the village of Thimilai near 
Chilaw78) moved there from Trincomalee after the name change from Thimilar to 
Sindhunadar, instead of the other way around. This last option runs counter to the 
story in the Mattakalappu Manmiyam, and it is complicated by the fact that neither the 
Thimilar whom I spoke to in Kottiyar Pattu, nor the Thimilar whom my research 
assistant spoke to in Thimilai know anything about each other. 
The local myths surrounding the management of the Verugal temple clearly put the 
Thimilar in charge of the temple, with Velalar and other castes in subservient 
positions. This is very similar to the (pre-war) situation at the Kokkatticholai 
Tantondriswaram temple in the south of Batticaloa District, where a non-Velalar 
kingly caste is in charge of the temple, with Velalar and the lower castes acting as 
servants79. This may have been a pre-existing situation, or the Thimilar may have 
risen to (local) kingly status around the time that Rajasinha II upgraded the temples 
at Verugal and Thampalakamam, reorganised the caste structures around them, and 
had a chronicle written to link these caste structures to the pre-existing organisation 
structure as it had existed before the Portuguese destroyed the Koneswaram temple 
at Trincomalee. This all makes sense, but there are two further complications. In the 
Konesar Kalvettu and in local myths of origin, the Thimilar are said to originate from 
Marungur, and other settlers brought in by Kulakkottan are said to originate from 
Karaikal (which nowadays is part of the Union Territory of Pondicherry). In myths 
of origin in Batticaloa, Marungur and Karaikal also figure with a similar difference in 
status, but both are identified as towns of origin of the Velalar caste. Secondly, the 
(caste-specific) cattle brand that the Thimilar use depicts a lotus flower and, for some 
                                                 
 
78 In late 2008, my research assistant made a trip to Chilaw and Thimilai for me, and spoke to 
a number of people who still identify themselves as Thimilar. These Thimilar identified 
themselves as belonging to the Kuru kulam, a group name which they could not explain, but 
which indicates a link with Jaffna. Casie Chitty (1834: 232) mentions that Kuru kulam is a 
name for a caste cluster of fishermen and boatmen in Jaffna who had become town servants; 
this cluster includes both the Thimilar and the Mukkuvar. The Thimilar of Thimilai claimed 
to have originated from Thirunelveli, a couple of generations ago. They were unaware of a 
reference in a temple chronicle to Kulakkottan settling the Thimilar in Thimilai (along with 
17 other castes) to serve the Munneswaram temple. They were also entirely unaware of the 
presence of a group of Thimilar in Kottiyar Pattu (interviews by my research assistant, 
Thimilai, July 2008).  
79 This was pointed out to me by Dennis McGilvray (e-mail, 25-10-2007). 
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kudis (matriclans), a plough. The plough is an obvious reference to farming, and on 
top of that the lotus flower is a Velalar cattle brand in parts of Batticaloa District, 
while the Velalar in Kottiyar Pattu (who still live in the villages that were identified 
as Velalar villages by Van Senden) have a crescent as a cattle brand.  
What is clear is that in between the late 17th century and the middle of the 20th 
century, the Thimilar dominated political power among Tamils in Kottiyar Pattu, 
and that they controlled most of the paddy land and the important temples at 
Verugal and Kankuveli. The sense of being the rightful leader was so strong that, 
when lower castes started challenging the status of the Thimilar, a number of 
Thimilar responded by hunting down disrespectful low-caste Tamils with shotguns. 
The “shooting incidents in Mavadichenai and Menkamam” were important enough 
to be reported in the annual report of the Trincomalee GA (AR 1954: A174). Fifty 
years later, a Thimilar man whose relatives had taken part in the shootings told me 
about these incidents with some pride. 
The Thimilar were however unable to hold on to power. In the 1950s, as the lower 
castes were beginning to deny the Thimilar their customary respect, the Velalar of 
Kankuveli took control of the Kankuveli Sivankovil and Agasthiyar Stabanam, two 
related temples near Kankuveli that had been under the control of a family from 
Mallikaithivu for generations. A court case followed, which was concluded in favour 
of the Velalar of Kankuveli: the Brahmin judge ruled that since the temples were in 
the territory of their village, they should control it. Together with the temple for 
Murugan at Verugal, the temple for Kali at Sampoor and (until 1983) the temple for 
Pattini at Neelapola, the Kankuveli Sivankovil has regional importance, with people 
from the entire region visiting its annual (one-day) water-cutting ritual in the 
Mahaweli River in June/July. After losing control over the temple, the people of 
Mallikaithivu built a new temple for Siva in their own village, and they now 
organise their water-cutting ritual on the same day as the Kankuveli Sivankovil, but 
at a location that is slightly upstream from (and thus both physically and ritually 
‘higher’ than) the original water-cutting site. 
The loss of power of the Thimilar was completed in 1970, when A. Thangathurai of 
Kilivetti, a Velalar, became Member of Parliament. Even though Thangathurai 
proved through his actions that he was not anti-Thimilar (one of the interventions 
for which he is remembered most in the area is the tarring of the road from 
Mallikaithivu to Kilivetti, starting at Mallikaithivu), the Thimilar suddenly had to 
come to terms with the fact that they were now ordinary inhabitants of Kottiyar 
Pattu. 
Some anti-Thimilar sentiments do exist among other Tamils in the area: when I 
asked non-Thimilar about the different castes in Kottiyar Pattu and their hereditary 
occupations, I was often told (accompanied by other disparaging remarks) that the 
Thimilar were either toddy tappers or washermen. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, much of the land owned by the Thimilar of Mallikaithivu 
was sold to Muslims. I have not been able to find out why this happened; it might 
have been to settle debts that had developed with the introduction of green 
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revolution rice, or to free up cash for investments outside agriculture. What is clear 
is that some of the money was used to educate youth. When the war broke out, this 
proved to be an advantage. One person from Mallikaithivu fled to Canada, and 
started sponsoring members of his extended family, who in turn sponsored others. 
Over time, about half of the population of Mallikaithivu moved to Toronto, earning 
Mallikaithivu the nickname ‘little Canada’. I was told that there is now even a 
separate Sindhunadar caste association in Toronto. Helped by their education levels, 
some of the refugees did well and started sending money back to the village, which 
enabled those left behind to buy back their lands from the Muslims to whom they 
had sold them a few decades earlier. Eechchilampattu and Pallikudiyiruppu and 
their satellite villages did not do so well, because these villages were under full LTTE 
control from 1997 onwards. Here, not much land had been sold to outsiders, but the 
restrictions instituted by the army made it very hard for people to invest in these 
villages. Nevertheless, it was clear that these villages were better off than 
surrounding villages in the LTTE-controlled area. 
The Thimilar are subdivided into exogamous kudi matriclans. In 1971, Dennis 
McGilvray collected data on Thimilar kudis in Eechchilampattu and 
Pallikudiyiruppu; the data that I collected in Eechchilampattu, Pallikudiyiruppu and 
Mallikaithivu during my fieldwork are very similar. I present them below in random 
order (table 3.2). 
 
Kudis identified in 1971 Kudis identified in 2005  
Cakkalattikudi  Sakkaraivattikudi 
Patattaarkilaikudi Padaththaarkudi  
Maalayankudi Maalayarkudi 
Maraikkaalkilaikudi Marakkaarkudi 
Vilvaraacankudi Vilvaranyankudi 
Toppuccukilaikudi Thoppichchikudi 
Umanakirikudi Umanakirikudi 
Kutiyiruppukudi Kudiyiruppukudi 
Veelaiyankudi  
Veerappanikkankudi  
Naiyinaarkudi  
Alavantaarkudi  
 Vithanakudi 
Table 3.2. Thimilar kudis identified in 1971 and 2005 (source: fieldnotes Dennis McGilvray, 1971; own 
fieldnotes, 2005) 
 
Most of the people who gave me names of Thimilar kudis told me that the kudis are 
hierarchically ranked; the problem is that everybody gave me a different ranking. 
Some claimed high status for certain kudis based on political positions, others 
claimed high status based on religious positions, and others did not give any specific 
explanation for the ranking. While Yalman (1971: 326) was told that kudi rankings in 
the area around Akkaraipattu are reinforced by the practice of hypergamy, 
McGilvray (2008: 179-180) found no evidence of it. In Kottiyar Pattu, I did not come 
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across any references to hypergamy either. I have not had the time to sort the puzzle 
of kudi rankings out in more detail; what is clear is that the kudi ranking is 
ambiguous, either because it is contested or because people do not think it is 
important enough anymore to have the hierarchy worked out properly.   
 
Velalar 
The Velalar in Kottiyar Pattu can mostly be found in Sampoor, Kilivetti, Kankuveli 
and Menkamam, as well as in the colonies LB3 (Linganagar), Athiyammankerny (an 
extension of LB3) and LB6 (Sivapuram); the abandoned village of Thirumankalai 
was also a Velalar village. Bharathipuram, a colony along the Muthur-Serunuwara 
road, has a sizeable population of Velalar, as well as two other caste groups. 
Traditionally, the Velalar are cultivators (and most of them still are); their 
landholdings centered around a number of small tanks around the fringe of the Allai 
scheme before it was extended: the Kankuveli tank, the Menkamam tank, the 
Kirankulam (near Kilivetti), and a number of small tanks near Sampoor.  
Apart from a number of village temples, the Velalar control two old temples with a 
wider geographical relevance: a temple for Kali in Sampoor that was famous for its 
trance rituals, and a temple for Siva at Kankuveli (see above). In contrast, the Velalar 
play only the subservient role of temple sweepers in the Verugal temple, and are 
thus sometimes described as Koviyar (temple labourers) by Thimilar. Nevertheless, 
the shrine for Pillaiyar, to whom most devotees pay obeisance before entering the 
main temple, was added to the Verugal temple by a Velalar.  
Before the conflict, the Velalar community in Kottiyar Pattu was largely 
endogamous. Intermarriage with other castes was rare, but even intermarriage with 
Velalar from other areas was not very common. Kilivetti is an exception to this 
pattern, as it had some influx of people from Jaffna in the late 19th and early 20th 
century; this group has pretty much amalgamated into the village community. 
As with the Thimilar, the Velalar have kudis. When he visited Sampoor in 1971, 
Dennis McGilvray was given the names of seven kudis. 34 years later, I was told that 
there were ten kudis. Of these, the people I spoke to could give me six names:  
 
Table 3.3. Velalar kudis identified in 1971 and 2005 (source: fieldnotes Dennis McGilvray, 1971; own 
fieldnotes, 2005) 
 
Kudis identified in 1971 Kudis identified in 2005  
Kāraiyapparkudi (the most prestigious kudi) Karaiyappukudi (poosaris) 
Pulavankudi Pulavankudi (bards) 
Periyakāraiyapparkudi Periyakaraiyappukudi (‘volunteers’) 
Iraiyāththukudi Iraiytheevukudi (take oil to Koneswaram temple) 
Kāppukkattikkudi  
Manjanirkudi  
Ilankudi Ilankudi (‘volunteers’) 
 Pasunkudi (management of the temple) 
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According to the myth of origin of the Adhi Konesar temple in Thampalakamam, 
Karaiyappar was brought from India by Kulakkottan to be the secretary of the 
temple80; he ultimately settled in Sampoor. As he did not have children, he adopted a 
son whom he made his heir. This man is known as Periya (‘Big’) Karaiyappar. The 
Pulavankudi provided the bards for the Koneswaram temple: pulavan is Tamil for 
‘poet’. 
While all the abovementioned kudis are found in Sampoor, the other old villages are 
dominated by either the Karaiyapparkudi and the Periyakaraiyapparkudi, or by the 
Pulavankudi, and the colonies have been settled primarily by people of the top three 
kudis.   
A curious detail about the Karaiyapparkudi and the Pulavankudi is that a number of 
people from both kudis insisted that the kudis are endogamous, and that 
intermarriage between the two kudis is not allowed. These people identified certain 
Velalar villages as belonging to the Karaiyapparkudi, and others to the Pulavankudi. 
What may have happened is that with the expansion of the population, the two 
exogamous kudis transformed into endogamous sub-castes, which would be fairly 
unique along Sri Lanka’s east coast: Yalman (idem: 326-331) only found kudi 
endogamy among the priestly Kurukkal kudi, which can thus either be seen as an 
endogamous sub-caste of the Velalar, or as a separate caste altogether81. The problem 
is that kudi endogamy constitutes incest, and is thus taboo: kudi members are 
classificatory siblings. If this kudi endogamy does indeed exist, it must have started 
at some point with a marriage between parallel cousins (which constitutes incest but 
may be forgivable if it concerns distant cousins), and exogamous sub-divisions must 
have formed within the kudis. I did not come across any named sub-kudis, but the 
lack of names may be due to the lack of a ritual role for these groups82. An alternative 
interpretation might be that there is no kudi endogamy, but a rule of marriage 
avoidance between the two kudis if both have traditional marriage links with a third 
kudi (possibly the Periyaparaiyapparkudi). As McGilvray (2008: 179-182) has 
documented, cross-cousins of cross-cousins are classificatory siblings, who are not 
allowed to marry. 
The other castes in Kottiyar Pattu may or may not have kudis. I never came across 
any reference to their existence, but also did not inquire into the matter in detail. 
Whenever I did ask non-Velalar and non-Thimilar about kudis, people either thought 
I was asking about caste or did not recognise the term at all.  
 
                                                 
 
80 This probably refers to the Koneswaram temple in Trincomalee 
81 Yalman may have been confused by the multiple ways in which the term kudi is used: both 
to designate (high-caste) matriclans, and to designate service castes. McGilvray (2008) has 
documented the existence of a number of exogamous kudis among the Kurukkals. 
82 When I visited the Somali region of Ethiopia in May 2008, I was told of a similar process 
that had taken place among some Somali clans that used to be exogamous, but became 
endogamous as the population grew. In order to avoid incest, exogamy rules were 
maintained at the level of the sub-clan. 
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Karaiyar 
Karaiyar (fishermen) can be found in the strip that covers Kattaiparichchan, 
Chenaiyoor and Kadatkaraichenai. Apart from fishing, some people also engage in 
subsistence farming. There may have been a small community there earlier (Van 
Senden mentions the existence of Kattaiparichchan), but it saw a comparatively big 
influx about a century and a half ago. Around the middle of the 19th century, a group 
of fishermen from Valvettithurai, on the Jaffna Peninsula, settled permanently in 
Thirukadaloor, a neighbourhood on the northern edge of Trincomalee Town. From 
there, they expanded into other coastal settlements, including the strip around 
Kattaiparichchan, and engaged in fishing, shipping of goods between Trincomalee 
and Jaffna, and smuggling. As the Karaiyar community in Trincomalee District 
increased in size the ties with Valvettithurai faded, though particularly during the 
economically restrictive regime of Sirimavo Bandaranaike (1970-1977) some people 
remained involved in lively smuggling with Valvettithurai and India (conversation 
with a retired policeman who was based in Trincomalee at the time, 2007). 
Valvettithurai shot into prominence as the Tamil militancy developed, because it 
was the birthplace of Veluppillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, and because 
the smuggling routes maintained by the Karaiyar became lifelines for the militant 
groups (Narayan Swamy  2003a, 2003b). This saw Valvettithurai being targeted for 
violence by the Sri Lankan military (including the massacre that triggered the 
Anuradhapura massacre in May 1985, which in turn triggered the carnage of May-
June 1985 in Kottiyar Pattu, see section 4.2.2). The link with Valvettithurai may have 
been a reason behind the particular viciousness with which Thirukadaloor and the 
other Karaiyar settlements in Trincomalee District were attacked repeatedly 
throughout the war.  
The Karaiyar villages in Kottiyar Pattu all fell under the full control of the LTTE 
between 1997 and 2006, and now fall into the High Security Zone (see sections 4.2.8 
and 4.2.10), which means that the entire population is currently languishing in 
camps. 
Access to boats has made it comparatively easy (though not at all safe) for members 
of this community to flee; the Karaiyar from Trincomalee are disproportionately 
represented among the refugee population in India. But where the Thimilar who 
moved to Canada were able to send back substantial amounts of money to their 
relatives in Kottiyar Pattu, the Karaiyar who fled to India were unable to do the 
same, and those left behind remain quite poor.  
Because this community has little to do with agriculture, it falls somewhat outside 
the local caste hierarchy; I have not come across any references to status conflicts 
between the Karaiyar and the other communities in Kottiyar Pattu. Karaiyar from 
Thirukadaloor do have one important ritual role to play in the annual temple festival 
at Verugal: they are responsible for the flag hoisting ceremony with which the 
temple festival opens. Apparently, the very first flag for the festival was provided by 
Karaiyar from Valvettithurai, who were therefore given the right to hoist the flag 
every year. Over time, this responsibility shifted to Thirukadaloor for logistical 
reasons. 
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Mukkuvar 
There are two Mukkuvar villages in Kottiyar Pattu. Both were established in the 
1930s, and the inhabitants all originate from Batticaloa District. As is the case in 
Batticaloa, the Mukkuvar in Kottiyar Pattu primarily engage in agriculture, though 
not many have access to own land. While the Mukkuvar are traditionally the 
dominant caste in Batticaloa (McGilvray 2008), they have no dominance whatsoever 
in Kottiyar Pattu. 
 
Thaththar 
A small community of Thaththar (goldsmiths) used to live in Koonithivu, a coastal 
village near Sampoor that is now part of the High Security Zone. With 
jewelrymaking being in continuous demand, some men of this community have 
retained their traditional occupation. Some of them work in Muthur, while others 
work in Trincomalee and in towns as far afield as Colombo. Unfortunately, I have 
never been able to visit Koonithivu, but I did speak to some goldsmiths and, 
separately, to some Muslim jewellers in Muthur in March 2008. The striking thing 
about the goldsmiths is the interdependence between them and the owners of 
jewelry shops, who in Muthur are all Muslims. Each jeweller employs one or a few 
goldsmiths, and they often have very long-standing working relationships. Because 
the jewellers are entirely dependent on the work of the goldsmiths, they do 
everything they can to protect them when needed. Both the goldsmiths and the 
jewellers whom I spoke to confirmed this. Whenever tensions broke out while the 
goldsmiths were still in Muthur, the jewellers would look after them in their own 
houses until it was safe to escort them to the bridge at Kattaiparichchan, from where 
the goldsmiths returned home safely.  
This local inter-ethnic interdependence provided no protection in Koonithivu itself. 
Statistics collected by CIRM (2004b) indicate that violence hit Koonithivu harder 
than most other communities in Kottiyar Pattu (see also section 4.3): two fifths of the 
households were female-headed, and over three quarters of the households were 
directly war-affected (which means that at least one person in the household was 
either killed, maimed or traumatised in the conflict). Being located near the entry of 
the Trincomalee harbour and with a number of LTTE bases nearby, Koonithivu and 
the neighbouring village of Soodaikudah were hit regularly by naval and artillery 
shelling and aerial bombardment. On top of that, particularly in the 1990s, there 
were regular roundups and ‘search and destroy’ missions in the area in which it is 
quite possible that ordinary civilians got caught up.  
 
Pachchan 
The Pachchan are another caste community with mysterious origins. In Kottiyar 
Pattu, nobody was able to tell me where the Pachchan came from or what their 
hereditary occupation was, and there does not seem to be a Pachchan caste 
anywhere else among the Tamils in Sri Lanka or in South India. The oldest reference 
that I found to their presence in Kottiyar Pattu is by De Graauwe (1676: f. 14), who 
mentioned the presence of the “Patjes”. Their responsibilities were to guard the 
fordable place across the Mahaweli River at “Pajanuture”, still known as 
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Pachchanuthurai (between present-day Shafinagar and Neelapola, and very near to 
the place where the new Trincomalee Circular Road will ultimately cross the 
Mahaweli River), and to catch elephants; however, from De Graauwe’s account it 
seems that a number of Pachchan had fled to Kantale, outside of the area under 
Dutch control. In 1786, Van Senden counted 14 adult men of the “Passen” caste at the 
village of “Patjewelij” or Pachchanveli, half an hour’s travel from Neelapola and 
near Pachchanuthurai (entry for 25-5-1786)83.  
Ryan mentions that the Portuguese authors Ribeiro and De Queyroz described a 
low-ranking caste of Pachas, and mentions that in the 1824 census the “Patchies” 
were included as a separate caste, which was identified with the present-day Sinhala 
Batgam caste (2004 [1953]: 64, 72)84. Jon Dart, referring to an article by Ferguson in 
JRAS 1899, mentions that Teixeira, an early Portuguese writer on Ceylon, mentioned 
the Pachas, a wild tribe who conserved meat in honey (Dart 1985: 21). Ferguson 
identified them with the Veddas. De Queyroz identified the Pachas as a low caste, 
separate from the Veddas, involved in the preparation of cinnamon, and 
geographically concentrated in the Four Korales and the Seven Korales (1992 
[1930/1687]: 19-20). Pachas were seemingly quite prominent among the lascorins, or 
native troops, and were "the worst enemies of the Portuguese, but self-interest made 
them friends" (idem.: 104, 230). 
What we thus probably have here is a group of soldiers of the (Sinhala) Pacha caste 
who settled – with their families – near the fordable place they were supposed to 
guard, lost contact with the rest of their community somewhere during the Dutch 
period, and adopted first the language and then the ethnic identity of the Tamils 
living around them, in a very similar process to what happened to the Coast Veddas. 
Around the beginning of the 20th century this community was destitute and, 
according to people of the community, lived in the jungle. Under the leadership of 
Fr. Bonnel, a missionary, a large swathe of jungle was converted into paddy fields, 
the people were settled in Pachchanoor, and a church was built. In response to Fr. 
Bonnel’s work, a large part of the community became Roman Catholic (Lange n.y.: 
158; interview with middle-aged couple, Iruthayapuram, August 2005). In recent 
years, the village has adopted the Catholic name of Iruthayapuram, which means 
‘Sacred Heart Village’. Socially speaking, the village has a fairly isolated position in 
Kottiyar Pattu. There are no regular marriage relationships with other Tamil villages 
                                                 
 
83 Near Pachchanveli (which is now only a stretch of paddy fields, without a village), one can 
still find the remains of an old tank that is known as Pachchankulam. While I was unable to 
determine the age of the tank, it is not unthinkable that the Pachchan who settled near 
Pachchanuthurai began cultivating paddy. In the census of 1824, a village with the name 
“Patchan Ore” (Pachchanoor) is included; I am not sure whether this was located where 
Pachchanveli was, or where the present-day village of Pachchanoor/Iruthayapuram is 
found. 
84 This caste, which is found “throughout the Kandyan provinces including the north-central 
jungle”, is traditionally one of hired labourers, though own traditions claim a former status 
as royal palanquin bearers (Ryan 2004 [1953]: 72-73, 127-128). 
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(not even with the Tamil Catholics in Muthur), and higher-caste landowners in 
surrounding villages resent the fact that the community, which is considered fairly 
low on the pecking order, is well endowed with fertile and well-irrigated paddy 
fields. 
Iruthayapuram is something of a village in-between. First of all, the village and its 
paddy fields form the boundary between the Muslim-dominated area around 
Muthur and the Tamil-dominated area to the south. Around Iruthayapuram, Tamil- 
and Muslim-owned paddy fields were interspersed before the conflict; after the 
conflict caused an ethnic homogeneisation of land use (see chapter 6), the boundary 
between Tamil and Muslim fields came to run just north of the village. Secondly, 
neither the Catholic Tamils from Muthur, nor the Hindu Tamils from particularly 
Mallikaithivu appreciated the Pachchans’ 20th-century rise in status from destitute 
jungle people to landowning farmers. This made the village an outlier among the 
Tamil community until the equalising effect of the war mitigated this to some extent. 
Thirdly, this village used to have a disproportionate share of mixed-ethnic marriages 
before the conflict – all marriages between Sinhala and Tamil Catholics. The mixed-
ethnic couples have moved out, and inter-ethnic marriage was replaced by a small, 
but increasing trend of interreligious marriage between Catholic and Hindu Tamils 
(see chapter 8). 
 
Kuyavar  
There is one small village of Kuyavar (potters) in Kottiyar Pattu; it used to be known 
under the name Kusavanoor (‘the village of potters’). Many of the people in the 
village survive as landless labourers or tenant farmers. As far as I know, no pottery 
is made in the village. This is in interesting contrast to the potters’ village where 
Deborah Winslow has been doing anthropological research for many years. There, 
pottery was discovered as a very viable income generating activity, and the village 
became rather wealthy in comparison to the surrounding villages (conversation, 
Madison, October 2006; see also Winslow 2003). In Kottiyar Pattu, this is visibly not 
the case.  
About a year and a half after the tsunami, another problem appeared on the horizon. 
Since there was a huge labour demand for post-tsunami reconstruction work, 
agricultural labour became scarce, and agricultural labourers demanded increasingly 
high wages85. This meant that the profitability of paddy cultivation came under 
                                                 
 
85 Note however that the scarcity of agricultural labour in Kottiyar Pattu was much less 
extreme than in other parts of the country, particularly Ampara District. Also, the scarcity of 
agricultural labour in Kottiyar Pattu manifested itself only about 1½ years after the tsunami, 
whereas elsewhere it manifested itself already within a few months after the tsunami. 
During national-level meetings to coordinate the construction of transitional shelters for the 
tsunami-displaced (which I attended in the capacity of shelter coordinator for ZOA), there 
were strong debates about the need to keep wages paid for labourers limited, so as not to 
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pressure for the farmers. In response, April 2006 saw the first combine harvester 
machine being put to work in Kottiyar Pattu. The consequence of this was that 
unskilled agricultural labourers had much less work available, and suffered from 
under-employment. The potters’ village was among the hardest hit. Because of the 
violence of August 2006, there was barely any harvest in the 2006 yala season, and 
the area cultivated for the 2006-2007 maha season was also below average. I have not 
been able to ascertain what happened subsequently.  
 
Paraiyar 
Entering into the only old Paraiyar (funeral drummer) village in Kottiyar Pattu 
(there is a drummer section in one of the Tamil colonies as well), you would not 
think that you have reached the bottom of the local caste hierarchy: it is among the 
most pleasant villages in the area. The compounds are shaded by arecanut palms 
and fruit trees, the village is clean, and there are two small but well-maintained 
temples.  
While De Graauwe’s report (1676) mentions the presence of Paraiyar in Kottiyar 
Pattu, Van Senden’s report (1786b) does not. This leads me to surmise that the 
drummers probably left the area when the local economy collapsed under the 
weight of epidemics, and the remaining high-caste farmers were unable to sustain 
the service castes. A hand-written village history that was once read out to me does 
not mention caste in any way. It states that the first five families came to Kottiyar 
Pattu from Kaluthavalai in Batticaloa District in 184086. It is very well possible that 
since in this time the situation slowly improved again, the dominant castes wanted 
to re-establish themselves and thus invited people of various service castes to come 
back and work for them. 
As far as I have been able to figure out, there are very few Paraiyar who have 
married outside their caste. The village has marriage links with Paraiyar 
communities in Batticaloa, Ampara (McGilvray 1983 and 2008: 247-265), and Jaffna 
Districts. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
mess up other markets for unskilled labour (Gaasbeek 2010). My guess is that the labour 
shortage in Kottiyar Pattu arose when labourers started migrating to other parts of the 
country to work there. Though there was a fair bit of tsunami damage in Kottiyar Pattu 
itself, the permanent housing reconstruction efforts hardly took off. During an evaluation 
that I did for a Sri Lankan NGO that had built houses in Muthur, the DS told me that of 
about 1,200 houses that needed replacement in the DS division, by June 2007 only about 250 
had been completed and another 100 were under construction. 
86 I have never raised the caste issue with people from the drummer’s village, because I did 
not want to embarrass anyone. The caste affiliation is however clear from its old name: 
Paraiyoor. In the village itself, I never heard anyone use this name. Palaiya Oor (“old 
village”), a similar-sounding name, was used several times. This name makes no sense to 
people from other villages however, since some of the other villages are hundreds of years 
older. 
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The drummer community has an ambiguous reputation. The Paraiyar are clearly 
looked down upon by people from other villages, but some are also sought after 
traditional healers and others are feared for their skills in sorcery and black magic.  
Similar to what McGilvray has described for the drummer village near Akkaraipattu, 
a process of emancipation has taken place over the last twenty years. The 
emancipation of Kottiyar Pattu’s Paraiyar was triggered or reinforced by the 
displacement of 1985. Irrespective of caste, almost all the Tamils in the area had lost 
their houses, all were displaced, and all had become dependent on handouts. This 
dependency was reinforced by the fact that the Tamil farmers were unable to harvest 
the crop that was on the fields when the 1985 carnage broke out, which meant that 
people would not have had resources to provide the customary donations to the 
service castes. 
Over time, more and more people refused to perform their traditional demeaning 
role of funeral drummers, and by the mid-nineties drumming at funerals had ceased 
entirely. This process was reinforced by demographic trends. Since the peak in births 
that occurred with the baby boom of the 1940s preceded a sudden increase in deaths 
(and thus in funerals at which drumming is required) by some fifty to sixty years, 
this meant that by the 1960s there were simply too many people in ‘drumming age’ 
for the drumming that was required. Part of the Paraiyar thus grew up without ever 
having to drum, which showed others that a life without drumming was entirely 
possible and may have increased the momentum for emancipation.  
The development of the education system further reinforced the process of 
emancipation. Access to primary education gave some youths a chance to pursue 
further education in secondary schools outside Kottiyar Pattu, where fellow students 
and teachers would not know the caste affiliations of the students. By 2005, three 
people from the village had become medical doctors in some of the country’s best 
hospitals. The self-emancipation of the Paraiyar has not earned them more respect 
among other Tamils in Kottiyar Pattu though, and the sad reality remains today that 
the only way the drummers can really break free of caste-based disrespect is to 
migrate to the cities and become anonymous (Rasaratnam 1996a: chapter 41).  
There are not many landowning farmers in the village at the moment, though this 
has not always been the same. The initial families who settled in 1840 were given 
some plots of paddy land to sustain themselves, and their descendants have cleared 
some more jungle around the village. By the 1950s however, there was no more 
jungle to clear and the village was not given access to colony lands under the Allai 
Extension Scheme. Most villagers sustain themselves as landless agricultural 
labourers or as tenant farmers. The village is however not as desparately poor as 
some other villages are. As I mentioned earlier, many Paraiyar families have planted 
arecanuts in their compounds. Though one will not get rich from a few arecanut 
trees, they do provide a useful additional income. It is interesting to see that the 
drummer community is the only community that has taken to this source of income 
in a large way.  
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Vannar and Ampattar  
Different from the other castes in Kottiyar Pattu, Vannar (washermen, also known as 
Dhobies) and Ampattar (barbers) do not live in separate villages but are dispersed, 
with a slightly larger group living in Muthur, where they serve both Muslims and 
Tamils. To a larger extent than what Dennis McGilvray (2008: 228-247) has 
documented for Akkaraipattu, both of these communities have over the last few 
decades emancipated from their subservient role while largely maintaining their 
traditional professions. Ritual services are still performed for temples, but only to a 
limited extent for polluting events like funerals. Particularly the barbers, but also 
some washermen no longer visit people’s homes to offer their non-ritual washing 
and hairdressing services; rather, they have set up shops that people now need to 
come to if they want their clothes washed or their hair cut. This process has been 
reinforced by the monetisation of the transaction. Where earlier, high-caste families 
would give ‘their dhoby’ and ‘their barber’ a gift of rice or other relevant goods on a 
regular basis, all customers now need to pay in hard cash. A high-caste man who 
told me about this strongly expressed his frustration over the loss of status that this 
entailed for his own caste community. Despite this emancipation and the (limited) 
increase in wealth that came with it, both communities still find themselves on the 
social margins of the villages they live in. 
 
Vedar 
Most Sri Lankans consider the Veddas to be a distinct, aboriginal, ethnic group87. 
Among them, Nevill identified a group living around Vakarai, directly south from 
Kottiyar Pattu, as “Coast Veddas” (Nevill 1886: 183-184, see also Seligmann and 
Seligmann 2003 [1911]: 331-340). The Coast Veddas had intermarried with Tamils, 
spoke Tamil, and identified themselves as Vedar (Tamil for hunters). Interestingly, 
they started speaking “pure but quaint Sinhalese with a Vaedda accent, as a rule, 
though mixed with some words characteristic of true Vaedda” when both Nevill and 
Seligmann and Seligmann asked them to speak their original language (Nevill 1886: 
183; Seligmann and Seligmann 2003 [1911]: 332). This, combined with local claims of 
origin, led Nevill to surmise that the Coast Veddas originated from what is now 
                                                 
 
87 The Mahavamsa relates how, when he first landed in Sri Lanka, Vijaya was seduced by 
Kuveni, a yakkhini (demoness), into marrying her. She handed control over Sri Lanka to 
Vijaya, and arranged for Vijaya and his men to massacre the other yakkhas (demons), lest 
they would kill Kuveni for her betrayal. After things had settled down, the time came to 
properly consecrate Vijaya as ruler of Sri Lanka. However, Vijaya refused to take the throne 
if he did not have a wife of royal lineage. His men promptly arranged for a Tamil princess 
from Madurai to be brought. Vijaya sent Kuveni with their son and daughter away so he 
could marry the princess, whose descendants became the Sinhalese. Unfortunately for 
Kuveni, not all yakkhas had been massacred, and she was killed by an angry yakkha who 
recognised her. The son and daughter fled to Adam’s Peak, where they married each other. 
Their children became the Veddas (Mahavamsa VII: 1-74). 
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known as Sabaragamuva Province, which Rajasinha II would have wanted to empty 
of people so that the wilderness functioned as a buffer between the Portuguese 
possessions around Colombo and the Kandy kingdom, and there would be nobody 
who could guide invading troops through the wilderness.   
Jon Dart (1985) identified a string of Coast Vedda villages south of Verugal, but 
missed out on a cluster of Coast Vedda villages in Kottiyar Pattu that covers much of 
the area between Sampoor, Pallikudiyiruppu, Ilankaithurai and the ocean shore.  
De Graauwe (1676: f. 13) mentioned the presence of two groups of Veddas in 
Kottiyar Pattu: one group near Thirumankalai, guarding the frontier with the Kandy 
kingdom, and another living around the Dutch fortalice at Erikalanchenai, not far 
from Kankuveli; this second group acted as servants to the local chiefs. Both groups 
were involved in hunting and the collection of honey and bees’ wax.  
Local Vedda narratives fit nicely with De Graauwe’s description and Nevill’s hunch 
about their settlement history. The narratives tell of two Vedda brothers migrating 
from the Kandy kingdom, first to Karaithivu (south of Batticaloa), and then to 
Kottiyar Pattu, where they settled near Kankuveli (which is not far from 
Erikalanchenai). Later on, one of the brothers moved to an area near Verugal (which 
is not far from Thirumankalai) with his clan; the other brother took his clan and 
moved towards Pallikudiyiruppu, where he married a Tamil (Thimilar) woman and 
began a long tradition of intermarriage with high-caste Tamils. The group that had 
settled near Verugal was badly affected by an epidemic; the survivors settled near 
the Ullackalli lagoon, where their descendants can still be found (Samad 2003: 163-
171). Over time, the Coast Veddas of Kottiyar Pattu became integrated into the local 
Tamil caste system as the Vedar (hunter) caste, similar to what Dart (1985) and 
Thangarajah (1995) have documented for the Coast Veddas of Vakarai.  
Intermarriage with high-caste Tamils (and particular the Thimilar) seems to have 
been fairly common for many years. Nevertheless, the Coast Veddas are still seen by 
the rest of the population as recently-settled, uncivilised tribals who worship their 
ancestors. Until the 1950s, hunting formed an important part of their livelihoods, 
next to fishing and subsistence agriculture. Before the tsunami, most Veddas in 
Kottiyar Pattu lived in tiny wattle-and-daub huts. When an NGO planned to build 
houses in one Vedda village in 2003, a model house that was set up was criticised by 
the intended beneficiaries as being so big that not only people but also spirits would 
move in – despite having a total surface area of just 30 m2. 
Despite the important role that the Veddas play in the founding myth of the Verugal 
temple, they have not been given the right to be responsible for the ritual on one of 
the 18 nights that the annual festival lasts. For a number of years, the Veddas have 
had a small ritual of their own on the thirteenth night of the festival, just outside the 
temple compound.  
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Kuravar  
Samad (2003: 342-343) mentions the presence of a community of Kuravar (gypsies) in 
three marginalised hamlets in Eechchilampattu. I have never visited these hamlets, 
and thus have no specific knowledge about this community. The Kuravar speak 
Telugu (the official language of Andhra Pradesh in south-central India) and, until at 
least the middle of the 20th century, were nomadic. Typically engaging in activities 
like snake charming, fortune telling and begging (beside unskilled labour), the 
Kuravar find themselves on the very margins of Tamil society. I know of two other 
Kuravar settlements on the east coast. One is near Thampalakamam (which was set 
up under the leadership of a local Protestant pastor); the second is the settlement of 
Alikambe, near Akkaraipattu, (which was set up under the leadership of a Catholic 
missionary, see McGilvray 2008: 47-49).  
 
Indian Tamils 
A separate category within the Tamil community is formed by the so-called ‘Indian 
Tamils’: descendants of those who were brought down from Tamil Nadu to work in 
the plantations in Ceylon. From the moment their ancestors arrived in Sri Lanka, this 
group of people has been discriminated against and exploited by the British colonial 
establishment, Sinhalese and Tamils alike (Daniel 1997). After a reduction in rice 
rations had caused starvation among the Indian Tamils and after many Indian 
Tamils were affected by the violence of the 1977 riots, thousands of Indian Tamils 
fled the hill-country and sought safety in the North-East. With assistance of a 
number of NGOs, several thousand families were housed in a string of settlements 
that was set up all over the North-East. In Kottiyar Pattu, several hundred Indian 
Tamils were settled in Puliyadicholai, on the outskirts of Kankuveli. After this 
settlement was burnt down in 1983 (see section 4.2.1), several dozen families settled 
in Kumarapuram (adjoining Kilivetti), while others returned to Puliyadicholai.  
Even though various castes are represented among the Indian Tamils, many Sri 
Lankan Tamils treat Indian Tamils as belonging to one low-ranking caste88. The 
people who settled in Puliyadicholai and Kumarapuram have no access to land or 
other productive resources, and mostly depend on manual labour. Being very recent 
immigrants, this community has no role in the local caste hierarchy, and ranks 
somewhere near the bottom of the status ladder. That they are tolerated but not 
necessarily accepted as equals became visible in 2005 and 2006, when the population 
of both Kankuveli and Puliyadicholai lived in the Kankuveli school for many 
months due to the security situation. Even though the Velalar and the Indian Tamils 
lived in the same school, both communities stayed in separate parts of the school 
compound and asked for separate facilities for water and sanitation (observations 
during field visit, September 2006). 
                                                 
 
88 This further underscores the ambiguity in the vernacular vocabularies on ethnicity, 
nationality, caste and community. What Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils see is endogamy 
and uniform status ranking (relative to the status of different Sinhala and Sri Lankan Tamil 
castes) and pretty much endogamous. The representation of Indian Tamil ethnicity and/or 
nationality thus takes the shape of caste. 
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Chakkiliyar  
In Palainagar, on the outskirts of Muthur, there is a small community of Chakkiliyar 
(cobblers). This community arrived in Muthur around 1940. After the British 
government brought a number of Chakkiliyar from Tamil Nadu to work as 
scavengers in Trincomalee89, 16 families from Trincomalee were asked to move to 
Muthur and work there as scavengers and street sweepers for the local government. 
In the 1960s, 10 small houses were built as quarters in Palainagar, on the outskirts of 
Muthur. Over time the entire community settled around these quarters. By the time I 
did my fieldwork, their community had expanded to 45 families. As a consequence 
of being shunned by almost everybody else, this community is strongly 
endogamous: spouses are mostly found from within the Chakkiliyar 
neighbourhoods around Trincomalee, but even from places as far away as Jaffna and 
Colombo. While a number of people have low-paid permanent jobs with the Muthur 
Pradeshya Sabha, the rest depend on their traditional trade of shoemending and on 
unskilled labour jobs; most are desparately poor. I was once told that there are five 
scavenger families in Thoppur as well, but have not been able to verify this.  
 
Other castes 
Apart from the castes discussed above, there may be small groups of people of other 
castes present in Kottiyar Pattu. For example, one of the backwaters that runs 
through Muthur bears the name Kollanaru: ‘the river of the blacksmiths’. Also, with 
the in-migration of small numbers of people from Jaffna over the course of the past 
two centuries, people from outside the local caste hierarchy may have moved into 
the area. Their numbers are however probably negligible, and they never featured in 
any narrative that I heard about the Tamil population in Kottiyar Pattu. 
 
3.2.2 Caste dynamics among Sinhalese in Kottiyar Pattu 
The Sinhalese in Kottiyar Pattu are all fairly recent immigrants, and have no locally 
grounded stories to use as arguments for making caste-related claims to status. 
Gaining insight into the caste background of the Sinhalese in Kottiyar Pattu and into 
inter-caste dynamics was much more difficult than it was among the Tamils. Only 
once did anyone provide me a list with the castes that were present in the colonies; 
this man was a Buddhist monk who proudly claimed top-notch caste status: he 
belonged to the Brahmana (Brahmin) community, which has only about 60 families in 
                                                 
 
89 In Akkaraipattu, Chakkiliyar arrived around the same time. McGilvray (2008: 154) links 
this to the introduction of the bucket latrine around World War II. This kind of latrines 
required a system where buckets with faeces were collected on a regular basis for disposal 
and cleaning. Carrying faeces was quite probably not something that anybody in the local 
caste hierarchy was willing to do. As pit latrines replaced the bucket latrines, the work of the 
Chakkiliyar shifted to garbage disposal and street sweeping. 
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the whole of Sri Lanka90. According to the monk, the following castes are 
represented (he presented them in random order): Kammal (carpenters91); Rada 
(washermen); Karava (merchants and fishermen); Durava (toddy tappers); Hali or 
Hannali (tailors92); Goviya (farmers), and Negati (drummers93). 
Rather than by caste, Sinhalese whom I spoke to identified the other settlers by area 
of origin94. Dehiwatte for example has a ‘Kurunegala street’ and a ‘Hambantota 
street’, the settlers in Neelapola originate from the Southern Province, those in 
Mahaweligama originate from Kurunegala and Kegalle, and those in Seruwila 
originate from Matale, Kurunegala and Kandy. This regional distinction is 
significant: the people from Kandy, Kurunegala, Matale and Kegalle are so-called 
Up-country Sinhalese (with a caste structure dominated by the Goviya caste of 
cultivators), while the people from the southern coastal districts are so-called Low-
country Sinhalese (with a caste structure dominated by the Karava caste of 
fishermen). Though love marriages within the colonies (rather than marriages with 
spouses from the region of origin) have become common, there is still a strong 
preference to marry within the same geographical (Up-country or Low-country) 
community. That some status competition exists between these two groups is visible 
in Dehiwatte, where the settlers from Kurunegala were planning to put up their 
own, separate pansala by the time I finished my fieldwork. 
One of the colonies stands apart as a low-caste community. There are quite some 
squatter families in this colony, and there seems to be very little intermarriage with 
people from the other colonies. 
 
3.2.3 Caste-like dynamics among Muslims in Kottiyar Pattu 
As any Muslim will tell you, Islam teaches that everyone is equal before Allah, and 
therefore the concept of caste is unislamic. There are indeed no ranked and named 
caste groups among the Muslim community in Sri Lanka, with exception of small 
groups of religious and ritual specialists, as described by McGilvray (2008). 
                                                 
 
90 Ryan does not mention Brahmins as a separate caste, but states that Karava (fishermen), 
Salagama (weavers and cinnamon pealers) and Navandanna (smiths) claim brahminical 
origins (2004 [1953]: 110, 113). 
91 This caste is not mentioned by Ryan. 
92 Interestingly, Ryan (idem: 113-114) claims that the use of this caste name was already all 
but extinct by the early 1950s; the only Hannali whom he came across lived in a village near 
Kandy.  
93 Ryan (idem: 129) mentions that the term Negati (or Nekati) is a term used in parts of the 
Low Country to indicate members of the Oliya caste, who are ritual dancers and “hold a 
virtual monopoly in astrological practices”. 
94 Particularly for those settlers who did not belong to the highest castes, the shift to the 
colonies offered an opportunity to deny their caste origins: the other families who settled in 
the same colony were generally from the same region, but often did not know each other. 
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Nevertheless, I contend that this absence of caste needs to be qualified.  At the 
bottom of the pecking order, Muslims traditionally did not have service castes (with 
exception of a small group of circumcision specialists), at least not within the Muslim 
community. Whenever services were required, it was common to hire Tamil barbers, 
drummers and washermen: the service castes were outsourced. At the top end of the 
status hierarchy, the Muslim religious specialists have a position that is somewhat 
similar (but in secular life more influential) position to that which Brahmins and 
Kurukkals have among Hindu Tamils. The crucial part is however in the middle. In 
Muthur and Thoppur, there is a subtle distinction between farmers and fishermen: 
though it is reducing, these groups are still pretty much endogamous, and there is a 
perceived status difference between them. When I asked Muslims if their community 
had something similar to a caste system, this was unanimously denied. However, 
when I started asking whether farming and fishing families would let their children 
marry each other, there was more reluctance. While many people claimed that they 
would let their children marry between the occupational groups, practical objections 
were raised: a farmer’s son who marries a fisherman’s daughter will not get land for 
a dowry and he will also not know how to fish; a fisherman’s son who marries a 
farmer’s daughter may get land for a dowry but will not know how to farm; 
choosing a place of residence will be very dependent on whatever job the husband 
decides to take. One man of farming origin ultimately stated “you know, fishermen 
have a smell [of dead fish] around them”, indicating that he felt that fishermen were 
somehow lower in status than farmers. 
A mini-survey in which my research assistant collected very basic information (age 
of the spouses, village of birth, village of present habitation, occupation) on 42 
Muslim couples and their parents, and two elaborate family trees that I wrote up 
with two Muslim acquaintances from Kottiyar Pattu clearly hint in the direction of 
in-group endogamy95. One family tree is of a petty trader from Muthur; the majority 
of men in his and his wife’s extended family are (or were) petty traders, while a 
small group is farmer or labourer. The second family tree is of a government servant 
from Thoppur: all the men in his and his wife’s extended family are either farmers, 
businessmen or government servants, but there are no fishermen. 
Nine of the twelve married fishermen who were interviewed in the mini-survey had 
a father and a father-in-law who were either fishermen or fishing labourers (some of 
whom at times also worked as agricultural labourers); in three cases either the father 
or the father-in-law was a farmer or an agricultural labourer. Three of those 
interviewed were farmers. In two cases both the father and the father-in-law were 
farmers, while in one case the father was a farmer and the father-in-law was a petty 
trader. Six interviewees were teachers. Five had a teacher as father or father-in-law; 
                                                 
 
95 The mini-survey and the two family trees together only cover between 0.5% and 1% of the 
Muslim couples in Kottiyar Pattu; it is therefore entirely possible that the sample is not 
representative. In order to minimise the risk of this, my research assistant went to different 
farming and fishing neighbourhoods of Muthur and Thoppur and randomly interviewed a 
number of men in each neighbourhood.  
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the only person for whom this was not the case had married a teacher. Those fathers 
or fathers-in-law who were not teachers were either farmers or businessmen. Most of 
the other interviewees were labourers. In most cases, the father or father-in-law (and 
sometimes both) was a labourer himself, with the other being either a fisherman, a 
farmer or a petty trader. 
My impression from these data is that the marital separation between farmers and 
fishermen is maintained most strongly among families who control assets; both 
groups intermarry with businessmen, but particularly teachers seem to have closer 
marital links with farmers than with fishermen. At the lower end of the economic 
ladder people depend on their own labour, and intermarriage is less of an issue. 
The increasing popularity of a more reformist form of Islam in particularly Muthur 
is beginning to undermine the practice of giving dowry. This may lead to an increase 
in intermarriage between farmers and fishermen over the coming years. 
 
3.3 Class 
With class, I refer to an economic ranking of people, depending on their access to 
and control over (productive) assets. While there are many ambiguities in definitions 
of social classes and their boundaries and while the concept of class is controversial 
in anthropology (Hann 2000: 98-9), access to and control over (productive) assets is 
very much a category of identification that influences everyday life in Kottiyar Pattu, 
and one that cuts straight through the other categories. Despite the importance of 
class, social organisation rarely follows class lines: “it seems that ‘vertical’ links 
across apparent class boundaries impede the formation of horizontal linkages 
between those sharing the same ‘objective’ economic situation’” (idem: 99). 
In Kottiyar Pattu, it is possible to identify four classes. They are presented in table 
3.4, ranked according to their position in the pecking order. I estimated the size of 
each group based on own observation and on a range of interviews in which my 
research assistant asked people how many percent of the population in their 
community belonged to the different classes. There was some variation in the 
answers, simply because in some villages more people have access to assets than in 
other villages, but the overall picture that people painted was fairly consistent.  
 
Extent of control over 
resources 
Occupations Estimated 
population 
share  
Control over significant 
amounts of physical and 
financial resources 
Politicians; wealthy businessmen / 
moneylenders; senior government servants 
1-2% 
Control over some physical 
and financial resources 
Petty traders; land-owning farmers; boat-
owning fishermen; middle-level government 
servants; some artisans 
15-20% 
Control over own labour and 
use of leased assets 
Tenant farmers; boat-hiring fishermen; three-
wheeler drivers; some artisans 
25-30% 
Only control over own labour Unskilled and semi-skilled abourers 50-60% 
Table 3.4. Categorisation of classes in Kottiyar Pattu 
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While these categories have been present in Kottiyar Pattu for a long time, the 
salience of the pecking order and the size of the lowest group have increased 
significantly in the last century or so. After Kottiyar Pattu lost its position as rice-
exporting region and trading port for the kingdom of Kandy in the late 18th century 
(which coincided with epidemics and a massive reduction in population), the area 
became pretty much a subsistence economy (Van Senden 1786b). Only Muthur town 
retained some economic importance through the production of bricks, roofing tiles, 
earthenware and tobacco (which were mostly sold to Trincomalee town and to the 
Jaffna peninsula). The sale of paddy lands that came with the rehabilitation of the 
Allai irrigation scheme in the 1860s and its further improvement in the 1920s and 
1930s brought in a gradually increasing degree of (absentee) landlordism (with the 
landlords mostly living in Trincomalee, Kinniya and Muthur). The increase in paddy 
acreage led to the resumption of the export of paddy, and particularly straw, to the 
Jaffna peninsula somewhere in the late 1920s or early 1930s (Rasaratnam 1996b). This 
in turn led to an increase in the amount of cash that revolved in the regional 
economy, and enabled the accumulation of some wealth in the hands of 
businessmen and landlords. Those landlords who had more land than they could or 
wanted to cultivate on their own, established links with cultivators who would 
cultivate part of the land on a sharecropping basis. Some of these landlord-cultivator 
links were inter-ethnic, and such relationships could last for many years: one elderly 
Muslim man whom I interviewed in Muthur had cultivated 8 acres for a Tamil 
landlord for twenty years. After the harvest, the cost of the inputs would be 
deducted, and the remaining paddy would be divided equally between landlord and 
cultivator (interview, Muthur, August 2007). 
Another change happened in the 1930s, when several dozen Catholic fishermen from 
Negombo started coming to Navalady in the mouth of the Mahaweli river to fish 
during the period that no fish could be caught in the south-west of the country. This 
migratory pattern was probably facilitated by the development, around the same 
time, of logistical facilities that enabled the transport of the fish back to the 
populated regions in the south-west. As V.A. Rasaratnam has documented in several 
of his short stories from the 1950s, these fishermen were part of a rigid economic 
structure that was pretty much isolated from the economy of Kottiyar Pattu: wealthy 
men in Negombo owned the boats and nets, and the fishermen worked as labourers, 
trapped in a near unbreakable cycle of debt (Rasaratnam 1962: chapter 6, Rasaratnam 
1996a: chapter 17). 
The increasing population and improved logistics and fishing technologies had a 
local spin-off as well. Where fishing had traditionally been done on a subsistence 
basis, a system slowly developed where traders, through middlemen, bought up the 
fish from the fishermen and in return gave them improved boats and nets on credit. 
By about the 1970s, structural indebtedness to increasingly powerful businessmen 
had become a fact of life for many local fishermen as well. 
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Change in the agriculture sector happened in two stages. In 1958, land reform 
legislation was passed with the intention of giving tenants and sharecroppers a 
better bargaining position against the landowners. One element of this legislation 
was that a tenant would be able to claim ownership of the land if he had cultivated it 
for several years. In response, landlords severed their ties with their cultivators, and 
started leasing out their land for up to three seasons at a time to whoever wanted to 
pay the lease (interview, Muthur, August 2007; see also Seneviratne 1993: 37). As 
tenants knew that they were not going to be allowed to cultivate the same land after 
the end of the lease, they lost an important incentive to maintain fields and channels 
carefully. 
The monetisation of agriculture increased dramatically with the widespread 
introduction of ‘green revolution’ packages of rice, fertiliser and pesticides, 
combined with the introduction of tractors. This was a trend that started in the 
1930s, stagnated during the 1970-1977 Sirimavo regime, and truly kicked off with the 
economic liberalisation of 1977 (see section 6.3.1). Even though harvests increased 
significantly, this did not bring wealth to all those involved in agriculture, 
particularly to tenants and labourers. V.A. Rasaratnam’s story ‘for Seethevi’, first 
published in 1978 and set around the same time, describes the change: 
 
“[The main character of the story] was a tenant farmer five years ago. […] There 
were buffaloes belonging to someone from Chenaiyoor to make the field muddy 
and to level it. The rent for the land and animals were to be paid from the 
harvest. The seed paddy was bought on interest. His physical labour – that was 
his investment. […] He would have four avanams of paddy after paying in paddy 
the lease for the land and buffaloes, harvesting and threshing charges. […] There 
would be no worry for rice when he has this at home, coconuts from the palms 
in his compound, fish in the stream, and bunches in the banana trees. 
However, now the situation has changed. The lease has to be paid in advance. 
He needs cash for tractor hire, seed paddy, weed-killer, imported fertiliser, 
reaping and threshing charges. Money up-front is needed for all this. Yes, you 
need money, money, money! Farming has become a business for a rich man who 
has money in the bank and not a vocation for a farmer like him. As a result […] 
[h]e became a labourer in the field[…] as he did not see any other possibility for 
livelihood except harvesting in the Vadichalchenai fields. Still, he somehow 
collected two avanams of paddy per season by doing reaping and threshing. […] 
The system of paying people in the form of paddy ceased from last year. When 
agriculture became a business for moneyed people, only cash was paid as wages 
for reaping.” (Rasaratnam 1999, chapter 8) 
 
While agricultural credit facilities had spread into the area under the Sirimavo 
government (Seneviratne 1993: 39), it was the liberalisation of the national economy 
in 1977 that truly turned Muthur’s agricultural economy into a cash economy. With 
it came widespread indebtedness and the rise to power of moneylenders. Apart from 
the indebtedness, the transition from payment-in-kind to payment-in-cash for 
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labourers meant a reduction in their food security. The amounts of payment-in-kind 
that were paid to labourers had hardly changed for many years. This meant poverty, 
but a reasonably reliable supply of staple food. The purchasing power of wages in 
money however kept reducing under inflationary pressure, while wages were not 
increased sufficiently to accommodate for inflation. As a consequence, the social 
underclass rapidly expanded. 
The increase in population pressure in combination with the stagnation of the 
regional economy following the start of the war further boosted the numbers of 
people depending on unskilled labour, as there simply were not enough resources 
available anymore to give regular jobs to everyone.  
Among Sinhalese, the out-migration of people in the period 1985-1987 (see sections 
4.2.2, 4.2.4, 4.2.5 and 4.2.6) counterbalanced this process of proletarisation to some 
extent. The development of a group of underemployed people also created a large 
reservoir of people in their twenties and thirties who could be hired as home guards 
(and, to a lesser extent, as policemen and soldiers). While some Muslims were also 
recruited as home guards, policemen or soldiers, for most underemployed Muslims 
and almost all underemployed Tamils the 1980s and 1990s saw a descent into 
deepening poverty. 
From what I have gathered in conversations with people from Kottiyar Pattu and 
with a few people who worked in a project to re-integrate former child soldiers with 
their families in 2004 and 2005, lack of job opportunities itself does not seem to have 
been a major reason for recruitment to Tamil militant groups. Many people joined in 
their mid- to late teens, before they had reached the age to worry about how to 
provide for their families. Many seem to have joined out of frustration over 
perceived (and often very real!) injustice by the state and its representatives, and 
because their own family had been directly affected by the violence. Among the 
child soldiers, some joined out of conviction or because they wanted to avenge a 
close family member who had been killed. Others joined to run away from a 
dysfunctional family or, as in the case of three former child soldiers whom my wife 
and I met in a village in Ampara District one day, simply because they were fed up 
with the household chores (conversation, Thangavelayuthapuram, July 200496). 
                                                 
 
96 This particular village also had its share of tragedy. When my wife and I were leaving the 
village (where we had visited some activities that ZOA was implementing), an elderly lady 
stopped us and asked if we had seen her son who, with many others, had been taken by the 
STF in 1990. She believed that her son, together with thousands of others who had 
disappeared, was still being kept in a secret prison in the jungle. The mother of the girls 
whom we spoke to told us that when the people of Thangavelayuthapuram returned after 
twelve years of displacement, they found human bones in many of the wells in the village, 
including the well that were sitting next to as we were chatting. 
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Many others became the victim of forced recruitment under the infamous slogan 
‘one child per family’ (UTHR(J) 2001, 2002 and 2003a)97.  
The expansion of the secondary education system between 1976 and 1985, when 
post-primary education in the Tamil and Muslim areas of Kottiyar Pattu increased 
from 2 secondary schools and 5 junior schools to 13 secondary schools and 6 junior 
schools (Samad 2003: 489-519)98, meant a significant increase in the number of youth 
continuing their education until secondary school. This in turn delayed their entry 
on the labour market by several years. Once the first significant batches of youth 
finished their secondary education in the early 1980s, the number of people entering 
the labour market peaked, as did the number of un(der)employed youth. The 
problem with the youth who had completed their secondary education was however 
that a lot of them had never learnt to do hard agricultural or fishing labour work 
because they were in school, and that some considered menial jobs below the 
standing of someone with secondary education. This last group was 
un(der)employed by choice, not just by lack of opportunity. I would not be surprised 
if comparatively many youth belonging to this group joined the separatist groups 
and the home guards in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
As fewer and fewer people could fall back on subsistence production, it became 
increasingly important for the rest to earn cash incomes to survive. The urgency of 
the need to survive contributed to the intensification of inter-group competition over 
access to productive resources (fishing grounds, paddy fields, jobs). As Benedikt 
Korf (2004) has documented, this competition has often been framed in ethnic terms. 
Since people primarily identified the problem as one of general resource scarcity and 
not as one of exploitation, this did not bring the ‘have-nots’ together in resistance 
against the ‘haves’; class conflict was therefore minimised. 
                                                 
 
97 An acquaintance who asked around about the caste background of the former child 
soldiers told me that child soldiers in Trincomalee District had predominantly been 
recruited from lower castes. This may mean that the higher castes were less supportive of 
the LTTE or that they were better able to avoid the recruitment of their children; it may also 
mean that among the lower castes there are comparatively more extremely poor families. I 
had planned to verify the correlation between caste and LTTE membership by counting the 
number of LTTE cadres buried in the cemetery near Sampoor by village of origin (which 
generally has a strong correlation with caste). The resumption of violence in early 2006 made 
this impossible.  
98 A similar expansion of post-primary education seems to have happened around the same 
time in the Sinhala areas, though Samad does not provide details on this. 
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3.4 Employment 
To some extent linked to caste and class, but also a distinct category of identification 
is employment. In the survey that CIRM undertook in 2004, people were asked what 
the primary source of income of their household was. The result is presented in the 
table below. 
 
 Muthur DS 
Division 
Seruwila DS 
Division 
Eechchilampattu 
DS Division 
Total Kottiyar 
Pattu 
Cultivation (own land) 1,381 (8.7%) 700 (19.6%) 598 (23.6%) 2,679 (12.1%) 
Cultivation (leased land) 583 (3.7%) 254 (7.1%) 31 (1.2%) 868 (3.9%) 
Livestock rearing  302 (1.9%) 37 (1.0%) 53 (2.1%) 392 (1.8%) 
Sea fishing (own boat) 406 (2.5%) 31 (0.9%) 44 (1.7%) 481 (2.2%) 
Sea fishing (hired boat) 1,186 (7.4%) 62 (1.7%) 7 (0.3%) 1,255 (5.7%) 
Lagoon / inland fishing 472 (3.0%) 8 (0.2%) 56 (2.2%) 536 (2.4%) 
Daily labour 5,573 (34.9%) 1,187 (33.2%) 1,006 (39.7%) 7,766 (35.2%) 
Self-employment 1,237 (7.8%) 264 (7.4%) 76 (3.0%) 1,577 (7.1%) 
Formal employment 
(government and private 
sector) 
1,557 (9.8%) 264 (7.4%) 114 (4.5%) 1,935 (8.8%) 
Work abroad 762 (4.8%) 175 (4.9%) 67 (2.6%) 1,004 (4.6%) 
No answer 2,491 (15.6%) 598 (16.7%) 481 (19.0%) 3,570 (16.2%) 
Total 15,950 (100%) 3,580 (100%) 2,533 (100%) 22,063 (100.0%) 
Table 3.5. Primary source of household income by DS Division, 2004 (source: CIRM 2004a, b and c) 
 
As can be seen, the largest group of people (slightly over two fifths of the 
households who answered) depend primarily on daily labour for their income; on 
top of this, a substantial part of the formally employed people are also labourers. The 
questionnaire does not specify whether this is agricultural labour, fishing labour, or 
other kinds of daily labour. My impression is however that labourers are primarily 
involved in agriculture. Those depending primarily on cultivation form a big group  
in Seruwila and Eechchilampattu DS Divisions (over a quarter of those who 
answered), while cultivation, fishing, self-employment and formal employment are 
roughly equally important in Muthur DS Division (at about one eighth of those who 
answered for each group). The data show clearly how rural the economy of Kottiyar 
Pattu is: about three quarters of those who answered are primarily dependent on the 
primary sector. I estimate that two thirds of these people depend on agriculture, and 
one third on fishing. 
It needs to be noted that many households have more than one source of income. 
Many owner-cultivators also lease land; some labourers also lease small plots of 
land. Government servants may also cultivate land, while most families that 
primarily depend on having someone abroad (in the Middle East) have tenant 
farming, fishing on a hired boat, or daily labour as a secondary source of income. 
Apart from this, the survey did not ask how many people are employed as home 
guard, police officer or soldier. I estimate that this kind of employment is relevant 
for 20-25% of the Sinhala households, and perhaps 2-3% of the Muslim households.  
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3.5 Religion 
In August 2007, a group of Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu and Christian religious leaders 
and local government officials climbed to the top of a hill three miles south of 
Muthur, in order to investigate claims that there were remains of a Buddhist shrine 
on top of the hill. Recent events had generated significant tension among the 
Muslims and Tamils of Muthur, many of whom were concerned that a new phase of 
settling Sinhalese and evicting Tamils and Muslims was around the corner. The 
Tamil-inhabited eastern half of Muthur DS Division had been declared a High 
Security Zone; near the Tamil village of Ilankaithurai Muhattuvaram (which had 
been renamed to Lankapatuna), a brand-new Buddhist temple had just been put up 
under the auspices of the Chief Justice (see section 2.3.2); the army had started 
constructing a massive road from the High Security Zone to Trincomalee straight 
through people’s paddy fields without any legal procedures for land alienation 
being followed; an NGO that was constructing houses for Muslim tsunami victims 
on the outskirts of Muthur was suddenly told that the second phase of the project 
could not be implemented because the land involved was owned by the Buddhist 
temple at Seruwila99, and the soldiers based at the foot of the hill that was visited by 
the multireligious group had started enforcing the renaming of the area into 
Pansalawatte (“the place where there is a Buddhist temple”). 
Not long after the inspection visit, I spoke to two of the people who climbed the hill 
that day. On the top of the hill, they had come across a pile of bricks, which the 
Seruwila chief priest claimed to be 2,500 years old, and part of a ruined Buddhist 
shrine. The residents of Muthur among those present disagreed, claiming that these 
bricks had been taken up there in 1987 by the IPKF for the construction of a bunker. 
On the top of the hill, they also found a 40 mulam long tomb of a Muslim saint100 and 
fourteen broken crosses that had been put up there by Catholics a couple of years 
earlier and were smashed up not long afterwards. When I, semi-jokingly, asked 
whether the people who inspected the hill had also come across a Hindu shrine, the 
                                                 
 
99 When the second phase of the housing scheme was planned, everybody involved in giving 
the formal approvals thought that the plot of land that was involved was state land. Rather 
unexpectedly, the chief priest of the Seruwila temple claimed that the land was owned by 
his temple. A search in the files of the Survey Department yielded a title deed which stated 
that in 1939, the field was donated to the Seruwila temple by a certain Aron Silva (interview 
with a local government official attached to the DS office in Muthur, Muthur, March 2008). 
Note that the first Sinhalese to settle in Muthur only came in 1942 (Samad 2003: 145). His 
name was David Silva, and he may well have been related to Aron Silva. This would 
probably mean that Aron Silva lived in Trincomalee and owned some land in Muthur. 
Alternatively, the deed may have been forged, though I do not think this is very likely. 
100 A mulam is a measure for length equal to the distance from the finger tips to the elbow, or 
about 45 cm. For some reason, quite a few graves of Muslim saints in Sri Lanka have a 
length of 40 mulam (18 m). 
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reply was a serious face and “there is a Hindu shrine at the foot of the hill” 
(interview, Muthur, August 2007)101. 
Kottiyar Pattu is home to Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists and Christians (both Roman 
Catholics and Protestants). As shown above, though less pronounced than 
particularly the ethnic boundary dynamics, the boundary dynamics between (and, 
equally importantly, within) religious groups have a clear relevance for an 
understanding of the overall social dynamics in Kottiyar Pattu. I briefly describe 
each of the groups below. 
 
3.5.1 Hinduism 
Hindu social life is structured around temples, some of which have a regional 
significance. Other than among Buddhists, Muslims and Christians, Hindu priests 
generally have very little to say in social life. The lay administration of these temples 
is the location where status competitions are being fought, but otherwise the religion 
has comparatively little structuring impact on group (boundary) dynamics among 
Hindus. 
In the divine geopolitics of Hinduism, the territory of Kottiyar Pattu is historically 
laid claim to by two deities in two temples: Siva in the Koneswaram temple in 
Trincomalee (whose territory covers the entire Trincomalee District), and Murugan 
(Skanda) in the Chittiravelayuthaswamy temple in Verugal (whose territory 
stretches from Muthur to Chenkalady in Batticaloa District)102.  
As I have  described in section 2.3.3, Kottiyar Pattu has probably had direct links 
with the Koneswaram temple in Trincomalee since the period of Chola rule in the 
late 10th century: temple-owned paddy fields provided grain and revenue to the 
                                                 
 
101 The hill, which is also is in use as a rock quarry, has a rather haunted status in local 
narratives. One of the first descriptions that I got of Kinanthimunai was a statement that, 
when it was still covered with jungle, it was a place where the spirits roamed. A second 
story that I was told was that in the 1970s, a magician set up a vegetable garden on top of the 
hill and positioned himself next to it, dressed in his finest ritual attire. He attracted fairly 
large crowds of visitors, curious to see how anyone could grow vegetables on a rock. After a 
while however, word got around that the magician had rather darker intentions with his 
garden. He had heard that there was a treasure hidden in the rock that would only be 
revealed if a human sacrifice was conducted, and therefore tried to lure a youth to stay on 
top of the hill after the other visitors had left so that he could kill him. An angry mob swiftly 
chased the magician away, and he was never heard of again. Then, in August 2006, about 
40,000 civilians fleeing from Muthur got stuck near the hill and were subjected to an intense 
artillery barrage. While the remarkably low numbers of deaths and injuries that this caused 
generated many stories of divine intervention, it further contributed to the hill’s reputation 
as a dark place.  
102 For a fascinating analysis of the dynamics of temple politics in another fiefdom of 
Murugan, centered around the regional temple of Mandoor, see Whitaker (1999).  
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temple, the village of Mallikaithivu provided jasmine flowers for the temple 
worship, Sampoor provided lamp oil and bards who recited the sacred texts in the 
temple, and so on. With the destruction of the Koneswaram temple by the 
Portuguese, the worship at Koneswaram ceased, and the vanniyar system of 
governance that embodied Siva’s rule over Trincomalee District collapsed. Rajasinha 
II, the king of Kandy, was instrumental in setting up a new system of governance, 
centered around the Adhi Konesar temple in Thampalakamam, where a statue that 
was rescued from the Koneswaram temple was installed. However, as the human 
political leadership was located in Kandy and not around Thampalakamam, Siva’s 
hold on the governance of Trincomalee District never regained its earlier stature. 
Ironically, the rebuilding of the Koneswaram temple and the surge in its nation-wide 
popularity in the 1960s was the last straw. The revived temple administration had no 
geographical representation and was entirely separated from the day-to-day 
administration of the district; Siva lost his earthly kingdom.  
Murugan still rules over Kottiyar Pattu from his temple in Verugal. As I have 
described in section 2.3.6, the myths of origin revolve around Rajasinha II’s financing 
of the (re)construction of the temple, and the institution of a system of 
administration that matched the worldly power relations between the castes in 
Kottyar Pattu. This administration system remains fairly intact, despite the 
emancipation of the service castes and attempts by the LTTE to erase caste from the 
Tamil cultural repertoire. Instead of castes, (caste-homogeneous) villages are now 
represented in the temple committee, and the order in which the different 
villages/castes organise their nights of the temple festival no longer reflects the local 
caste hierarchy. Nevertheless, the real power still lies with the Sindhunadar 
community that controls the key positions in the temple management. 
 
3.5.2 Buddhism 
Buddhism in Kottiyar Pattu revolves around the temple at Seruwila and around 
smaller village temples. Virtually without exception, the Buddhists in Kottiyar Pattu 
are Sinhala by ethnicity. Every Sinhala settlement has its own pansala, most of which 
were built in the 1950s and 1960s. Almost casually exhibited near each of these 
temples are smaller or larger collections of carved stones, broken stone pillars or – in 
a few cases - an old Buddha statue, thus laying an explicit claim to ancient heritage. 
Some of the temple compounds also feature round hills with bricks scattered around 
– which looks like the remains of ancient caitiyas.  
Each temple has its own resident monk, and some of the larger temples provide 
training for samaneras, young recruits to the monkhood. Each village temple belongs 
to one of the three main congregations of monks (Siam nikaya, Ramanya nikaya and 
Amarapura nikaya) that exist in Sri Lanka. Despite being connected to different 
nikayas, all Buddhist temples in Kottiyar Pattu (and Kantale) fall under the regional 
authority of the temple at Seruwila. This is symbolically represented during the 
Seruwila temple festival in August: each village temple has the (shared) 
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responsibility for one day of the festival. During the perahera (procession), wider 
links are also made visible: in August 2008, troupes from Trincomalee, Matale, and 
Dompe (near Galle) formed part of the line-up (as were a Muslim troupe and three 
Tamil troupes from Mallikaithivu, Kankuveli and Trincomalee).  
Apart from the politicians, the Buddhist monks are among the most important 
leaders in the Sinhala communities in Kottiyar Pattu. Primus inter pares among the 
monks is the head monk of the Seruwila temple. The second most respected monk is 
the resident monk of the Neelapola temple, who has stayed there right throughout 
the conflict, encouraging his flock of settlers not to abandon their role as 
frontiersmen. 
 
3.5.3 Islam 
Muslim religious life in Kottiyar Pattu is organised around two separate clusters of 
mosques: one cluster in and around Muthur, and the other in and around Thoppur. 
Each cluster originated from a single mosque. Muthur had only one mosque until 
1932, while Thoppur had a single mosque until 1933 (Samad 2003: 36-54, 251-252). 
As the population grew and expanded geographically, it became clear that the 
mosques were becoming too small. In Muthur, solving the practical problem of how 
to enable all Muslim men to attend jumma (Friday) prayers led to a power struggle 
between the trustee board of the Muthur Grand Mosque and the people of 
Akkaraichenai and Anaichenai, two neighbourhoods about a kilometre away from 
the mosque. In both neighbourhoods, thaikkas (prayer halls where Muslims come for 
their daily prayers but where no sermons are given) had been set up in 1924 and 
1930 respectively, but in 1932 and 1935 the people of Akkaraichenai and Anaichenai 
decided to set up their own jumma mosques. By doing so, they not only established 
independence where worship was concerned, but also with regard to the day-to-day 
running of community affairs: marriages, funerals and conflict resolution were now 
done by the trustee boards of the independent mosques. The Anaichenai mosque 
was burnt down within months after it started functioning independently; it took 
until 1956 before jumma prayers were again conducted there. Around the same time, 
a conflict within the Akkaraichenai mosque led to the establishment of a separate 
mosque nearby. As they were within earshot of eachother, it was soon decided to 
alternate jumma prayers between both mosques. This practice continued until the 
new mosque was accidentally bombed by the air force in 1990; the building has been 
under renovation ever since. 
The disagreements were finally put aside in 1981, when the Administrative 
Federation of Muthur Mosques was established. This overarching body of mosque 
administrators, religious leaders, teachers and other community leaders has since 
played an important role in binding the Muslim community of Muthur together. 
As the population kept growing, it became necessary to construct new jumma 
mosques and thaikkas to accommodate them. By 2003, Muthur and the surrounding 
Muslim settlements counted 10 mosques and 6 thaikkas. After the tsunami, relief 
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funds from Islamic organisations enabled a significant expansion: by the end of 2005, 
there were 11 jumma mosques and 23 thaikkas (interview with Muslim religious 
leader, Muthur, December 2005).  
The decision to set up new jumma mosques in the settlements that sprang up around 
Thoppur seems to have been taken in much greater harmony than in Muthur. 
Starting with Palathoppur in 1933, a jumma mosque was built within a few years of 
the establishment of each new settlement. By 2003, there were eight mosques in the 
cluster around Thoppur. 
Apart from having separately organised clusters of mosques, Muthur and Thoppur 
also each have their own cluster of ziyarams, or graves of Muslim saints. These 
clusters have territorial associations: I have been told stories about the saints of the 
Muthur cluster gathering together after dark for a cup of tea at the grave of the most 
prominent saint, about lights emanating from a main shrine and travelling to the 
other shrines in the cluster, and about the most prominent saint patrolling through 
the area, past the other shrines, in times of tension: nothing could be seen, but the 
sound of a horsecart travelling along the route could be heard clearly. Some of the 
saints came from Yemen, others came from other areas - one is called ‘Vankali 
(Bengali) Appa’ -, and some of the saints were local people. Some lived many 
centuries ago, while others lived on the edge of living memory; descendants of 
‘Wattaividane Appa’, one of the saints, can still be found in Thoppur.  
Each of the saints has his or her own specific blessing to give: one gives rain during 
droughts, a number of saints heal various skin diseases, and so on. The shrines are 
zones of peace where chicken and predators live side by side, but the protection that 
emanates from the saints goes much further: I have been told several times of bombs 
exploding near ziyarams with nobody being hurt. When 40,000 people fleeing 
Muthur in August 2006 came under heavy artillery and rocket fire in open terrain 
and remarkably few people were hurt, one man (whose own child had been killed 
by artillery fire earlier in that week) interpreted this as an act of protection by a 
nearby saint. He told me how the rockets, as they flew over the ziyaram, started 
swerving and slammed into nearby rocks rather than into the crowd of civilians that 
they were headed for (interview, Muthur, April 2007). Apparently, the fame of the 
ziyarams had spread beyond the Muslim community. The same man told me how a 
Sinhala army officer was a regular visitor to one of the shrines, while a ziyaram in the 
area controlled by the LTTE was apparently visited by LTTE cadres who prayed 
there for protection before they went out on missions.  
The ziyarams are all small shrines without day-to-day worship going on, and without 
decorations; at most, one will find a few green prayer flags and a tillbox next to the 
saints’ grave. Those who believe in the strength of the saints go to pray at their 
graves whenever they have a specific need, and some of the shrines have an annual 
kandoori (feast). 
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 As in the rest of Sri Lanka, an increasing percentage of Muslims considers the 
worship of saints unislamic: prayers should be directed at Allah directly, without 
any intermediaries. This is part of a larger worldwide trend of Islamic reform, but is 
also linked to Sri Lankan dynamics. On the one hand, the development of separate 
Muslim schools from the 1960s onwards made the younger generation more aware 
of what it means to be a Muslim; this was complemented by the spread of Arabic 
Colleges. On the other hand, the war contributed to the hardening of ethnic 
identities, and for aspiring to gain political clout it became increasingly important to 
stress ethnic and religious purity. Kandooris lost their popularity, and a number of 
ziyarams in Kottiyar Pattu seem to even have been abandoned altogether. At the 
same time, mosque attendance (even for the early morning prayers and the late 
evening prayers) has surged, as has the number of children and youth (both boys 
and girls) attending religious education. Another aspect of this process was very 
visible in Muthur (though less so in the cluster of Muslim villages around Thoppur 
and in the agricultural settlements around Muthur). Between 2000, when I first 
visited Kottiyar Pattu, and 2008, when I ended my fieldwork, the number of veiled 
women increased dramatically, and among veiled women, there was a big increase 
in the percentage of those who covered not only their hair but also their face from 
about 2004 onwards.  
Figure 3.1. The ziyaram for Wattai Vidane Appa in Thoppur (own photograph) 
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3.5.4 Christianity 
Where the followers of Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam in Kottiyar Pattu are pretty 
much mono-ethnic, the Roman Catholic Church in Kottiyar Pattu is organised across 
ethnic lines. Kottiyar Pattu forms one parish, with churches at Muthur and 
Iruthayapuram and chapels at Sahayapuram (64th Milepost) and the Sinhala village 
of Somapura. The Roman Catholics in Kottiyar Pattu live mostly in Muthur and 
Iruthayapuram, with small numbers of Catholic families living Sahayapuram, 
Somapura and places like Kilivetti and Lingapuram (LB3 Colony) 103. Even during 
the war, Tamil Catholics would visit the chapel in Somapura if there was a special 
occasion. Before the war, there were about two dozen Sinhala-Tamil mixed families 
in the parish, but most of these families have moved to Trincomalee or other 
comparatively safe places. While ethnicity thus does not seem to have been a big 
dividing factor among the Catholics of Kottiyar Pattu, caste is a divider among the 
Tamil Catholics. I regularly heard Catholics of Muthur and Iruthayapuram make 
disparaging comments about each other. There is hardly any intermarriage between 
the two groups: despite the small size of both communities, many would rather 
marry a Hindu than to marry a Catholic from the other village. While local caste 
dynamics are divisive, the shared faith is a binding factor when a threat to the 
Catholic religion is perceived. In 2000 or 2001, Catholics from Iruthayapuram made a 
local pilgrimage site with the ‘Stages of the Cross’ by adding 13 crosses to a cross 
that was already standing on top of Kinanthimunai hill, next to the village. Over 
time some of the Muslims in Muthur started to take offense: the crosses on the 
highest point of Kottiyar Pattu were perceived as a Christian (and, more 
importantly, Tamil) claim to space that needed to be undone. After a couple of 
months, a group of Muslims smashed up the statues (in the process also destroying a 
recently revived shrine for a Muslim saint at the foot of the hill). Catholics from 
Muthur and Iruthayapuram were united in their disapproval of this desecration. 
Both caste communities are integrated into the wider Catholic community of the 
Trincomalee-Batticaloa Diocese. Particularly the Catholic community in Muthur, but 
to a lesser extent also the one in Iruthayapuram, has marriage links with the Catholic 
communities of Trincomalee and Batticaloa. This wider integration is also visible in 
the shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Palaiyoothu, on the outskirts of Trincomalee 
Town. This shrine was erected in the beginning of the 20th century, after a potentially 
disastrous cholera epidemic in Muthur was warded off, and an annual pilgrimage 
has been conducted ever since. Over time, the shrine developed a life of its own, and 
it is now visited by people from all over Trincomalee District. 
                                                 
 
103 As I mentioned earlier, the Catholics of Muthur (and those who settled in LB3 and 
Sahayapuram) are largely Paravar and were Catholics from the time they settled in Muthur. 
This community also includes some Burgher families and, according to some people I spoke 
to, some Barber families, but pretty much functions as one community. The Catholics of 
Iruthayapuram are largely Pachchan, and converted only in the beginning of the 20th 
century. 
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Kottiyar Pattu also has a small Methodist community, centered around the 
Methodist Church in Muthur. Some of the members originally moved in from 
outside, while others come from local families that converted over the last century. 
Conversion happened in two stages. In the first decades of the 20th century, the 
Methodist Church operated a number of schools in Kottiyar Pattu (the schools were 
taken over by the government around 1930). Some of the people who went to these 
schools converted to Christianity, and small groups of Methodists can still be found 
in Mallikaithivu and other villages. A second group of people converted in recent 
years, after the Methodist Church got involved in long-term community 
development and evangelisation in some of the most destitute villages in Kottiyar 
Pattu. This group has grown so fast that two chapels have been put up to provide 
the new converts with a possibility to worship close to their home. 
While the Catholic and Methodist communities are numerically small, the churches 
have played an important role throughout the conflict. Where Muslims and Sinhala 
Buddhists have their religious leaders as spokespeople in times of crisis, such 
leadership is absent among the Tamil Hindu community. The churches however, 
with their national network of contacts, their international access to resources for 
emergency relief, and their relative neutrality in the conflict, were able to fulfil a 
leadership role for the Tamils when negotiating for safety and access to relief 
assistance. Within Muthur, the Catholic and Methodist church compounds have 
always been places of comparative safety for Christians and Hindus alike in times of 
tension. The Catholics of Muthur have also fulfilled a bridging function in another 
way: until the number of trained Muslim teachers expanded from the 1990s 
onwards, many of the teachers in Muslim schools in Muthur were Catholics. 
 
3.6 Gender 
Adolescent and adult men and women in rural Sri Lanka live in quite segregate 
worlds. This segregation is not just social, but also geographical. Other than with 
their own close relatives, men and women rarely interact across the gender divide. 
The norm is for the men to be ‘outside’, and the women ‘inside’. This segregation 
exists at various geographical levels:  
• the men go out to the fields, to the sea, to the jungle or to the town, while the 
women stay in the village and look after the household;  
• when the men are out on the road, the women stay in the compound – they 
mostly come onto the road only after the men have left the village, and visit their 
female friends and neighbours (in matrilineal East Sri Lanka, these are generally 
their sisters and cousins);  
• when a man invites an unrelated man into his compound, the women disappear 
into the house, and 
• when a man invites another man into his house, the women disappear into the 
kitchen or into the bedroom.   
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The norm for gender segregation is a strong one, particularly among Muslims and 
Tamils. Some statistics from the 1971 census can serve as a proxy indicator for this 
point. In this census, data on employment among adults were collected, segregated 
by gender. For each of the current three DS Divisions, the gender-disaggregated 
employment rates are as follows104: 
 
DS Division  Employment rate (male) Employment rate (female) 
Muthur 82% 2% 
Seruwila 87% 23% 
Eechchilampattu 91% 3% 
Table 3.6. Employment rates by DS Division and gender, 1971 (source: 1971 census) 
 
As can be seen, only a tiny minority of women were engaged in any form of paid 
work, and the percentage of working Sinhala women (who were concentrated in 
Seruwila DS Division) was much higher than the percentage of working Tamil and 
Muslim women. I have not come across more recent statistics in this regard, but the 
impression I got during the years that I did my fieldwork is that this has not changed 
significantly, except for the large group of war widows (who largely found 
employment within their village).  
Obviously, not everybody adheres equally rigidly to the norm for gender 
segregation. There are ambiguous spaces like shops where women often work as 
hard as their husbands, and where they will interact with other men, but only 
because the men have been recategorised as ‘customers’. This seems to be only true 
in Sinhala and Tamil shops though, and generally only where the shop is adjoining 
the house. Muslim shops in Kottiyar Pattu are, as far as I know, without exception 
run and staffed only by men. 
For Buddhists, Hindus and Christians, there are places of worship where men and 
women come together – but even there people are either segregated by sex, or 
people largely stay in clusters of relatives. Religious festivals and particularly 
weddings are places where men and women find themselves in the same space at 
the same time. Even then, they interact only to a limited extent, and considerable 
social policing takes place105. I was however told several times that weddings are key 
events where unmarried youth (and their parents) check out potential spouses, and 
sometimes even arrange marriages. Lastly, with the expansion of co-education 
                                                 
 
104 I have calculated the employment rates by dividing the total number of people reported 
to be employed by the total number of people of 15 years and older (1971 census, table 28 
and 29 [p. 116-9, 124-5]). Employment refers to any form of paid work, whether formal or 
informal.  
105 In 2001 and early 2002, I lived in a house on the beach in Batticaloa, not far from a temple 
that had a fairly big annual festival. Between my house and the temple was a casuarina 
plantation that was policed at night during the period of the temple festival by villagers 
anxious to prevent adolescent men and women from getting up to mischief. 
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secondary schools (for Sinhala and Tamil students; Muslim secondary schools in 
Kottiyar Pattu are segregated by gender) and, perhaps more importantly, tuition 
classes, adolescent boys and girls increasingly mingle. 
Among Muslims in Muthur, the custom of wearing full body-covering veil has 
visibly gained in popularity over the past decade. In Thoppur and its surrounding 
cluster of villages, this is much less so. There, it is still common to see women 
covering their hair with the end of their sari (a six-yard-long cloth worn as a 
traditional women’s garment throughout South Asia). While the veil rigidly 
visualises the separation between the genders, the paradox is that it has in fact 
facilitated a form of emancipation: it is very common to see un-chaperoned, veiled 
Muslim women on the road and in shops in Muthur, while in Thoppur you will 
rarely see any women outside their compounds at all. Precisely because the veil 
marks separation, it has become possible for women to be among unrelated men and 
still remain separated. 
 
For two very practical reasons, women do move out of their villages against the 
dominant norm. The first, and most obvious, reason is poverty. If the husbands are 
unable to earn enough to sustain their families, or if they are dead or have 
abandoned their family for someone else, women will have to jump in. Thus it is not 
uncommon to see poor, often elderly, Muslim women sitting near threshing sites, 
gleaning the straw for any rice that may have been left behind, or to see poor Tamil 
women working with their husbands in the rock quarry at 64th Milepost. Notice 
however that, though these women do go out of their villages to work, the Muslim 
women who look for rice grains sit separately from the farmer and his labourers, and 
the Tamil women who work in the rock quarry work together with male relatives106: 
where possible, separation is maintained or buffered through proximity of male 
relatives. Particularly in the poorest Muslim villages (much less so among Sinhalese 
and Tamils), migration to the Middle East for work as housemaids was also a fairly 
common response to poverty. As stories of women being ill-treated filtered back 
however (including the story of a young girl from the outskirts of Muthur who was 
sentenced to death for accidentally causing the death of the baby of her employers), 
the number of migrating women reduced. A last option that is available for young 
women is employment in the garment factories north of Colombo. Not more than 
several dozen Sinhala and Tamil women from Kottiyar Pattu seem to have followed 
                                                 
 
106 I have not been able to spend sufficient time in Sinhala villages to figure out to what 
extent Sinhala women go out to work due to poverty. It is however not uncommon in other 
parts of the country to find Sinhala women (but not Tamil or Muslim women) working in 
road repair gangs – clearly a job that people would not choose if they had better options. 
Also, I have the distinct impression that extreme poverty is much rarer among Sinhalese 
than among Muslims and particularly Tamils in Kottiyar Pattu: there is always the option of 
becoming a homeguard, police(wo)man or soldier. 
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this route. I am not sure however whether joining the garment industry is a choice of 
the poorest families or of slightly less poor families who have had the resources to 
enable the women to learn sewing. 
The second reason for the emancipation of women in Kottiyar Pattu was the conflict. 
Virtually every single person in Kottiyar Pattu has been displaced at least once, and 
often three or more times, over the course of the conflict. Life in crowded IDP camps, 
where the customary separations were hard to maintain, undermined traditional 
practices. Apart from the displacement, the threat of violence put a disproportionate 
strain on particularly Tamil women. Irrespective of ethnicity, there has been a 
disproportionate share of men between 20 and 45 years of age among those who lost 
their lives. This age range is the prime fighting age, but that does not mean that most 
men in this age group died fighting. As Patricia Lawrence (1997) has documented 
vividly, the simple fact of being in the fighting age range made people, suspect in the 
eyes of ‘the other parties’. Particularly Tamil men in this age group have suffered 
from arbitrary arrest, torture and disappearance throughout the war. This has had 
two consequences. On the one hand, those men who were married left behind 
widows, who in many cases had to fend for themselves and had no other option but 
to go out and find work (Thiruchandran 1999; Shanmugam 1999). On the other hand, 
Tamil men had to minimise any tasks that involved passing checkpoints (like going 
to the market) in order to reduce the risk of getting arrested107; in their stead, women 
took on these tasks. As Annamarieke Hoekzema (1999) has pointed out, this reversal 
of roles has meant an extent of emancipation for the women, and it has caused an 
identity crisis for many men, who were no longer able to live up to the standard of 
‘provider for the family’. 
 
3.7 Age 
Generational differences play out in several ways. For the purpose of this research, 
the population of Kottiyar Pattu can roughly be divided into three categories: those 
who were born before about 1965-70, those who were born between about 1965-70 
and about 1980-5, and those who were born after about 1980-5. The youngest 
category of people was born after the war began, and had never known life in peace 
before the 2002 cease-fire. The middle category has known life before the war, but 
was generally too young to have inter-ethnic friendships before the war began. 
                                                 
 
107 This was particularly the case in areas under LTTE control, where many people had lost 
their identity papers during the various episodes of displacement. After the 2002 ceasefire, 
this situation changed and men started visiting the Sinhala and Muslim market places again. 
However, after the renewed violence of 2006, the people were back to square one. On market 
days, one can see the main road in the Sinhala town of Serunuwara lined with Tamil women 
sitting in the shade, waiting for one of the few available buses to take them and their 
groceries back to the villages around Eechchilampattu.  
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Those in the oldest category were already adults before the war began, and part of 
them had (very) friendly relations with people of other ethnicity before the conflict 
constrained inter-ethnic interaction.  
When I spoke to people of the three age groups, it became clear that they had 
different perspectives on issues of peace and reconciliation. Those in the oldest age 
group know what was lost because they know what life was like before the war; I 
generally found a yearning for reconciliation to be strongest among this generation. 
On the other hand, they are also most acutely aware of how things were lost, and 
who was responsible for the descent into violence. Therefore, resentment may be 
intense. The middle group has a special position. This is the age group from among 
which most people bearing arms have been recruited on all sides. Particularly 
among Tamils, this is thus also the age group that has been targeted most directly for 
harassment and arrest throughout the conflict. Letting go of militarised mindsets 
and learning to trust the ethnic other again are important and difficult tasks ahead. 
The youngest group was too young to have consciously witnessed the start of the 
war. For them, peace is a novelty. Particularly before the 2002-2005 cease-fire period 
(which was not calm at all where Muslim-Tamil relations around Muthur are 
concerned), most lived ethnically segregated lives in largely mono-ethnic villages 
and mono-ethnic schools. For this generation, inter-ethnic peace largely meant 
starting from scratch during the cease-fire years. 
Largely parallel to the age categories described above, there are generational 
differences among the settlers in the Allai Extension Scheme colonies. The first 
generation of settlers was given a house, a homestead, and enough paddy land to 
serve a family. These people worked hard to conquer the jungle and make a living 
for themselves and their families. The second generation of settlers generally was 
able to make a living as tenant farmer or labourer. There was no land available for 
distribution among this generation, as colony lands can normally only be transferred 
undivided upon the death of the original settler. The out-migration of large numbers 
of (Sinhala) colonists after 1985 meant that land became available for lease, and by 
and large this generation has been able to look after itself. The third generation 
however has a problem. After second-generation colonists started cultivating those 
lands that were abandoned by displaced settlers and that were not too risky to 
cultivate, land again became a rather scarce commodity, which meant that the option 
of being a tenant farmer is not open to many third-generation settlers. As other jobs 
are hard to come by, the only alternative for many is to work as an agricultural 
labourer. However, many youth of this generation have gone to secondary school. 
Because they spent so much time in school, they never got used to hard agricultural 
labour. Also, manual labour is considered to be below the dignity of an educated 
person. Therefore, even if labour work is available, not all youth want to do this 
work, rather preferring to wait for an office job that is unlikely to come their way 
because they lack the skills for office work (interview with a mother and her 
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adolescent son, Neelapola, March 2005)108. The likely consequence is that a new 
generation of underemployed and frustrated youth grows up in the colonies, which 
may be a risk factor for future ethnic relations. 
While a similar pattern exists among the original inhabitants of the area, the 
demographic spread among the original inhabitants is much more gradual than 
among the colonists (who all came at a similar point in time and were of a similar 
age when they came). Therefore, generational boundaries with respect to economic 
development are a bit less marked among original inhabitants. 
 
3.8 Length of stay: settlers versus original inhabitants 
In Kottiyar Pattu, the boundary between settlers and original inhabitants runs 
largely (but not entirely, given the presence of a few Tamil and Muslim colonies in 
the Allai Extension Scheme) parallel to ethnic lines. Though it has become 
increasingly ethnicised in popular discourse, length of stay deserves attention as a 
separate category of identification that is linked to a distinct set of issues. These 
issues were described in 1957 by the British geographer B.H. Farmer, who wrote one 
of the first critical analyses of irrigation-cum-settlement schemes in Sri Lanka: 
 
“A set of problems of a somewhat different nature is created by the fact that 
almost all colonies are set down adjoining or even encircling purāna villages 
which, though mainly small, are tending to grow rapidly and which, moreover, 
are peopled by peasants who are most tenacious of their rights in purāna lands 
and of the status that goes with such ownership. At the very least, colonization 
in these circumstances means disturbance of peasant rights to chena; it may mean 
very much more if paddy lands are affected, or if social relations between colony 
and village are bad. […]  
No very consistent policy has been followed in the treatment of private land […] 
which is found to be included in or to adjoin the area which it is intended to 
colonize […]. If all such private land is acquired and reorganized to conform 
with a consistent pattern of development, purāna holders are likely to absorb a 
large proportion of the available holdings. Indeed, if an attempt had been made to 
give holdings in the colony to all the villagers affected by the Allai scheme there would 
not have been enough land to go around. Thus, quite apart from the feelings of 
villagers about their ancestral lands, the tidy solution may be physically 
impossible” (Farmer 1957:308-309, emphasis mine). 
 
Even though it does not receive much public attention, length of stay is an important 
category of identification, particularly for land-owning (Tamil and Muslim) ‘original 
inhabitants’. Until about 1930, the villages in Kottiyar Pattu were separated from 
                                                 
 
108 Similar concerns were regularly raised when I spoke to Sinhala parents of adolescent 
children who lived in Kottiyar Pattu. 
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each other by large patches of jungle that acted as expansion buffers. As the 
population increased, villages and surrounding agricultural fields gradually 
expanded into these jungle buffers. The first concerted land development in Kottiyar 
Pattu happened around 1911, when Catholic priests developed a stretch of paddy 
fields around the settlement that became known as Iruthayapuram (see section 
3.2.1). While the sudden jump in status from landless jungle dwellers to land-owning 
farmers caused conflict between the people of Iruthayapuram and particularly the 
old land-holding elite of Mallikaithivu, this land development did not yet cause any 
land shortage. 
In the 1930s, the government’s support to village extensions led to the development 
of a range of satellite settlements around Muthur, Thoppur, Pallikudiyiruppu, 
Eechchilampattu and Mallikaithivu, to accommodate for the increase in population, 
as well as two settlements for Mukkuvar immigrants from Batticaloa District. Still, 
there was enough land available, and most of the people moving into the settlements 
originated from Kottiyar Pattu and retained their status. These village extensions do 
not seem to have caused any problems. 
Things changed when the Allai Extension Scheme was developed in the mid-1950s. 
Suddenly, all the low-lying land that was available was alienated and redistributed 
among settlers, and (particularly around Mallikaithivu, Menkamam, Kankuveli and 
Kilivetti) all room for future expansion was abruptly taken away. This problem was 
made more acute because between about 1965 and 1975, the first batch of people 
who were born after anti-malaria spraying was introduced between 1945 and 1947 
got married.  
Between 1945 and 1955, the crude death rate in Sri Lanka dropped sharply, from 
2.2% in 1945, to 1.26% in 1950, to 1.1% in 1955 (Abhayaratne and Jayewardene 1967: 
22, table 6). At the same time, crude birth rates which had fluctuated around 3.8% 
from 1900 to 1935 and had dropped to around 3.5% between 1935 and 1940, spiked 
around 4.0% between 1947 and 1953 (idem: 24, table 7). After 1953, the crude birth 
rate dropped gradually to reach 3.0% by 1970 and 2.0% by 1990 (CBSL 1998: 272).  
Infant mortality also dropped sharply: from 14.0% in 1945 and 1946 to 10.1% in 1947, 
8.2% in 1950, 7.1% in 1953, and 5.7% in 1960 (Meegama 1986: 7, table 2). As a 
consequence, the cohort of children born in the period 1951-1955 who survived their 
first year of life was about 30% larger than the cohort for the period 1943-1947109.  
In Trincomalee District, the change was even more marked: the crude death rate, 
which had fluctuated around 3.5% between 1900 and 1944, dropped to about 1.0% in 
just four years (Abhayaratne and Jayewardene 1967: 71-2, table 24). With birth rates 
going up during this time, this led to a near 5% annual population growth by the 
mid-1950s (idem: 51-2, table 22). Assuming an even higher drop in infant mortality 
                                                 
 
109 This was calculated using the data mentioned above, and Abhayaratne and Jayewardene 
1967: 32, table 10. 
  Social complexity in Kottiyar Pattu 
129 
   
rates than for the entire country110, the cohort of children born in Trincomalee 
District in the period 1951-1955 who survived their first year of life was more than 
50% larger than the cohort for the period 1943-1947. This had dramatic consequences 
25 years later.  
In the matrilineal Eastern Province, land is normally given as a pre-mortal in 
heritance to the daughter for her wedding (McGilvray 2008). Just when room for 
expansion had been taken away by the colonies, demand for additional land 
increased dramatically when the babyboomers started getting married. To some 
extent, the dramatic increase in paddy yields that happened around the same time 
allowed for a process of agricultural involution somewhat similar to what Geertz 
(1963) has described for Java to take place; people also started encroaching on 
reserved lands such as tank beds and drains (which is significant when looking at 
the conflict over the Menkamam tank, see section 6.6.1). The increase in population 
density due to the lack of expansion possibilities is acutely visible in villages like 
Mallikaithivu and Menkamam, where housing densities became very high over 
time.  
After the war broke out, the security forces made it very difficult for Tamil farmers 
to access fertiliser, because fertiliser can be used for making bombs. As a 
consequence, yields declined and the incomes of Tamil farmers dropped drastically. 
Muslim farmers suffered less from restrictions by the security forces. However, the 
higher birth rate among the Muslim community meant that the amount of paddy 
land per family reduced at a greater speed than among the other ethnic 
communities. The consequence of these trends was a descent into poverty for many 
original inhabitants of the area111. 
                                                 
 
110 I have found no infant mortality figures for Trincomalee District. However, Meegama 
gives infant mortality figures for the ‘endemic, intermediate and non-endemic malaria 
zones’ of Sri Lanka for the period 1936-1948 (1986: 27, table 31). Much of Trincomalee 
District was in the endemic zone. While the countrywide infant mortality was about 14.0% 
in 1946, 10.0% in 1947 and 9.2% in 1948, infant mortality in the endemic zone, which was 
about 20.0% from 1943 to 1945 and peaked at 24.8% in 1946, dropped to 12.8% in 1947 and 
10.3% in 1948. As malaria was effectively held back after that, infant mortality figures for 
subsequent years can be assumed to be similar to the countrywide average.  
111 During the post-2002 cease-fire, some people opted for interesting alternative strategies to 
escape the pressure on residential and paddy land in their village. One Tamil man in his 
fifties told me how he was planning to clear a piece of jungle that had become safe again. 
Then he would go to the local office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), claim he that he was a refugee who had just returned from India, obtain 
materials for a shelter and a loan or grant for livelihood purposes, settle in the jungle, and 
give his land in the village to his children. The man knew full well that UNHCR and its 
implementing partner NGOs would not be able to figure out whether or not he was 
genuinely a returning refugee; he also knew that these agencies would be happy with every 
beneficiary they assisted, because it would help them reach their targets. 
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Between about 1970 and 1980, children of the first generation of settlers got married 
and started setting up their own families. As a consequence, land scarcity became an 
issue in the colonies as well. As mentioned in section 3.7, colony land can only be 
transferred undivided, which would have meant that most of the new families 
would need to find other sources of income. As in the original villages, (informal) 
fragmentation of landholdings and encroachment on reservations were strategies 
used to absorb some of the increased pressure. By the 1990s, the situation in the 
Muslim and Tamil colonies was similar to that in the original villages. The flight of 
about half of the Sinhala population between 1985 and 1987 meant that for the 
remaining people the problem of a lack of available land reduced in severity for 
about 15 years, though this was partially offset by the abandonment of areas that 
had become too dangerous. Therefore, while Muslim and Tamil settlers sank into 
similar conditions as the Muslim and Tamil original inhabitants, Sinhala settlers 
remained comparatively better off in terms of land availability per farmer. As a 
consequence, the distinction between settlers and original inhabitants became less 
prominent over time, being incorporated into a broader ethnic distinction. 
Particularly for the older generation of original inhabitants however, it remains a 
clear category of identification. 
Now that the war has ended, all sides will benefit by the end of “tax collection” by 
the LTTE (provided that this form of extortion does not get taken over by other 
actors), the renewed accessibility of areas that were long considered too dangerous, 
and hopefully by a general increase in economic growth. My hunch is that initially 
the Tamil farmers will benefit comparatively much from the reducing restrictions on 
among others fertilisers. This will make it possible to increase productivity, and 
make up some of their comparative disadvantage with Muslim and Sinhala farmers. 
For Muslims, not much will change, while Sinhalese in Kottiyar Pattu might find 
themselves having to pay a price for peace, when more settlers who fled the area two 
decades ago return and increase the pressure on resources, and when, ultimately, the 
military apparatus will need to downsize and home guards will lose their income. 
 
3.9 Political affiliation 
Sri Lanka has two large political parties, three or four medium-sized parties, and a 
large number of small parties. The United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP) have dominated the political landscape ever since 
independence, and control over the government has alternated between the two. The 
UNP generally leans towards the neoliberal side, while the SLFP tends to be more 
populist, but both parties have at times borrowed quite freely from the other’s 
ideological base whenever that was opportune.  
Originating from the urban labour movement is a cluster of small, but at times 
influential socialist and communist parties that is often grouped together under the 
term ‘Old Left’. Over time, the ‘Old Left’ was superseded in importance by the JVP. 
This originally maoist party developed over time into a staunch left-leaning Sinhala-
nationalist party that initiated two violent uprisings against the state in 1971 and 
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1987-1989. Although the party leadership was almost entirely annihilated by the end 
of the second uprising, the JVP bounced back. By 2004 it formed an alliance with the 
SLFP under the name United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) and became part of 
the government, only to be split in two by internal rivalries two years later. On the 
right-wing Sinhala-Buddhist side of the spectrum, a small but highly vocal party is 
the Sihala Urumaya (SU). In order to increase its electoral chances, the party 
reinvented itself into the Jatika Hela Urumaya (JHU), a party of Buddhist monks, 
striving to protect Buddhism in Sri Lanka (while remaining as rabidly Sinhala-
nationalist as it had been before). The restyling worked: until 2010, the JHU had nine 
seats in parliament. However, infighting in combination with the successful Sinhala-
Buddhist self-representation by a section of the SLFP has severely eroded the JHU’s 
support base. 
Since its founding in the late 1940s, the Federal Party (FP) became the dominant 
party representing Tamil interests. In alliance with a few other Tamil parties, it 
formed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1972. Under pressure of the 
LTTE, the TULF in turn aligned itself with more Tamil parties in 2001 to form the 
Tamil National Alliance (TNA). Right throughout, there have been smaller Tamil 
parties. Prominent among these are the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil 
Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), Tamil 
Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) 
which were originally Tamil militant groups that gave up the fight and joined 
mainstream politics in the late 1980s. 
A separate Muslim political party only came to its own in the late 1980s, when the 
Muslim political activist M.H.M. Ashraff founded the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress 
(SLMC). Before that, Muslims had largely voted for either the UNP or the SLFP. 
Over the course of the 1990s, the SLMC became dominant among the Muslim 
electorate, although its electoral heartland was always confined to the Eastern 
Province (Ameerdeen 2006). After Ashraff died in a helicopter crash just before the 
elections of October 2000, the SLMC disintegrated. Rauff Hakeem took over the 
leadership of the party, but very soon Ashraff’s widow Ferial split off and formed 
her own party, the National Unity Alliance (NUA). In 2003, further splits followed, 
and by 2007 the bigger Muslim towns on the east coast were like small town 
republics, each with its own dominant political party.   
In Kottiyar Pattu, as in the rest of Sri Lanka, voting behaviour differs by ethnicity. 
Among Sinhalese, the most popular parties for national elections have always been 
the UNP and the SLFP, while since 2003 the JVP also gained some popularity. Both 
the parties of the Old Left and the SU/JHU hardly get any votes. Since the 
establishment of Tamil political parties, Tamils have always overwhelmingly voted 
for the FP, and later TULF and TNA. From the 1970s, Muslims largely supported the 
UNP until the establishment of the SLMC, which has since developed a solid voter 
base in Muthur (though much less so in Thoppur); before that, votes were given to 
whichever candidate MP was considered suitable. In the 1960s, concerns over the 
settling of Sinhalese in the AES led many Muslims to vote for the FP. 
.  
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In local elections, national political parties are less important, and votes tend to be 
divided among the big parties as well as a range of local ‘independent lists’. In the 
bi-ethnic Muthur Pradeshya Sabha, this has meant that whichever ethnic group 
managed to minimise vote dispersal could claim dominance. During the Pradeshya 
Sabha elections of 2006, the Muslim leadership of Muthur forced all Muslim 
candidates to jointly come under one list that was given the meaningful symbol of 
the pineapple – a fruit with many ‘eyes’. Between the various candidates there was 
fierce competition for votes, but because all were on the same list, Muslims for the 
first time managed to ensure dominance in the council. 
3.10 Military control 
For most people in Kottiyar Pattu, military control was a category of identification 
that they had very little control over (except when they chose to leave their homes 
and flee to a territory under another regime of military control).  
From about 1990, there were three acknowledged regimes of military control in Sri 
Lanka’s war zone. They were designated, in formal as well in colloquial usage, with 
the English terms ‘cleared’, ‘uncleared’ and ‘grey’. Territory designated ‘cleared’ was 
controlled by the Sri Lankan military (and its paramilitary counterparts) during the 
Figure 3.2. Propaganda for the local council elections in Muthur, 2006 (own photograph) 
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day and, at least officially, also at night. Territory designated ‘uncleared’ was 
controlled by the LTTE during day and night112. Territory designated ‘grey’ was 
generally controlled by the Sri Lankan military during the day and by the LTTE at 
night, but could also be visited by government-allied Tamil paramilitary groups 
(Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer 2000). In Kottiyar Pattu, ‘grey’ areas basically 
covered everything outside the Sinhala and Muslim settlements, outside the 
‘uncleared’ areas, and further than a few hundred metres away from army camps in 
Tamil areas. Very similar to Kalyvas’ analysis of violence in civil-war Greece (2006), 
‘grey’ areas were the most dangerous areas since military control was unstable, and 
one could find both the military and the LTTE in the same area at the same time 
(Hoekzema 1999). Because of the continuous movement of LTTE cadres in or 
through these areas, there were more cordon-and-search operations, and people 
were at greater risk of getting arrested or getting caught in a crossfire than 
elsewhere. Still, soldiers and rebels seem to have found practical solutions to 
minimise casualties when no leadership-sanctioned operations were ongoing. One 
night in 2000, a friend who was in Muthur was kept out of his sleep because the 
LTTE was plundering the warehouse of the Multi-Purpose Cooperative Store. The 
militants had walked into Muthur without firing a shot, and left the town without 
firing a shot, after loading their loot on noisy and slow ox-carts. There was obviously 
some sort of silent agreement with the army, which could have easily intercepted the 
cadres and ambushed them on their way back to base if the will had been there. 
There were similar hints of accommodation elsewhere. In Batticaloa District, the 
(army) brigade headquarters at Valaichchenai got its water via a pipeline from 
LTTE-controlled area, while the local LTTE headquarters at Karadiyanaru got its 
electricity from government-controlled area. An acquaintance who was in the north 
of Sri Lanka in the early 1990s told me how he was taken to a frontline where 
soldiers and LTTE cadres had established a practice of loudly insulting each other’s 
mothers at regular times, but only firing their guns when ordered to do so by 
someone high up in the respective hierarchies. 
Formally, the category ‘grey areas’ did not exist or was a subcategory of ‘cleared 
areas’. Therefore, the only formal boundary that was in force was that between 
‘cleared’ and ‘uncleared’ areas. This boundary was marked by checkpoints, bunkers, 
barbed wire and in some parts of Sri Lanka, though not in Kottiyar Pattu, with 
minefields. Physical movement of people and goods across this boundary was 
restricted. People, vehicles and goods travelling in both directions were subjected to 
thorough checking, and every crossing of the boundary was registered on both sides 
                                                 
 
112 To make things more confusing, the LTTE insisted on designating areas under its control 
‘cleared’ and areas under government control ‘uncleared’. Civilians in LTTE-controlled 
territory sometimes used the LTTE’s set of designations, and sometimes the government’s 
set. As the government’s version of things was also part of the formal discourse, I stick to 
that categorisation. 
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in elaborate logbooks. Anything that could directly benefit the rebels was banned 
from being taken to the other side. This included items like fertiliser and batteries 
(which could be used for making bombs), but also packets of instant noodles, which 
could be used as combat rations. At times, the restrictions went so far as to include 
basic medicines like panadol (Rasaratnam 1996a: chapter 18). Fuel and construction 
materials could only be taken in small quantities and with the right paperwork.  
Since the checkpoints were only open during the day and health care facilities in 
LTTE-controlled areas were very limited, any medical emergency between dusk and 
dawn could easily turn deadly because people could not be taken to hospital in time. 
The restrictions had two direct consequences. For the bulk of ordinary civilians 
living in LTTE-controlled territory, the restrictions meant severe hardship and 
poverty; for a small group of people with the right contacts, the development of a 
black market opened up opportunities for making money113.  
Within the ‘cleared’ areas, a wide network of checkpoints developed over time. Like 
the boundary checkpoints, these checkpoints had to be negotiated with care, 
particularly by Tamils, for whom the risk of arrest was always present (Montani 
1999: 145-171)114. This checkpoint infrastructure contributed significantly to the 
militarisation of the landscape, but was more an institution of domination than a 
serious hindrance for the militants. Rarely was military hardware discovered at the 
checkpoints, which was not entirely surprising because many checkpoints could 
fairly easily be bypassed via by-lanes, or through patches of jungle115. The 
bureaucracy of registrations was however formidable.  
                                                 
 
113 People on all sides of the conflict profited from this. To give an example: after the 
government closed the checkpoints into the Vanni for building materials in 2007, a lively 
smuggling route for cement developed via Mannar Island. Lorry-loads of cement drove 
from the south to Mannar Island, where the cement was loaded into small boats. Then it was 
smuggled into the Vanni. Despite the formal embargo, cement was available in bulk, but the 
price per bag was Rs. 1,000/- more than in the rest of Sri Lanka, where a bag cost about Rs. 
700/-. Half of the price difference went to the Sri Lankan navy, a quarter went to the LTTE, 
and a quarter went to the smugglers (conversations with people living in Mannar and NGO 
staff working in Mannar and the Vanni, 2007). 
114 Interestingly, such checkpoints did not exist inside LTTE-controlled areas. Within the 
‘uncleared’ areas, people could freely move around 24 hours a day. In the ‘cleared’ areas, 
movement after dark varied depending on whether people were in a Tamil-dominated area 
or in a Muslim- or Sinhala-dominated area. One night in October 2000, I drove home late to 
Batticaloa with some colleagues following an emergency food distribution to flood-affected 
families near Verugal. Every Tamil settlement that we drove through was deserted, but in 
the Muslim town of Eravur shops were open and there were many people on the road. For 
one of my (Tamil) colleagues, it was the first time in ten years that he had been outside 
Batticaloa town after dark. 
115 One day, I was travelling in a threewheeler from Battaramulla, 10 km out of Colombo, to 
my house in the heart of the city, when the authorities decided to check every single vehicle 
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3.11 Reflection: shades of otherness  
In this chapter, I have discussed nine axes along which people whom I spoke to in 
Kottiyar Pattu defined sameness and otherness: caste, class, employment, religion, 
gender, age, length of stay, political affiliation, and military control. There may well 
be more, but these nine, together with ethnicity which I discussed in chapter 1, 
figured most prominently in people’s stories. The point here is to show complexity, 
not to reduce everyday social interaction in Kottiyar Pattu to a mere nine-
dimensional model. As shown, each of these categories of identification comprises 
(almost) the entire population of Kottiyar Pattu, and divides it up in different ways.  
While some of the boundaries and (status) hierarchies within categories of 
identification are contested, the constituent groups within each category are pretty 
much fixed, and it is more or less possible to categorise everybody in Kottiyar Pattu 
according to each of the categories of identification that have been discussed above.  
The extent to which the boundaries within each category of identification overlap 
with the boundaries in other categories of identification is schematically represented 
in table 3.7. As can be seen, some categories overlap more than others, and in some 
cases the extent of overlap is co-determined by a structuring third category, which is 
generally ethnicity. 
For each person, there will be a small group of people who are in the same group as 
the self within (almost) all these categories of identification, as well as a small group 
of people who are ‘others’ according to (almost) all of these categories. There are 
however also many people who are ‘same’ in some respects and ‘other’ in other 
respects: Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims who are all farmers, Buddhists and 
Christians who are Sinhalese, Tamils and Sinhalese who are Christians, Hindus and 
Muslims who are labourers, Muslim farmers and fishermen who both vote SLMC, 
and so on. 
There are two other important categories of identification that I did not discuss so 
far: relatives and friends. (Almost) everyone has a circle of relatives and a circle of 
friends around them, and these circles of relatives and friends are of crucial 
importance for people and their social interactions. The problem is that every 
person’s circles of relatives and friends are unique, though there tends to be 
considerable overlap among clusters of people. On the scale of Kottiyar Pattu, it is 
impossible to identify identity groups in the categories of relatives and friends in the 
same way as it is possible for ethnicity, caste, class, and the other categories 
discussed in this chapter. That does not mean that nothing can be said about the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
entering the city, and massive traffic jams developed. The driver, who was known to me, 
suggested to take a ‘long-cut’ (as opposed to a short-cut). He got me home through 
backroads, without us passing a single checkpoint. Significantly, this ‘100% checking’ was 
instituted the day after there had been a bomb blast in Colombo. Officially, the objective was 
to apprehend those who had planted the bomb. However, only incoming traffic was checked, 
while outgoing traffic could move freely. 
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structural location of relatives and friends. For the vast majority of people, relatives 
are in-group members according to at least three of the four following categories: 
ethnicity, caste, class and religion. Friends, on the other hand, are in-group members 
according to at least one category of identification, and on top of that they are 
generally of the same gender. Friends need to have something in common, but what 
it is that they have in common does not really matter. Gender homogeneity among 
(adult) friends is a strong cultural norm among people of all ethnicities in Kottiyar 
Pattu: cross-gender friendships are risky, because they can easily be misinterpreted 
as scandalous affairs. 
While there is no denying that the ethnic category of identification predominates in 
public discourse across Sri Lanka and that ethnic boundaries are fiercely and 
violently guarded by ethno-nationalists, the ambiguity of what constitutes otherness 
allows people room for manoeuvre to interact with a much larger group of people 
than just the small in-crowd. It allows people of the same ethnicity to interact across 
boundaries of caste, class or religion, and it allows people of different ethnicity who 
share a religion or livelihood to interact across the ethnic boundary, and still frame it 
as a form of intra-, rather than inter-group interaction. Inversely, this also means that 
apart from the conflict along ethnic lines, there are also conflictuous issues along 
other lines that may keep people of the same ethnicity separated. As I will show in 
the case studies, this manoeuvring is crucial for understanding everyday inter-ethnic 
interaction. 
 
 
  Caste Class Employ-
ment 
Religion Gender Age Length of 
stay 
Political 
affiliation 
Military 
control 
Ethnicity Sinhalese 
and 
Tamils 
have 
parallel 
caste sys-
tems; 
Muslims 
officially 
not, but 
some-
what 
ambigu-
ous 
practice 
Largely 
cross-cutting, 
though eth-
nically dif-
ferentiated 
access to 
resources has 
generated 
differences in 
the average 
wealth status 
per ethnicity 
Cross-
cutting; 
home 
guards 
and 
soldiers 
predomi-
nantly 
Sinhala; 
compara-
tively few 
Sinhala 
fisher-
men 
Largely 
structu-
red by 
ethnicity. 
Christi-
ans are 
either 
Sinhala 
or Tamil 
Cross-
cutting 
Cross-
cutting 
hardly 
any 
Sinhalese 
non-colo-
nists; 
some 
Tamils 
and 
Muslims 
among 
colonists 
Largely 
structured by 
ethnicity, 
with intra-
ethnic 
divisions. 
Some 
support for 
SLFP and 
UNP among 
Muslims and 
to a lesser ex-
tent Tamils 
All Sinhalese 
and Muslims 
and part of 
the Tamils 
formally 
under 
government 
control; part 
of the Tamils 
under LTTE 
control (until 
2007) 
Caste   Largely 
cross-cutting; 
people of 
low castes 
are generally 
also low on 
the class 
hierarchy 
Partly 
parallel, 
partly 
cross-
cutting 
Cross-
cutting 
Cross-
cutting 
Cross-
cutting 
Cross-
cutting 
Cross-cutting Cross-
cutting 
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  Caste Class Employ-
ment 
Religion Gender Age Length of 
stay 
Political 
affiliation 
Military 
control 
Class     Partly 
parallel, 
partly 
cross-
cutting 
Cross-
cutting 
Cross-
cutting 
Cross-
cutting 
Cross-
cutting 
Not entirely 
sure; probab-
ly largely 
cross-cutting 
Crosscutting 
though 
wealthier 
groups 
concentrated 
in govern-
ment con-
trolled area 
Employ-
ment 
       Cross-
cutting 
 Cross-
cutting 
 Cross-
cutting 
Cross-
cutting  
Cross-
cutting  
Cross-
cutting 
Religion         Cross-
cutting 
Cross-
cutting 
Length of 
stay and 
religion 
are both 
largely 
structu-
red by 
ethnicity 
Political affi-
liation and 
religion are 
both largely 
structured by 
ethnicity; 
both Muslim 
and Sinhala 
political 
parties use 
religious 
discourse. 
Linked to 
ethnicity: all 
religions 
represented 
in govern-
ment-con-
trolled area, 
only Hindus 
and some 
Chris-tians 
in LTTE-con-
trolled area 
Gender           Cross-
cutting 
Cross-
cutting 
Cross-cutting cross-cutting 
Age            Cross-
cutting 
Cross-cutting cross-cutting 
Length of 
stay 
             Cross-
cutting; as 
Sinhalese are 
dominant 
among colo-
nists, Sinhala 
parties domi-
nant there, 
and other 
parties 
dominant 
among non-
colonists 
only 
colonists in 
government-
controlled 
area 
Political 
affiliation 
               linked to 
ethnicity; 
cross-cutting  
only among 
Tamils  
Table 3.7. Overlap between boundaries within categories of identification in Kottiyar Pattu 
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4 Violence in Kottiyar Pattu 
 
How many lives were destroyed during [the] violence? You cannot count them. 
In this land, water should flow, but it is blood that is flowing. Almost every 
family has lost one of its loved ones due to the war. Still, they are longing for 
them. How many souls are longing for their loved ones? Violence is like a 
crocodile’s snout. 
By a 15-year old girl (Cassiere et al., 2000: 12) 
 
Between two cats 
That are fighting for the soil 
We are trapped and suffering 
Like rats that can’t close their eyes 
From the poem ‘Letter of tears from the Muthur refugee camp’ (Navamani 2006) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Suffering and its documentation 
A week after the tsunami, I spent a day in the small town of Valaichchenai with a 
team of ZOA to assess the water and sanitation facilities in a number of sites where 
those who were unable to return home had found temporary accommodation. Two 
journalists also joined us. When, during a tea break, we heard that some bodies of 
recently recovered tsunami victims were being cremated nearby, the journalists 
asked to be taken there. As I had seen the smoke and knew the roads in the area 
well, I offered to show them the place, where we found one improvised funeral pyre 
made of vehicle tyres. The acrid smell of burning rubber outswamped the putrid 
smell of decaying and burning flesh, and in the deepening rays of the late-evening 
sun the thick billowing smoke suddenly revealed the empty eye-sockets of a skull. 
Next to it, a faithful dog crouched close to its former owner. As I watched in silence, 
the only thing the journalists found to say was “the lighting is stunning”.  
The sight was unspeakable, but infinitely more so were the horror of this person’s 
dying moments and that of the surviving relatives who would now have to face life 
without him or her. As Patricia Lawrence (1997) and Rebecca Walker (2010) have 
documented in their work on Batticaloa, those who suffered from violence faced a 
further tragedy: even if they had words to express their suffering, it was often too 
dangerous to express them.  
In order to place my findings on everyday inter-ethnic interaction in proper context, 
it is important to document the extent and impact of the ethnicised violence that has 
affected the people living in Kottiyar Pattu. And therein lies a triple problem: how to 
document agony; how to compile a ‘bigger picture’, and how to link individual 
stories to this ‘bigger picture’.  
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Narrating agony is painful and, particularly during the latter half of my research, 
could be dangerous for the narrator. Because of this, I have avoided asking about 
people’s personal experiences, except when they themselves started talking about 
them. Apart from that, documenting agony requires writing skills that I simply do 
not have (see Walker 2010, chapter 3 for a good example of how it can be done). As a 
lesser substitute, I have tried to demonstrate the sheer ubiquitousness of violence in 
Kottiyar Pattu in the chronology presented in this chapter. 
When I started my research, I assumed that compiling a factual chronology of 
violence would be fairly simple; all the more so, since a cease-fire was in place. It 
was clearly noticeable that people were not as reluctant to talk about past violence116 
as they had been during my first year and a half in Sri Lanka, when the conflict was 
still ongoing. However, things proved to be more complicated than that. I have 
asked many people in Trincomalee District if they were willing and able to describe 
the local chronology of the conflict, but most people limited themselves to general 
statements about “[19]85” and “[19]90”117. In Kottiyar Pattu, many people referred 
me to others, who they said would be better able to tell me about what happened. In 
the end, all these referrals led me to one person, who was recommended as 
something of the ultimate source for me. I had met this person before. He had 
already told me much about the area, and he had been extremely helpful. However, 
when I asked him about the history of the conflict, he broke down in tears and was 
unable to help me further. With that, I gave up – until I came across the Nadesan 
Centre For Human Rights Through Law. The diligent work of the staff at this centre 
has resulted in an elaborate collection of newspaper clippings related to the conflict, 
from late 1982 to the present. My research assistant spent weeks going through most 
of them, and getting every single article about Trincomalee District that he came 
across photocopied – this amounted to about 15 cm of double-sided photocopies! 
Together with the insights and information that I’ve been able to gather from 
interviews, translated texts from Kottiyar Pattu, human rights-related reports and 
the wider literature on Sri Lanka, this generated a disjointed, but reasonably 
structured story.  
                                                 
 
116 This talking was mostly in descriptive terms, without reference to what this meant 
personally for the narrator: “there was a bomb there”, “on such and such a date, this and 
that village were attacked”, etc. 
117 I found that violence tends to be described in deceptively factual terms. Death of close 
relatives, destruction of property, and displacement were often reduced to the year in which 
they occurred. Something similar happened after the tsunami: without exception, people 
whom I met spoke of the dead as having been ‘washed away’, not as having died. While I 
assume that understating the painful is a fairly common practice, I had not expected it to be 
so unemotional. It must of course be stated that most my sources were speaking to an 
interested stranger with whom they had no close connection, so they would probably show 
a lot less of their feelings to me than they would to their friends and relatives. Nevertheless, 
even close friends used a similar extent of understatement. 
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The disjointedness of my description of violent events in the area is definitely proof 
of gaps in my information, but it is also indicative of the third problem in 
documenting violence: violence is temporal, spatial and individual. Still, it is these 
little details that matter (Richards 2005: 14) because together they shape a violent 
context.  
Violence is temporal, often orgasmic in nature. Traumatic and dramatic though 
violent events may be, most of the time during a period of violent conflict no actual 
violence is happening. What is however always present is the memory of earlier 
violence, as well as the anticipation of potential new violence. It is in this force field 
of actual, remembered and anticipated violence that everyday life takes place. Each 
of these three varies in intensity, but as long as the conflict is not over, they will all 
be present. 
Violence is also spatial. In people’s narratives, violence is always linked to specific 
locations. People carry with them ‘topographies of violence’, so to speak. This is true 
for remembered, actual and anticipated violence. Any reference to a remembered 
violent event includes its location, often in great detail. Any actual event of violence 
is spatially bound: some areas are affected, while others are not. Finally, there are 
places that people consider potentially risky and therefore to be avoided:  
 
Several months after the Sri Lankan armed forces had captured Eechchilampattu 
DS Division from the LTTE, I visited the area with my research assistant. On the 
way, we gave a ride118 to a young mother with her seven-month-old baby who 
was returning home after going to the market. When we asked her about the 
situation in the area, she told us that she avoided walking alone along one 
particular stretch of road that we passed, because of the soldiers posted in the 
bushes along the road (and because there are no houses within screaming 
distance) – she was afraid of being raped and therefore preferred to travel in 
groups. Had we not given her a ride, then she would have waited in a safe place 
until someone else going the same way showed up (fieldnotes, August 2007). 
 
There is more. It is not only that violence is topographical in nature; people also 
carry ‘violent topographies’ with them. Even when conversations were not about 
violence, places were often identified by referring to violent events that happened 
there: “Kinanthimunai is the hill where the Muslims were shelled”, “this junction is 
                                                 
 
118 Under normal circumstances, it would be culturally highly inappropriate for unknown 
males to give rides to unknown females. However, as the woman had a small baby and a 
bag of goods to carry, as walking distances are considerable (this woman lived about 10 
kilometres from the market), and as there simply were not many other sources of transport 
available, the convenience won from the restraint. Giving rides to people provided unique 
opportunities to talk to them without them having to be afraid of others (army, 
paramilitaries, LTTE) listening in, and I noticed that people were remarkably free in 
expressing their opinions about the situation in the area. 
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where so-and-so was shot”, “over there is where a claymore mine blew up a 
soldier”. It took me a while to realise it, but it is indeed remarkable that violence has 
become a primary marker on people’s mental maps, rather than more innocent 
things like trees, shops, etcetera119. 
In a broader sense, the geographical location of Kottiyar Pattu was of influence on 
the occurrence of violence. While the main conflict theatres were always Jaffna and 
Batticaloa, the communication and supply routes between both theatres ran through 
Trincomalee District. As documented by Gunaratne (2000), it was important for the 
government to block these routes through a combined strategy of settling Sinhalese 
in buffer zones and subsequently militarising these zones. The northern coast of 
Kottiyar Pattu is also of strategic importance because control over the coast east of 
Muthur gives a form of control over access to Sri Lanka’s main naval base at 
Trincomalee 
Apart from being temporal and spatial in nature, the experience of violence is also 
individual. It only takes one violent incident to ruin somebody’s life, but most of 
these incidents are irrelevant to almost everybody else (more so with increasing 
temporal and spatial distance). Because public memory leaves out most of these 
individual incidents, a public narrative on violence is little more than a symbolic 
collection of elements, quite far removed from the actual experiences of suffering of 
individual members of the public. Individual narratives consist of an 
undifferentiated interweaving of the symbolic elements of the public narrative and 
details on own experience of a limited number of incidents. This is what makes 
documenting violence so difficult, because every story is different and has a limited 
scope.  
Newspaper articles provide a much larger collection of incidents, but suffer from 
two defects. Firstly, incidents are only reported if they are considered newsworthy. 
As will become obvious in the rest of this chapter (and in chapter 7), the English-
language newspapers that I have been able to look at have had a definite bias, 
                                                 
 
119 Newcomers to a conflict zone quickly develop their own violent topographies. In January 
2006, the local branch of the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UN-OCHA) in Trincomalee published a map of Trincomalee town and its 
surroundings with key landmarks (UN-HIC 2006a). On it, five junctions were named and 
marked with red squares. As such, these junctions are not remarkable, and there are many 
other junctions in Trincomalee that are equally important. However, these five junctions 
(Anuradhapura Junction, Third Milepost Junction, Fourth Milepost Junction, Madathadi 
Junction and Abeyapura Junction) were locations where many incidents were taking place. 
The junctions were geographical markers of violence, but as this could not be publicly 
stated, red squares were used instead. 
Similarly, after a person had been assassinated about 100 metres from the house of an 
expatriate friend, she took me along and showed me the place. Part of ‘talking about it’ was 
to give an on-site reconstruction of what had happened, who had come from where, where 
the victim had fallen, and where the assassins had run off to. 
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reporting casualties caused by militants in great detail while largely ignoring 
casualties caused by government-related forces. There is thus no way of verifying 
completeness of documentation. Secondly, with few exceptions the journalists and 
editors who produced the articles were neither from the area where incidents 
occurred nor familiar with their context. Therefore, descriptions may be flawed and 
important context factors may be ignored.  
Specific human rights-related reports are a third source of information. These tend to 
be well-researched and provide detailed analyses of specific incidents. While being 
extremely valuable, such reports can however by their very nature only cover a 
limited number of incidents. 
A last source of information are so-called ‘massacre lists’ (Sinhaya 2009; SPUR n.d.; 
NESOHR 2007; Anon. 2004). These long lists, produced by Sinhala, Tamil and 
Muslim nationalists respectively, document attacks against their own ethnic group. 
While these documents are obviously one-sided propaganda tools that are primarily 
intended to show the evilness of the enemy, the incidents included did all happen 
(though not always exactly in the way they are presented). While the descriptions 
need to be read critically, the lists themselves can serve as a valuable addition to 
check a chronology for completeness. 
 
4.1.2 Structure of the chapter 
Section 4.2 provides the chronology of violence. It is subdivided in ten sections that 
deal with specific stages in the conflict as they were distinguished by the people 
whom I spoke to in Kottiyar Pattu. This chronology needs to be seen in the light of 
the wider chronology of violence as summarised in section 1.1.2. Of the remaining 
chapters, particularly chapter 7 is related to specific parts of the chronology (sections 
4.2.9 and 4.2.10). While this chronology is centered around Kottiyar Pattu, I have 
regularly included references to key incidents outside the area that shaped the 
immediate setting in which incidents within Kottiyar Pattu took place. 
I present something of a ‘balance sheet of suffering’ in section 4.3, in order to come to 
a tentative summary of conflict-affecteness by ethnicity. 
Section 4.4, finally, returns to the chronology from some distance, and summarises 
characteristic patterns in the violence. 
Bridging troubled waters?  
144 
 
4.2 A chronology of violence in Kottiyar Pattu 
4.2.1 Up to May 1985: silence before the storm 
All people from Kottiyar Pattu whom I spoke to were unanimous in stating that 
there was no major ethnically motivated violence in the area before 1985, and 
relations between Sinhalese and Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims, and Muslims and 
Tamils had been friendly120. The Administrative Records of the late 19th century and 
the first half of the 20th century lend credence to such a view: “Trincomalee”, thus 
wrote the district’s chief administrator in 1922, “is not a criminal district” (AR 1922: 
E22). From the oldest records that I have found (covering the late 1860s) until the 
second world war, the sections on crime consistently describe Trincomalee District 
as an exceptionally calm area (see for example AR 1890: F25 and AR 1899: F20). The 
only troublemakers were some criminals in Kinniya who were active between about 
1912 and 1920 (AR 1912-13: E6, AR 1920: E20). The construction of the Trincomalee-
Colombo railway and the expansion of the navy base saw the influx of several 
thousand male jobseekers from elsewhere, and with it a, still fairly limited, increase 
in crime (theft, gambling, prostitution, but also some assaults and murders) in and 
around Trincomalee town: “[t]he indigenous population is very rarely involved in 
crime and the stranger within our gates commits over 85 per cent. [sic] of the crime” 
(AR 1939, part I: E28; see also AR 1924: E24). After World War Two, reported crime 
dropped, only to increase again in with the influx of labourers working on the 
irrigation schemes. The Administrative Report for 1953 documents:  
 
“There has been an increase of grave crime during the year. The total number of 
cases was 437 as against 384 in the previous year. The Magistrate is of opinion 
that the Colonization and Land Development Schemes in the District are a 
contributory factor to the increase of crime and that the opening of the police 
stations at Mutur and Kantalay should be expedited as they are unpoliced areas 
where the schemes are in full swing and most of the workers appear to be 
undesirables. 
Crime was steady on the increase in the above areas and it is imperative that a 
police station should be opened at Mutur.” (AR 1953: A151). 
 
In or around August 1954, a “communal clash” took place in Muthur; a month later, 
a police station was opened (AR 1954: 172, 174). Samad sheds light on what 
happened: 
 
“The Land Development Department (LDD) brought outsiders as labourers […]. 
These outsiders were from the majority community. Their language was Sinhala, 
which was new and incomprehensible to the villagers of this area. These workers 
                                                 
 
120 Some typical examples of what people told me can be found in the next chapter. 
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used to come to Muthur to buy provisions and to watch movies because the 
Allai-Kantale road was not yet opened at that time. […] These labourers from the 
majority community, who came here to spend their leisure and to transport 
materials in trucks sang, danced and made a lot of noise. The people of this area, 
who lived a disciplined life, did not like these activities and began to hate the 
outsiders. During this period, Muthur Muslims had arguments that turned into 
fistfights with the Sinhalese who came to the cinema, as the former did not 
understand the language of the latter. This hostility began to intensify daily.  
Since 1945, the wealthy paddy merchants from Jaffna used to come to Muthur by 
boat during the paddy-harvesting season to buy paddy and straw. They paid 
advances and bought paddy through Muslim intermediaries from Muthur. 
These brokers sent local traders to the villages and purchased the paddy. The 
Sinhalese labourers in the colony area attacked late Mr. V. A. Caseer from 
Muthur, who went to purchase paddy. He escaped but they robbed his money. 
The people of the area who could not tolerate this began to attack them 
whenever they came to Muthur. This turned out into big riots” (Samad 2003:585-
6).  
 
It is important at this point to note that the colonists themselves were not involved in 
the Muslim-Sinhala violence. This is a pattern that resonates with what Stanley 
Tambiah observed during the 1956 riots in Gal Oya (Tambiah 1996: 82-94) and with 
what Tarzie Vittachi noted with regard to the 1958 riots in Padaviya and 
Polonnaruwa:  
 
“A notable feature of these [riotous] activities was that the Sinhalese colonists 
who had settled in the area for some years, and thereore had some stake in 
general orderliness, took no part in the rioting. The vast majority of the [rioters] 
were imported Government labourers and the rest were recently arrived 
squatters who had no roots yet in the area” (Vittachchi 1958: 37).  
 
Apart from the unrest between Muslims and Sinhalese, there were also incidents of 
caste-related violence among Tamils. The decades after independence saw increasing 
self-assertion and emancipation among lower caste Tamils in the North and East of 
Sri Lanka (Pfaffenberger 1990, McGilvray 1983). Locked in struggles over temples 
and privileges (see section 3.2.1), high-caste Tamils in Kottiyar Pattu sometimes 
asserted their dominance with violence. A high-caste Tamil once told me with glee 
how people from his village would go with shotguns to hunt down low-caste Tamils 
from a neighbouring village who had stopped showing the customary respect (such 
as getting off the road when a high-caste man came walking past)121.  
As mentioned in section 3.5.3, there was also some violence among the Muslims of 
Muthur over the setting up of new mosques.  
                                                 
 
121 In 1954, there were “shooting incidents at Mavadichenai and Menkamam” (AR 1954: 174). 
This may be a reference to the caste violence referred to. 
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When other parts of Sri Lanka saw large-scale Sinhala-Tamil violence in 1956, 1958, 
1961, 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1983, nothing much happened in Kottiyar Pattu122. As if to 
underscore this, a Tamil lady who married a Sinhala man in the 1950s mentioned 
that her family had been displaced during the 1958 riots, because her brother had 
been beaten up. While they were displaced, her husband and two sons went back to 
their fields to harvest the standing crop (interview, August 2007). Violence was so 
rare that one beating was sufficient to make an entire household flee the area for an 
entire year.  
Following the riots of 1956 and 1958, the early 1960s saw a series of civil 
disobedience campaigns that were harshly repressed by the government. As in many 
parts of the world, the late 1960s saw increasing radicalisation of youth who had 
been able to complete their secondary and higher education, but had few 
perspectives on jobs that met their qualifications. As mentioned in section 1.1.2, the 
JVP attempted to overthrow the government in a failed uprising in April 1971 that 
was brutally repressed. In Jaffna, youth also became more and more militant. The 
adoption of a new and explicitly Sinhala-Buddhist constitution in 1972 changed the 
political scene. A small, but growing section of the Tamil population began to 
question whether the non-violent approaches that had been used up to that time 
would be sufficient to ensure Tamil rights. In the same year, the first Tamil militant 
group was started under the name ‘Tamil New Tigers’. When police action during a 
Tamil studies conference in Jaffna led to 8 deaths in 1974, emotions surged. In 1975, 
the Tamil New Tigers killed the mayor of Jaffna; he was the first casualty of many 
that were to follow. In this setting of increasing youth militancy, 1976 was a crucial 
year. During a party congress on May 14th, the TULF, which had been formed from 
the Federal Party and two other Tamil political parties, adopted what became known 
as the ‘Vaddukottai Declaration’.  
 
“This historic pronouncement accused the Prime Minister Mrs Bandaranaike of 
having ‘callously ignored’ the TULF’s ‘last attempt … to win constitutional 
recognition of the Tamil nation without jeopardising the unity of the country’. 
The convention called on ‘the Tamil nation in general and the Tamil youth in 
particular to come forward to throw themselves fully in the sacred fight for 
freedom and to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign socialist state of Tamil 
Eelam is reached’” (Wilson 1994: 128). 
                                                 
 
122 The riots of 1956 were largely limited to Gal Oya and Colombo, and the violence of 1979 
and 1981 was largely confined to Jaffna and pockets with Tamil people in the south-west of 
Sri Lanka.  
In 1958, there was severe anti-Tamil unrest in – among others – the Padaviya irrigation 
scheme in the North of Trincomalee District and in Polonnaruwa, and there was an anti-
Sinhala response in Batticaloa (Vittachi 1958). Rajan Hoole mentions that “Kantalai erupted 
during the 1977 violence claiming the lives of 30 Tamils” (2001: 72). In all these instances, I 
have not found any reports of anything serious happening in Kottiyar Pattu. 
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In the same year, the Tamil New Tigers changed their name into the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Over the coming years, about three dozen Tamil militant 
groups were formed. 
The year 1976 also saw a controversy that significantly raised ethnic stakes between 
Sinhalese and Tamils in Kottiyar Pattu. In the Tamil village of Kilivetti, there was an 
old bo tree in the premises of a Hindu temple. From the early 1960s onwards, some 
influential Sinhala-Buddhists identified it as a sapling from the Anuradhapura bo 
tree belonging to the Seruwila temple (despite the fact that the tree was almost five 
kilometres away the Seruwila temple!), and claimed that it was the second-oldest 
known bo tree in Sri Lanka. Fearing that the involvement of the archaeology 
department would lead to the claiming of the village as Sinhalese, and thus to the 
settlement of Sinhala colonists in the village, a group of Tamil villagers got together, 
allegedly with the support of A. Thangathurai, MP (who was from Kilivetti), and 
destroyed the tree (Kemper 1991: 148-160)123. By 1977, the place where the tree had 
been was filled in with concrete. In the months after the cutting of the tree, a string of 
incidents occurred of which I have not been able to ascertain the chronological order: 
a small group of intermarried and well-integrated Sinhalese petty traders who had 
settled in Kilivetti were chased out and their shops were burnt; at least one Sinhalese 
shop owner was killed; and six houses of Tamil families who had been living in 
Dehiwatte from before the time that the colony was developed were burnt down. 
After this, no incidents happened in Kottiyar Pattu for a couple of years, and 
generally things seem to have been peaceful.  
The controversy over the tree helped raise the public profile of Seruwila: in 1979, the 
area around the Seruwila temple was declared a sacred area by the rabidly Sinhala-
nationalist minister Cyril Matthew, who played a crucial role in organising anti-
Tamil mobs during the 1983 riots (see below, footnote 129). Seruwila was actively 
promoted as a Sinhala-Buddhist pilgrimage site, but its isolation seems to have 
prevented it from really picking up in popularity. 
Around the same time as the controversy over the bo tree, a young Tamil man from 
the area, who was known as Kanda Podiyan, roamed through the jungles near 
Kankuveli, Neelapola and Dehiwatte. He was engaged in robberies (and in the 
process ended up murdering several people as well), but attained a Robin Hood-like 
status among Tamils because he redistributed some of his wealth among poor Tamil 
families. Among Sinhalese however, his actions further reinforced anti-Tamil 
sentiments. During the riots of 1983 only one incident took place in Kottiyar Pattu: 
the village of Kankuveli was attacked and burnt. I have not been able to discover 
how much damage was actually caused, but to older people living in the nearby 
villages (the Sinhala villages of Neelapola and Dehiwatte and the Tamil villages of 
                                                 
 
123 Branches of the tree had already been cut in 1964. In 1970, Thangathurai was instrumental 
in extending the electricity line from Serunuwara to his own village of Kilivetti. In order to 
make way for the cables, several more branches had to be removed (Kemper 1991: 156). 
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Kilivetti, Lingapuram, Sivapuram, Menkamam and Kankuveli) this was a significant 
event. A Tamil person of some social standing who lived in the area at the time gave 
me the following account:  
 
Interviewee: The first problem was in 1978. This was Sinhala-Tamil. After this, 
there were riots again in 1986124. In 1978, there was no iyakkam125. There was a 
young man, called Kanda Podiyan, who was hiding in the forest. He was a thief 
and robbed places. But if people were without food, he would give them. One 
day in Dehiwatte, a post master who came with his salary was killed by him. 
That is how it started. 
TG: Did they catch him? 
Interviewee: They caught him in the end, and he was shot and killed in 
Vellaveli126. Because nobody knew who he was, he would be sitting and listening 
during meetings at which people discussed how to catch him. He was actually 
caught several times, but managed to escape every time, until he met his end at 
Vellaveli. 
One day I met him near Dehiwatte, and noticed that he was hiding his gun in the 
sleeve of his shirt, keeping it in place with one folded finger. 
I told him ‘I understand who you are. Will you talk to me for a while?’ I took 
him to [a nearby building]. There I said ‘you leave these things, I will teach you 
ways to be a good man.’ The boy responded ‘now it is too late, I cannot change, 
but I will not harm people like you.’ 
In the beginning, relations with the Sinhalese were good, but they became bad 
over this boy. The Sinhalese people saw it as a Tamil harassing them, not as an 
individual doing this. 
The “Che Guevarists” were active in the area before this127. 
During this period [that Kanda Podiyan was active], seven [Tamil] people were 
taken to the forest, and after being forced to pose for photographs128 in the forest, 
they were killed. The Police officer in Muthur, who was a just man, refused to 
                                                 
 
124 Here my source is mistaken. The first major violence hit Kottiyar Pattu in 1985. I found 
that it is common for people to mix up years when recounting events in the past. The first 
year mentioned may have been 1976 instead of 1978. 
125 “Iyakkam” is Tamil for “movement”; it is a colloquial term used to describe the LTTE, but 
probably in this case was intended to mean Tamil militancy in general. 
126 Vellaveli is an area in the South-West of Batticaloa District. 
127 “Che Guevarists” was the term used in the 1970s and 1980s for the youth who were 
involved in a violent uprising in April 1971, led by the JVP. The term is rarely used for those 
involved in the second JVP-led insurrection, which lasted from 1987 to 1990. 
128 This seems to have been a reasonably common tactic. I have heard stories several times of 
soldiers forcing civilians whom they had arrested to pose for photographs with weapons in 
their hands and/or wearing camouflage clothing, before being executed. The photographs 
were then used as proof that the dead had been terrorists. More common were stories about 
civilians who were first killed and then photographed with weapons or military equipment 
next to them to create an alibi for the killers. 
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accept the bodies, so they were buried somewhere in the forest. This happened 
in 1978 or 1979. 
TG: Was Kankuveli burnt during this time? 
Interviewee: Yes, the village was nearby. After this, we could not go to that area 
for a whole year. This was because politicians made it a big problem (Interview, 
Muthur, April 2007).  
 
I had heard the story about Kanda Podiyan and the related burning of Kankuveli 
from several other people but nobody gave me this much detail, and the references 
to the people being killed and buried in the forest and to a big issue being made out 
of it by politicians were unique to this interview.  
To what extent Kanda Podiyan was merely a criminal who did not engage in 
separatist militancy can be doubted. In November 2007, I had a conversation with a 
Tamil lady who originated from Kilivetti. When I asked her what she knew about 
Kanda Podiyan, her face lit up: “He was from Kilivetti. It was him who started the 
iyakkam in our area! He had a shotgun. There would always be groups of young men 
who would be with him, and he trained them in the use of the gun”.  
This lady knew Kanda Podiyan personally. Once, after she had given birth, he came 
and visited her with a gift for the baby. From what she further said, I gather that 
Kanda Podiyan himself did not deliberately engage in separatist politics, but that he 
did provide a kind of role model for wannabe militants, and that he did train them. 
After the LTTE ambushed an army patrol at Tinneveli near Jaffna in July 1983, a 
wave of ethnic violence engulfed Colombo and spread to many parts of Sri Lanka. 
Tensions had already been building up for a while, and many observers are of the 
opinion that the riots, if not actively stage-managed129, were definitely not stopped 
by the government of the time (Hoole 2001; Tambiah 1986 and 1996; ICES 2003). In 
his painstaking study of the Sri Lankan conflict, Rajan Hoole lends further credence 
to his thesis that the government of the time was actively involved in generating or 
stimulating ethnic tensions and violence by describing the situation in Trincomalee 
in the period before the riots broke out in Colombo (Hoole 2001: 69-82). Over a 
period of a month and a half, an unprecedented series of violent incidents took 
place, in which about two dozen people died – all Tamils. As far as I know, Kottiyar 
Pattu remained calm, with exception of the attack on Kankuveli and the chasing out 
of the few remaining Tamil families in Neelapola130. In the process, an old temple for 
                                                 
 
129 The widespread use of voter lists for the identification of Tamil-inhabited houses seem to 
point at active complicity from elements in the state apparatus. Several prominent people 
linked to the government were leading mobs. Minister Cyril Matthew, a rabid Sinhala-
nationalist, was seen organising an attack against a prominent Tamil business (Hoole 2001: 
110-111). 
130 Before the Allai Extension Scheme was implemented, Neelapola (which is located next to 
Kankuveli) was a Tamil village with the name Neelappalai. Originally, it was scheduled for 
development as a colony for Tamil people from the area. In 1958, “rough elements from 
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the goddess Pattini Amman was damaged and the statue taken. The temple has 
since been restored and is now under the patronage of Sinhala Buddhists, but among 
many Tamils the impression exists that the temple was totally destroyed. According 
to some Tamils whom I spoke to, the attack was a delayed act of revenge by 
Sinhalese inhabitants of Neelapola, who suspected the Tamils living in Kankuveli of 
supporting Kanda Podiyan. 
I am inclined to view the 1983 attack on Kankuveli as something much bigger than 
just local revenge. After a famine among plantation workers and anti-Tamil violence 
following the elections in 1977 caused the displacement of thousands of Indian 
Tamils, Tamil NGOs (particularly Gandiyam) took it upon themselves to settle these 
people in the North and East of Sri Lanka. In Kottiyar Pattu, several hundred were 
settled in Puliyadicholai (which forms part of Kankuveli). Some people have told me 
that it was not the whole of Kankuveli but Puliyadicholai that was burnt in 1983 (see 
also Shanmugathasan 2003). With Kanda Podiyan allegedly being an Indian Tamil, 
this might explain the targeting of Puliyadicholai, were it not that at exactly the same 
time a whole string of state-sponsored attacks took place against settlements of 
Indian Tamils, and Gandiyam became the focus of Sinhala-nationalist wrath (Hoole 
2001, chapter 3 and 5).  After the attack on Puliyadicholai, some of the affected 
families rebuilt their houses in the same place, while others were settled in 
Kumarapuram, near Kilivetti (only to be faced with a massacre thirteen years later). 
Apart from the incidents around Neelapola and Kankuveli, Kottiyar Pattu was calm 
between 1978 and 1985. This is not entirely surprising. At least until July 1983, there 
was no active Tamil militancy in Kottiyar Pattu. The militant groups that existed simply 
did not have enough recruits to cover large areas, and largely limited themselves to 
the Jaffna District, with the odd foray towards Mannar or Vavuniya. When, after the 
1983 riots, militant groups did establish a presence in Trincomalee District, they seem 
to have started in the northern half of the district. Only gradually did they expand 
their network of jungle hideouts into Kottiyar Pattu, primarily to support a ‘Ho Chi 
Minh trail’-like logistics network between Batticaloa and Jaffna (Whitaker 2007: 89-
92). The first militant attack in Kottiyar Pattu does not seem to have occurred before 
mid-1985. 
Not only were there no active militants; there was also hardly any presence of state 
security forces. Until about 1980, the only force that was present was the police, 
which was limited to police stations in Muthur and Serunuwara and a few posts in 
the Sinhala colonies; a very small army detachment seems to have been posted in 
Dehiwatte and Neelapola from the early 1980s onwards. After the LTTE killed about 
60 Sinhalese in Kent and Dollar Farms, Kokkilai and Nayaru on the northern 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
colonisation schemes around Polonnaruwa” were settled there overnight on instructions of 
the hardline Sinhala-nationalist minister of agriculture, C.P. de Silva (UTHR(J) 1996). The 
village seems to have had a mixed population until the early 1980s, when little by little the 
Tamil inhabitants were worked out. The remaining Tamil villagers were chased away in 
1983. 
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boundary of Trincomalee District on November 30th and December 1st 1984131, an 
apparently pre-existing plan to provide weapons to Sinhala settlers became 
politically acceptable132. Starting in January 1985, weapons were distributed and 
training was provided to colonists in three ‘frontline’ areas: the Weli Oya irrigation-
cum-settlement scheme on the boundary between the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces, a range of colonies near the Malwattu Oya on the southwestern boundary 
of the Northern Province, and lastly the Sinhala settlements around Trincomalee, 
which had been designated as the intended future capital of the Tamil state. 
Weapons and training were provided to Sinhala settlers in the Allai Extension 
Scheme sometime between February and April 1985. At the same time, the army 
built up a permanent and growing presence in the area (Hoole 2001; Gunaratne 2000; 
Vije 1986).  
For many decades farmers of all communities used to have shotguns to keep wild 
boar out of their paddy fields, but the possession of firearms had been banned under 
Emergency Regulations. Even as weapons were being distributed among Sinhalese, 
this ban was enforced against Tamil farmers (Rasaratnam 1999, chapter 14). By 
taking away this meagre resource for self-defence from Tamil civilians, the power 
balance was further disrupted. A timebomb had been set up and armed; the waiting 
was for somebody to light the fuse133: 
                                                 
 
131 The attacks on Kent and Dollar Farms, Kokkilai and Nayaru constituted the first 
massacres of Sinhalese civilians in the war. Kent and Dollar Farms had been Tamil 
settlements earlier. The inhabitants had been chased out several months before the massacre, 
and replaced by Sinhala ex-convicts and other ruffians who were engaged in sustained 
harassment of the surrounding Tamil population (Hoole 2001). The settlement of Sinhalese 
happened  under the guise of an irrigation system development. A region that used to be 
called ‘Manal Aru’ was renamed ‘Weli Oya’. The development of the ‘Mahaweli System L’ 
was a clear deception. Hardly any investment was made in irrigation infrastructure, and 
most of the land remains unirrigated. It did however become a massive militarised wedge 
between the Northern and Eastern province (UTHR 1993b and 1995; Hoole 2001: 206-212). 
An acquaintance of mine once described the area as follows: “there are a thousand farmers 
there, protected by seven thousand soldiers” (private conversation, Batticaloa, early 2001). 
132 Gunaratne (2000) indicates that the plan of arming settlers already existed earlier, but was 
considered politically inappropriate. While Gunaratne presents the arming of settlers as an 
initiative of a few well-meaning civilians, soldiers and monks, the fact that the president’s 
son led the operation and that Air Force helicopters and planes were used to transport the 
weapons and trainers indicate clear involvement of the highest levels of the state. 
133 Twenty-one years later, there was again an elaborate distribution of guns for ‘self-
defense’, and ‘protection against elephants’, in many Sinhala and Muslim villages (some 
people whom I spoke to openly doubted why Sinhalese in the suburbs of Trincomalee 
would need to protect themselves against elephants, as there was no jungle there). President 
Mahinda Rajapakse instituted the ‘Jathika Saviya’ programme, ostensibly a village 
development programme. However, the core of the programme seems to have been the 
distribution of weapons and the recruitment and training of thousands of new home guards. 
All that was needed to be issued a gun was a letter from the Grama Sevaka, which stated that 
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“Arming border Sinhalese was bound to provoke a steep increase of tensions as 
they actually did. An individual bully with a gun was going to make, apart from 
his neighbours, also those in adjacent Tamil villages insecure. This in turn was 
bound to increase militant recruitment in Tamil villages, followed in time by 
serious action against Sinhalese thought to be close to the Army. This process 
was bound to push relations to breaking point, resulting in uncontrolled 
violence. Further, arming Sinhalese home guards with shotguns has been 
conclusively shown to be futile over the years. Home guards proved useless 
against attacks by Tamil militants coming in groups with surprise on their side, 
armed with automatics.” (Hoole 2001: 326) 
 
4.2.2 The carnage of May and June 1985 
The proverbial fuse was lit within a few months after the distribution of arms to 
settlers in the Allai Extension Scheme. In May and June 1985, an orgy of violence 
resulted in some 200 deaths in the area, and changed Kottiyar Pattu forever.  
On May 7th and 9th, 1985, two landmine attacks by the LTTE in the village of 
Valvettithurai134 in the Jaffna peninsula killed ten soldiers and an officer. This 
triggered a string of tit-for-tat attacks that spread across much of the North-East. 
May 10th saw a revenge massacre of 70 Tamil civilians in Valvettithurai by the Sri 
Lankan Army. Four days later, a group of LTTE cadres walked into the sacred area 
of Anuradhapura and started shooting indiscriminately. In the mayhem, 120 
Buddhist worshippers were killed and 85 were injured. The massacre at one of the 
most sacred sites of Sinhala Buddhism shocked the nation, and triggered a wave of 
reprisal massacres. On the two days following the Anuradhapura massacre, 75 Tamil 
civilians lost their lives; dozens more were killed in the following weeks. In the 
northern half of Trincomalee District, about 30 people were killed up until May 24th 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
the bearer of the letter was considered fit to carry a weapon. Of course, the guns were only 
available for Sinhalese and Muslims. 1,600 Muslim youth from Muthur and Thoppur were 
recruited as home guards in early 2006 and given two weeks of training. When they were 
subsequently told that they would be incorporated in the Sri Lankan Army to form a 
Muslim regiment that could be posted anywhere in the country, the vast majority quit and 
went home. In the Sinhala villages, several hundred youth (including, as a special group, the 
pre-school teachers) were trained as home guards, and many others were simply given 
weapons. This contributed considerably to tensions and instability in the area (interviews in 
Kottiyar Pattu, 2006 and early 2007). 
134 Valvettithurai, or VVT for short, was the birthplace of the LTTE leader Velupillai 
Prabhakaran. Along with a few ‘daughter settlements’ that had been established near 
Trincomalee in the late nineteenth century, VVT had a reputation for smuggling contraband 
between India and Sri Lanka. 
  Violence in Kottiyar Pattu 
153 
   
(Hoole 2001: 331-332)135. Then, the violence shifted to Kottiyar Pattu (ibid.; see also 
NESOHR (2007) and Sinhaya (2009) for accounts from Tamil and Sinhala nationalist 
perspectives).  
On May 24th, two Tamil civilians from Kankuveli were killed by Sinhala home 
guards in or near Dehiwatte. The next day, two Tamil civilians from Lingapuram 
were killed by Sinhala home guards not far from Kankuveli. This was followed by 
the burning of forty Tamil houses in Poonagar by Sinhala home guards from 
Mahindapura. “As though in a bid to orchestrate further violence, the Government 
announced fictitiously over the state media that about 40 houses of Sinhalese had 
been set on fire and destroyed at Mahindapura” (Hoole 2001: 332). 
 
On the same day, four Tamil civilans from Lingapuram (LB3 colony) disappeared, 
presumed killed by Sinhala home guards, and three Tamil youths fishing near 
Koonithivu were shot and killed by the Army. On May 27th, Sinhalese home guards 
stopped a bus near Mahindapura, killed six Tamils on the bus and injured one more. 
In four days, 17 people (all Tamils) had lost their lives, but this was only foreplay. 
The next act in the drama took place after a lull of four days. On May 31st, around 
8.30 pm, Thanganagar was raided by police and home guards. About fifty houses 
were burnt, and 37 Tamils were taken. They were killed and the bodies burnt along 
the Allai-Kantale road. One person survived.  A little while later, “Tamil militants, 
believed to be of the TELO, opened fire at the Sinhalese villages of Mahindapura and 
Dehiwatte killing 5 civilians” (idem: 333)136. In the national press, a big deal was 
made out of this attack: after the Anuradhapura massacre, this was presented as 
further evidence of the mortal threat that the Tamil militants posed to innocent 
Sinhala civilians. Note however that T. Sabaratnam, a generally well-respected Tamil 
journalist, claims in his biography of the LTTE leader Prabhakaran that those killed 
were home guards and not mere civilians (Sabaratnam 2005, chapter 42).  
An article in the New York Times of June 2nd, 1985, citing a “senior member of the 
Government party”, states that “at least fifty” people were killed and “more than 50” 
                                                 
 
135 Space does not permit me to elaborate on the many violent events that have occurred in 
the northern half of Trincomalee District. More detailed accounts can be found in Hoole 
(2001: 69-82, 202-214 and 308-349) and UTHR(J) (1993a, b and c). 
136 Sinhaya.com (2009) dates this event on May 30th, which would mean it happened before 
the incident in Thanganagar. On the other hand, some Tamil sources, like Vije (1986) date 
the incident in Thanganagar on May 30th as well. The order of these two events does carry 
some weight, in the sense that whichever attack occurred first may be perceived as 
unprovoked, while the second incident was a swift retaliation. On the other hand, the 
maelstrom of violence had already been unleashed in Kottiyar Pattu a few days earlier, and 
until the attack in Mahindapura and Dehiwatte all the incidents had been one-sided: 
Sinhalese (home guards and Army) attacking Tamils. In the lists that I am aware of, the 
Dehiwatte attack is marked as the fifth incident in which Sinhala civilians were killed by 
Tamil militants. 
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houses were burnt by “separatist guerrillas” in Seruwila, Neelapola, Dehiwatte and 
Mahindapura, all Sinhala villages (‘New Sri Lanka attacks reported’, New York Times, 
2-6-1985). The next day, the government denied this and stated that only five people 
had died (‘Only five were killed in terrorist attack’, Sun, 3-6-1985; ‘Govt states only 5 
were killed in Trinco’, Island, 3-6-1985). The initial report was actually fairly correct, 
but – as shown above – the bulk of the damage took place in a Tamil village and was 
inflicted by Sinhalese rather than the other way around. 
The next day, on Saturday, June 1st around 2 p.m., “the Army, Police, home guards 
and a Sinhala mob from Dehiwatte” descended on Kilivetti, killed ten Tamils, burnt 
125 houses, and took eight men and five women back to Dehiwatte, where the men 
were killed and the women raped (Hoole 2001: 333). “Later people from Kilivetti 
obtained help from some local Sinhalese to rescue the women. They went with cloth 
and sarongs to cover their naked bodies. One of them was found tied naked to a 
tree” (ibid; emphasis mine). The death toll would have been much higher if someone 
from Dehiwatte had not warned an acquaintance in Kilivetti that an attack was being 
planned, enabling most of the people to find refuge in surrounding Muslim villages 
(ibid). 
There is an important detail here. While it is undeniable that Sinhala mobs were 
attacking Tamil civilians, not everybody joined in and not everybody agreed with 
what was happening. I contend that for a group of Sinhalese to be able to walk over 
to the raped Tamil women and rescue them, they either had to have the backing of a 
sufficiently powerful section of the local leadership, or be sufficiently large in 
numbers to prevent a backlash. The argument that the mob may have let the women 
go because their thirst for revenge was satisfied is not valid in my eyes, because less 
than 48 hours later one-sided anti-Tamil violence flared up more ferociously than 
ever, and the same mobs were involved. 
On June 1st, militants attacked a navy camp and police station in Trincomalee, 
claiming to have killed 30 navy personnel (Narayan Swamy 2003a: 150). The next 
day or the day after that (Hoole indicates that different sources give different dates), 
thirteen (Tamil) civilians were killed and nine injured not far from Trincomalee 
town, when a bus was stopped by armed Sinhalese and the passengers attacked.  
After a lull on June 2nd, an orgy of violence and destruction broke out in Kottiyar 
Pattu on June 3rd and 4th. Details are sketchy, but the end result was that every single 
Tamil village within walking distance from a Sinhala settlement in the Allai Extension 
Scheme was destroyed in what may well have been some of the most destructive days of the 
entire conflict. The villages of Kilivetti, Menkamam, Sivapuram, Kankuveli, Pattitidal, 
Palaththadichenai, Arippu, Poonagar, Mallikaithivu, Peruveli, Munnampodivattai, 
Manalchenai, Bharatipuram, Lingapuram, Eechchilampattai, Karukkamunai, 
Mavadichchenai, Muttuchenai and Valaithottam were razed to the ground by a 
looting and plundering mob of Sinhala soldiers, policemen, home guards, and 
ordinary civilians. Over 80 people were reportedly killed, and 200 disappeared 
(‘Over 80 killed, 200 missing, many homeless in Mutur after clashes’, Island, 7-6-
1985). Estimates of the number of houses destroyed vary between “more than 1000” 
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(Narayan Swamy 2003a: 150) and 3,500 (Vije 1986, annex 3). The entire surviving 
Tamil population fled to Tamil villages that had not been attacked and to Muslim 
villages, where they were sheltered (Rasaratnam 1999, chapter 11). 
The extent of the destruction explains why it was calm for two days before the 
attack: organising the logistics of destruction (manpower, fuel for burning the 
houses, etc.) on such a scale is a daunting task that takes some time. The logistics 
involved show that this was no ordinary case of spontaneous mob anger, but a well-
orchestrated attempt at victimising the Tamil population in this part of Trincomalee 
District. The violence was also entirely one-sided. Without exception, all those who 
died or disappeared, and all those whose houses were destroyed, were Tamils. 
After this, the sources that I have available do not document any incidents in 
Kottiyar Pattu for an entire week. This is not surprising: there probably was hardly 
anyone left to attack, and if there was anything left to loot or destroy there were no 
witnesses who would be interested in reporting it. The vacuum that was created by 
the displacement of the Tamil population was however bound to implode, since 
Tamil militants were no longer restrained by the possibility of revenge actions 
against Tamil civilians in the area. On June 11th, Tamil militants again attacked 
Dehiwatte (and, according to some sources, Mahindapura), and killed thirteen 
Sinhalese civilians137. This time, the Sinhala population fled to Kantale and beyond. 
Many settlers went to their areas of origin, never to return.  
Two days later, the military attacked the remaining Tamil settlements that were too 
far from the Sinhala colonies: 
 
“On 13th June, violence and arson against Tamils in Cottiar Division [sic] 
resumed. Mr. Athulathmudali was present in the area on this day138. 900 houses 
of Tamils were burnt at Kattaiparichchan, Sambur [sic], Chenaiyoor and Muthur. 
The arson continued in the coming days and Tamil civilians continued to be shot 
and killed along the roads and in paddy fields. In one incident in Lingapuram, 
Mr and Mrs Pathakuddy and their 3 children were shot and killed by the armed 
forces.” (Hoole 2001: 335) 
 
In general, when people talk of the ‘troubles of 1985’, things tend to be phrased in 
such a way that the unsuspecting listener gets the impression that there was a series 
                                                 
 
137 This second attack was later claimed to have been made by the LTTE, under the 
leadership of its Muthur leader Ganesh after whom, posthumously, the village of 
Ganeshapuram near Sampoor was named (‘Forces lose 11 men in mine blasts’, Daily News, 7-
11-1986; ‘7 Policemen and four soldiers killed’, Island, 7-11-1986).  
138 Lalith Atulathmudali was Minister of National Security at the time, and regularly directed 
attacks in person. An acquaintance who was in Jaffna in the mid-1980s once told me how 
people used to tune their radios to the frequency used by the air force in order to have some 
early warning in case of an airstrike, and how he could sometimes hear Atulathmudali, who 
was flying overhead in a helicopter, indicating which targets were to be attacked. 
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of attacks and counterattacks by mobs, and that in the end everybody fled. As will 
have become clear from the above, there was no such thing. There were two 
incidents in which Sinhala civilians were shot and killed by small groups of 
militants; there were no attacks by Tamil mobs; no Sinhala women were raped; and 
no Sinhala properties were damaged or looted. On the other hand, after a number of 
steadily escalating incidents, June 3rd and 4th of 1985 saw what cannot have been 
anything else but a well-planned and well-organised mob offensive against every 
single Tamil village within walking distance of the Sinhala settlements in Kottiyar 
Pattu, and when that was done, the armed forces took on a cluster of accessible 
villages that had no Sinhala villages nearby. 
While this was going on, the Tamil villages of Thiriyai (400 houses) and Kallampattai 
(300 houses) in the north of Trincomalee District were attacked and destroyed by 
armed forces on June 5th. Things then calmed down somewhat, as the government 
declared a three-month ceasefire on June 18th, 1985. Two rounds of peace-talks 
followed in Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan, but did not lead to much. Even before the 
ceasefire expired, violence escalated again. On August 10th and 14th, sixteen Tamil 
civilians were killed in the north of Trincomalee District in two incidents. On August 
17th, a rumoured (and probably wildly exaggerated) massacre of Tamils in 
Sambalthivu, just north of Trincomalee town, was taken by the militant groups as a 
cue to walk out of the peace talks. The day after the incident in Sambalthivu, Tamil 
militants killed 6 Sinhalese in the village of Namalwatte. This caused a large part of 
the Sinhala population of Morawewa and Gomarankadawela DS Divisions, north of 
Trincomalee, to flee (Hoole 2001: 335-336). 
Again a month later, from September 4th to 9th, soldiers, home guards and Sinhala 
hoodlums attacked and destroyed the Tamil neighbourhoods in and directly north 
from Trincomalee Town: 
 
“The last of the large-scale attacks intended to cause destruction was a marathon 
which went on uninterrupted from 4th to 9th September along the northern 
coastal suburb of Trincomalee. It covered the town’s main shopping area in 
Central Road and Main Street, through Ehambaram Road, Veeranagar, 
Thirukadaloor, Manthottam, Uppuveli Navalar Road, up to the 3rd Mile Post, 
Uppuveli Junction. It was an operation involving Sinhalese home guards ably 
assisted by the national armed forces from land, sea and air. All premises, 
private and commercial, were looted before being committed to the flames. 
It was a grand carnival of light, sound and screams. The Air Force fired from 
airborne helicopters, the Navy’s gunboats shelled from the sea and the Army, 
armed to the teeth, took up positions to the north of the isthmus so that the good 
work could go on without being spoilt by intruders. The main business was 
done by Sinhalese home guards brought from outside Trincomalee and service 
personnel in plain clothes.” (Hoole 2001: 336) 
 
An acquaintance from the area told me that the northward spread of the destruction 
was stopped when a group of Tamil fishermen decided to fight back. A mob of 
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Sinhalese who landed on the Uppuveli beach in a number of boats had not expected 
a counterattack, as so far everyone had simply fled for them. Being drunk, they were 
no match for the defenders, and after a while they fled back to where they had come 
from.  
After five days, the carnage ended for rather cynical, but very practical reasons: 
“[f]urther destruction on such a scale was brought to an end because there was little 
else to destroy in the Trincomalee District.” (ibid.) 
The carnage in Trincomalee District was one of the most destructive periods of the 
entire conflict, and – in terms of houses destroyed per day – the attacks on the Tamil 
villages in Kottiyar Pattu on June 3,4 and 13 must have been among the most 
destructive single days in the conflict139. It is therefore puzzling that – with the 
notable exception of Hoole’s book – the incidents in Kottiyar Pattu have barely 
received any attention in the literature on the Sri Lankan conflict. Even in the book 
“Tigers of Lanka” by M.R. Narayan Swamy, one of the more detailed descriptions of 
the Sri Lankan conflict, the incident is described in only one sentence: “[a]rmed 
Sinhalese went on a rampage in a number of Tamil villages in Trincomalee on June 
4, leaving at least 30 people dead” (Narayan Swamy 2003a: 150). I contend that three 
factors contributed to the incidents receiving so little attention. Firstly, Kottiyar Pattu 
was and remains a backwater that few people of importance in politics, press, and 
academia are really interested in, and that even fewer people of importance are 
familiar with. Secondly, the events may have suffered from their timing because of 
the ceasefire. During the honeymoon period of any ceasefire, it is inconvenient and 
inappropriate to talk about gross human rights violations by either of the signing 
parties. By the time the honeymoon period of the 1985 ceasefire was over, there were 
many other events that were more pressing. Thirdly, there was a clear trend in the 
English newspapers of paying extensive attention to any attack against Sinhalese, 
but virtually – if not entirely – ignoring attacks against Tamils. 
Following the twin attacks on Dehiwatte, about 3,500 Sinhalese were reported to 
have displaced from Kottiyar Pattu (‘More flee their homes in Trinco’, Sun, 8-6-1985). 
That amounts to about 25% of the Sinhala population of the area. 
About 12,000 Tamils from Kottiyar Pattu fled to Batticaloa District (‘Tension in 
B’caloa over flood of refugees from Trinco’, Island,17-11-1985). Within Trincomalee 
District, a further 12,000 Tamils were displaced (‘More Tamil refugees in Trinco’, 
Daily News, 28-6-1985). About half of these also originated from Kottiyar Pattu. With 
a total of about 18,000 displaced Tamils, this means that about 65% of the Tamil 
population of Kottiyar Pattu was displaced. 
Many of the displaced Tamils and about half of the displaced Sinhalese returned 
between three months and three years later. I have not been able to verify how long 
                                                 
 
139 For all this, there is only one – heavily censored – newspaper article in the archive of the 
Nadesan Centre that describes what happened on June 3rd and 4th 1985 in some detail (‘Over 
80 killed, 200 missing, many homeless in Mutur after clashes’, Island, 7-6-1985). 
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the villages really remained empty, as everybody whom I asked about this gave me 
a different answer. What is clear is that the returning Tamil families were unable to 
live in their destroyed houses and that many were afraid to stay away from others. 
They were ‘temporarily’ settled in camps in or near their own villages, where many 
lived until the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1987 provided a 
sense of protection, which enabled people to slowly start rebuilding their villages – 
only see them get burnt down again in 1990. Returning Sinhalese were technically 
able to live in their houses, but from people’s stories I get the impression that, at 
least in the beginning, quite a few people preferred to stay together (and near the 
existing police and army posts) for safety against attacks by Tamil militants.  
 
4.2.3 October 1985: the first Muslim-Tamil violence 
Initially, the violence in Kottiyar Pattu had largely bypassed the Muslim inhabitants. 
Moves to instigate violence between Muslims and Tamils had resulted in a string of 
attacks on Tamil villages by Muslim mobs in Batticaloa and Ampara Districts in 
April 1985. The mobs were led by members of the STF and Muslim thugs who had 
been sent from Colombo by a Muslim cabinet minister. A.L.A. Majeed, former MP 
for Kinniya for the SLFP, worked hard and initially successfully to prevent violence 
to break out in Muthur (Hoole 2001: 328-329). However, in October 1985 things 
started to go wrong. On October 15th, three partly burnt bodies of Muslim coconut 
sellers were found near Mallikaithivu Junction. They were on their way back from 
Neelapola to Muthur. The government claimed that they had been killed by Tamil 
militants, who tried to put the blame on the government. Authorities of the National 
Security ministry stated that “these senseless killings are an attempt made by the 
terrorists to create antagonism among the Muslims towards the security forces”. 
(‘Security for Mutur Muslims’, Daily News, 17-10-1985)140. On October 17th, a 
government press communiqué stated that two Muslims had been abducted and 
killed at Mallikaithivu on the 16th (‘Terrorists abduct & kill 2 Muslims at Malikativu’, 
Island, 18-10-1985). Whether this is the same incident or a different one is not clear. 
Without providing further details, Vije (1986, Annex 3) puts the number of casualties 
at 5 Tamils and 10 Muslims, which seems to indicate that there was more to the story 
than meets the eye. 
In response to the incident(s), Muslims put up protest posters (‘Terrorists kill three 
Muslim vendors’, Island, 16-10-1985). Significantly, the government responded to the 
incident by taking “special measures to ensure the protection of the Muslim 
residents of Muttur [sic]” (‘Security for Mutur Muslims’, Daily News, 17-10-1985). 
                                                 
 
140 This needs to be read critically. The accusation that the militants wanted to create 
antagonism against the government forces may indicate that Muslims genuinely suspected 
the state machinery of killing the victims. Given the cynicism of state propaganda of the day, 
I would consider it quite possible that it was the state that wanted to engineer communal 
problems in order to divide Muslims and Tamils, and put the blame on the militants.  
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On October 27th, the body of a Muslim cowherd was found on a prominent junction 
at the entrance to Muthur town with a notice explaining why he was killed. People 
whom I spoke to in Kottiyar Pattu commonly marked this as the first incident that 
triggered Muslim-Tamil violence. Many of my sources, both Tamils and Muslims, 
went to rather great lengths to explain how bad they thought this was, and they all 
stressed the point that before this happened, the relations had been good – to the 
extent that when Sinhalese burnt the Tamil villages in June 1985, many Tamils were 
sheltered by Muslims.  
The newspapers reported that the man had been killed for refusing to support the 
militant cause (‘Anti-Eelam Muslim a lamp post victim’, Daily News, 30-10-1985; 
‘Tension in Muttur eases’, Sun, 30-10-1985). Local narratives paint a somewhat 
different picture of the victim. Some of my sources claimed that he was a cattle thief 
who was caught by one of the Tamil militant groups (not the LTTE), and that the 
notice explained the misdeeds that the man was alleged to have committed. UTHR(J) 
(1993c, section 4.6) documents that a complaint letter about this man had been sent 
to the Muslim leadership earlier, asking the leadership to conduct an inquiry, and 
that the man was executed after the Muslim leadership refused to do this.  
In response, Muslims burnt “a few” Tamil houses (‘Anti-Eelam Muslim a lamp post 
victim’, Daily News, 30-10-1985), in what was the first time the destruction reached 
Muthur town. This triggered the abduction of 20 Muslims, and a retaliatory 
abduction of 23 Tamils. Muslim and Tamil leaders, the MP for Muthur, and 
representatives of the Security Forces intervened and managed to secure the release 
of all those who were abducted on October 29th. In the morning of the same day, a 
Muslim father and his 14-year old son, one of them a (trainee) mullah, were shot 
dead somewhere in Trincomalee District (‘Terrorists kill mullah and 14-year son’, 
Island, 30-10-1985; ‘Mullah and father shot dead’, Daily News 30-10-1985). The next 
day, “several houses of Muslims” were destroyed by “bomb explosions” (‘Muslim 
homes bombed’, Sun, 31-10-1985). This triggered the flight of two thousand more 
people (‘Exodus from Muttur’, Sun, 1-11-1985). Five days later, the number of 
displaced was reported to have increased by 7,200, both Muslim and Tamil (‘More 
refugees in Muttur’, Island, 6-11-1985). I have been unable to ascertain in detail what 
happened. However, the true extent of destruction must have been much larger than 
reported in the papers. Every single Tamil from Muthur whom I spoke to about the 
1985 violence said that they had lost all they had, as did many Muslims. About half 
of the population of the town became displaced. 
 
4.2.4 Mines along the Allai-Kantale road 
On November 6th, 1985, a police jeep was blown up by a landmine on the Allai-
Kantale road, killing seven policemen. An army jeep that was sent from Vakarai 
with reinforcements was hit by another mine somewhere on the way, killing another 
four soldiers and injuring four more. This was the first reported mine attack along 
the Allai-Kantale road, and there were many to follow. I was first made aware of this 
when my translator and I were having tea in a roadside stall in Somapura, one day 
in February 2006:  
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A policeman was there, and the shop owner and another man working in the 
shop, and they were all very talkative. They said the situation was bad, that the 
road from Kallar to Kantale had had the highest number of landmine blasts in 
Sri Lanka. The man working in the shop said his parents had died in a blast in 
1983, and later someone pointed out the artificial foot of the old man who owned 
the shop [I had already noticed it a bit earlier] – he lost his lower leg due to a 
landmine. They also said that some 165 civilians had died there [I am not sure 
which ethnicity, only Sinhala or also Tamil and Muslim], and that people were 
afraid of the LTTE (Field notes, February 2006). 
 
What I did not realise while having the conversation was that we were actually 
sitting next to a mass grave for 27 victims of one of these attacks (‘Mass burial of 
victims’, Sun, 22-2-1986). For the period from January 1985 to December 1990, I have 
found reports of twelve attacks along the Allai-Kantale road, most involving 
(claymore) mines and most at a place called Siththaru, in the newspaper-clipping 
collection of the Nadesan Centre141. In total, 128 civilians, mostly Sinhalese, and 21 
soldiers and policemen were reported to have died in these attacks, and nearly 100 
civilians and one soldier were reported to have been injured. The casualty toll may 
have been higher if some of the injured succumbed to their injuries after the attacks 
had disappeared from the newspapers.  
In an otherwise somewhat tendentious article142, E.M.S. Ekanayake states that there 
have been “151 LTTE attacks on the Seruwila DS division within the timeframe of 
1986-2000, which resulted in 585 deaths, and 250 reported injuries. Also, 94 Tamil 
civilians have disappeared within the timeframe of 1989-1992 (Police Crime Report 
2000, Serunuwara Police)” (Ekanayake 2004:124)143. It is clear that the mine attacks 
account for a disproportionately large part of the deaths and injuries. 
                                                 
 
141 Except for one, all attacks took place between November 1985 and May 1988. On January 
26th, 1986, six landmines were found and defused, and thus at least one other attack was 
prevented (‘Tiger fuel dump found in Trinco’, Sun, 28-1-1986). A foreign deminer working 
in Kottiyar Pattu told me in 2005 that when the Allai-Kantale road was done up somewhere 
in the 1990s, demining proved too complicated, and the simple solution was to add a thick 
layer of laterite and compact it well – the pressure of the compaction would probably force 
any remaining mines to explode, and if anything remained, the laterite layer is a fairly solid 
protection against further incidents. 
142 The article’s underlying storyline seems to be that Sinhalese in Seruwila DS Division have 
suffered significantly more than Tamils or Muslims. While I do agree that many other 
publications on the Sri Lankan conflict tend to ignore the suffering of Sinhalese in the area (if 
any attention at all is paid to Kottiyar Pattu), I think that such a conclusion is not grounded 
in fact. The active support from the state and its military apparatus created a situation that 
was significantly more favourable for Sinhalese than for Tamils, with the Muslims 
somewhere in between.  
143 This presentation of facts is misleading, as it creastes the impression that a 
disproportionately larger fraction of Sinhalese than of Tamils or Muslims was killed or 
injured. Firstly, the “585 deaths, and 250 reported injuries” are taken over a period of 15 
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4.2.5 November 1985-August 1987: massacres and counter-massacres 
From November 1985 onwards, Trincomalee District saw a string of massacres and 
counter-massacres that continued well into 1987. This needs to be seen in the light of 
a general trend of using massacres as a tool of warfare, particularly between 1984 
and 1990 (Sinhaya 2009; SPUR n.d.; NESOHR 2007; Anon. 2004).  
On November 7th 1985, Tamil militants attacked the Sinhala settlement of 
Namalwatte in Gomarankadawela DS Division and killed at least twelve civilians, 
including ten children. The next day, a three-day operation was launched near 
Sampoor by the army, navy and air force, with the stated objective of finding those 
responsible (‘33 terrorists killed, 80 arrested in army swoop’, Island, 11-11-1985). 
While the jungles around Sampoor had become well-known as militant hideouts by 
this time, it is unlikely that the attackers would have been able to reach Sampoor 
from Gomarankadawela within 24 hours. Quite possibly, there was an additional 
reason for attacking Sampoor: the double landmine attack of November 6th, 
mentioned in section 4.2.4. The loss of fifteen men and two vehicles was the biggest 
loss that the forces had had to take so far in Kottiyar Pattu. 
On November 11th, victory was declared: thirty-three ‘terrorists’ had been killed by 
the time the operation ended on November 10th (ibid.). Others had a different version 
of what happened: those killed were ordinary civilians. Apart from those killed, 
another seventy people disappeared and are presumed to have been killed. Over 100 
houses were reported destroyed. (Vije 1986: Annex 7; Hoole 2001: 340). 
Revenge was swift. On November 10th, a van hit a landmine on the Allai-Kantale 
road killing the Muslim driver and seven Sinhalese passengers, and injuring ten 
more (‘Troops kill 33 terrorists, capture 80’, Daily News, 11-11-1985; ‘Terrorists first 
shot the van driver’, Sun, 13-11-1985). The same day, six Sinhalese civilians were 
killed near the Kantale sugar factory (‘6 killed in ‘Uksirigama’ attack’, Sun, 12-11-
1985; ‘Terrorists attack village: 8 killed’, Island, 12-11-1985). 
Two days later, Trincomalee was declared forbidden terrain for foreigners and 
journalists, in order to prevent “mischievous reporting”, that might “cause a 
backlash in the South” (‘Mischievous reporting can cause unrest – Brigadier’, Daily 
News, 13-11-1985)144.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
years, while the disappearances of “94 Tamil civilians” are taken over a period of four years, 
and on top of that, the year 1985 – in which a significant number of Tamils was killed as 
against a fairly small number of Sinhalese – is excluded. Secondly, the “585 deaths, and 250 
reported injuries” include soldiers, policemen and home guards, while the 94 Tamils who 
disappeared were all civilians. Thirdly, the “585 deaths, and 250 reported injuries” are not 
specified by ethnicity. Fourthly and lastly, the population of the Seruwila DS division in 
2000 was 62% Sinhala, 25% Tamil and 13% Muslim. For a proper comparison of casualty 
rates, the per capita casualty rate for each ethnicity should have been calculated and 
compared. 
144 The cynicism of this statement should be obvious. No attempts were ever made to 
discourage the reporting on massacres of Sinhalese civilians – on the contrary, journalists 
were regularly flown in by helicopter to the sites of the massacres within 24 hours! The only 
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Around the same time, President Jayawardene declared Sampoor, Chenaiyoor, 
Kattaiparichchan, Koonithivu and “other villages” to be “prohibited zones”, which 
meant that nobody would be allowed to live there (‘TULF protests over ‘forcible 
eviction’ of Tamils in Trinco’, Island, 25-11-1985). I am unaware of whether this was 
actually implemented or not. Twenty-one years later, the very same area was 
declared a High Security Zone, in order to protect the Trincomalee naval base (see 
sections 2.2.4 and 4.2.10).  
In the rest of November, three more incidents were reported. On November 13th, 
eight militants were reported to have been killed, and 18 taken prisoner, at Ralkuli 
(‘Terrorist casualties in Trinco encounter’, Daily News, 14-11-1985); on November 
18th, 59 Tamils were arrested in a round-up in and around Muthur, and on 
November 27th, sixteen militants were reported to have been killed at 
Kattaiparichchan and Sampoor, while one soldier was injured (‘Security forces kill 
40 terrorists’, Island, 29-11-1985). I have found no further references to first two 
incidents, but the last incident is again strongly contested: UTHR(J) reported that  
“21 Tamils from Kadatkaraichenai, Koonithivu and Chenaiyoor were killed by the 
army. According to the citizens’ committee 30 fro [sic] Koonithivu and 56 from 
Sambur [sic] were missing” (UTHR(J), 1993c, section 4.6). 
On December 3rd, five soldiers and a civilian were killed when the jeep they travelled 
in hit a mine on the Allai-Kantale road (‘Five soldiers killed in mine blast’, Sun, 4-12-
1985). Three days later, ten ‘terrorist suspects’ who had been detained at the 
Seruwila Army Camp, were claimed to have been shot dead as they tried to escape 
(’10 terrorists shot dead trying to escape’, Island, 7-12-1985; ’10 terrorist suspects 
killed in escape bid’, Sun, 7-12-1985). Given the context, and given that it is fairly 
common in Sri Lanka for arrested suspects to mysteriously die before they end up in 
court145, there is every reason to suspect that these ten people were executed. 
On Christmas Day, “[f]our home guards arrested two Tamil women from a house in 
Muthur, raped and shot them. One woman died and the other escaped with injuries” 
(Vije 1986: 29). 
1986 began with the killing of a home guard at Sumedankarapura on January 2nd. 
While he was patrolling his village with a colleague, the home guard encountered a 
group of people who were looting window panes and doors from houses abandoned 
by their Sinhala occupants. The looters claimed to be Muslims and lured the home 
guards into the jungle, where one was shot dead. The other lived to tell the tale 
(‘Home Guard killed’, Island, 8-1-1986; ‘Vigilante describes how fellow officer was 
shot’, Sun, 10-1-1986). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
“mischievous reporting” that was prevented was the reporting of massacres of Tamil 
civilians, and that was very unlikely to cause a “backlash in the South”. 
145 Somewhere in 2007 or 2008, I read an article in a Sri Lankan newspaper that described 
how a murder suspect had ‘accidentally’ fallen out of a small boat and drowned when the 
police took him to a lake to look for the murder weapon which he said he had thrown into 
the water. The bizarreness of the search for the weapon was in its timing: it was conducted 
after dark! 
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On January 17th, three soldiers were killed by a landmine in Dehiwatte, and several 
were injured (‘3 soldiers killed in landmine blast’, Island, 18-1-1986). 
The end of the month saw another three-day operation near Kattaiparichchan. 
Thirty-six militants were claimed to have been killed (‘Forces take terrorist base in 
land-sea-air assault’, Daily News, 3-2-1986). Almost three weeks later, on February 
19th, a landmine exploded on the Allai-Kantale road near Siththaru, and hit a lorry 
that was travelling in a convoy of four vehicles. After the blast, gunfire was heard. 36 
Sinhalese civilians and four soldiers lost their lives, and about 35 civilians were 
injured (’39 killed in mine explosion’, ‘Seruvawila tragedy’, and ‘’To hell and back’: 
Survivors tell their tale’, Sun, 20-2-1986; ‘The Dehiwatte carnage, Daily News, 21-2-
1986). 
The next two months seem to have been fairly calm. On March 23rd, a Muslim 
homeguard was abducted with his gun (‘Navy destroy boat with terrorists’, Island, 
31-3-1986), and on April 14th, five Muslim civilians were killed as they got caught in 
a cross-fire (‘Good work by army in Trinco’, Daily News, 15-4-1986). Probably as a 
measure to prevent outside infiltration, the Muthur and Kuchchaveli Divisions were 
closed off to outsiders. To get in, a pass would be needed from the divisional 
administration (‘Out of bounds to visitors’, Daily News, 7-4-1986). For the people in 
Muthur DS Division, this caused great suffering. One day, when I was interviewing 
a man from Kottiyar Pattu, 
 
I explained that I was trying to piece together what happened but I had noticed 
that many people are too affected by what happened to be able to talk, and I had 
heard that he might be able to give me an outline. The man said that he did not 
want to talk. People had moved on and he did not want to disturb them (he gave 
the example of people from one area going and raping a girl in another area, and 
subsequently a lot of boys from this area marrying girls from her area and 
moving abroad and having good lives).  
Then he told about how the armed forces officers had called all GSs in the area, 
and told them that the Tamils in Muthur would be issued with a new ID card, 
without which they would not have a right to be in their villages. As the first 
group came to register for the ID cards (and have their pictures taken with a 
Polaroid camera), about 100 people were arrested, after having been identified 
by people with hoods over their faces as being LTTE, PLOTE, TELO, etcetera. 
They all disappeared. Subsequently people did not dare to go and register, but 
the lack of ID cards caused great fear because of the risk of getting arrested. 
“Fighting is one thing, but this…” (Fieldnotes, March 2006). 
 
Chaos broke out in the district on April 20th, when the Kantale tank bund collapsed. 
The floodwaters killed 125 people, destroyed hundreds of houses and 3,000 acres of 
paddy land, and also cut Trincomalee’s road and railway connections with Colombo 
(‘Fresh theory on Kantalai disaster’, Weekend, 27-4-1986). Although a bomb attack by 
Tamil militants was initially suspected to have been the cause of the disaster, an 
investigation by a team of engineers concluded that the masonry in one of the sluices 
had given way due to poor maintenance, thus causing the collapse of the dam. 
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The end of April saw two military attacks. On April 24th or 25th, an LTTE camp in the 
jungle near Verugal was raided. Twelve cadres were reported killed, and several 
injured (’12 terrorists killed in jungle shootout’, Island, 26-4-1986). On April 29th, a 
mine hit a bus at Kattaiparichchan, killing two policemen and a soldier, and injuring 
thirteen (‘Three killed, 13 injured in landmine blast’, Daily News, 30-4-1986). 
The first week of May saw an attack by LTTE cadres on a Muslim settlement in the 
Kinniya division in which four died, ten were injured and several dozen houses 
were burnt (‘Four killed, ten injured in terrorist revenge’, Daily News, 7-5-1986). 
Two weeks later, Sri Lanka’s Buddhists celebrated the Vesak full moon day, which is 
among the holiest of days for Buddhists. On this day the birth, enlightenment and 
death of the Buddha are remembered. Tamil militants marked the festival with a 
string of attacks. On May 19th, nine Sinhalese were killed in Morawewa. On Vesak 
day itself, six or seven Sinhalese were killed and eight or nine were injured in two 
attacks at Block C/RB4 and Kallar/Somapura (‘Ten killed in Vesak day terror strike’, 
Weekend, 25-5-1986; ‘Terrorists kill 9 in 3 villages in Trinco’, Island, 25-5-1986). Two 
more Sinhalese were killed in the north of the district. Two days later, 21 Sinhalese 
were killed in another massacre (‘Massacre at Mahadivulwewa: 20 shot dead’, Island, 
26-5-1986). In revenge, seven Tamils were killed in two attacks in Thampalakamam 
(Hoole 2001: 340). On May 27th, two home guards were killed and one was injured at 
Muthur (‘Two home guards killed’, Sun, 28-5-1986). Three days after that, on May 
30th, a military convoy was attacked by a landmine. A bus was hit, killing 25 soldiers, 
and injuring several more; five civilians were also killed (’18 soldiers killed at 
Muttur; 9 dead in Cold Stores blast’, Island, 31-5-1986; ‘Death toll 30’, Sun, 2-6-1986). 
On the same day, nine civilians were killed in a bomb blast in Colombo; on May 31st, 
the train between Batticaloa and Colombo was blown up at Veyangoda, killing 13 
and injuring 50 (‘B’caloa-Trinco train blasted: 13 dead, 50 injured’, Island, 1-6-1986). 
On June 4th, 18 Sinhalese, including a Buddhist monk, were killed and several were 
abducted near Andankulam, just outside Trincomalee town (‘Another terrorist strike 
at Trinco’, Daily News, 6-6-1986). On June 11th, two buses were blown up in 
Trincomalee town, killing around twenty and injuring around seventy (‘Trincomalee 
bleeds after terrorist attacks’, Daily News, 12-6-1986; ‘Carnage in Trincomalee as 
terrorists bomb two buses’, Sun, 12-6-1986; ‘Genocide’, Weekend, 15-6-1986).  
The attacks triggered a new exodus of Sinhalese from Trincomalee District. The 
army was sent in to protect outlying villages (‘Army begins ‘Operation Watchdog’ in 
Trinco’, Sun, 13-6-1986). Over five hundred Tamils were arrested during the days 
that followed, and ten Tamils were murdered in Trincomalee town (‘500 Tamil 
youths detained in Trinco’, Island, 27-6-1986; Hoole 2001: 341). The day after the bus 
bombings, a convoy of “20 Tamil refugees accompanied by 3 government servants 
and 2 village headmen” taking relief materials to displaced people in 
Eechchilampattu was attacked by homeguards from Mahindapura; “21, including 2 
Muslims were killed, 2 were injured and 2 escaped.” (’25 bodies found at Muttur’, 
Island, 14-6-1986; ’19 civilian deaths in Trinco to be probed’, Sun, 17-6-1986; Hoole 
2001: 341; NESOHR 2007: 101; Vije 1986: Annex 3). The government denied the 
report (‘Only 3 bodies found at Muttur’, Island, 15-6-1986). Hoole reports three more 
attacks at Thampalakamam, Kantale and Minneriya, in which 28 Tamils 
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disappeared, as well as an attack on the Kantale market that killed 2 and injured 18 
Sinhalese. 
On June 25th, a pick-up truck of the Seruwila AGA that was travelling to Kantale 
with a load of civilian passengers was hit by a mine at Siththaru. Sixteen people 
died, and seven were injured (‘Terrorist peace ‘starter’: 3 attacks, 16 killed’, Daily 
News, 26-6-1986; 16 killed & 55 injured in three blasts’, Sun, 26-6-1986). The next day, 
almost forty Tamils were killed in two incidents at Thampalakamam and 
Sambalthivu, a village North of Trincomalee (Hoole 2001: 341). 
July 5th saw the return of violence to Kottiyar Pattu, when an LTTE hideout at 
Kattaiparichchan was attacked. The next day, a Sinhala family on a bullock cart was 
shot at from the direction of LB3 (Lingapuram) as they were travelling on the 
channel bund road between Dehiwatte and Somapura. Two people were killed, and 
two were injured (‘Woman and infant killed’, Sun, 7-7-1986). 
On July 8th, two fish lorries travelling from Trincomalee to Colombo with 
passengers were attacked 10 kilometers out of town. Sixteen Sinhalese died; there 
was one survivor (‘Terrorists kil 16 civilians’, Sun, 10-7-1986). Two days later, eleven 
Tamils were killed in a nearby Tamil settlement, and five in Trincomalee (‘Survivors 
feigned death or fled’, Daily News, 12-7-1986). 
July 16th saw a gruesome massacre with a very cynical cover-up. Both the ‘Sun’ and 
the ‘Island’ of July 18th describe two parallel incidents (’37 terrorists killed’, Sun, 18-
7-1986; ’16 terrorists killed in shoot out with troops’ and ‘… 37 more die at Pathidal 
[sic]’, Island, 18-7-1986). The first incident happened when an army patrol that 
originated from the Kattaiparichchan army camp was reportedly fired at from the 
jungle at Pattitidal. When fire was returned, 37 “terrorists” were killed, and a 
woman and child were accidentally killed in the crossfire. There was no report of any 
army casualties. Both papers add that the government ordered an inquiry into the 
events, after MP Amirthalingam (TULF) made allegations on (unspecified) incidents 
in Pattitidal. The second incident is described differently in the two newspaper 
articles. The ‘Sun’ claims that fifteen people were arrested in a 24-hour roundup at 
Pattitidal, among whom two EROS members. The ‘Island’ reports that the security 
forces, acting on information, surrounded an LTTE hideout “north of Dehiwatte”, 
and attacked it:  
 
“The terrorists had retaliated. In the encounter that followed 16 terrorists were 
killed and several injured. Security forces also believe that some civilians may 
have been victims in the shoot-out. Forces later recovered a large quantity of 
hand grenades with the LTTE insignia on them and other weapons. The forces 
suffered no casualties, according to these sources”146.  
 
                                                 
 
146 The claim that the hand grenades that were supposedly recovered had “the LTTE insignia 
on them” seems intended to graphically stress the ‘truth’ of the story, but it is almost silly. 
Hand grenades are merely expendable ammunition that nobody would bother painting 
logos on; even re-usable weapons like guns are rarely marked with insignia. 
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Nothing could be further from the truth. What happened was an unprovoked attack 
on a refugee camp, and all those killed were civilians. During the night, armed forces 
and home guards surrounded the Peruveli Government Mixed School (which had 
been turned into an IDP camp after the destruction of the surrounding Tamil 
villages). At dawn, they moved into the camp, opened fire, and burnt down part of 
the camp (interview with a survivor, Mallikaithivu, December 2004; see also 
UTHR(J) 1993c, section 4.6 and NESOHR 2007: 107-109). According to an eyewitness 
account presented in the NESOHR document, civilians who had gone to 
Mallikaithivu to work were killed there, and their bodies were thrown into wells. A 
number of women were raped. Different sources report different numbers of people 
killed: according to NESOHR (2007: 108), “48 people were shot dead and more than 
20 were injured”. UTHR(J) (1993c, section 4.6) reports that 67 were massacred, but 
that the bodies of only 32 victims were recovered – 15 of them women and children.  
The next day, ten people (seven Sinhalese, two Muslims and one Tamil) were 
massacred by Tamil militants near the Kantale sugar factory (‘Terrorists kill 10 
colonists in swoop at Kantale’, Daily News, 19-7-1986; ‘Terrorists kill ten Kantalai 
Sugar Corp. employees’, Island, 19-7-1986; Hoole 2001: 343). The morning after that, a 
round-up was staged at Manalchenai, not far from the site of the Peruveli school 
massacre, and 44 people were arrested, taken and killed. They were from 
Menkamam, Kankuveli and Mallikaithivu (Hoole 2001: 343, NESOHR 2007: 111). 
On the same day, 21 Sinhalese were massacred at Medirigiriya, South of Kantale, 
followed by the blowing up of a bus in Vavuniya on July 22nd (‘Death toll rises to 18’, 
Sun, 22-7-1986; ‘Mine rips CTB bus: 29 killed’, Daily News, 23-7-1986).  
Hoole places the string of incidents and massacres in May, June and July 1986 in a 
very specific context. On May 7th, the LTTE turned its guns on TELO, and in the 
process “massacred a large number of the TELO cadre” (Hoole 2001: 341). Because 
many of the killed TELO members originated from Trincomalee District, the LTTE 
had a major reputation problem there. This was resolved by drawing attention away 
through the creation of another problem. The LTTE knew that if they attacked 
Sinhala targets, retaliation would be swift to follow, thereby putting the Tamil 
civilians in grave danger. In such a situation, the LTTE could then present itself as 
capable of avenging the injustice done to the Tamils by staging yet more attacks 
against Sinhala civilians, in the process regaining the trust of the Tamil population. 
In the second week of August, severe Tamil-Muslim violence broke out in and 
around Kalmunai, causing over 10,000 people to flee their homes (‘Clashes continue 
in Kalmunai: nine dead’, Sun, 13-8-1986).  The violence continued until at least the 
end of the month (‘Tension mounts in Kalmunai as terrorists abduct six more’, 
Weekend, 31-8-1986; ‘Kalmunai clash: Army takes over’, Island, 1-9-1986). While this 
was going on, a Muslim home guard was shot dead in Muthur on August 20th. No 
backlash seems to have followed (‘Home guard and old farmer shot dead’, Sun, 21-8-
1986).  
After this, the situation seems to have calmed down somewhat. In September, two 
more landmine attacks at Kattaiparichchan were reported that killed three soldiers 
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and injured five (‘Landmine injures 4 soldiers’, Island, 1-9-1986; ‘3 patrolmen killed 
by landmine’, Daily News, 29-9-1986). UTHR(J) (1993c, chapter 7) reports two 
incidents in which four Tamil civilians were killed in retaliation for an (unspecified) 
incident involving Sinhalese on September 26th.  
The next incident of significance took place on November 5th, when ‘Ganesh’, the 
LTTE’s area leader for Muthur was killed at Periyapalam (‘2 terrorists shot dead’, 
Sun, 6-11-1986).  
From February 14th to 18th, 1987, the security forces carried out another operation in 
Kottiyar Pattu. At the time, newspapers reported that several militant camps had 
been overrun, and at least 12 militants were killed and 10 captured (’12 terrorists 
killed in Muttur’, Sun, 17-2-1987; ‘Terrorist mine factory raided’, Island, 17-2-1987; 
‘Freedom returns as Tigers retreat’, Daily News, 18-2-1987; ‘Tree LTTE camps in 
Muttur destroyed’, Island, 18-2-1987). The Daily News article even claimed that 
militants were now fleeing from Muthur, because it had got too dangerous for them.  
An article in the ‘Island’ of March 29th gives a fairly elaborate description of a 
journalist’s visit to Trincomalee and Muthur. In the article, the author describes a 
search for casualty figures of the army operation. The answers are revealing. An 
army colonel who is the Co-ordinating Officer (CO) for Trincomalee District claimed 
that there were no civilian casualties, but that “24 terrorists were killed”. Civilian 
sources contest these claims:  
 
“[w]e have been given a figure of 23 civilians killed and fifty six missing. In 
Mutur [sic] we are given a death toll of 48. Earlier a representative of the 
Trincomalee Citizen’s Committee has said 56 people died. The CO seizes on this 
and points out that an army on the move cannot really stop to make an accurate 
count of bodies. Death tolls are estimated when the operation is over, and 
incidents are reported to the police.” (‘Fear grips Muttur-Trinco border’, Island, 
29-3-1987) 
 
As had by now become an almost standard pattern, the militants retaliated by 
attacking a lorry on the Allai-Kantale road at Siththaru, killing its three occupants 
(‘Landmine kills driver, two others’, Island, 24-2-1987). 
The middle of April is Sinhala/Tamil New Year. This holiday is celebrated with fun 
and games, and many people return to their home areas. In Muthur, three Muslims 
taking part in a cycling race were shot dead, allegedly by Tamil militants (‘3 
Muslims shot by terrrorists’, Sun, 13-4-1987). A few days later (which happened to be 
Good Friday), three buses carrying people on their way back to Trincomalee after the 
holidays were waylaid near Habarana, and most passengers (including 31 security 
forces personnel in civils) were massacred by LTTE cadres. About 130 people were 
killed and several dozen injured (‘Black Friday massacre’, Island, 18-4-1987; 
‘Terrorists slaughter 122 bus travellers in East’, Sun, 18-4-1987; ‘Survivors talk of 
massacre’, Weekend, 19-4-1987). 
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In response, the army launched a “‘once-and-for-all’ mopping up of the LTTE’s 
suicide squads based in the Eastern Province” (‘Trinco troops poised for decisive 
blow to LTTE’, Daily News, 20-4-1987)147. One of the focus areas of this operation was 
Kottiyar Pattu.  
Two days after the massacre at Habarana, another 15 Sinhalese civilians were killed 
in a village near Kantale (’15 civilians killed by Tigers’, Sun, 21-4-1987). Again two 
days later, a massive bomb went off in the Pettah bus stand in Colombo, killing over 
100 people and injuring around 300 (‘Hospital staff rally round’, Daily News, 22-4-
1987). 
On April 26th, 1987, a vehicle carrying troops was hit by a landmine near Thoppur, 
killing six soldiers, a policeman and a civilian (‘Eight killed as vehicle hits landmine’, 
Island, 27-4-1987). On the same day, a clash took place between the LTTE and 
government armed forces near the Tamil village of Pattitidal. In the clash, a Muslim 
home guard and two others (possibly soldiers) died. In retaliation for the attack, 
armed forces descended upon Pattitidal. Almost the entire population fled, except 
for three Christian households who were having a prayer meeting as it was a 
Sunday. They were shot and cut to death, after which the house they were in was set 
on fire (NESOHR 2007:117-119, UTHR(J) ) 1993c, section 4.6). 
In the months that followed, the attention shifted away from Trincomalee to 
particularly Jaffna; very few incidents are documented in the newspaper cuttings 
that are kept at the Nadesan Centre. 
 
4.2.6 August 1987 – April 1990: the Indian Peace Keeping Force 
In the middle of 1987, the Indian government intervened in the Sri Lankan conflict. 
At that time, the Sri Lankan army had nearly taken control of Jaffna, at heavy cost to 
the civilian population. India compelled Sri Lanka to sign an agreement that would 
see a cessation of hostilities, devolution of power, and the deployment of the IPKF to 
the North and East of Sri Lanka to enforce the cessation of hostilities, maintain law 
and order, and to facilitate elections for the newly-formed North-Eastern Provincial 
Council. The presence of the IPKF changed the local power balance because the Sri 
Lankan armed forces had to stay in their barracks, and the home guards had to hand 
in their guns. This enabled Tamil militant groups to regroup and recuperate. 
Incidents against Tamils significantly reduced, but the number of attacks by the 
LTTE against Sinhalese increased dramatically. Another change that happened was 
that the LTTE, which hardly had any presence in Kottiyar Pattu before 1987, was 
able to establish itself and – within a short period – become the dominant militant 
                                                 
 
147 Note that this was written 2 ½ months before the LTTE carried out its first suicide bombing 
on July 5th, 1987. The reference to suicide squads is to the practice of wearing cyanide 
capsules to prevent capture, rather than to the suicide attacks that the LTTE became 
notorious for in subsequent years. 
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group in the area. Even then, it is important to realise that the total number of Tamil 
militants in Kottiyar Pattu was probably not more than a few dozen until the middle 
of 1990. 
The honeymoon did not last very long. In early October 1987 the LTTE took up arms 
against the IPKF, which soon got mired in a losing battle that was largely fought in 
Jaffna and the jungles of Batticaloa (Gunaratna 1994; Dixit 2003; Singh 2001; Singh 
2006). Trincomalee District saw a string of attacks against Sinhalese in the first ten 
days of the month, in which about 260 were killed. The primary targets were the 
Sinhala settlements that had been set up to form a ring around the old town, from 
Sirimapura via Mihindupura to China Bay. The outlying agricultural colonies were 
less affected, but a large part of the farmers had already fled in 1985 and 1986. The 
difference with the 1986 massacres was that this time, the Tamil militants sought to 
physically destroy Sinhala property on a much larger scale than earlier (Hoole 2001: 
226-8; ‘LTTE rampage in Trinco continues’, Sunday Times, 4-10-1987; ‘Trinco burns 24 
hours after truce with Tamil terrorists’, Weekend, 4-10-1987; ‘The port of trouble’, Sun, 
6-10-1987; ‘The blow up in Trincomalee’, Weekend, 11-10-1987). While this was going 
on, two LTTE vessels ferrying arms to Trincomalee were apprehended. In order to 
avoid being transferred to Colombo, a number of the captured LTTE cadres, 
including some leaders, committed suicide (‘Captured 17 tigers take cyanide en 
masse’, Sun, 6-10-1987). In response the LTTE started fighting the IPKF with 
devastating consequences, particularly in Jaffna (Hoole et al. 1992). 
On October 15th, the LTTE shot dead 14 Sinhalese travelling on two lorries on the 
Allai-Kantale road (SPUR n.d.). 
As the attacks against Sinhala settlements eased after October 9th, Muthur town was 
struck by violence. According to the newspapers, Tamil rebels had attacked and set 
fire to the camps of the Sri Lankan army and the IPKF, the police station, the DS 
office, the education office and a petrol shed, after which they set fire to about 50 
houses and shops of Muslims. In response to this, Muslims reportedly burnt down a 
number of Tamil houses (‘Tigers attack Muttur as IPKF advance on Jaffna’, Daily 
News, 14-10-1987; ‘Tiger rampage in Muttur’, Sun, 14-10-1987; ‘‘Tigers’ burn Mutur 
army camps’, Island, 14-10-1987). Some people I spoke to in Muthur claimed that the 
violence was instigated by the IPKF. The first batch of IPKF soldiers in Muthur 
apparently came from Tamil Nadu, and connived with the EPRLF to arrest Muslims, 
who were accused of belonging to the ‘jihad’ group (see section 7.3.5). Muslims had 
been upset about this, and attacked the EPRLF office. In response, the EPRLF had 
attacked Muslim houses while the IPKF stayed in their barracks (interview, Muthur, 
March 2008). UTHR(J) gives a third version, documented from local testimony in 
1993:  
 
“By the time the IPKF arrived in August `87, relations between the LTTE and the 
Muslims had soured. In early September 1987, Habib Mohamed, AGA/Muthur 
was shot dead. Muslim civilians stoned the local LTTE office. On 12th October 
1987, a Muslim police constable was murdered. The police and homeguards 
started shooting Tamils. The LTTE then retaliated against Muslims. Mr. A.L.A. 
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Majid [sic], SLFP, MP for Kinniya, was then very active trying to bring about a 
settlement. The LTTE invited him to Vavuniya for talks. During the IPKF 
presence the Muslims generally had it rough. Majid [sic] was assasinated [sic] 
just after the commencement of war between the IPKF  and the LTTE on 10th 
October 1987. Those who attribute the murder to the LTTE cite his closeness to 
the IPKF. Others who are sceptical [sic] about the LTTE wanting to murder him 
suspect the Cassim group within the Sri Lankan army. This group had been 
credited with a mission to bring about a breach between Tamils and Muslims - a 
mission later taken over by the LTTE” (UTHR(J) 1993c, section 4.6). 
 
In the Muslim-Tamil violence of 1985 and 1987, quite a few people must have been 
killed. In his photobook “Paradise in Tears”, Victor Ivan has included a photograph 
of a Muslim protest placard with the text “over 200 killed in Muthur so far” (2008: 
179). This photograph was taken in late December 1987 or early January 1988. 
While the IPKF and the LTTE fought their battles, the Sri Lankan government had its 
hands full with a JVP-led insurgency that had erupted in response to among others 
the Indian intervention. This insurgency and its brutal suppression caused the 
deaths of an estimated 60,000 people between 1987 and 1990, the vast majority 
gruesomely killed by forces linked to the state (Gunaratna 2001, Alles 1990, 
Chandraprema 1991). On October 4th, 1987, JVP activists overran the army camp at 
Kallar, and ran away with seven guns, some ammunition, and some spare parts 
(‘IPKF acts to restore peace in Trincomalee’, Sun, 6-10-1987). Ostensibly, this was 
done to defend the Sinhala villages in the areas against the Tamil rebels and against 
the IPKF. Since the army was confined to its barracks under the peace agreement 
and the guns of the home guards had been confiscated, the colonists were in no 
position to defend themselves, and the state could not protect them either. However, 
the JVP never attacked either the IPKF or the LTTE. Chandraprema claims that the 
JVP used the plight of the fleeing settlers to boost its propaganda against the peace 
agreement and against the government, and even went to the extent of staging 
attacks on colonies to chase more settlers away (1991: 179-184). 
 In my conversations with people in Kottiyar Pattu, the IPKF was rarely mentioned. 
If the IPKF was mentioned at all, then generally by Tamils making the point that the 
arrival of the IPKF brought a period of peace and quiet for the Tamils (with 
exception of the abovementioned violence in Muthur town), who were able to 
resettle in their villages and rebuild their houses. In his “The story of a banyan tree”, 
Rasaratnam describes the comparative calm: 
 
“There was a lot of fun at the banyan tree [a tree at a key junction in Muthur 
town] during the time of the Indians. There would always be four persons 
standing ‘sentry’ by the banyan tree. We also come and squat there. The English 
of the Indian is laughable. He would say ‘No, go’ for ‘Don’t go’ and ‘Go’ for ‘Go’. 
When four soldiers stand sentry, forty would shop in the bazaar. They would 
buy small umbrellas, flash lights, coconut oil, tape recorders, cassettes, TVs and 
so on, which are valuable in India. When they take it there, they do not have to 
pay any tax.” (Rasaratnam 1996a, chapter 48) 
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Things were not entirely peaceful though. UTHR(J) reports the killing of ten civilians 
in the village of Pattitidal by the IPKF (1993c, section 4.6), and several people whom I 
spoke to mentioned that a number of Tamil villages were burnt a second time in 
1987.  
 
4.2.7 The carnage of June 1990 
After the JVP insurrection had been crushed, the government and the LTTE agreed 
to a ceasefire in order to make the IPKF redundant. Formal peace talks were held, 
but as soon as the IPKF left tensions began building up again. 
After a few incidents had raised the stakes, the LTTE overran a range of police 
stations in the East on June 10th, capturing and executing about 600 Sinhala and 
Muslim policemen. This in turn triggered a massive counteroffensive by the Sri 
Lankan armed forces. Within a few months, almost a million Sri Lankans 
(overwhelmingly Tamils) had to flee from their homes. In the East, almost every 
other village was razed to the ground, and thousands of people died or disappeared 
(Sessional Paper no. VII 1997; UTHR 1990a; UTHR 1990b; Lawrence 1997) 
V.A. Rasaratnam has succinctly described the start of the war in his stories 
“Boldness” and “The story of a banyan tree” (with a Muslim as the narrator in both 
stories): 
 
“[After the IPKF left, the LTTE] were wandering in Muthur. They built a sentry 
near the army camp. Suddenly one night you hear gun shots from both sides. 
The navy fired shells from gun boats in the sea to chase the ‘boys’. Many people 
were injured in Akkaraichenai and Vedankandu by the navy shells. Six Muslims 
died. All of us were on the beach. We ran into the village fearing the shells. Nine 
people died by the bombs from an aeroplane on Periyapalam mosque148. […] 
Later the army got the upper hand. We returned to our houses as usual.” 
(Rasaratnam 1999, chapter 15) 
 
“The helicopters are roaring above the head. Shots are flying from the sky. Shells 
are coming from the [army] camp. The sound of cannons from gunboats can be 
heard in the sea. We are afraid as to what is happening. 
The ‘boys’ who were standing sentry on the road for three weeks have backed 
out. It is said that the army that has come by the sea has joined those in the army 
camp here. When it was dark there was no noise to be heard. It was quiet! 
                                                 
 
148 With a near characteristic display of excessive force, the bombing raid was intended to kill 
a single LTTE cadre who had been spotted nearby (UTHR(J) 1993c, section 4.6). In 2006, a 
similar incident happened when heavy artillery shells were fired to kill individual LTTE 
cadres, but landed in the Arabic College compound, holding 30,000 Muslim refugees, 
instead, killing and maiming many Muslims.  
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When it dawned the army had captured the village. I see them going about in all 
the streets. Army fellows have started ‘clearing’ the village. Clearing means 
cleaning.  
We write ‘Muslim house’ hurriedly in Sinhala on the wall and door frame of our 
house. The army fellows break open all the Tamil houses and take all things in 
unoccupied ones. They even remove the doors and windows. They take the 
television, radio and [cassette] deck. They pile up the rest [of the things] and set 
fire to them. The fire is ‘clearing’ everything149.  
I am squatting under the banyan tree on the day the war starts. Teacher 
Veithanayagam goes this way carrying some of his books and his grandson. All 
the Tamil people are running away from the village carrying suitcases, bags and 
baggage. Even the tiny tots are running. It is pathetic to see them.” (Rasaratnam 
1996a, chapter 48) 
 
An ex-LTTE cadre who was in Muthur in 1990 told me that in the weeks before the 
war they had, by smart manoeuvring, managed to give the army in the 
Kattaiparichchan army camp and the police in the police station the impression that 
                                                 
 
149 UTHR(J) (1993c, section 4.6) confirms this: “When the army came into Muthur just after 5th 
July 1990, the Tamil houses were looted by the forces and to put the blame on the Muslims, 
the police ordered Muslims to set fire to Tamil houses”  
Figure 4.1. The banyan tree in Muthur (own photograph) 
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Muthur was besieged by a large group of LTTE cadres – despite being with only 
about ten people. The unfortunate result was a massive counterattack once the war 
did break out. The destruction was still very visible when I visited Muthur in 2000 
and 2001. 
In the subsequent clearing operation, hundreds of Tamil youth were arrested; many 
never returned: “[a]t Kattaiparichchan and Mutur, 230 bodies were seen in a burnt 
state and hundreds of Tamils were missing according to reports” (UTHR(J) 1990b: 
section 2.2). Because the violence was so overwhelming, little has been documented 
in detail. From what has been documented in newspapers and in the reports of 
UTHR(J) (1990a, 1990b and 1993c), and from what people in Kottiyar Pattu have told 
me, I estimate that at least about 400 people were killed between June and September 
1990, almost without exception Tamils. 
 
4.2.8 September 1990 – February 2002: towards a stalemate 
In the last months of 1990, the heat of the fighting reduced somewhat, and most of 
those who were displaced in Kottiyar Pattu returned home. The duration of 
displacement was measured in months, unlike in 1985. According to quite a few 
people whom I interviewed in the area, one factor that contributed to this was that in 
1985, the conflict was perceived as being between Sinhalese and Tamils in general, 
whereas in 1990, the conflict was primarily perceived as being between the Sri 
Lankan armed forces and the LTTE. While the risk of death or disappearance had 
not reduced, the conflict had become less primordial and more military in 
representation. A changing discourse on the conflict from the side of the government 
contributed to this. 
Another change that happened was a significant militarisation of the landscape. 
After the landmine attack on the Allai-Kantale road in November 1985, 
reinforcements consisting of a single jeep with a handful of soldiers had to be called 
all the way from Vakarai (see section 4.2.4). By early 1991 “over 125 SLA [Sri Lankan 
Army] detachments, mini camps and camps” had been established in Trincomalee 
District, most of them after the war broke out in June 1990 (‘Trincomalee – ‘the 
ruined city’’, Sunday Island, 3-11-1991). Though the withdrawal of troops during the 
Vanni offensive in the late 1990s led to several camps being closed, some new camps 
were opened in government-controlled areas during 2000 and 2001, and again from 
2005 onwards. 
Incidents continued to happen regularly, but were rarely reported on: violence had 
become so common that it had lost newsworthiness. Every so often, there were still 
bigger incidents. In March 1991, an ambush with a claymore killed eleven soldiers 
(‘Fifteen soldiers killed in Trinco’, Island, 11-3-1991; ‘Deaths of 11 soldiers: Tigers first 
detonated Claymore mine – Lance Corporal’, Island, 14-3-1991). A month later, LTTE 
cadres forced several dozen Sinhala and Muslim fishermen to the shore near Foul 
Point and opened fire. At least 11 were killed (‘Massacre of fishermen by Tigers at 
Trinco’, Daily News, 4-4-1991; ‘Tigers attack fishing craft killing 11 fishermen’, Island, 
4-4-1991). In response, a search operation under the name ‘operation Smash’ led to 
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the capture of 10 suspected LTTE cadres in Sampoor (‘Koddiyar Bay killers captured 
by troops’, Daily News, 19-4-1991; ‘Major LTTE base in Trinco captured’, Island, 19-4-
1991). On September 10th 1992, the ferry at Kilivetti was blown up by the LTTE, 
killing 22 soldiers and 7 civilians, and injuring a soldier and two civilians (SPUR 
n.d.). 
In 1994, the UNP lost its hold on power, and Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge 
became prime minister and (in 1995) president on a programme that was strongly 
pro-peace. A ceasefire was declared, and four rounds of peace-talks followed. 
Despite the high hopes, mistrust between the government and the LTTE kept 
building up, and on April 19th, 1995, the LTTE started fighting again. To mark the 
renewal of hostilities, LTTE frogmen destroyed two ships in the Trincomalee 
harbour (Narayan Swamy 2003b: 251-255; ‘LTTE blasts two navy gunboats’, 
Observer, 19-4-1995; ‘Tigers break truce, sink two boats’, Island, 20-4-1995). 
A month later, Muslim-Tamil violence broke out in Muthur. After a Muslim soldier 
attached to the intelligence unit of the army at Muthur was shot dead by the LTTE, 
24 Tamils who had gone to collect firewood in the jungle were abducted in revenge 
by Muslim hoodlums; three Tamils were killed. After this, the people of 
Kattaiparichchan displaced. The tensions were sufficient to warrant a visit by a 
Member of Parliament (‘Tension in Kattaiparichchan’, Veerakesari, 24-5-1995; 
UTHR(J) 1996 (introduction); ‘Majeed pours oil on troubled waters’, Daily News, 30-
5-1995). In the same week, the LTTE massacred 42 Sinhalese in the village of 
Kallarawa, in the north of Trincomalee District150. The army detachment at 
Kallarawa, which had lost a third of its men in an ambush only two weeks earlier, 
fled into the jungle when the attack started (‘Tigers massacre 42 at Kallarawa’, Island, 
27-5-1995; ‘Why did soldiers fail to defend Kallarawa village?’ and ‘Did Soldiers 
Desert Kallarawa Village?’, Sunday Island, 28-5-1995). 
February 11th 1996 saw a massacre at Kumarapuram, next to Kilivetti. In response to 
the death of two soldiers earlier on the day, troops from nearby army camps went on 
the rampage and killed 24 (Indian) Tamil civilians from the village. The responsible 
officer was merely transferred to another army camp in Kottiyar Pattu, after an 
investigation by a group of officers that included this man’s immediate superior 
(UTHR(J) 1996; Shanmugathasan 2003; ‘Army, police probe attack in Muttur’, Daily 
News, 13-2-1996; ‘Govt probes civilian death toll in Mutur’, Daily News, 14-2-1996; 
‘The Kiliveddi massacre’, Sunday Island, 18-2-1996; ‘Army’s Mr. Clean image 
tarnished?’, Sunday Leader, 18-2-1996). Ten years later, people in the area were 
threatened with a repeat of the Kumarapuram massacre if any soldiers would get 
attacked (see section 7.6.2). 
After the LTTE started fighting again in 1995, Kumaratunge’s government embarked 
on what it called a ‘war for peace’, which saw the successful recapture of the Jaffna 
peninsula in 1995, followed by a hugely expensive and ultimately unsuccessful bid 
                                                 
 
150 This was the first massacre after a series of massacres on Muslim villages and revenge 
massacres on Tamil villages in Polonnaruwa District in 1992 caused international outrage. 
After the Kallarawa massacre, massacres have been rare. 
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to recapture the Vanni between 1997 and 1999. The army was so short of manpower 
that troops were taken from the East and sent to the northern theatre of war. Army 
camps in the villages of Pallikudiyiruppu, Selvanagar, Eechchilampattu, Verugal 
and Anaithivu in Kottiyar Pattu, and Kathiraveli, Vakarai and Mankerni in the 
northern part of Batticaloa District were abandoned in mid-1996. By autumn 1997, 
camps in the villages of Mallikaithivu, Palathoppur, Pachchanoor, Mahindapura, 
and Selvanagar (this camp had apparently been re-established) in Kottiyar Pattu and 
Panselgodella, 64th Colony and Siththaru along the road to Kantale were vacated. In 
some cases these camps were handed over to small detachments of policemen; in 
other cases, the camps were abandoned entirely. This effectively handed over much 
of the territory between Muthur and Valaichchenai to the LTTE (‘Demo in Seruwila’, 
Island, 4-7-1996; ‘Nine schools closed in Seruwila’, Island, 6-7-1996; ‘Seruwila woes 
remain unsolved – Thera’, Island, 12-7-1996; ‘Clockwork scenarios and the reality’, 
Sunday Times, 19-10-1997). Rather remarkably, this significant shift in the power 
balance in the area did not cause an increase in violence. The LTTE itself was too 
busy with the battles in the Vanni. Apart from this, I contend that the LTTE had 
good reason for not staging big attacks in Kottiyar Pattu. Any serious attacks would 
lead to an increase of military presence in the area, which would make its use as a 
transit zone between Batticaloa and the Vanni difficult151. There was one exception: 
in October 2000, M.L. Ubaithulla, a candidate for the ruling party was killed in a 
suicide blast as he was leaving an election rally; at least 20 people died and 45 were 
injured (‘Dozens killed in blasts’, TamilNet, 2-10-2000; ‘Sri Lanka: suicide bomber 
kills 24’, New York Times, 4-10-2000). There was more than just politics behind this 
assassination: Ubaithulla had been head of the police intelligence unit in 
Trincomalee. In that capacity, he had earned notoriety in the 1990s, particularly for 
arresting men so that he could bribe their pretty wives or sisters to have sex with 
him; the men invariably never returned, and a number of the women ended up as 
prostitutes (conversation with local human rights activist, Trincomalee, 2005). On the 
same day, two home guards were killed in a firefight with LTTE cadres. Revenge 
was swift: the next day, seven Tamils civilians were massacred as they were working 
in a paddy field between the Tamil village of Poonagar and the Sinhala village of 
Mahindapura (‘Civilians massacre in Trinco’, TamilNet, 4-10-2000; ‘Impartial inquiry 
into civilian massacre – TULF’, TamilNet, 5-10-2000). 
                                                 
 
151 Something similar happened along the Valaichchenai-Polonnaruwa road. This road was 
the main route by which the army supplied its troops in Batticaloa. Crossing this road 
somewhere west of Valaichchenai was an important supply route by which the LTTE 
smuggled goods from Batticaloa to the Vanni. For both parties, it was fairly easy to ambush 
entire convoys. This rarely happened however. During the day, soldiers patrolled the road, 
and by night they mostly stayed put in their camps. During the night, the LTTE moved 
people and goods around. The only incidents of open fighting during the period that I lived 
in Batticaloa occurred around dusk and dawn, in cases where either the army or the LTTE 
was too early or too late and they happened to bump into each other.  
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In the middle of 2000, the LTTE managed to capture the strategic Elephant Pass, and 
almost recaptured the entire Jaffna peninsula. Ultimately, the tables turned and the 
LTTE was beaten back, but the cost on the economy had been so enormous that the 
state was unable to continue the war at this level of intensity. The LTTE’s attack on 
the Katunayake airport near Colombo on July 24th 2001 (‘LTTE’s three times lucky 
terror at Katunayake’, Sunday Times, 29-7-2001) dealt a further crippling blow to the 
economy. On its side, the LTTE ran into trouble after the 9/11 attacks in the United 
States. The ‘war on terror’ became a global phenomenon that the Sri Lankan 
government cunningly latched on to. As a consequence, the LTTE lost international 
legitimacy, and its fundraising operations became increasingly difficult. If only to 
recuperate, both parties had little option but to go for a ceasefire, which was signed 
in February 2002. 
 
4.2.9 February 2002 – November 2005: cease-fire and new violence 
Following the signing of the 2002 ceasefire, violence between the LTTE and the Sri 
Lankan armed forces stopped almost entirely for about three years. However, June 
2002, April 2003, December 2005 and April 2006 saw violence and rioting between 
Muslims and Tamils, with people on both sides regularly accusing the LTTE, 
Muslim politicians and Muslim armed groups (the existence of which is publicly 
disputed by many Muslims, but was confirmed by trusted sources in Muthur) of 
being behind the violence. I elaborate on this Muslim-Tamil violence in chapter 7. 
Peace talks that had been held intermittently after the signing of the ceasefire 
agreement broke down in April 2003. Several months later, President Kumaratunge 
took control over the defence ministry and two other key ministries from the 
government under Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. The reason she gave for 
this was that Wickremesinghe had been too lenient where national security was 
concerned, particularly around Trincomalee. The LTTE had set up a range of new 
camps around the Bay of Trincomalee, which was seen as a serious threat to the 
security of the navy base (Fernando 2008: 215-45).  
In April 2004, the LTTE’s eastern leadership under Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan 
(better known under his nom de guerre “colonel Karuna Amman”) split off from the 
LTTE with about 5,000 of the estimated 20,000 cadres that the LTTE had in total. The 
official reason for the split was the claim that the LTTE was too much dominated by 
Jaffna Tamils, a resentment that had existed for many years already (UTHR(J) 1991, 
section 1.1). The talk on the ground was more mundane: Karuna had allegedly been 
found guilty of embezzling money152, and had been called for an inquiry that could 
not have ended in anything else than his execution. Therefore, to save himself, he 
                                                 
 
152 These claims were also not new. During a visit to some villages in the jungle west of 
Batticaloa about a year before the split, an acquaintance pointed out a big tiled house along a 
main road and told me that was the villa that Karuna had been building for himself. 
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jumped ship. Whatever the real reasons may have been, the result was first a 
successful offensive by the LTTE against cadres loyal to Karuna, and then a long 
drawn-out string of assassinations and counter-assassinations that filled the Tamil 
civilians in the Eastern Province with fear.  
The physical boundary between the area where people mostly supported Karuna 
and the area where people mostly supported Prabhakaran lay at the Verugal River. 
When the LTTE began its counteroffensive, one of the key battles took place in 
Verugal. About 200 Karuna cadres, mostly child soldiers, surrendered and were 
promptly executed.  
After Karuna sent most of his cadres, including about 2000 child soldiers, home 
(only to start a vigorous campaign of forced recruitment again not long after), both 
factions were severely understaffed and focused their struggle in Batticaloa District. 
Until mid-2005, Kottiyar Pattu remained very calm. 
In the second half of 2004, tensions between the government and the LTTE were 
building up to the extent that in November 2004 everybody I spoke to in 
Trincomalee District was convinced that war would break out again by mid-January 
2005. The LTTE was openly warning people to enjoy Christmas and the Tamil 
festival of Thai Pongal (January 14th), but to prepare for war immediately after. The 
tsunami that devastated Sri Lanka’s coastline on December 26th disrupted this 
situation. For about two weeks, everybody was focused on helping the survivors, 
and whatever threats of war had existed were put on hold. I personally witnessed 
how the LTTE actively tried to take control of the emergency response in the East 
from the beginning by sending in hardcore cadres wearing T-shirts with logos of the 
Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO – an NGO that had intimate links with the 
LTTE) to take over IDP camps, and by sending cadres of the Political Wing to 
convince the relevant government administrators that they should work through the 
LTTE. Largely because international aid agencies simply ignored them (for many 
expatriates this was due to sheer ignorance of the situation), this attempt failed 
(Gaasbeek 2005). 
By the middle of 2005, the conflict between the LTTE and the Karuna faction heated 
up again, and cadres of the Karuna faction, which had by that time linked up with 
state intelligence forces, increasingly infiltrated into Kottiyar Pattu to attack the 
LTTE there (conversations, Trincomalee, 2005). In parallel to this, tensions between 
the Tamils and Sinhalese in Trincomalee District increased significantly from May 
2005 onwards, after the highly provocative placing of a Buddha statue in the heart of 
Trincomalee town. A string of demonstrations and attacks followed. In Kottiyar 
Pattu, attacks by the LTTE on home guards and soldiers in the Sinhala villages near 
Serunuwara increased. Most of these attacks did not lead to any tension, but on 
several occasions where victims’ relatives had links to nationalist political parties 
tensions occurred, which were usually brought under control by local negotiation 
mechanisms in a few weeks (Bock, Lawrence and Gaasbeek 2006; see also section 7.5 
for a more detailed description and analysis of these events). 
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4.2.10 November 2005 – May 2009: the end of the war 
A fundamental change took place in November 2005, when Mahinda Rajapakse won 
the presidential elections on a hardline Sinhala-nationalist ticket, with a narrow 
majority of about 181,000 votes (1.9% of the total number of valid votes). What is 
important to realise is that the majority of Sri Lankans was not in favour of 
Rajapakse’s war rhetoric at the time, and that the elections were rigged. The LTTE 
effectively banned about 300,000 Tamils in the North and East from voting after 
allegedly having been bribed by the Rajapakse camp (‘President’s Tiger Deal 
Exposed’, Sunday Leader, 8-7-2007). Also, some 400,000 voters in areas that were 
predominantly in support of Ranil Wickremesinghe, the opposition candidate, had 
been surreptitiously scrapped from voter lists (‘400,000 voters to be stripped again’, 
Sunday Times, 4-12-2005). Had these people been allowed to exercise their vote, then 
Ranil Wickremesinghe would have become president on a much less hawkish ticket.  
From this moment onwards, the Sri Lankan government became increasingly anti-
LTTE, to which the LTTE responded with ever more attacks and provocations. In 
January 2006, five Tamil students were killed execution-style on the boulevard in 
Trincomalee town, in a joint operation of Army, Police, Navy and Special Task Force. 
These murders, committed in front of about three hundred witnesses, had the clear 
intention of terrorising the Tamil civilian population into silence (UTHR(J) 2006a and 
2007a). After a bomb exploded in the Trincomalee market in early April 2006, many 
Tamil shops were burnt in revenge by a mob that was organised suspiciously 
quickly, while police and troops stood by and watched. The total death toll that day 
was about 25. The following week, violence spread to Kottiyar Pattu (see section 7.6). 
Another week later, an LTTE suicide bomber attempted to assassinate the Army 
Commander, Sarath Fonseka. In retaliation, the combined armed forces started a 
massive bombardment of LTTE-controlled areas in Kottiyar Pattu from sea, air and 
land. At the checkpoints on the boundaries of these areas, soldiers prevented 
civilians and NGOs from taking any significant quantities of goods into LTTE-
controlled territories. As a consequence, tsunami rehabilitation projects came to a 
standstill, but worse, people from the area were unable to sell their produce and 
unable to buy food, which caused severe hardship. On July 20th, the LTTE blocked 
the sluice gates in the Verugal anicut, denying irrigation water to the farmers in the 
Allai Extension Scheme and very nearly destroying their crops153. The Sri Lankan 
                                                 
 
153 The official reason given by the LTTE was that a planned water project that was 
scheduled to supply Muthur and Seruwila with drinking water excluded Tamil villages in 
Eechchilampattu that are also chronically short of drinking water in the dry season 
(‘Colombo caused Mavilaru crisis – Elilan’, TamilNet, 26-7-2006). This seems to have been a 
ruse: two weeks before the sluice gates were closed, an SLMM representative who had 
visited the LTTE office in Sampoor (‘SLMM Trinco head meets Elilan in Sampoor’, TamilNet, 
7-7-2006) told a friend of mine that the LTTE were under a lot of pressure from the civilians 
in the area to do something because they were starving. Following this line of argument, the 
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government responded with a massive offensive to capture not only the anicut, but 
the entire LTTE-controlled territory in the Eastern Province. This offensive was pre-
planned, and the blocking of the sluice gates was merely an excuse: at least a month 
before the attempt to kill the Army Commander, the army camp at Kallar was rather 
suddenly, and with no obvious reason, upgraded to brigade status (conversation 
with SLA officer, Trincomalee, April 2006). A slow but massive influx of troops and 
military hardware followed. The LTTE, for its part, had vigorously intensified its 
provision of compulsory military training to civilians. On June 30th, some 6,000 
people from the LTTE-controlled part of Muthur DS Division (a large part of the 
adult population in the area) participated in a ‘graduation’ ceremony after 
completing the training programme (‘Six thousand civilians complete training in 
Muttur east’, TamilNet, 1-7-2006).  
It is interesting to note here that according to a report in the Daily Mirror newspaper, 
local Buddhist priests had already sorted out the issue with the LTTE and an 
agreement had been reached on re-opening the channel at the time that the Sri 
Lankan Army started its operation to capture Mavil Aru (‘Military offensive 
‘disrupted deal with LTTE’’, TamilNet, 1-8-2006). 
While the fighting at Mavil Aru was ongoing, the LTTE overran Muthur town on 
August 2nd. After artillery shells fired by the army had hit several sites where people 
had gathered (killing about two dozen people and injuring many more), the entire 
population of Muthur town fled to Kantale on August 4th, where they were joined by 
the Muslims from Thoppur who had also fled the fighting. The LTTE stopped the 
fleeing population – about 40,000 people – at a row of hills 5 km out of town, and 
forced people to walk over a narrow path, where a hooded person picked out 
suspected Muslim militants. When somebody attacked an LTTE cadre, a gun went 
off. The sound of the gun alerted the army, which started firing heavy artillery and 
multi-barrel rocket launchers in the direction of the hills – putting the thousands of 
civilians who were stuck there at grave risk. The strange thing about this is that the 
fleeing civilians had passed an army camp about two kilometres out of town, and on 
top of the hills there was one army outpost that had not been abandoned, from 
where the sea of civilians was easily visible. Also, the army and the central 
government had been informed by the Muslim leadership that they were going to 
walk towards Kantale. The army knew full well that these civilians (most of whom 
were pro-government and anti-LTTE) were there, and still fired its heaviest weapons 
at them. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
closure of the sluice gates would have been intended as a means to pressurise the 
government to relax the restrictions on taking goods in to Sampoor and Eechchilampattu. 
The government totally ignored this line of reasoning, and the LTTE came up with the rather 
weak argument of the drinking water pipeline. 
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Through sheer luck, most of the shells and rockets hit the rocks, and only about 100 
people were killed or injured. About 30 Muslims who were arrested by the LTTE 
never returned. 
On the same day, Muthur was retaken by the government forces. Seventeen staff of 
the NGO Action Contre la Faim who had stayed behind were lined up and 
summarily executed by forces linked to the state (UTHR(J) 2006c and d, 2007b, 2008 
and 2009a).  
I was in Trincomalee during this week and was closely involved in the humanitarian 
co-ordination meetings. On August 4th, I drove a van towards Muthur to help with 
the evacuation. A few hours after the shelling at Kinanthimunai, I reached a place 
several kilometres before Kinanthimunai where I had to turn around because there 
were simply too many people on the road (figure 4.2). With about 30 passengers on 
board, I joined the row of vehicles that was evacuating people and drove back to 
Kantale. 
Figure 4.2. People fleeing Muthur, 04-08-2006, around 3 p.m. (own photograph)  
NB: Also in the picture is a vehicle of the NGO Action contre la Faim (ACF), part of a convoy that 
made an attempt to rescue their colleagues who were trapped in Muthur but was turned back by the 
army on the outskirts of town. About an hour after this picture was taken, 17 ACF staff members were 
lined up and shot through their heads. 
NB2: The image is wobbly because there was something wrong with the camera, and because I took 
the picture while driving. 
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As the displaced reached Kantale, a big disappointment awaited them. While two 
large sites that could easily accommodate thousands of displaced were available (an 
abandoned sugar factory and a large Sinhala school), the Muslims and Tamils from 
Muthur and surroundings were denied access. Instead, they were herded into 
hugely overcrowded mosques and Muslim and Tamil schools. In September and 
October, the government discontinued the supply of water to the camps, forcing the 
displaced to return to Muthur at a time that many people considered Muthur still 
unsafe. 
After the recapture of Muthur, the offensive continued. A slowly shifting and 
indiscriminate barrage from multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs), heavy artillery, 
and aerial bombardment forced the LTTE and with it the entire population of the 
eastern half of Muthur DS Division and Eechchilampattu DS Division (about 25,000 
civilians) to flee towards Vakarai. A body count was never maintained, but estimates 
by people from the area suggest that at least 180 Tamil civilians from Kottiyar Pattu 
died on their long flight that ended in IDP camps in Batticaloa District in January 
2007 (UTHR(J) 2007c). An indication of the extent of damage that was generated 
during and possibly after the offensive can be gleaned from figures 4.2 and 4.3, 
which depict satellite imagery of the village of Sampoor, taken in June 2006 and 
September 2009 respectively. As can be seen, almost all houses were turned into 
ruins between the taking of the two images, while the school complex (in the middle 
bottom of the images) was turned into a military camp. 
On December 7th 2006, the LTTE fired a few artillery shells at the army’s main 
ammunition dump in Kottiyar Pattu, the Paddy Marketing Board stores in 
Somapura which had been requisitioned for the purpose. The shells missed their 
target, and instead hit a school right next to it, killing a teacher and injuring a teacher 
and nine students. Another shell hit a nearby house, killing a student and three 
adults (‘Bunkers in houses at Serunuwara’, Daily Mirror, 13-12-2006). The 
government, embarrassed by an artillery bombardment that had killed several dozen 
refugees in a school in Kathiraveli not long before, presented this as a case of the 
LTTE deliberately targeting civilians, and about half of the Sinhalese population of 
Seruwila DS Division fled to Kantale. Two days after this incident, army shells hit a 
school full of IDPs in the LTTE-controlled village of Palchenai not far from 
Kathiraveli, killing 15; the next day, 19 were killed in another school (’15 Tamil 
civilians feared killed, 41 wounded in 11 hour artillery barrage’, TamilNet, 9-12-2006; 
’19 more Tamil refugees killed, new SLA offensive south of Vaharai’, TamilNet, 10-
12-2006).
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Figure 4.3. Satellite image of Sampoor, 17-06-2006 (source: Google Earth) 
Figure 4.4. Satellite image of Sampoor, 27-09-2009 (source: Google Earth) 
  Violence in Kottiyar Pattu 
183 
   
 
The displaced Muslims were home in September 2006. Though many wanted to get 
home in time for the Id-Ul-Fitr festival, those who did not yet consider Kottiyar 
Pattu safe as the fighting was still ongoing were forced back because the government 
stopped providing assistance (including the supply of drinking water) to the camps 
where Muslims were staying154. The displaced Sinhalese were sent back to their 
villages as soon as Eechchilampattu was taken in late 2006. Most of the displaced 
Tamils were forced to return to Kottiyar Pattu, sometimes at gunpoint, between 
September 2006 and March 2007, only to find themselves dumped in incomplete 
‘transit camps’ because the villages where they came from had been declared off-
limits (IASC 2007, CPA and IMARD 2007). The population of Ralkuli and 
Eechchilampattu was allowed to return to their villages in early 2007 - only to find 
them plundered by the armed forces (conversations with various people in 
Eechchilampattu, Ilankaithurai, Punniyadi and Ralkuli, 2008). A large area around 
Sampoor was declared a High Security Zone (HSZ), and the residents were barred 
access. Over time, the size of the HSZ has been reduced, and people have been 
allowed to return to their destroyed and plundered villages as new areas were 
opened up. The people who originate from the remaining HSZ are still stuck in the 
camps, without viable alternatives for resettlement155. (ICG 2008 and 2009; CPA 2009; 
                                                 
 
154 In Kantale, where most of the Muslim IDPs found shelter, the local government was 
distinctly hostile to the influx of such a large group of non-Sinhalese. While the Muslim 
schools and the mosques were absolutely overcrowded and woefully short of sanitary 
facilities, the Muslims were not allowed to spread out into large Sinhala school that was 
empty for the school holidays and the massive compound of the defunct sugar factory. In 
meetings, local government officials explicitly stated their displeasure with the presence of 
the Muslim IDPs (own observations and conversations with NGO staff, Kantale and 
Trincomalee, August 2006). 
155 The nature of the HSZ has also changed, and the area is increasingly described as a 
‘Special Economic Zone’ (SEZ) (UDA 2007a, UDA 2007b, UDA 2007c). Now that the war is 
over, the military justification has lost most of its validity. Instead, a large area has been 
appropriated bypassing all procedures, and a power plant is being constructed. The siting of 
the power plant is a study in politics in itself: originally, the plan was to build one power 
plant in the Muslim settlement of Noracholai (near Kalpitiya, in the north-west of Sri Lanka), 
but this ran into severe opposition (because of the pollution it would cause) under 
leadership of the Roman Catholic bishop. As an alternative, it was then proposed to put the 
power plant in China Bay, near Trincomalee. The Sinhala inhabitants of this area opposed 
the idea, and the UNP government of the time decided to put the power plant in 
Hambantota instead. In November 2005, Mahinda Rajapakse won the presidency. 
Hambantota is his home area. Within months of coming to power, work started on the 
Noracholai plant, and as soon as the LTTE was chased out from Sampoor, that area was 
selected for a second plant. Neither site has any Sinhalese living nearby, nor any substantial 
SLFP voter base. 
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UTHR(J) 2007c; ‘Feasibility of Sampur Thermal Power Plant. Ethnic cleansing? No 
thanks, just cleansing for power’, Lakbima, 1-6-2008). 
After the expulsion of the LTTE from Kottiyar Pattu, Muslims and Sinhalese have 
largely lived in peace, and free of fear. A sense of relief was evident when speaking 
to people. This relief was not there among Tamils. After the displaced returned to 
the area, there was a wave of targeted killings of people with suspected LTTE links, 
but also some killings that seemed intended as acts of theatrical violence, meant to 
instil fear among the Tamil population. Between late April and the end of May 2007, 
15 killings and 9 disappearances were documented (UTHR(J) 2007c)156. By the time I 
ended my field research, regular round-ups and arrests took place, and stories of 
women getting harassed and even raped caused fear and apprehension. With the 
final defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, the war seems to have finally ended. It will be 
interesting to see how things develop over the coming years. 
 
4.3 A balance sheet of suffering 
As I mentioned in section 2.2.3, CIRM has compiled an elaborate database with 
information on vulnerability for each village, hamlet and neighbourhood in 
Trincomalee District (CIRM 2004a, b and c). In the context of this chapter, three 
indicators from the CIRM data sheets are of specific interest: the percentage of 
female-headed households, the percentage of households living in a temporary or 
damaged house, and the percentage of households “directly affected by the war” 
(households of which members were killed, maimed or severely mentally affected 
due to the war). When aggregated at GN division level and plotted on a map of 
Kottiyar Pattu (maps 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3), these data make it possible to make a 
geographical analysis of war-affectedness. In order to visualise the correlation 
between the geographical and ethnic spread of war-affectedness, it is useful to 
compare the maps with maps 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.  
 
                                                 
 
156 One particularly nasty killing took place on August 4th, the day the people fled from 
Muthur. Late in the evening, an elderly Tamil man who had decided to stay the school in 
Kilivetti for the night was dragged out by soldiers, and executed at point blank range on the 
road in front of the school. After that, relatives were not allowed to remove the body for 
many hours. A relative who told me of the killing was of the opinion that the man had been 
randomly picked, and was executed merely to instil fear among the Tamil population 
(conversation, Trincomalee, September 2006). 
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Map 4.1. Percentage female-headed households in Kottiyar Pattu by GN division (source: CIRM 
2004a, b and c) 
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Map 4.2. Percentage temporary or damaged houses in Kottiyar Pattu by GN division (source: CIRM 
2004a, b and c) 
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Map 4.3. Percentage war-affected households in Kottiyar Pattu by GN division (source: CIRM 2004a, b 
and c) 
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Indicator 1: Female-headed households 
The percentage of female-headed households is an indicator of conflict-affectedness 
in three ways: women become widows because their husbands are killed157; couples 
get separated more often than normal because the conflict puts a strain on family 
relations; or running away with a mistress becomes easier due to reduced social 
control (particularly in contexts of displacement). Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims 
generally frown upon divorce and running away with a (married) lover, and social 
control keeps this in check to a fair extent. There are three geographic concentrations 
of female-headed households. The first of these is in Tamil-dominated GN divisions 
along the A15 Batticaloa-Trincomalee highway. Attacks on military targets have 
largely been concentrated along the A15, and therefore crossfire, retaliatory attacks 
and round-ups have also concentrated there. In the area between Kilivetti and 
Muthur, another factor contributed to this: the landscape largely consists of paddy 
fields, making it difficult to ‘melt away into the landscape’ in the case of a round-up. 
The second concentration of female-headed households can be found in the Tamil-
inhabited north-eastern tip of Kottiyar Pattu. From the beginning of the violence, this 
has been an area where militants had hideouts in the jungle; this area has seen a 
disproportionate amount of military incursions, in which a lot of civilians have got 
caught up. The third concentration is found in Tamil and Sinhala areas around the 
Ullakkalli lagoon. This was a narrow passage through which militant supply routes 
passed, and therefore the scene of regular ambushes and counter-ambushes.  
 
Indicator 2: Housing conditions 
The percentage of households living in a temporary or damaged house is an 
indicator of conflict affectedness in two ways: directly, because many houses have 
been damaged in the war; and indirectly, because war-related restrictions have 
hampered economic development. Note that these data were collected about 2 ½ 
years after the 2002 ceasefire agreement was signed; this period saw a boost in the 
local economy and in rehabilitation efforts by humanitarian agencies. Many of the 
houses were repaired or upgraded in this period (often only to be damaged again in 
the tsunami or in the fighting of late 2006). Before the ceasefire, the situation was 
considerably worse, particularly in the areas under LTTE control. It is clear from the 
map that on average, housing conditions in Tamil-dominated GN divisions are 
worse than in Sinhala- or Muslim-dominated GN divisions. The fact that average 
housing conditions are comparatively good in the Tamil-inhabited north-eastern tip 
of Kottiyar Pattu is no indicator of a lack of damage; rather, comparatively many 
                                                 
 
157 Note that this is not an indicator of the concentration of Tamil militants: most Tamil 
militants were unmarried. While some of the married Tamil men may have actively 
supported the insurgents, they will rarely have been militants themselves. Sinhala and 
Muslim home guards on the other hand live among their families; many are married. 
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families in this area were able to access funds to improve their houses between 2002 
and 2004 (only to lose everything again in 2006).  
 
Indicator 3: War-affectedness 
Rather obviously, the percentage of households directly affected by the war is a 
direct indicator of conflict-affectedness. It needs to be mentioned here that the 
percentages recorded for this indicator are likely understatements. It often happens 
that more than one household member gets killed or injured in the same incident 
(for example because they happened to be travelling on the same bus, or because 
they found themselves in the same house). Apart from this, people are more likely to 
be traumatised if a household member has been killed or maimed then if that is not 
the case. Also, my impression is that households that have lost people are more 
likely to move or flee to safer areas than other households. These data should 
therefore be viewed as lower thresholds; the actual number of people who have been 
affected is likely at least twice as high as the number of affected households. As with 
the other two maps, the conflict-affected families tend to be concentrated in Tamil-
dominated GN divisions, with a particular concentration in stretches along the A15 
that border Sinhala- or Muslim-dominated areas, and along the coast (which saw 
frequent shelling by the Sri Lankan Navy). This is in line with Kalyvas’ assessment 
that border areas where one side is dominant but both sides in the conflict have 
access see most violence (Kalyvas 2006) 
 
Another way of presenting these data is to aggregate them by ethnicity. Because not 
all villages are entirely ethnically homogeneous, I have taken the short-cut of 
dividing the number of female-headed households, households living in temporary 
or damaged houses, and households directly affected by the war for such villages 
pro rata over the ethnic communities present in such villages. After that, I have 
calculated the total number of families in each category for Kottiyar Pattu, and 
compared this with the total number of families of each ethnic group in Kottiyar 
Pattu. That gives the following results: 
 
Ethnicity Total 
number of 
households 
No. of female-
headed households 
(%) 
No. of households 
living in temporary 
or damaged houses 
(%) 
No. of households 
directly affected by 
the war (%) 
Sinhala 2,251 287 (12.7%) 659 (29.3%) 120   (5.3%) 
Tamil 10,576 2,236 (21.1%) 6,282 (59.4%) 1,299 (12.3%) 
Muslim 8,842 1,361 (15.4%) 1,707 (19.3%) 330   (3.7%) 
Total 22,063 3,986 (18.1%) 8,798 (39.9%) 1,798   (8.1%) 
Table 4.1. Rates of war-affectedness by ethnicity in Kottiyar Pattu (source: CIRM 2004a, b and c) 
 
As can be seen, there is a clear ethnic bias in war-affectedness, with Tamils being 
significantly more affected than Muslims and Sinhalese. 
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Between 1985 and 2008, I estimate that a total of about 3,100 people died or 
disappeared as a consequence of the conflict: 2,300 Tamils (including about 500-600 
militants), 450 Sinhalese (including about 150-200 home guards, policemen and 
soldiers), and 350 Muslims (including about 50-100 home guards, policemen and 
soldiers). That is about 5% of the 1981 population of Kottiyar Pattu. Broken down by 
ethnicity, this comes to about 3.5%, 8.5% and 2% of the pre-conflict population of 
Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims respectively. 
If the casualty rate for Kottiyar Pattu – which was pretty much an outlying corner of 
the war zone – is representative for the total war zone, then the number of people 
killed during the war must have been significantly higher than the number of 70,000 
that was long quoted (this excludes the many thousands killed during the last six 
months of the war). In 1981, the total population of the Northern and Eastern 
provinces was a little over 2 million people. A 5% casualty rate would give an 
estimated conflict-related death toll of about 100,000 in the North-East. Add to this 
between 10,000 and 30,000 civilians and LTTE cadres killed in the last six months of 
the conflict, and some 20,000 soldiers and civilians from outside the North and East 
killed during the entire conflict, and the total death toll comes to 130,000 to 150,000. 
If, instead of the overall average casualty rate, the average casualty rates per 
ethnicity are used to estimate deaths in the North-East, the death toll estimate 
increases by a further 40,000. 
 
4.4 Reflection: patterns of violence 
Over the past decades, Kottiyar Pattu has seen great suffering and devastation due 
to violent conflict. Popular discourses about inter-ethnic harmony among residents 
of the area are largely correct for the period up to the mid-1970s. The only major 
disturbances between 1870 and 1970 revolved around unruly construction labourers 
who were working on the Allai Extension Scheme, and around high-caste Tamils 
who violently suppressed the emancipation of lower castes; both these incidents 
occurred in the 1950s. 
Ethnicity only became problematic in Kottiyar Pattu after national-level ethnic 
politics had set the stage for the genesis of separatist violence in the 1970s. From the 
Kilivetty bo tree incident onwards, violence in Kottiyar Pattu has always been 
induced by national-level agendas. At the same time, demographic and socio-
economic changes in the decades after independence created ground conditions that 
were highly conducive for the development of violence, particularly among youth: 
within a short timespan, access to land, jobs and other livelihoods resources had 
become scarce for an expanding population of youth, while at the same time access 
to some of these resources became increasingly controlled by party-political patron-
client relationships that became increasingly ethnicised.  
Violence in Kottiyar Pattu has always come in peaks that rarely lasted more than a 
few days. The build-up and aftermath of such ‘violence peaks’ were generally 
marked by strings of smaller incidents. Once violence had become established as a 
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pattern, the mere threat of violence in combination with infrequent, but generally 
fairly limited, incidents was enough to keep the entire population in a near 
permanent state of fear. During much of the conflict period, there was little 
destruction, simply because there was very little left to destroy; every time people 
had rebuilt their villages, a new wave of destruction followed not long after. 
For understanding why peaks of violence occurred at specific points in time, it is 
important to look at the military balance. Every time that the balance shifted, the 
side that had the advantage engaged in violence: newly-armed home guards against 
disarmed Tamils in 1985, Tamil militants against disarmed Sinhalese in 1987, an 
invigorated and vastly expanding army in 1990, and an invigorated LTTE against 
Muslims in the years 2002-2005. 
The first major outbreak of violence in 1985 comes close to having been communal in 
nature. There was a large involvement of ‘ordinary’ Sinhala civilians in inflicting 
violence on ‘ordinary’ Tamil civilians. While willingness to avenge the 
Anuradhapura massacre may have been there among Sinhalese in the area, the 1985 
violence was strongly orchestrated from the side of Sri Lanka’s security apparatus. 
At the same time, the fact that Sinhalese warned Tamils and otherwise tried to help 
them is clear evidence that by far not everybody agreed with the violence. 
After 1985, the character of violence between Sinhalese and Tamils changed. 
Between 1986 and 1988, violent incidents mostly involved soldiers (and home 
guards) or militants deliberately attacking civilians of the ‘other (ethnic) side’, as 
well as clashes between fighting parties. The second major outbreak of violence in 
1990 saw the deaths of many (mostly Tamil) civilians at the hand of the Sri Lankan 
military. Still, people in the area distinguish the period from 1990 onwards from the 
earlier years. From 1990 onwards, it was ‘the army versus the LTTE’, rather than ‘the 
Sinhalese versus the Tamils’. The vast expansion of the military apparatus in the area 
contributed to this: from several dozen policemen and soldiers in the early 1980s, it 
expanded to two army battalions (plus police, plus home guards, plus navy) by the 
mid-1990s, and to an entire brigade (plus police, plus home guards, plus navy) by 
2006. Over the same period, the number of resident Tamil militants expanded from 
maybe a dozen to several hundred. Apart from the militarisation of the area, local 
dynamics also played a role:  
 
The area [Kottiyar Pattu] is one where Tamils have considerable interaction with 
the Sinhalese, and both communities are bilingual. Relations have generally been 
good, with both communities attending functions in each others' villages. With 
severe restrictions placed on Tamil village shops, supposedly as a means of 
curtailing supplies reaching the LTTE, Tamils regularly shop for groceries and 
items like batteries in the Sinhalese and Muslim villages (eg. Thoppur). All these 
complicated arrangements for mutual survival and welfare have given the three 
communities a strong vested interest in continuing good relations. It is notable 
that the Sinhalese of the area have been very much against the security forces 
being harsh with the Tamils, nor has the LTTE attacked Sinhalese civilians in the 
area in any significant incident since the late 80s (UTHR 1996) . 
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Between Muslims and Tamils, the trend was different. The first periods of Muslim-
Tamil violence (in 1985, 1987 and 1990) were clearly orchestrated. Only after 
repeated violence did relationships really sour. The destruction around Muthur and 
the slow pace with which some form of normalcy returned in the decade after 1990 
meant that there was little worth attacking, and despite communal animosity there 
was comparatively little violence. It was only after the 2002 ceasefire that cycles of 
revenge between Tamils and Muslims became common again. However, with the 
defeat of the LTTE, violence between Muslims and Tamils seems to have come to an 
end. 
With the details presented in this chapter, I have wanted to underscore the point that 
the people of Kottiyar Pattu have suffered immensely from the conflict. The 
everyday inter-ethnic interaction that I have documented and analysed in chapters 6 
to 8 needs to be seen in this light. Most people have every reason to fear and/or hate 
the ethnic other. The fact that there still is so much everyday inter-ethnic interaction 
is a small miracle in itself. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Muslim schoolgirl walking in front of a destroyed house in Muthur (own photograph) 
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Figure 4.6. Militarisation of the landscape: children’s drawings on a wall, Dehiwatte (own 
photograph) 
Figure 4.7. Militarisation of the landscape: contested Buddha statue in Trincomalee (own photograph) 
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Figure 4.8. Militarisation of culture: pre-school children with brand-new camouflage caps on a ‘Peace 
Sportsmeet’, Dehiwatte, April 2003 (own photograph) 
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5  Intermezzo: local narratives 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter forms a link between the background information presented in the first 
half of the book and the case studies presented in the second half. Though rooted in 
local sources, the background chapters contain my interpretation of things; the same 
is true for the case studies that follow. To let the voices of those who live in Kottiyar 
Pattu be heard more clearly, I reproduce four indigenous texts in this intermezzo. 
The texts have been selected for their own articulateness, and because they are 
representative for specific discourses that I came across in Kottiyar Pattu during my 
fieldwork. The first text gives a Sinhala perspective, the second an orthodox Muslim 
perspective, the third a Sufi Muslim perspective (which is distinctly different from 
the ‘standard’ Muslim perspective on Kottiyar Pattu), and the last text gives a Tamil 
perspective. Each text gives its own interpretation of the history of Kottiyar Pattu, 
and each has noteworthy comments about inter-ethnic relations in the area. When 
reading the texts apart, it is sometimes hard to imagine that they are all about the 
same small part of Sri Lanka. When taken together, they show something of just how 
bewildering the variations in stories are, and how closely verifiable facts and 
garbled-up legends (and sometimes verifiable nonsense) are interwoven. 
 
5.2 First text: interview with a Sinhala man  
The first text that I present is a slightly edited transcript158 of my fieldnotes on a 
fascinating interview that I had with a Sinhalese man in the area in August 2007, 
around the time that the Sri Lankan security forces were completing their offensive 
to chase the LTTE out of the Eastern Province. I have included this rather long 
narrative because it was by far the most complete and elaborate Sinhala perspective 
that I heard while doing my research and, more importantly, because the man who 
was talking to me had a reputation for being pro-peace, which had become fairly 
rare among Sinhalese in Kottiyar Pattu after mid-2005. 
The interview from which I have taken this text took place in a Sinhala village in 
Kottiyar Pattu. While my research assistant and I were asking some people about the 
arrival of Buddhist monks in the area, one of the people listening to the conversation 
started talking:  
 
                                                 
 
158 The editing consisted of removing a limited number of questions that were asked to 
clarify details, and inserting the answers into the narrative wherever relevant. 
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In 1921, Buddhist monks came to Batticaloa. In 1922, for Vesak, they came to 
Trincomalee, by the ship ‘Mary Queen’159. The monks asked for the way to 
Seruwila, and found some Muslims who showed them the way to Thoppur. The 
people who helped the hamuduru were Muslims from Thoppur. In 1931, the 
Seruwila temple was rebuilt. 
 
At the site where there is now a kovil in Kilivetti, there was a Buddhist temple 
with a big bo tree. Similarly, at the Verugal kovil, there was a Budhist temple. The 
name was really Vehara-gala160. Kavanthissa’s younger brother 
Saddhatissakumara’s wife earmarked the place, where a pansala was built. This 
is not the actual birthland of the Tamils.  
 
In 1800161, there was a king in Polonnaruwa, whose name was Valagambahu. 
There were 108 kings here, and he was one of them. In the reign of the king 
before Valagambahu, there was an army officer called Hāta.  There was some 
problem with the king, and he (Hāta) ran away to Tamil Nadu. (Up to Kandy it 
all belonged to the Polonnaruwa kingdom then. There were four divisions in Sri 
Lanka then. The Polonnaruwa kingdom was called Pita Rata. Seruwila was part 
of Ruhunumagampattuwa; that division, east of the Mahaweli River, was all the 
way from here to Kirinda).  
Before Hāta ran to India, in South India everything was hondai (good), but they 
did not know how to govern the place. This man became friendly with the king, 
and learnt that the king did not know how to develop agriculture in the country. 
Hāta said “there are people who can work and can develop agriculture in my 
country”. He came to Sri Lanka with some people, and he took all the strong, 
young people – 12,000 of them – to South India. 
If you want to frighten little children, then you say “the goni billa is coming”162. 
Well, these people who came with Hāta were disguised in gunny bags (looking 
like goni billa). 
 
When Valagambahu became king, he brought people and made this area 
prosperous. He had a weapon with the name Yakkadāwa, that was kept to the 
                                                 
 
159 This must be a reference to passenger ship that circled around the island. It was probably 
called ‘Queen Mary’. 
160 Sinhala for “Vihara rock”. 
161 This must have been “1800 years ago”. The king referred to as Valagambahu is identified 
as Gajabahu I in Rajavaliya: 47-8; he reigned from 114-136 AD (De Silva 2003: 566). 
162 The goni billa (Sinhala for “ghost covered in a sack”) is a monster that comes and snatches 
(naughty) children away in his gunny bag, somewhat similar to the figure of “Zwarte Piet” in 
Dutch folklore. Note that when people with sacks over their heads started to be used by the 
army to identify possible enemies (who would then be tortured and often killed), the 
mythical monster became a real person. 
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right of the king’s throne. Only the person who could lift this weapon was 
worthy to be king163. 
 
A reddi (washerwoman) came to the palace to wash the king’s clothes. She had a 
son of twelve or thirteen years old who used to come with her. While the mother 
did her work, this child used to walk around everywhere. One day, he went near 
the throne of the king. He saw the weapon, which was made of iron, facing one 
particular way. There was a hollow in the weapon which was filled with water, 
and it could be dismantled. The boy looked at it, took it apart, and put it back 
with the pieces in a different order. This is when the Tamils came to the Eastern 
Province. 
 
The king saw that the weapon had been tampered with. He asked “who came to 
the palace today?” “Only the washerwoman and her son,” was the answer. “This 
weapon is very heavy. Only I can lift it. Someone else must have come who is as 
strong as I am.” 
The washerwoman and her son were brought, and the king told the son to lift 
the weapon and give it. This child came without fear, lifted it and gave it to the 
king. The king brought up this child and took him into his army as his yodhaya 
(bodyguard). 
This boy was known as the cleverest officer in the army. He became like a 
lieutenant-general164.  
 
The king used to go to the country secretly to find out whether his people had 
been doing their work properly. One night, some time after the boy had become 
the commander of the army, the king went in disguise to check how the people 
were doing. In one house, the king heard a woman crying. He made a mark on 
the door with a piece of limestone, and the following day he told his men to 
bring the woman. 
He asked her “why did you cry in your house last night?” 
“Two of my sons, healthy and strong, were taken away by the goni billa,” she 
said. “If I can see my sons before I die, that is sufficient. I was thinking of that 
and cried.” 
When the king inquired, he learnt about this army man who had gone to India. 
These two boys must have been taken by Hāta. 
“These people are my subjects. They have to be brought back to my country. The 
Buddhist people who lived here always followed the Buddha Dharma and never 
caused any trouble. My subjects, my people, have been taken to another country, 
and are being ill-treated. I need to bring them back.” 
                                                 
 
163 Note the similarity with the legend of King Arthur’s sword, which could only be lifted by 
the rightful heir to the throne. 
164 At the time of the interview, this was the highest rank that anyone in the Sri Lankan 
Army had. The comparison is therefore a comparison with the Sri Lankan Army 
Commander, lieutenant-general Sarath Fonseka. 
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The king and his army commander, whose name was Neela Maha Yodhaya165, 
went to Mannar, crossed the sand dunes166, and went to South India. In Tamil 
Nadu, they went separate ways. The king went to the palace of the king of Tamil 
Nadu, while the army commander went to the place where these people were 
imprisoned and where they did forced labour. 
The king spoke to the king of that country and negotiated their release. The army 
commander brought the people to the entrance of the palace. As a kind of 
interest (on a loan), he also forcibly brought another 24,000 people. Until these 
24,000 people came here we were people who did not harm anybody, we were 
good167. 
 
These 12,000 plus 24,000 people were brought back, across the sand dunes, to Sri 
Lanka. Until these 24,000 people came, there were no Tamils at all, neither in 
Jaffna nor in the Eastern Province. This is a Sinhala Buddhist country. Although 
it is our land, we have never shown hostility towards Muslims or Tamils, to 
anybody. This was an agricultural land. To do agriculture, we needed some 
animals. These 24,000 people were taught how to do agriculture and they took to 
cultivation. Over time, the population increased. Only after that did they see the 
North-East. Gradually they went to the East and North to settle down. Up to 
1954, all these people have not done anything to destroy Buddhist temples. They 
had a political party, got into government, began to be stable in politics, and 
began to talk about a homeland. Then they started doing minor discriminatory 
acts against the Sinhalese. For them to go up, they have to do some harm to the 
king or to the people. 
 
These people came and built a kovil in Kilivetti (on the site of a pansala). We (the 
Sinhalese) never told them not to do that. The tree was cut in the early 1980s168. 
In one night, it was cut and destroyed without a trace. Sampanthan (the MP) was 
involved in that. Sampanthan, Thangathurai, and Vigneswaran169. They were 
                                                 
 
165 Sinhala for “the great blue giant warrior” (Obeyesekere 1984: 26) 
166 Adam’s Bridge 
167 Note that this is an almost literal version of a legend on the settlement of Chola prisoners-
of-war in Sri Lanka as given in Rajavaliya: 47-8, and elaborated on by Abeyawardana (1999: 
17-18, 115-8). Obeyesekere (1984:361-80) discusses the “Gajabahu myth” at length, and 
concludes that the story has very little historical value, but rather serves as a kind of master 
dialectic that has been used and adapted for centuries whenever a need was felt to explain 
the presence of settler groups of comparatively Indian origin: “it is very likely that most, if 
not all, Sinhala groups in this island were at some period or other immigrants from South 
India. The Gajabahu myth is a symbolic way of expressing this sociological fact” (idem: 374-
5). 
168 This was 1976. 
169 Thangathurai, who originated from Kilivetti, was MP for Muthur from 1970 to 1977, and 
later again from 1994 until his assassination by the LTTE in 1997. Sampanthan (who has 
been in parliament intermittently since 1989) and Vigneswaran were both lawyers. To my 
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from Kilivetti, and started this homeland talk. Vigneswaran was not involved in 
the incident with the tree. 
These people started destroying Buddhist relics. When they did this, we lost our 
temple there. 
Without getting into confrontation, we asked for justice through the priests etc. 
Then the leaders of Kilivetti got together (to chase the Sinhalese away). There 
was a Paddy Marketing Board stores, where there was a Sinhalese officer in 
charge. There were also some Sinhala businesspeople in Kilivetti. People who 
came to Seruwila from Muthur were killed170. All were innocent Sinhalese.  They 
started hurting the Sinhala people, started talking about their motherland. They 
killed Sinhalese, harassed them, destroyed places of worship. In this period only, 
the LTTE developed. Only then the Tamils started saying “we have ownership of 
this land”. I am not a communalist to tell this story. I am telling the truth about 
what I have learnt.  
 
Tamil leaders are trying to create a boru (false) story, but from this story you will 
understand to whom the land belongs. There were one crore of pansalas here. 
Earlier people called this place “Kottiyara Pattu”, because there were so many 
places of worship. Other communities have no history here. 
 
If anyone else says “this place is ours”, that is a lie. This land belongs to the 
Sinhalese. Whatever they say, whether Kilivetti or Verugal, these lands have 
proof in the foundations that there were viharas. Although the bo tree was 
destroyed, we know where the vihara was, we know where the chaitiya was. This 
land belongs to us, to nobody else. There is a history. Those who say otherwise 
are just communalists. They make up stories. 
 
In June 2006, the terrorists blocked Mavil Aru. The water comes from there. 
Seruwila is the central place here, the hamuduru is the main man. Mavil Aru is 
the heart of the place. It belongs to the people of Seruwila, Eechchilampattu and 
Muthur: Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims, all groups. The terrorists blocked the water 
that was going to Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims. 
 
Water is a humanitarian thing. In North America they said 2,500 years ago that 
you cannot do harm to water. It is purely a terrorist act. Christopher Columbus, 
the man from England [sic!] said that you should not harm a thing like this. He 
went in the ship and discovered America. There were red Indians there. There 
was a red Indian leader. Christoper Columbus wanted to buy the land from him 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
knowledge, Sampanthan is not from Kilivetti. The Vigneswaran referred to here is a 
different person from mr. Vigneswaran who led the protests against the Buddha statue in 
Trincomalee in 2005 and was subsequently shot dead.  
170 When I asked my source when this took place, he answered “somewhere between 1978 
and 1985” – so between the cutting of the tree at Kilivetti and the first large-scale outbreak of 
violence in 1985. 
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with money. He told Christopher Columbus “nobody has any authority over the 
land, it does not belong to anybody”. Now this has changed.  
In June 2006, the terrorists blocked the water and land belonging to the people 
here. The leaders of Seruwila and the priests spoke to the LTTE: “please do not 
do this, please open the sluicegate”. There was a chap called Elilan; he was the 
area leader. He was not interested in solving the problems of the people, only in 
blood. Everybody, the peace committee, everybody spoke to the LTTE for 
twenty-three days to solve the problem, but that did not happen. The army 
salvaged this. It was a strong necessity for Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim people in 
the area, so the army had to salvage this. The LTTE started shelling Sinhala areas 
from Verugal171, so the army had to get the LTTE out. Twenty-one families 
remained in Eechchilampattu. The Sinhala army has never fought with Tamils 
with any haughtiness. The army gave the 21 families that remained food, 
medicine, and saved them172. During this period, nobody destroyed any places of 
worship or anything important to the Tamils. The LTTE destroyed Buddhist 
places of worship. Today, the Verugal temple festival is conducted because of 
the Sinhalese army173. 
The LTTE has claimed that Sinhalese and Muslims are enemies of the Tamils, but 
Sinhalese have never said anything like that. The LTTE is saying that Buddhists 
and Muslims are living in their motherland. When looking at history, anybody 
can understand whom this land belongs to.  
 
Without talking about these things, if all three communities come together and 
work together, this area can be developed. All religious leaders in this area 
should come together and explain this to the people. I believe and I hope that 
during my life there will be some peace and unity between the communities. If 
you want, I can show you the important places which prove that this area 
belongs to the Sinhalese. 
 
5.3 Second text: “The history of Kottiyarpurapattu”, chapters 3 and 27  
The second text in this intermezzo is a reproduction (with permission) of most of 
chapters 3 and 27 of the book “The history of Kottiyarpurapattu”, written by M.A. 
Samad, a retired school principal from Muthur (Samad 2003: 23-31, 423-430). As is 
the case with all Tamil texts that I have used in my research, the translation of the 
chapters was done by one of my research assistants. This narrative is important, 
                                                 
 
171 This refers to the shelling of Somapura on December 7th, 2006, in which a school located 
next to an ammunition dump was hit (see section 4.2.10) 
172 UTHR(J) (2007c, Appendix 1) confirms this story. Except for one person, all survived. 
173 This refers to the balasthanam ritual that was celebrated in the last week of August 2007. 
This ritual marked the start of a process of renovation and purification, meant to do the 
physical and ritual pollution that happened during the conflict. The process culminated in a 
kumbh abishekam (re-dedication) festival a few months later, after which the temple was re-
opened for regular worship. 
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because Samad’s book has become the standard reference work for all secondary 
school students from Muthur who want to learn about the history of the area; some 
local leaders whom I met in Muthur promoted the book as the standard canon on the 
history of Kottiyar Pattu. The book is based on twenty years of collecting stories 
from the elderly people in the entire area (interview, Muthur, 10-8-2005), and (at 606 
pages) is by far the most comprehensive description of Kottiyar Pattu that is 
available.  
I present chapter 3 here, because it gives a very clear Muslim perspective on the 
settlement history of Kottiyar Pattu, and because – for the older history of the area – 
it demonstrates an ingenious combination of post-dating verifiable events regarding 
the settling of South Indian Hindus in the area, and omitting in their entirety other 
key events, particularly those regarding the introduction of Buddhism in the area 
many centuries ago. As an aside, note that Muslims are claimed to have been the 
first settlers in the region (in the seventeenth century), despite the acknowledgement 
of the presence of “hunters” (Veddas) since “ancient times” (Samad 2003: 23)174. In 
the struggle over who were the original inhabitants of eastern Sri Lanka, Veddas are 
represented by Muslims, Sinhalese and Tamils alike as people without history, and 
thus without significance in the debate175. 
Chapter 27 is important, because it gives the most detailed historical perspective on 
the development of Muslim-Tamil relations that I have come across. 
 
Chapter 3 [first part]. Emergence and growth of the villages of 
Kottiyapurapattu 
It could be understood from the history of the descendents of the Vedda 
community here that there were only some villages formed as result of that 
community coming into settlement in ancient times. The hunters who moved 
from places like Bintenne in the south settled in Kankuveli area at the beginning 
and later moved to Umanagiri (present Thoppur), Malaimunthal, Mattappukali, 
                                                 
 
174 The word used in Tamil is vedar, which means hunter. The Vedar community is 
commonly referred to as Coast Veddas (see section 3.2.1).  
175 Note however Nevill’s claim that the ‘coast Veddas’ originated from the area that became 
the Sinharaja rainforest, and settled on the east coast in the reign of a Kandyan king, 
probably Rajasinha II (Nevill 1886: 183-184). There may be some truth in this version of 
history. Samad has recorded a strikingly similar historical narrative from Veddas in Kottiyar 
Pattu: “[a] person known as Kunchar and his brother Sempar had migrated with their wives 
and children during the time of the Kandy King and settled [in Kottiyar Pattu] […] before 
the time in which the Verugal Sri Siththiravelautha temple was built […] about 400 years 
ago” (Samad 2003: 164, 171). The argument is further strengthened by the fact that both 
Nevill and Seligmann and Seligmann have noted that the original language as remembered 
by the now Tamil-speaking coast Veddas was in fact a form of Sinhala. The narrative that 
Samad has documented claims however that the Veddas in Kottiyar Pattu originate from the 
area around Katharagama, and not from the area around Ratnapura. 
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Karukkamunai and Ilankaithurai and stayed there and so these villages came 
into being.  
The Portuguese who came to Ceylon in 1505 seized the coastal provinces of 
Ceylon and brought it under their control as there were splits between the kings 
of the Kotte Kingdom and since they wanted to capture the harbors where the 
Muslims carried out their businesses and they wanted to do business by 
themselves. Moreover, they blocked the businesses carried out, through the 
harbours of Puttalam, Kalpitya and Colombo, by the Muslims who were their 
business rivals, and drove them out of those areas. 
The Muslims who were affected by this, approached the king of Kandy and 
sought his assistance. Realizing the impact his kingdom had as a result of the 
effect on businesses, king Rajasinha II asked them to settle down in the east 
which came under his rule and to carry out their business through the ports of 
Batticaloa and Kottiyaram in order to obtain the provisions his regime required 
and to get their produce and spices sold. Accordingly, one group settled down in 
Batticaloa. Another group was involved in business through Kottiyapura harbor 
in 1626 and settled down there. This is how the village of Mutur emerged.  
 The Dutch, who followed the Portuguese to the eastern countries, were their 
enemies and they became friendly with the king of Kandy.  He took this 
favorably and requested the Dutch to help him chase off the Portuguese from 
Ceylon and in return he made an agreement with them to give them the right to 
do business and pay them the war expenses. Consequently, the Dutch captured 
the eastern coastal provinces from the Portuguese and drove them away. At the 
end of the war since the King did not fulfill his promise and violated the 
agreement, the Dutch closed the harbors of Batticaloa, Kottiyaram and 
Trincomalee and built their forts there and guarded the places.  
Since businesses were blocked and the harbors were closed, the affected Muslims 
living in this area got involved in agriculture. Similarly, the Tamils who 
embraced the Catholic religion during the Portuguese regime were subjected to 
cruelty and torment by the Dutch. As a result, these Catholics moved from the 
coastal area and settled down in the Kingdom of Kandy. The Kandy King 
honoured and respected the Catholic Clergy. He granted them permission to 
perform religious services in his territory. A group of Catholics who went away 
like this came to Kottiyaram and settled down there. They were not only friendly 
with the Muslims who were already there but also began to live near them.    
There were Catholics from Thoothukudi among the people who came and 
settled down on Mutur. Most of them were seafarers and they were able to carry 
on with their vocation in the sea. Since the Dutch prohibited entry to the sea and 
its surrounding, they could not work there and so they lived here and got 
involved in cultivation. 
Subsequently, Tamils in areas like Trincimalee and Jaffna were tormented, their 
belonging looted and temples destroyed during the Portuguese and Dutch 
periods. These Hindus were expelled from there. It can be learnt from historical 
evidence and from the older generation that a group of those Tamils came and 
settled in Thampalagmam and Kottiyaram. 
It is said that the Hindus, Muslims and Catholics who came to Kottiyaram lived 
together making their homes close to each other and settled down in Mutur. 
When we look at how the dwellings of these three communities are situated, the 
Muslim who came initially were close to the jetty, the Catholics houses next and 
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then the Hindu settlement. Their places of worship are also similarly located. 
This is an example of the communal harmony and friendship of the people of 
this village.  
It is not surprising that Mutur became an ancient village where all three 
communities lived united because the interval between their colonization is 
between about 40 to 60 years. The Dutch Governor Rijckloff van Goens, in a 
report written to his superior on 14-09-1665, has mentioned that the people who 
lived in Jaffna and Kottiyaram under their regime had two different dispositions 
and cultures. It is clear from this that Muslims came to Kottiyaram first. 
The Trincomalee Konesar temple and other temples were destroyed by 
Portuguese General Constantine de Sa. The properties of the Tamils were 
plundered and they were persecuted and driven away.  King Kulakkottan, who 
is called Ilamsingan176, visited the temples that were destroyed after the people 
were driven away and did holy service by restoring them. The book called 
‘Konesar Kalvettu’ explains this in detail. According to this, people from service 
caste were brought from places like Sindhunadu, Marungoor and Karaikal and 
settled in Trincomalee, and Vannimais were brought and settled in 
Kattukulampattu, Thampalagamampattu and Kottiyapurapattu to take care of 
them. 
Similarly people from service castes from Sindhunadu, Marungoor and 
Gurunadu were brought to restore and maintain Verugal Sri Chiththira 
Velayutha Swami temple and Kankuveli Agasthiyar Stabanam. He distributed 
agricultural lands to these people and dug the Allaikulam, Kanthalaikulam and 
Vendarasankulam to irrigate these lands.    
According to these notes, people from Sindhunadu were Velalars and were 
settled in Anaithivu, Eechchilampattai, Mallikaithivu, Pallikudiyiruppu, and 
Sampoor. People from Gurunadu began living in Kankuveli, Kilivetti, Muthur, 
Sampoor and Koonithivu and those from Marungoor in Chenaiyoor and 
Kattaiparichchan.  
The ancient tribes of hunters (Veddas) lived in Mavadichenai, Ilankaithurai and 
Ilankaithurai Mukathuwaram, Karukkamunai and Valaithottam. It is said that 
people of the service castes lived in villages like Paraiyanoor, Palathadichenai, 
Pattithidal, Kusavanoor and Manalchenai.  
When we look at these villages, we can observe they have names concerning 
cultivation land usage, natural lands and dwelling lands. For example: 
 
Names referring to agriculture and other forms of land use 
Kamam (agriculture) – Menkamam 
Vetti (cut) – Kilivetti (cut and cleared place) 
Chenai (upland cropping area) – Chenaiyoor 
Veli (field) – Periyaveli 
Names referring to elements in the landscape 
Piddy (hill), Pallam (pit), Meidu (raised ground), Veli (field), Manal (sand) 
Manal – Manalchenai 
Piddy – Allaipiddy 
Veli – Chinanveli 
                                                 
 
176 Tamil for “young lion”. 
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Names referring to dwellings  
Ur (place of origin) – Muthur 
Kudiyiruppu (settlement) – Pallikudiyiruppu 
 
Names referring to trees, bushes, creepers etcetera 
Sampu (rose apple tree) – Sampur 
Eanchu (a species of palm) – Eachilappattu  
Mallikai (Jasmine) – Mallikaithivu 
Maa (Mango) – Maavadichenai 
 
Some parts of this area with natural wealth and splendour have disappeared due 
to natural disasters and calamities of the sea. For example, many hundreds of 
acres of residential lands and coconut estates in Muthur Mukaththuwaram and 
the earlier jetty area (near the present Police Station) have been swallowed up by 
the sea. The coconut estates belonging to M. Krishnapillai, Kasilebbe and 
Seenithamby have become sea now. Likewise, the land area from the coast of 
Sampoor to Thalaiyadimunai and Vattahthumunai areas have been destroyed by 
the sea. 
The names of some ancient places have been changed due to the colonization 
undertaken in this area in recent times. For example: 
Thirumangalapuri (Old Kilivetti) – Thirumangalapura 
Palaichenai – Neelapola  
Kalarippu – Mahindapura 
Vettaiyadivempu – Gemunupura  
Thumpaaraivembu – Somapura  
Elumichchaiyadipatti – Dehiwatte  
 
“Where history is silent, the names of places may open their mouths and speak” 
so said the savant S. L. Ramasamy. Therefore it is very important to know the 
parts of names of places. There may be occurrences in our country too in keeping 
with changes of the transforming world. There is room to think that this would 
affect lands as well.   
Hence it is imperative to preserve our ancient villages, their excellence and 
individually so that the descendents of the future generation could live without 
any ethnic of religious differences. 
 
[Chapter 3, second part.] Political developments 
The politicians from the Eastern Province became members of majority parties 
after this country attained independence in 1948 and worked for the betterment 
of the party they were aligned to. They failed consider the integration of the area 
or its future prosperity. As a result, ancestral lands that by historical and 
archaeological evidence were proven to belong to the Tamils and Muslims of the 
Eastern Province have been taken away from them for activities like excavation 
research, the declaration of sacred areas, agricultural expansion schemes and 
green revolution. This has been implemented continuously to make these people 
who were already there a minority. Particularly Ampara and Trincomalee 
Districts have been affected in this way. 
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Mutur, being a dual-member constituency which could elect the representatives 
of the Tamil and Muslim minority communities in Kottiyapurapattu, was 
changed into two electorates in 1977 [sic]. Consequently, political representation 
and land areas have been lost. The future generation that has improved due to 
the growth of civilization and the development of education should see to it that 
the ancient heritage of the area is not harmed and that the individuality of the 
villages is preserved in their quest for modernity and refinement.  
By knowing fully the history of the arrival of the Muslims, Catholics, Hindus, 
Muslims and hunters in sacred Kottiyapurapattu and their religious and cultural 
traditions, the historical evolution of the place can be understood to a certain 
extent. It is the duty of every son and daughter who live here to know the 
history of these communities. So, let us enter into it.   
 
Chapter 27. The relationship between the Tamils and Muslims in the Mutur 
region and the present situation 
When the Muthur region was known as Kottiyarpurapattu, the Tamil villages of 
Eechchilampattu, Verugal, Anaithevu, Karukkamunai, Ilankaithurai, 
Mavadichenai, Mattappukali, Malaimunthal, Ilakkanthai, Koonithivu, Sampoor, 
Chenaioor,  Kattaiparichchan, Pallikudyiruppu, Kilivetti, Menkamam, 
Kankuveli, Mallikaithivu, Peruveli and Pachchanoor, and the Muslim villages of 
Thoppur and Muthur were the ancient villages. All the other villages are 
colonization villages that came up gradually after the 1930s in accordance with 
the need of the time. 
The Tamils and Muslims who lived in these ancient villages have been living 
cordially like members of the same family without any caste or religious 
differences from the beginning. There was not any discrimination between the 
villages. Transport between the villages was mostly on foot or by bullock carts.  
It was not possible to travel about frequently as the distances between villages 
were far and the roads were through jungle areas. 
During this period, the traders who lived in Muthur and Thoppur area brought 
goods for the people’s daily needs and sold them. Transactions were on a barter 
system as very little money was in rotation. Agricultural produce, livestock, 
honey, ghee and so on were brought from the villages and sold in the Muthur 
area. 
It was difficult for the Muslim traders who went to the Tamil areas to return 
home immediately and so they used to stay in those Tamil villages for a few 
days to do business. The relationship between the two communities developed 
as there was mutual understanding and goodwill. Similarly, it was a practice for 
people who came from remote Tamil villages to Muthur for various needs, to 
stay in Muslim homes. 
The association which grew like this later turned into a relationship based on 
work. These regions changed into agricultural areas with the passage of time due 
to colonization. Consequently, the two communities worked together in 
preparing new paddy lands for cultivation, making channels, irrigating, 
ploughing, protecting crops and harvesting. Moreover, the Tamils were share 
holders and lessees of the cultivation activities of the wealthy Muslims and 
worked with them closely. 
Agricultural lands were close to each other and were generally near Tamil 
villages. Both communities were involved in breeding livestock well. All the 
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grazing grounds were far away from Muslim villages. Therefore it was possible 
for Muslims to continue rearing livestock only with the assistance and 
cooperation of the Tamils. 
Close relationships were found among the people of this region for ages as a 
result of occupational ventures like this. They had cordial relationships in that 
they participated in the happy and sad events of each others family, they 
borrowed and lent money and worked together. After the 1950s, labour 
opportunities dwindled due to the changes that transpired in the field of 
agriculture by the introduction of machines and modern methods of agriculture 
and the use of chemical insecticides and fertilizers.   
While the wealthy got involved in cultivation in accordance with their financial 
positions, the poor had to go to other places seeking jobs.  Consequently, the 
occupational relationships between the communities slackened. Only a limited 
number of persons from the communities were permitted into each others 
ventures.   
It was customary for Muslims to go into jungle areas near Tamil villages during 
seasonal rains for a few days to hunt and feast under the guidance of the 
villagers.  
It has to be remembered that Muslims used to go annually to the Sampoor, 
Chenaiyoor and Verugal temple festivals to see the gala occasion and 
entertainment throughout the night. They intermingled with the people and 
returned the following day.  
This type of concord was prevalent in the vocation of fishing as well. Many 
fishermen from Muthur used to go in groups to a place called Kokkatti in the 
Sampur area and to the area around Ilankaithurai Mukathuwaram during the 
season and stay there for months for fishing. It was customary for fishermen of 
neighbouring villages to go to those places as well during the period and catch 
fish in harmony. Similarly, this type of unity was found among fishermen who 
catch prawns every night in places like Ralkuli, Suvaanthirai and the Kokkatti 
River. Fishermen of both communities were involved in fishing by casting nets 
in the Chenaiyoor area and in places like Ralpalam and Chenaiyoorkali. 
Fishmongers from Muthur used to go to these places day and night to purchase 
fish and prawns.  
The same harmony was found in jungle occupations as well.  There is a long 
history of both communities of clearing forest together for cultivation of crops 
and for dwelling, and living side by side. Kayalmuthan, Kulathuchenai, 
Thiruppanavettai, Kalladichenai, Pattalipuram, Seenanveli, Uppural and areas of 
Ullaikulam and Ithikulam could be mentioned as examples.  
The activities of Tamil parties were intensified due the ethnic differences and 
discrimination in administration and the disregarding of the rights and benefits 
of the Tamils that transpired in the politics of this country after the 1960s. Tamil 
political parties were involved in nonviolent struggles like sathyagraha and 
stoppage of work etc. to win self-determination rights for the Tamil-speaking 
people. Tamils who lived in the Northern and Eastern provinces participated in 
large numbers in these struggles. However Muslims took part in the struggles 
only during the period when Muslim politicians were with the Federal Party. 
The association ceased when the Muslim politicians left the party. There was no 
leadership or institutionalized system to guide them to continue in these 
nonviolent struggles. Since the politicians of the North-East were either 
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independent or aligned to the southern political parties, they failed to guide the 
Muslims of this region in the proper path. Later, when a political leadership 
emerged among the Muslims, they got their supporters together independently 
and began to part ways and function separately. The close relationship between 
communities that was prevalent for a long period of time began to slacken. 
During the period of political elections the distance between these two 
communities became much larger.  
Moreover, gaps began to appear in the relationship between the younger 
generation of both communities as a result of education being imparted along 
ethnic lines with schools being separated as Tamil and Muslim schools, and with 
cultural traditions being introduced and practised in schools. 
A situation emerged after 1970 when unemployed educated youth of each 
community in this area had to get the assistance of their respective member of 
parliament to obtain government jobs. 95% of the jobs were awarded on the 
recommendation of the MP of the community and a Tamil-Muslim division 
appeared. Consequently the closeness between the communities slackened.  
Since the governments that came after 1948 paid no attention to the non-violent 
struggles for their rights, a situation arose when the frustrated Tamil youths 
ignored the moderate approach of the Tamil politicians and began an armed 
struggle to win the self determination rights and authority. The struggle that 
began to win the rights took the shape of communal riots due to the war action 
undertaken by the government forces after 1983. Tamils suffered loss of lives and 
damage to their properties and became refugees as result of this. Many youths 
got involved seriously in the struggle forming different armed groups to protect 
the people and to achieve a home land. However some of these groups gave up 
their struggle and joined the political stream and their supporters had to join 
them and act accordingly. 
However the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are continuing their struggle to 
win their goal, declaring certain jungle areas where only Tamils live as areas 
under their control so that enemies would not know their activities and people of 
other communities would betray them.  It is on this basis that all the Tamil 
villages in Muthur region have come under LTTE control. 
It is with this intention that the Tigers have prohibited the Muslims of Mutur 
and Thoppur from going into Tamil villages with which they have had long 
cordial relationships.  
However, Tamils who live in Tiger controlled areas come to Mutur and Thoppur 
for their livelihood and to obtain their needs. They could be seen having friendly 
and cordial relationship with the Muslims. […] 
 
5.4 Third text: description of the Kalladiyappa ziyaram 
The third text is a reproduction (with permission of the author, M.A.C. Juhais) of an 
essay that was published in the Thinakaran newspaper. This essay gives a description 
of the Kalladiyappa ziyaram, a shrine for a Sufi saint that is located some five 
kilometres south of Muthur (‘Al Kuthb As-Seyed Ash-Sheikh Abdul Qader Makky 
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Kalladiappa Valiullah’, Thinakaran, 23-12-2002) 177. I present the text here because it 
contains a distinctly alternative version of Muslim claims to history in the area. A 
Muslim religious leader involved with this shrine told me a very similar version of 
the story of the shrine before I came across this article. Note that the increase in 
attention for this shrine took place at the same time that more reformist forms of 
Islam became visibly more present in Kottiyar Pattu. While people have worshipped 
at the shrine for decades, the recent explicit emphasis on the site reads like a form of 
resistance to the reform movement. It is also noteworthy that in Kottiyar Pattu, this 
shrine has become something of a symbolic battle ground. It is only at this site that 
worship has been reinvigorated; at the same time, most of the other ziyarams in 
Kottiyar Pattu are increasingly neglected. 
 
This essay was published on the occasion of the 5th anniversary Kandoori of As-
Seyed Al Kuthb Ash-Sheikh Abdul Qader Makky Kalladiyappa Valiullah. This 
great man’s ziyaram is found in Jebelnagar, south of Muthur.  
 
The period during which he arrived 
History says that the Quraish178 who were deported during the regime of 
Abbacies came towards South East Asia by sea visited and lived in places there. 
Accordingly, Kalladiyappa Valiullah179 should have arrived here towards the 
latter part of the eighth century AD. Researchers say since Jebelnagar with 
natural surroundings during that period was suitable for meditation, he should 
have lived and died in that area. The opinion of historian Sir Alexander Johnston 
supports these researches. His view follows: 
“According to the customs prevalent among the descendents of Mohammedans 
who settled down in Ceylon at the very beginning, they were Hashemite Arabs 
who were expelled from Arabia at the beginning of 8th Century during the 
tyrannical regime of Caliph Abdul Malik bin Marvan, went south from 
Euphrates to the Concan, to the southern parts peninsular India, to the Island of 
Ceylon, and to Malacca and settled down there. The group that came to Ceylon 
made eight big settlements in the north east and north of the island each in 
Trincomalee, Jaffna, Manthottam, Mannar, Kuthirai [Horse] Hill, Puttalam, 
Colombo, Barbaryn [Beruwala] and Point de Galle”180. 
The observation of Sir Alexander Johnston is noteworthy. 
The fact that Mutur region is one of the places in the east where the initial 
Muslim settlements took place needs to be underlined. It is evident from 
research that Kalladiappa Valiullah was an Arab from Mecca and many of his 
Murids [disciples] had also come with him to that area. It is considered that 
Kalladiyappa may be the great man referred to in the Islamic Encyclopedia as 
the saint who lived and died in AD 832.  
                                                 
 
177 See section 3.5 for more on this shrine and the multiple claims to the area. 
178 The Quraish were the dominant tribe of Mecca when the Muslim religion emerged; its 
prophet Muhammad belonged to this tribe. 
179 Literally ‘friend of Allah’. This is an honorific term used for Sufi saints. 
180 This text seems to have been quoted literally from Abdul Azeez 1907. Abdul Azeez 
referred to a letter that Alexander Johnstone wrote in 1827. 
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The appearance of the ziyaram 
Kalladiyappa Valiullah’s ziyaram must have been identified about 300 or 350 
years ago as it has come under the maintenance of many generations.  
It is situated in a field where paddy is cultivated. Before the ziyaram was 
identified, a Tamil man named Deva had cultivated paddy near it. His crop had 
withered without rain or water and he had to face loss due to the drought. He 
was badly indebted and he had gone home with the idea of drinking poison to 
commit suicide, and had fallen asleep. While he was sleeping, a saintly man 
appeared in a dream and told him that he was buried there; he also told him to 
identify the place. Kalladiyappa went away telling Deva that he would meet 
with a very good crop. As a result Deva identified Kalladiyappa’s ziyaram and it 
rained despite the fact that it was dry season.  It is possible to learn from the 
people who lived at that time that Deva had a very good crop. Deva had 
maintained the ziyaram until he died.      
Later on the ziyaram was treasured, preserved and patronized by a lady called 
Valli Amma. She lit incense sticks and she lit lamps at night. It is also said that 
Kalladiyappa chaperoned her at night. Later on, the Kalladiyappa ziyaram was 
maintained by a Hindu called Oblamaniyam. It was maintained by him until AD 
1985 or 1990. Oblamaniyam’s paddy land was situated near the ziyaram. It was 
customary for this Hindu son to vow a rooster when sowing his field. After the 
harvest, that bird was slaughtered, a Moulavi was invited and a fathiha was 
recited at the Kalladiappa ziyaram. 
Kalladiappa has been responsible for many kiramath (miracles). The Muthur area 
was a business centre before 1983. Muslim traders who came there on business 
from other areas used to visit the Kalladiyappa ziyaram and pay their respects. It 
is now maintained by the Kalladiyappa Foundation.  
 
The emergence of the Kalladiyappa Foundation 
This foundation was created in 1998 to maintain the Kalladiyappa ziyaram on the 
request of [four names mentioned]181. As a result, some services have been 
undertaken amidst numerous difficulties.  
The administrative members of this foundation are [the names of three moulavis, 
two teachers, and nine others are given here].  
A temporary hut with corrugated iron sheets was built for the Kalladiyappa 
ziyaram in 1998. It was completely destroyed during the communal riots in 
2002182.  
It is significant that a kandoori has been given in memory of this great saint since 
1999. A kandoori in his memory is given at this dargah every year on 7th day of the 
                                                 
 
181 Since worship at Sufi shrines is becoming an increasingly sensitive topic among Muslims 
in Sri Lanka, I have decided not to reproduce the names of people mentioned in the article. 
182 An interesting point here is that it is not clear whether the hut was destroyed by Tamils, 
upset at the destruction of a row of crosses on a nearby hill, or whether it was destroyed by 
the group of orthodox Muslim youth who are alleged to have destroyed the crosses, and 
took on this ‘heretical’ site as well. 
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Islamic month of Shawwaal by the members of the foundation. Since there are 
paddy fields around the Kalladiappa ziyaram, people have to walk on ridges 
carrying things during the kandoori. There are no buildings or huts to keep things 
at the ziyaram. There is no well either. The kandoori is given under lots of 
difficulties; people erect tents during this period. 
 
5.5 Fourth text: interview with a Tamil man 
The fourth and last text in this intermezzo is the partial, and slightly edited183 
transcript of an interview that I did with a Tamil man of the Sindhunadar caste, who 
has in-depth knowledge about the Verugal temple and its myth of origin. This text 
presents a Tamil perspective on local history, but it also demonstrates inter-caste 
competition. 
The interview started with a description of the myth of origin of the Verugal temple 
(which can be found in section 2.3.6 and is not reproduced here), followed by the 
myth of origin of the Sindhunadar caste. After this, the discussion shifted back to the 
Verugal temple and its current situation. Finally, we spoke about inter-ethnic 
relations in Kottiyar Pattu when my source was a young man, before the war broke 
out.  
 
At the end of his time, Nallainathan Chettiyar handed the keys to the people in 
Eechchilampattu, and disappeared.  
The kudi that used to be responsible for holding the key was the Sakkalaththiyaar 
kudi.  
However, now it has changed and Eechchilampattu village is now responsible in 
its entirety. This change came about 10 years ago, because they were not very 
efficient in maintance184.  
 
Pallikudiyiruppu, a Sindhunadar village, has its own temple. The annual festival 
lasts ten days, and the thiruvilaa are allocated as follows: 
The first, second, third and sixth thiruvilaa are organised by small groups which 
have no kudi. 
                                                 
 
183 As with the first text in this chapter, I have written the narrative of my source into a 
single, uninterrupted text. While the man was talking, I did ask a number of questions for 
clarification; the answers have been woven into the narrative. 
184 While there may be truth in the lack of responsibility among the Sakkalaththiyaar kudi, it 
may also have been that the LTTE (which, according to people whom I spoke to in the area, 
actively discouraged caste and kudi identification) forcibly replaced the identification by kudi 
by an identification by village. For the temple committee and the temple festival, a similar 
change happened, apparently on orders of the LTTE: where earlier positions in the temple 
committee and entitlements to a thiruvilaa in the annual festival were allocated to castes or 
kudis, the entitlements have now come to be identified by village.  
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The fourth thiruvilaa is organised by the Maalayarkudi, which is found in 
Eechchilampattu, Mallikaithivu and Pallikudiyiruppu 
The fifth thiruvilaa is organised by the Vilvaranyankudi, which is found in 
Eechchilampattu, Mallikaithivu and Pallikudiyiruppu 
The seventh thiruvilaa is organised by the Padaththaarkudi, which is found in 
Eechchilampattu, Mallikaithivu and Pallikudiyiruppu 
The eighth thiruvilaa is organised by the Thopichchikudi, which is found in 
Eechchilampattu, Mallikaithivu and Pallikudiyiruppu 
The ninth thiruvilaa is organised by the Umanakariyaarkudi, which is found in 
Mallikaithivu and Pallikudiyiruppu 
The tenth thiruvilaa is organised by the Kudiyiruppukudi, which is found in 
Mallikaithivu and Pallikudiyiruppu 
 
All people in these villages are relatives, and there are no limitations on which 
kudi you can marry. Earlier, there was a strong system of marrying outside your 
own kudi, but now it does not matter anymore and people marry anyone, even 
within their kudi. 
In Eechchilampattu, the biggest kudi is the Sakkalaththiyaar kudi. They are not 
found in Pallikudiyiruppu, but in Mallikaithivu and Eechchilampattu. Apart 
from that, there are the four kudis mentioned above. 
The Sindhunadar have a cattle brand consisting of a lotus flower with various 
additions to the stem185. This cattle brand is also found in Siththandy and in 
Palukamam, where our relatives are into temple management186.  
The term ‘Sindh’ in the [caste] name ‘Sindhunadar Thimilar’ refers to Sindh 
Province, to Harappa and Mohenjodaro. That is where we originate from. 
Nowadays though, we all use Tamil names; no more names from Sindh are in 
use.  
This year there will not be a festival in the Verugal temple; we cannot go there 
now. If there are no people, the festival cannot be held. Then the god does not 
mind. After 1985, the temple was closed for 15 years. It was only reopened in 
1999, and that was celebrated with a kumbh abishekam. The temple was repainted, 
big kurukkals from other temples were invited, and it was reopened in style. 
Normally, the kumbh abishekam is to be held every ten years.  
Earlier, the Kankuveli Sivankovil and the Neelapola Pattiniyammankovil were 
under Sindhunadar management just like the Verugal temple. However, there 
was a court case after the colonies were established, and the Kankuveli people 
took over the Kankuveli and Neelapola temple. The Neelapola temple is still 
there. Sinhalese people took the statue of the goddess away, but they brought it 
                                                 
 
185 See section 3.2.1, paragraph on Sindhunadar Thimilar. 
186 This statement is interesting: in Batticaloa District, the lotus flower cattle brand is 
associated with the Velalar caste, and Siththandy and Palukamam both have relatively 
important, Velalar-managed temples. There are at present no (Sindhunadar) Thimilar in 
Batticaloa District. 
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back. It does not have a thiruvilaa, only a one-day festival in the period from 
March to May. 
The Kankuveli Sivankovil is now under management of Kankuveli, but the 
Sindhunadar still have a separate theertham187 at Kurukkalgangai. It is on the 
same day, but on a different location188. 
When I was young, the people in Palllikudiyiruppu were involved in paddy 
cultivation and cattle rearing. At the time, the relations with the Muslims in our 
area were very good. They came to our village, and we gave them free curd. The 
Muslims did not have any milk, so we gave it to them. Later on189, we started 
selling the curd. We used to go for their funerals and weddings, and they came 
for ours. But there was no marriage between Tamils and Muslims. We are very 
different. Tamils marry Tamils, Muslims marry Muslims. After the problems, the 
relations are still there, Tamils still go to Thoppur for weddings and funerals. 
The Pallikudiyiruppu people used to be in Thoppur. When the Muslims came, 
we moved to Pallikudiyiruppu. There was enough land then, so we just shifted.  
 
5.6 Reflection: a bewildering array of stories 
Together, the texts presented above present a bewildering array of myths, historical 
claims, and claims about the present. I have selected these four texts because they 
were particularly eloquent, but – with exception of the specific reference to the 
‘Gajabahu myth’, which I heard only once – the texts are not unique. Very similar 
narratives were given by other people whom I interviewed. Also, these four 
narratives are not the only versions of reality that are recounted in the area. There 
are many self-identifying groups in Kottiyar Pattu, and each group has its own 
stories. 
Though an outsider might snicker at the sometimes ingenious ways in which 
historical, mythical and sometimes nonsensical elements have been weaved into 
comprehensive stories, it is very important to realise that these stories are part of 
people’s sense of reality, and significantly contribute to the shaping of people’s sense 
of reality. Crucially, these stories shape the preconceptions that people have about 
people of other (ethnic, religious, caste etc.) groups. 
In chapter 2, I have described the complex history of Kottiyar Pattu. In chapter 3, I 
have described the complex structure of society in Kottiyar Pattu. In chapter 4, I have 
described the widespread violence and suffering that people in Kottiyar Pattu have 
had to endure during the war. All of these aspects of complexity are necessary for 
placing everyday inter-ethnic interaction in context, but they are not sufficient for 
understanding what everyday inter-ethnic interaction means and how it is shaped. 
                                                 
 
187 Tamil for ‘water-cutting ritual’ 
188 See section 3.2.1, paragraph on Sindhunadar Thimilar. 
189 After the monetisation of the local economy that followed the introduction of green 
revolution rice, fertilisers and credit. 
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This chapter displays some of the preconceptions that are part of public discourses, 
and the next chapters will focus on the importance of individual agency. 
The first important element of the preconceptions that comes back across the board 
is a sense  
of ‘we were here first, we are the original bearers of the history of Kottiyar Pattu, and 
therefore we are its rightful heirs’. The Sinhalese were there before the Tamils (and 
the Muslims), the Muslims were there before the Tamils and the Sinhalese, the Sufi 
saints were there before the other Muslims, and the Tamils were there before the 
Sinhalese and the Muslims. Sometimes, the narratives contain remarkable claims. 
For example, the (‘Dravidian’) Sindhunadars’ claim of originating from Harappa and 
Mohenjodaro makes them more ‘Aryan’ than the Sinhalese, while the very same 
narrative acknowledges the important role played by the king of Kandy in the 
establishment of the Verugal temple. And Samad’s history, which otherwise is very 
thorough, makes the Muslims the earliest settlers by merging events (involving the 
settlement of Tamils in the area) that happened between the tenth and thirteenth 
centuries with Dutch documents, and by ignoring the obviously ancient Seruwila 
temple altogether. The first (Sinhala) narrative, finally, makes claims about Tamil (or 
Hindu) settlement in Kottiyar Pattu by almost literally re-narrating a section of the 
Rajavaliya, and then diverging from the text on one critical point: the Rajavaliya 
claims that the Chola prisoners-of-war were all settled in the Central Highlands and 
in the South-West (Obeyesekere 1984: 365), and thus not in the East of Sri Lanka. 
Such textual creativity, and the mutual incompatibility of the narratives, may seem 
ridiculous to a self-respecting social scientist, but that is entirely irrelevant. What 
matters is that these narratives are fundamentally part of people’s lived experience. 
They may or may not be true, but they are very real indeed. 
Another important element of the preconceptions found in the narratives has to do 
with intergroup relations. In essence (though regularly presented in very kind 
ways), the presence of other groups is condoned on the precondition that they 
acknowledge the primacy of the narrator’s own group. Intergroup (and particularly 
inter-ethnic) interaction is therefore acceptable to fellow group members as long as it 
is fundamentally unequal, with the ‘other’ being the lower-ranking element in the 
equation. As a consequence, intergroup interaction becomes subversive to fellow 
group members only when the person interacting does this from a premise of 
equality. 
A further point of note is the extent to which local narratives are linked to old texts: a 
17th-century Dutch memoir, an 18th-century Sinhala chronicle, and a 19th-century 
British report, none of which are easy to come across if you are in Sri Lanka and do 
not have access to the internet, a good bookshop, or the National Library. As 
indicated by the way references to such textual sources are used, the formulation 
and continuous sharpening of narratives is very serious business. This is all the more 
remarkable given the comparative isolation of Kottiyar Pattu. It must be said though 
that at least three of the four narratives that I have reproduced were given by 
teachers, who are likely to have an above-average access to written sources.  
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6 Water: irrigation management in the Allai Extension 
Scheme 
 
“The conflict, that was between the government and the LTTE. We are all 
farmers” (ex-LTTE member turned farmer and family man) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the first of three case studies from Kottiyar Pattu on inter-
ethnic interaction in a context of violent ethnicised conflict. It is focused on the 
question that triggered my research: how was it possible that the Allai Extension Scheme 
continued functioning to a reasonable extent during over two decades of violent ethnicised 
conflict, despite the fact that the scheme is shared by Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim farmers? 
In the subsequent sections, I first describe the technical and institutional set-up of the 
AES in some detail (section 6.2), followed by an analysis of major trends that 
influenced scheme performance in the years before violence broke out (section 6.3): 
the introduction of green revolution technology, increasing land scarcity, and 
decreasing water availability. In section 6.4, I discuss trends in paddy cultivation in 
Trincomalee District during the conflict, followed by a discussion of the performance 
of the AES during the conflict (section 6.5). Section 6.6 deals with strategies followed 
by ID staff, farmer representatives, and farmers that contributed to the sustained 
functioning of the AES during the conflict. After this, I invert the question: to what 
extent did the shared use of the AES contribute to ethnic violence (section 6.7)? The 
chapter closes with a reflection on what the case can teach us about everyday inter-
ethnic interaction (section 6.8). 
I approach this case study from a sociotechnical perspective (Mollinga and Bolding 
2006, Vincent 2001, van der Zaag 1992). This perspective views technology (and its 
artefacts) and social interaction as intricately related. Technology, of which an 
irrigation scheme with its channels and structures is an example, forms a site for 
social interaction. On the interface formed by an irrigation scheme, a range of 
stakeholders (among others Irrigation Department staff, farmer representatives, and 
farmers) contest and co-operate to keep the scheme functioning (Ubels 1992; 
Kalshoven 1992). This interaction is shaped by the physical infrastructure, but – as 
different stakeholders meddle with the infrastructure, the interaction also shapes the 
infrastructure: 
 
“To discover the rules governing water supply, the primary point of entry 
should not be property rights in water (and land and infrastructure), but more 
generally the social and technical relations that determine who exerts water 
control” (Mollinga and Bolding 2006: 33). 
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6.2 A description of the Allai Extension Scheme 
6.2.1 Design of the scheme 
The AES is a run-off-the-river scheme with a command area of about 7,000 ha (map 
6.1 and 6.2); it is the most downstream scheme that gets its water from the Mahaweli 
Ganga. The AES was developed in the 1950s, and greatly expanded the extent of 
irrigated agriculture in Kottiyar Pattu. The original Allai irrigation system is 
centuries old, and was rehabilitated by the British in the 1870s. Between then and 
about 1930, the system was gradually improved upon, but expansion was hampered 
by lack of funds and a shortage of buyers for the newly developed land. A further 
expansion became feasible when, under the enthusiastic leadership of D.S. 
Senanayake (who was minister of Agriculture and later Prime Minister), a drive to 
recolonise the Dry Zone and settle Sinhalese from the densely populated south-west 
of the country gathered momentum in the 1940s. 
 
Headworks 
The scheme’s headworks are located about three kilometres south of Kallar, across 
the Verugal Aru and the Mavil Aru, which branch off from the Mahaweli Ganga 
near a place called Kandakkadu. The headworks consist of a weir with four radial 
gates, a 300 m long concrete spillway, a silt extraction sluice, and a sluice at the head 
end of the main channel.  
An embankment connecting these different elements forms a buffer reservoir with a 
live storage of 4,000 acre feet, or about 5,000,000 m3 (interview, Irrigation 
Department office, Kallar, December 2004)190.  
When I did my fieldwork, the headworks had been in poor condition for many 
years: two of the radial gates had been broken and had been replaced by a 
temporary concrete structure, the spillway had disintegrated in several places, part 
of the flood bund was in poor condition, and the silt extraction sluice had been 
dysfunctional since the LTTE blew up a bridge that runs over it in 1990191. As a 
consequence, the buffer capacity of the reservoir had been reduced, which affected 
the reliability of water supply in the dry season. The destruction of the silt extraction 
sluice significantly worsened the silting up of irrigation and particularly drainage 
channels that was already identified as a “major problem” when the silt extraction 
sluice was still operational (Brewer 1984: 3). The silting up of drainage channels has 
worsened flooding problems in low-lying parts of the scheme, and has affected 
water supply in particularly the channel to Muthur and the channel to 
Eechchilampattu. 
 
                                                 
 
190 This buffer is enough to meet full system requirements for about five days if the Verugal 
Aru and Mavil Aru both run dry, or about ten days if the combined inflow reduces to 5 m3/s. 
191 In October 2009, Prof. Vincent visited the AES and was taken to the headworks. By then, 
the implementation of a rehabilitation programme worth about US$ 2 million had come up 
to speed. This programme focuses primarily on the rehabilitation of the headworks. 
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Left Bank Main Channel 
Inlet Channel 
Headworks 
Right Bank Main Channel 
Eechchilampattu 
Channel (RB Br. 3) 
Raja Ela Main Drain 
Muthur Channel (LB D6) 
Inset (map 6.3) Inset (map 6.4) 
Map 6.1. Overview map of the AES (Source: Google Earth image and AES blocking-out plan) 
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 Channel network 
At Kallar, the inlet channel splits into two contour channels: the Left Bank Main 
Channel (LBMC), with a formal command area of about 4,800 ha, and the Right Bank 
Main Channel (RBMC), with a formal command area of about 2,400 ha. 
Below the level of the main channels, the fairly flat topography and the presence of 
pre-existing villages and irrigation infrastructure within the command area have 
made the lay-out of the scheme very complicated and confusing. There is no 
uniformity in the size of tertiary units, and even the terminology used for secondary 
and sub-secondary channels varies across the scheme.  
The LBMC feeds 18 secondary units (known locally as ‘tracts’) which vary in size 
from about 15 ha to almost 800 ha (map 6.2). Below the LBMC, there are 12 
‘distributary channels’ (LB D1 to LB D12). Some of these secondary channels have 
been subdivided into ‘branch channels’, one of which in turn has distributary 
channels. In two cases, distributary channels branch off from each other (D3 and D4, 
and D9 and D10). The RBMC feeds 9 tracts of land which vary in size from about 23 
ha to a little over 600 ha. Below the RBMC, there are 4 ‘branch channels’ (RB B1 to RB 
B4), two of which have been subdivided into ‘distributory channels’. Some of the 
tracts are fed by a secondary or sub-secondary channel, some are fed straight off a 
main channel, but there are also tracts that share one channel. 
Tertiary units are fed by ‘field channels’ (FC), which may branch off from the main 
channel, a distributory channel, or a branch channel. There are close to 400 tertiary 
units in the AES (not counting the purana lands irrigated by the Muthur channel, for 
which the channels do not have codes under the AES). The tertiary units vary in size 
from a little under 4 ha to about 30 ha; most however are in the range from 12 to 18 
ha. The number of lots per tertiary unit varies from 3 to about 25, though the 
majority has about 10 to 12 lots per unit. In this variation, there is a problem. In Sri 
Lanka, channels with a capacity up to 25 cusec192 (700 l/s) are designed with a fixed 
longitudinal slope (S=0.0004) and sideslope (1:1.5), a limited range of bed widths (1’, 
1’6”, 2’, 2’6”, 3’, and so on), and standard depths.  
The smallest channel cross-section has a capacity of 1 cusec (28.3 l/s). This design is 
used for all FCs with a command area up to 14 x 3 acres, or 17 ha. As the gates to the 
tertiary channels are normally either fully opened or fully closed, this means that the 
smaller tertiary units receive a disproportionate share of the water. As there are 
many smaller tertiary units in the head end of the scheme, tail-end water scarcity is 
inherent in the system’s design. 
The complexity of the lay-out of the AES underlines Farmer’s observation that the 
early colony schemes were primarily designed to maximise the number of settlers, 
and that structured water management was only a secondary design criterion 
(Farmer 1957). 
 
                                                 
 
192 1 cusec is 1 cubic foot per second, or about 28.3 l/s. 
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Map 6.2. Tracts and tanks in the AES (Source: Google Earth image and AES blocking-out plan) 
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Command area 
According to the blocking-out plan that can be found in the Irrigation Department 
office in Kallar, the Allai Extension Scheme has a command area of 17,803 acres, 
equivalent to 7,205 ha. Two thirds of the command area (4,841 ha) consists of 3,865 
lots of ‘colony land’; the remaining 2,364 ha is so-called ‘purana land’, which was 
already in private property by the time the AES was built. The first 561 lots that were 
distributed have an extent of 4 acres (1.62 ha) each193. The remaining lots are 3 acres 
(1.21 ha) each, with exception of 195 2-acre (0.81 ha) lots between Mahindapura and 
Poonagar that were developed in 1964. 
Outside the formal command area, about 2,000 ha is irrigated without authorisation. 
This is about 30% of the formal command area, placing the Allai Extension Scheme 
among the schemes with the worst problems in this regard in Sri Lanka (Dekker 
2007: 56). Already before the war broke out in Kottiyar Pattu, Brewer (1984: 4) put 
the extent of “encroachments and illicit irrigation of highland holdings” at “even 
larger” than in the Parakrama Samudra Scheme (where it comes to 25% of the formal 
command area) and in the Minneriya scheme (where it comes to 40% of the formal 
command area). This may have been an over-estimate, but it indicates that the 
problem has been severe for a long time. Unauthorised cultivation comes in two 
forms: encroachment of reserved lands (for roads, drains etc.) that are by themselves 
irrigable (map 6.3), and and cultivation of lands that are too high for normal 
irrigation, and which require water levels in the channels to be raised beyond the 
normal design level (map 6.4).  
Most of the AES has alluvial clay soils, which are among the best soils that Sri Lanka 
has for paddy cultivation. Some areas have sandy soil: an area near Manalchenai 
(part of LB tract 9A), and much of RB tract 5 and 6 near Poonagar. These areas have a 
higher water requirement and are more susceptible to drought damage. The 
secondary channel that takes water to the Eechchilampattu region (RB BC3) passes 
through the second sandy region at a critical location, right between the Sinhala 
colony of Mahindapura and the Tamil colony of Poonagar. Because this area has a 
higher elevation than the rest of the scheme, the channel had to be cut fairly deep. 
The channel banks were designed at a side slope of 1:1 ½, which is too steep for 
sandy soil. As a consequence, the banks slowly collapse, and the channel’s capacity 
is reduced by sediment. Because precisely this area was a military frontline for many 
years, maintenance of the channel was difficult. 
                                                 
 
193 These lots can be found in LB tracts 1-7 and 8A; they were settled between about 1951 and 
1953.  
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Drain; tract boundary 
Encroachments 
Irrigation channel 
Tract boundary 
Abandoned fields 
Original lots 
Map 6.3. Example of encroachment. (Source: Google Earth image and AES blocking-out plan) 
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6.2.2 The organisation of operation and maintenance  
Because the AES gets its water from a river that crosses provincial boundaries, it is 
considered to be an interprovincial scheme (despite being located in its entirety 
within the Eastern Province). This means that it falls under the central, rather than 
under the provincial Irrigation Department (ID). 
In Sri Lanka as in many other countries, the Irrigation Department has traditionally 
been responsible for operation and maintenance (O&M) of the headworks, main 
channels and secondary channels (including sub-secondary channels) of major 
irrigation schemes; within the tertiary unit, farmers are responsible for O&M.  From 
the late 1970s however, there has been a trend towards increasing farmer 
participation in O&M at the secondary level and even at the system level. Increased 
farmer involvement in O&M was supposed to lead to increased irrigation efficiency, 
which in turn should lead to a reduction in tail-end water shortages, and ultimately 
to a higher food production for the country and higher income for farmers. Apart 
from lofty ideals of democratic and participative democratic involvement of farmers 
that tend to be stressed in the public discourse, a much more mundane reality has 
been at least equally important in the development of participative O&M systems 
across the world: after the massive surge in development of new irrigation systems 
between the 1950s and 1970s, it became clear that existing O&M systems were not 
going to be affordable. Giving farmers a bigger say in water management, combined 
Right Bank Main Channel 
Small tank 
Unauthorised channel 
Map 6.4. Example of illegal cultivation (Source: Google Earth image) 
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with the introduction of an O&M fee, was a significant cost-cutting exercise 
(Wickremaratne and Ekanayake 2002: 150)194.  
After a local initiative to improve O&M in the 6,000 ha Minipe Scheme with farmer 
participation proved successful, the government accepted the strategy and made it 
national policy. The first large-scale implementation was done in the Gal Oya (Left 
Bank) Scheme in Ampara District (Uphoff 1992; ARTI 1991). Initial results were so 
encouraging that the Integrated Management of Major Irrigation Schemes (INMAS) 
programme was set up to spread the new O&M method over a further 37 major 
irrigation schemes. For the management of the INMAS programme, a separate 
Irrigation Management Division (IMD) was set up within the Ministry of Irrigation 
(Dharmasena 2000: 168-169; De Silva 2000; Dekker 2007). In every scheme that falls 
under INMAS the IMD (which is mostly staffed by people with a social science 
background) has appointed a Resident Project Manager (RPM) who is responsible 
for the overall management of the scheme and for facilitating the work of Farmer 
Organisations (FOs), while the ID provides the technical expertise and implements 
the day-to-day O&M of irrigation infrastructure according to the plans made by the 
IMD.  
The AES was included in the INMAS programme in 1985. However, after the RPM 
was shot dead within a few months, the introduction of INMAS was put on hold and 
the RPM’s position remained vacant until 2003. During this time, the Irrigation 
Department remained responsible for O&M up to the tertiary outlets. In 2003, a new 
RPM was appointed, and a new start was made with the training of FOs. Frequent 
staff turnover (by the time I left in 2008, the third or fourth RPM in five years was in 
place) and the difficult security situation in the years 2005 and 2006 have however 
meant that progress has been slow. 
 
As the proper introduction of INMAS in the AES did not start until 2003, the pre-
existing system for O&M at the tertiary level remained in existence throughout most 
of the conflict. This system was centered around the post of the wattai vidane or 
irrigation headman195, and was in many ways similar to the ‘traditional’ wattai vidane 
system that was (re)discovered and formalised during the tenure of Governor Sir 
Henry Ward (1855-1860): 
                                                 
 
194 As Wickremaratne and Ekanayake (2002) indicate, the introduction of the O&M fee in 
1984 saw only limited success. It was initially set at Rs. 100/= per acre per year (50% of the 
actually required fee), and was intended to be gradually increased to fully cover actual 
O&M expenses. However, as fee collection proved disappointing, it was decided to freeze 
the rate. Despite significant inflation, the fee was still Rs. 100/= per acre per year when I did 
my field research. 
195 According to Kasynathan and Manoharan, a more accurate translation would be 
something like ‘tract headman’. A tract ‘usually has an extent of  300-500 acres’ (1986:1, 
footnote 1) 
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“Ward’s greatest contribution to irrigation was the revival of the ancient 
customs, relating to paddy cultivation for the purpose of regulating the use of 
water and setting up a communal machinery for the settling of disputes relating 
to its use […] The suggestion of reviving these ancient customs was contained in 
[a] unique report, [that] dealt with the ancient irrigation system in Ceylon and 
enumerated the ancient customs connected with paddy cultivation and 
irrigation. These customs […] were enforced by the ancient kings through the 
gansabhawas or village councils of elders in various districts. The powers and 
functions of these councils did not concern irrigation only but their jurisdiction 
extended to all aspects of the life of the village communities, subject to the final 
authority of the King. According to these customs, it was the duty of every 
cultivator of paddy lands, who drew his supply of water from a common 
irrigation work, to contribute his labour to the building, repair or maintenance of 
these works” (Balasingham 1968:66).  
 
In practice, this system of customs meant that each farmer was responsible for a the 
maintenance of a stretch of irrigation channel proportionate to the acreage of paddy 
land that he commanded, ploughing and water allocation were co-ordinated in order 
to optimise water use, a system of water rotation was implemented during periods 
of scarcity, and a system was in place to solve conflict and to punish those who did 
not obey the rules (ibid.:66-67). Apparently, the old customs and the village councils 
had fallen into disuse under the British196, and the British legal system was too 
cumbersome, slow and expensive for most farmers to be able to claim their rights 
(Balasingham 1968:67). The position of the wattai vidane was legally recognised in the 
Irrigation Ordinance no. 9 of 1856. 
What is interesting in the discourse presented above, is that two things are left out. 
Firstly, it was very convenient for the British to come up with a revival of ‘traditional 
water management systems’, as this would greatly reduce the financial burden on 
the colonial government, which to a great extent would be able to disengage itself 
from operation, maintenance and conflict resolution regarding irrigation systems. 
Secondly, by re-creating the institution of ‘beneficiary contribution’, the rajakariya 
(compulsory unpaid labour as a service to the King) which had been abolished in 
1832 could be re-introduced with a friendly face, thus greatly reducing the cost of 
constructing and rehabilitating irrigation systems, and reducing the pressure on a 
very tight labour market, where labour was quite structurally in short supply and 
competition between plantations and public works for the allocation of the available 
labourers was at times fierce197. This was significant in a time when budgets were 
                                                 
 
196 Note however that neither Balasingham nor Kasynathan and Manoharan give any details 
of how these customs had functioned before the British came. 
197 In a similar vein Mosse (1997), discussing the colonial construction of ‘traditional 
irrigation management’ in India, concluded that the so-called ‘traditional irrigation 
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tight, following an economic crisis in Britain in 1846198. And there was another push 
factor behind irrigation development: as the number of plantations increased, more 
labourers were imported from India. Local paddy production was insufficient to 
feed this group of people, and large amounts of money had to be spent on the 
import of rice – during Wards tenure, annual rice imports increased from roughly 
65,600 tonnes to 72,600 tonnes. “[The] [g]overnment would not necessarily incur loss 
of revenue if rice imports decreased but increased cultivation would lead to 
increasing land-sales and tithes in return for any advances made by the 
government” (ibid.:65). Ward and his successors enthousiastically promoted the 
wattai vidane system, and with success: the system was in use for almost a century.  
 
Kasynathan and Manoharan summarise the tasks of the Wattai Vidane as “the 
management of irrigation water, the clearing and maintenance of channels, and 
other cultivation-related tasks such as the enforcement of fencing obligations, 
exclusion of stray cattle, etc” (1986:1). Farmers and Wattai Vidanes from Kottiyar 
Pattu gave me similar lists of tasks. Crucially however, the tasks were generally 
presented in a different order. Negotiating with the Irrigation Department office for 
water supply and for the allocation of maintenance funds was given as the most 
important task, closely followed by fencing and keeping stray animals out. Then 
came channel maintenance, and water management within the area under the wattai 
vidane’s responsibility came only in the last place. This was somewhat contrary to 
what I had expected: water management tends to be very limited. The Irrigation 
Department does its best to keep the main and secondary channels filled to – or over 
– capacity, and the field channels are opened at the beginning of the season and 
closed at the end. Within the tertiary units, there seems to be very minimal 
collaborative water management. Farmers simply cut a hole in the channel bund 
when they need water for their fields, and close it when they do not need any. 
Repeated questioning of wattai vidanes and farmers without exception drew the same 
answer: “we take water when we need it, and when we do not need water, we do 
not take it.” Nobody whom I spoke to ever mentioned any kind of system of water 
allocation or water sharing. In contrast to the elaborate literature that exists on 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
management’ mechanisms (using unpaid community labour) were quite possibly invented 
by the colonial government as a way to cut the cost of operation and maintenance of 
irrigation infrastructure. 
198 I refer here, among others, to the following quote about Earl Grey, the Secretary of State at 
the time: “[Earl Grey] realised that restoration of these [irrigation] works could be 
undertaken only at considerable expense, which the Government could ill afford at a time of 
economic crisis. He favoured however a policy of making grants-in-aid, restricted to works 
in which a considerable amount of native labour could be engaged or which could produce a 
fair return for the capital invested by increasing the production powers of the Island” 
(Balasingham 1968:63). 
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intricate systems of irrigation water management, the issue does not seem to be 
relevant to the farmers in Kottiyar Pattu. No intricacies there: field channels are 
opened at the beginning of the season and closed at the end, and there is no water 
level adjustment in between. When there is water, people take what passes their 
fields, and when there is not, they either do not take water or they block a channel 
somewhere to get water199.  
Despite the sturdiness of the wattai vidane system, it was not trouble-free. The wattai 
vidanes were generally among the larger landowners in their areas, and “derived 
their authority, and therefore their effectiveness, by holding a fairly high socio-
economic position in the feudal hierarchy in the village” (Kasynathan and 
Manoharan, 1986:11). This meant that they had the power to deny people water, and 
that there was very little room for democratically correcting power abuse. In order to 
improve the lot of particularly tenant farmers and break through the feudalism, the 
government of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike introduced the Paddy Lands Act in 1958. The 
wattai vidanes were replaced by Cultivation Committees (CCs), composed of elected 
farmer representatives. These committees did not function very well however, 
because they were unable to muster the level of authority to organise contributions 
for maintenance and to punish farmers who did not stick to the rule that the wattai 
vidanes had had. Also, moneylenders and absentee landlords, who had been 
excluded from membership, undermined the functioning of the committees (De 
Silva 2000: 409).  
When the Agrarian Services Act was introduced in 1979, the responsibilities of the 
Cultivation Committees were taken over by Cultivation Officers, who are civil 
servants falling under the Agrarian Services Department. The post of wattai vidane 
was re-instituted, but merely as an assistant to the Cultivation Officer. As with the 
Cultivation Committees, the restyled wattai vidane was supposed to an annually 
elected farmer representative.  
Despite all these formal changes, Kasynathan and Manoharan found in the mid-
eighties that in the Tamil-speaking area where they conducted their research, the 
wattai vidane system continued functioning much as it did prior to 1958. Although 
the land reforms and the subdivision of lands among the baby boom generation 
meant that wattai vidanes were generally no longer large landholders, most came 
from families which had occupied the post for several generations. 
                                                 
 
199 Erik Dekker, who lived with a farmer’s family in Dehiwatte for a couple of weeks and 
spent much of his time looking at the channels around Dehiwatte, made similar 
observations: channels were opened at the beginning of the season and closed at the end, 
and barely touched in between. I never once saw anyone adjusting a gate setting over the 
years that I visited Kottiyar Pattu. That may have given me a distorted picture however, 
because farmers generally go to their fields in the cool early hours of the morning and of the 
late evening, while (partly as a security precaution) I generally did not leave Muthur before 
8.30 am, and usually returned to work out my fieldnotes around 5 pm.  
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Under INMAS and its parallel programmes of irrigation management reform, 
Farmers’ Organisations were introduced, which were not only responsible for O&M 
of the irrigated area under their responsibility, but also became the body through 
which farmers could access subsidised inputs, credit and crop insurance. Rather than 
per tract, farmer representatives are elected per tertiary unit, and the executive 
committee of the FO consists of the representatives of each tertiary unit in the area 
under control of the FO. The chairman of the FO then acts as liaison to the various 
government departments.  
In the AES, a start had been made with the introduction of FOs in the colony areas in 
1985, but as support under INMAS was put on hold within a few months, the FOs 
did not receive coaching and follow-up support. In practice, the FOs became 
dysfunctional, and their tasks were taken up by individual farmer representatives; 
elections rarely took place. 
In the Tamil villages, the wattai vidanes remained in function in a way that is very 
much in line with Kasynathan and Manoharan’s observations in the tail end of the 
Gal Oya Left Bank scheme, in the south of Batticaloa District. They documented that 
elections are seldom contested, and the wattai vidane generally inherits his position 
from a maternal uncle. Mark Whitaker, who conducted his PhD research in 
Mandoor, a village in Kasynathan and Manoharan’s study area around the same 
time as they did, describes a case where there was an election (Whitaker 1999:96-98). 
This may not be contradictory: I found that in Muthur, wattai vidanes are formally 
elected, but just like Mark Whitaker has documented, candidates tend to get selected 
from certain key families, so that succession tends to take place from an uncle to his 
sister’s son. The election that Whitaker documented ended in a unanimous vote. 
According to Whitaker, openly losing an election was considered a great loss of face, 
so that the actual – in this case fiercely contested – election was done informally and 
the final, formal vote was unanimous.  
In Muslim villages, most wattai vidanes whom I spoke to had been in function for 
many years. Here, the system is again different: rather than through elections or 
inheritance, wattai vidanes are selected and appointed by the mosque committee, 
which is in charge of almost all community affairs in the village. 
 
6.3 Trends affecting scheme performance, 1950-1985 
In this section, I describe three trends that have affected the performance of the AES 
since it was developed: the spread of modern farming technologies, an increasing 
scarcity of land, and a decreasing availability of water. 
 
6.3.1 The introduction of modern farming technologies 
Throughout the second half of the 19th century, rice yields in Sri Lanka were very 
stable: between 20 and 30 bushels per acre (1.0-1.5 MT/ha) with irrigation, and 
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between 10 and 15 bushels per acre (0.5-0.8 MT/ha) without (Elliott 1911-1914, see 
particularly vol. XXXIX, no. III: 237). The total production did increase substantially, 
but this was primarily due to an increase in irrigated area. Despite numerous trials, 
it proved impossible to structurally increase yields beyond 1.5 MT/ha until well into 
the 20th century. The first so-called ‘pure-line’ rice seed was introduced in 
Trincomalee District in 1935 (AR 1936: E18). The spread of this seed peaked in 1961, 
when about one fifth of the cultivated area was sown with it. The first proper ‘green 
revolution’ rice variety, H-4, was introduced in the district in the maha season of 
1960-61, when it was used on 100 acres. A year later, H-4 was used on 3,622 acres, 
about 10% of the total acreage sown in the district. The acreage of ‘pure-line’ seed 
dropped to 5,000 acres (AR 1961-2, part IV: C319). Between then and 1980, green 
revolution rice spread to about 75% of the sown acreage. By 1985, this had increased 
to about 90% (Henegedara 2002:17, figures 3 and 5). 
The introduction of improved rice varieties also led to an increase in the use of 
chemical fertiliser. Demand for fertiliser increased so fast that the available logistical 
facilities could not handle it; in order to create buffer stocks, the Trincomalee GA 
proposed the construction of four fertiliser stores in the main paddy-producing areas 
in 1964, one of which was to be constructed in Kilivetti (AR 1964-5: A16). The 
seasonal fertiliser use for the district exceeded 1,000 MT for the first time in yala 1970 
(AR 1969-70: A29); 4,771 MT was used in maha 2001-2, and 3,204 MT in yala 2002 
(Trincomalee Kachcheri 2003: 41,42,50). 
Farm mechanisation also made its appearance, and slowly but steadily spread 
throughout the district. The first tractor had been introduced in Kottiyar Pattu by 
1948 (AR 1948: A85). In 1953, the use of tractors for ploughing in the district was 
“becoming very popular especially in Tampalakamam Pattu where there are 5 
privately owned tractors” (AR 1953, vol. I: A148). Nine years later, demand had 
outstripped supply. A shortage of tractors was reported for the first time (AR 1962-3: 
A11). 
These developments, combined with the expansion of irrigation facilities, 
contributed to a rapid increase in average yields for Trincomalee District, from about 
1.6 MT/ha in the mid-1930s to almost 3.5 MT/ha in 1970 (AR 1936: E21, AR 1969-70: 
A29). The protectionist economic policies of the Sirimavo regime (1970-1977) saw a 
reduction of yields because the availability of imported inputs like fertiliser 
reduced200. The liberalisation of the economy by the UNP regime of J.R. Jayawardene 
brought a renewed increase in yields. Available data show that between 1979 and 
1985, the average yield in Trincomalee District increased from 2.5 MT/ha to 3.5 
MT/ha (ASD 2009).  
                                                 
 
200 Average yields for the whole of Sri Lanka declined from 2.6 MT/ha in 1970 to 2.3 MT/ha in 
1976, before bouncing back to 3.6 MT/ha in 1983 and exceeding 4.0 MT/ha for the first time 
in 2004 (ASD 2009) 
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The introduction of new rice varieties had another advantage: because the new 
varieties had a shorter growth period than the traditional varieties, double-cropping 
became much easier than it had been. In the AES, the cropping intensity increased 
from around 0.95 in 1944 and 1945 (AR 1944: B44, AR 1945: B22) to about 1.78 in 1968 
(Wickramasekara 1984: 29).  
 
6.3.2 Increasing land scarcity, 1960-1985 
After the AES was completed by the mid-1960s, no further expansions took place. 
Insufficient attention for drainage in the design of the scheme meant that part of the 
fields around Neelapola and about half of the fields that had been planned in the 
former tank bed of the Allai Tank suffered from annual flooding. In addition, the 
high sediment load of the water caused the silting up of channels and drains. 
Insufficient budget for maintenance meant that the AES started a slow but steady 
process of decay right from the moment it was completed. 
Initially, this does not seem to have been a very big problem, as substantial amounts 
of reservation land were available. First the farmers whose original allotment was 
unusable, and then second-generation farmers started encroaching on these lands. 
Over the course of the 1970s, the introduction of green revolution rice varieties in 
combination with the rapid expansion of fertiliser use and farm mechanisation led to 
increased yields, which made it possible to partly compensate for the reducing per 
capita availability of paddy land. By the late 1970s however, there was hardly any 
more land available for encroachment201, and land scarcity became a serious issue.  
To indicate the severity of the problem, it is useful to look at data from the census of 
1963 (just after the influx of new settlers had stopped), 1971 (just before the second 
generation of settlers started to get married) and 1981 (the last census data before the 
outbreak of violence). 
Table 6.1 gives the estimated number of households (assuming an average of about 5 
people per household) for these three years, as well as for 1985. I have extrapolated 
the figures for 1985 using the same population growth rates as for the period 1971-
1981. Table 6.2 gives the increase in number of families in each time period. 
                                                 
 
201 Brewer (1984: 4) noted the presence of very substantial extents of illicit cultivation in the 
AES in early 1984. Between then and now, the extent of encroachments does not seem to 
have changed much anymore.  
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 1963 1971 1981 1985 (estimated) 
Kottiyar Pattu (total) 6,600 8,500 12,000 13,800 
Muthur DS Division N/A 5,900 8,000 9,000 
Seruwila DS Division 
(including Eechchilampattu 
DS Division) 
N/A 2,600 4,000 4,800 
Table 6.1. Estimated numbers of households in Kottiyar Pattu 
 
 1963-1971 1971-1981 1981-1985 
(estimated) 
1971-1985 
(estimated) 
1963-1985 
(estimated) 
Kottiyar Pattu (total) 1,900 3,500 1,800 5,300 7,200 
Muthur DS Division N/A 2,100 1,000 3,100 N/A 
Seruwila DS Division 
(including Eechchilampattu 
DS Division) 
N/A 1,400 800 2,200 N/A 
Table 6.2. Estimated periodical increases in the number of households in Kottiyar Pattu 
 
In 1971, about 72% of the working population in Kottiyar Pattu was employed in 
agriculture. In the area covering Seruwila and Eechchilampattu DS Divisions this 
was 81%, while in the area covering Muthur DS Division (where there was also a 
substantial population of fishermen, and a small population of government servants 
and people working in the business sector) it was about 67% (Census 1971: 116-119, 
124-125). Assuming that these ratios remained fairly stable until the outbreak of 
violence, this leads to the following numbers of agriculture-dependent families 
(table 6.3) and periodical increases (table 6.4): 
 
 1963 1971 1981 1985 (estimated) 
Kottiyar Pattu (total) 4,720 6,050 8,570 9,870 
Muthur DS Division N/A 3,950 5,350 6,000 
Seruwila DS Division 
(including Eechchilampattu 
DS Division) 
N/A 2,100 3,220 3,870 
Table 6.3. Estimated numbers of agriculture-dependent households in Kottiyar Pattu 
 
 1963-1971 1971-1981 1981-1985 
(estimated) 
1971-1985 
(estimated) 
1963-1985 
(estimated) 
Kottiyar Pattu (total) 1,330 2,520 1,300 3,820 5,150 
Muthur DS Division N/A 1,400 650 2,050 N/A 
Seruwila DS Division 
(including Eechchilampattu 
DS Division) 
N/A 1,120 650 1,770 N/A 
Table 6.4. Estimated periodical increases in the number of agriculture-dependent households in 
Kottiyar Pattu 
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My estimate is that about 50% of the new agriculture-dependent families that were 
established between 1971 and 1981, and 75% of the new agriculture-dependent 
families that were established between 1981 and 1985, were unable to acquire 
(through inheritance, purchase or encroachment) sufficient land to live from, and 
became effectively landless. Over a period of a mere 14 years, these new landless 
families came to constitute almost 20% of all agriculture-dependent families in 
Muthur DS Division, and almost 30% of all agriculture-dependent families in 
Seruwila DS Division. This dramatically changed the socio-economic composition of 
the population. As mentioned in section 3.3, it is not suprising that it was from 
among this category of people that hundreds were recruited as home guards, who 
were to play a notorious role in the violence of 1985. 
 
6.3.3 Decreasing water availability, 1976-1985 
Many farmers whom I spoke to mentioned another problem that occurred around 
the same time that serious land shortages developed: water shortages caused by the 
diversion weir at Polgolla that was taken into use in 1976. This weir on the outskirts 
of Kandy diverts substantial amounts of water from the Mahaweli River in the 
direction of Anuradhapura. In figure 6.1, I have plotted average discharge at 
Manampitiya for the maha and yala seasons from 1954 to 2004, as well as the lowest 
recorded discharge for each yala season202. For each of the three variables, I have 
included linear trendlines for the period 1954-1975 (before the Polgolla weir was 
taken into use) and for the period 1976-2004 (after it was taken into use). The gaps 
between the trendlines make it obvious that the Polgolla weir caused a substantial 
reduction in the Mahaweli’s discharge downstream of the weir: the average yala 
discharge nearly halved, while the minimum discharge was reduced by 75%. While 
the Polgolla weir caused a shock reduction in discharge, there has also been a long-
term, and equally dramatic, downward trend in discharge patterns at Manampitiya. 
Irrigation development and reducing rainfall (see figure 2.3) are presumably key 
factors behind it; a more in-depth analysis was outside the scope of my research. 
In order to determine how severe the impact of both trends was on the AES, it is 
essential to establish a relationship between discharge at Manampitiya and inflow 
into the AES. 
 
                                                 
 
202 Particularly with regard to minimum discharge values, it must be noted that I am not sure 
of the accuracy of the measured values. Since the discharge is not measured over a fixed 
profile, regular calibration of the rating curve is necessary, but I have no information on 
such calibration. Also, the profile of the river bed keeps changing, and water levels are very 
shallow in the dry season. This makes reliable measurement extremely difficult. 
Nevertheless, the trends are very clear. 
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Manampitiya, along the Polonnaruwa-Batticaloa road, is the most downstream point 
along the Mahaweli River where discharges are measured. Between Manampitiya 
and Kandakkadu, where the Verugal Aru and the Mavil Aru branch off from the 
Mahaweli River, there is no substantial inflow of drainage water, which means that 
the possibility of a reduced flow at the measuring station being compensated by a 
return flow of diverted water can be discounted. Even though the irrigation schemes 
at Polonnaruwa and Minneriya are located between Manampitiya and Kandakkadu, 
satellite imagery on Google Earth clearly shows that the drainage water from these 
two schemes flows parallel to the Mahaweli, separated by a ridge, until just 
downstream of the point where the Verugal River splits from the Mahaweli. 
The problem that remains then is how much of the water in the Mahaweli flows 
straight on to the sea, and how much branches off towards the AES headworks. The 
only data that I have been able to find on this are from dry-season measurements 
that were conducted between 1938 and 1951 at three points: in the Verugal River, in 
the Mavil Aru, and in the Mahaweli River between the branching point of the 
Figure 6.1. Discharge patterns at Manampitiya (Source: Irrigation Department) 
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Verugal River and the sea203 (AR 1945: B59; AR 1946, part V: B57; AR 1947, part V: 
B67, AR 1951, part V: appendix F, table 3).  
These limited data (seasonal average discharge, average discharge for the entire 
measurement period, and lowest measured discharge) give an indication of the way 
the water is divided over the branches for a discharge range from 0 to about 160 
m3/s, as schematised in figure 6.2.  
If the fairly standard rates of 1.5 l/s/ha for pre-saturation and land preparation, and 
1.0 l/s/ha for maintenance flow are used to estimate water requirements for the AES 
(Albinson and Perry 2002: 17), the total requirement for the full command area (7,000 
                                                 
 
203 Drainage flow from the irrigation schemes at Polonnaruwa, Minneriya, Giritale and 
Kaudulla does flow into the Mahaweli between the branch with the Verugal River and the 
downstream measuring point in the Mahaweli (at Chundakadu, not far from Kankuveli). 
While the area irrigated by these four schemes is substantial, the Kaudulla Scheme had not 
yet been developed by the time the measurements were taken and the Polonnaruwa Scheme 
was only partially developed. Also, a substantial part of the drainage water was re-used to 
irrigate encroachments. But even if all the drainage water does flow to the river, the total 
volume is limited. For the 1999 yala season, Bandara estimated total field losses in this 
cluster of irrigation schemes to be about 840 mm (2003:165), which comes to 0.6 l/s/ha. At 
least half of this will be seepage losses in fields and channels. With a total cultivated area at 
the time of  about 10,000 ha (less in a very dry year) and an average return flow of say 0.3 
l/s/ha, the total return flow will average only 3 m3/s.  
Figure 6.2. Estimated division of flow between the Mahaweli River and the Verugal Aru and Mavil 
Aru 
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ha) comes to around 10.5 m3/s at the start of the season and 7.0 m3/s during the rest 
of the season (the dotted lines in the graph). This means that water shortages will 
start to occur roughly when the discharge at Manampitiya drops below 40 m3/s 
during the start of the season, and below 35 m3/s during the rest of the season. 
While this is only a rough estimate, it fits with observations by farmers with whom I 
spoke: the earliest remembered episode of serious water shortages was in 1972, 
when the discharge at Manampitiya dropped to 34 m3/s. This was the first time it 
was below 40 m3/s since 1959 (when the scheme was still partly under development, 
and scheme requirements were still limited). In that year a temporary weir was built 
across the Mahaweli for the first time, with the objective of diverting more water 
towards the AES headworks. After 1976, the minimum discharge dropped 
dramatically, and the construction of a sandbag weir at Kandakadu became an 
annual event organised by the ID with the participation of a large number of 
Muslim, Tamil and Sinhala farmers. By 1983, the farmers were desperate; only about 
half of the fields could be cultivated in the yala season (Brewer 1984: 3). When the 
Irrigation Department started building another temporary weir,  
 
“some farmers assaulted the work crew and TA [Technical Assistant] and 
eventually took the TA hostage in order to force the ID [Irrigation Department] 
to use a tractor that had been assigned to a different project so that the dam 
could be built more quickly. One result was severe damage to the tractor. From 
other comments, it appears that there is great hostility toward ID officers in Allai 
and little control by the ID of the situation. […] 
In Allai, the IE [Irrigation Engineer] has reportedly spent much of the last six 
months away from the scheme to recover from illness. From outside sources I 
have been told that some of the TAs do not even try to do their jobs there” 
(Brewer 1984: 5). 
 
Brewer’s report was confirmed by several middle-aged and elderly farmers whom I 
spoke to in the course of my fieldwork. What is crucial here is that, while in other 
parts of the country (including around Trincomalee town!) ethnic tensions rapidly 
degenerated into violence over the summer of 1983, the farmers in the AES 
collaborated to increase the water supply, rather than that they competed with each 
other over what little water was available. At this point in time, the ‘enemy’ was the 
Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project (and the Polgolla weir in particular), not 
the other farmers within the scheme.   
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6.4 Paddy production in Trincomalee District, 1981-2009 
In order for me to say anything relevant about the performance of the AES during 
the years of conflict, data are required. Unfortunately, the data that are available 
specifically about the AES are sketchy and do not cover the entire conflict period. As 
a compromise, I therefore first present the longitudinal data that were available, 
namely at the level of Trincomalee District. In the next section, I merge the 
districtwide trends with specific data and information from interviews to 
reconstitute a picture of the performance of the AES during the years of conflict. 
 
6.4.1 Sown and harvested areas 
In this section, I present and analyse statistics on paddy production in Trincomalee 
Districts for the period October 1980 – September 2009204. The data were drawn from 
the website of the Agriculture Statistics Division (ASD) of the Department of Census 
& Statistics (ASD 2009).  
As can be seen in figures 6.3 and 6.4, the area under paddy cultivation showed a 
rapid increase between 1981 and 1984. This was mainly due to the development of 
the Morawewa and Gomarankadawela irrigation schemes. After large-scale violence 
during the maha season of 1984-1985 and the yala season of 1985 caused thousands of 
people to flee from their villages205, large areas were abandoned. The failure of the 
Kantale reservoir bund at the start of the yala season of 1986 caused a further 
(temporary) drop in cultivated area. The arrival of the IPKF at the start of the 1987-
1988 maha season brought the return of displaced Tamils and a slight increase in 
cultivated area, only to be outstripped by renewed displacement of Sinhala colonists. 
After the war of 1990, paddy cultivation bounced back. This upward trend was 
briefly interrupted after fighting broke out in the second half of 1995, and after 
fighting broke out in the middle of 2006. 
An important detail in the data on paddy cultivation is the extent to which sown 
land was not harvested. I present these data in figures 6.5 and 6.6. 
                                                 
 
204 Agricultural years (which run from October to September) do not match calendar years. 
In this section, I follow the practice of the Department of Census & Statistics of indicating an 
agricultural year by one calendar year rather than two. So the agricultural year 2009 runs 
from October 2008 to September 2009. The maha (rainy) season runs from October to March; 
the yala (dry) season runs from April to September.  
205 Mass violence around Trincomalee town started in 1983, but did not yet affect the main 
paddy producing areas so much. In late 1984, there was violence and displacement in the 
Tamil villages in the rural northern half of the district, but as these villages had 
comparatively small acreages under paddy, the impact on district-level figures was minor. 
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Figure 6.3. Extent under paddy in maha season, Trincomalee District, 1981-2009 (Source: ASD 2009) 
 
Figure 6.4. Extent under paddy in yala season, Trincomalee District, 1981-2009 (Source: ASD 2009) 
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Figure 6.5. Percentage not harvested in maha season, Trincomalee District, 1981-2009 (Source: ASD 
2009) 
 
Figure 6.6. Percentage not harvested in yala season, Trincomalee District, 1981-2009 (Source: ASD 
2009) 
 
Bridging troubled waters?  
238 
 
As can be seen, in almost two thirds of all seasons in the time series, the abandoned 
area was less than 5% of the sown area. Large-scale abandonment of paddy lands is 
primarily related to extreme weather: maha 1982 and 1996 saw drought, maha 1984, 
2004 and 2008 saw floods, yala 1983, 1985, 1987 and 1991 saw drought. Large-scale 
violence and displacement only comes in second place as a reason why farmers 
abandoned their fields before the harvest – this was the case in the yala seasons of 
1985, 1987, 1990 and 2006 and the maha season of 1987-1988. In almost 2/3 of the 
seasons in the time series however, less than 5% of the area that was sown was not 
harvested. 
When taking figures 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 together, two very important conclusions 
can be drawn. Firstly, the amount of land that farmers cultivated is primarily related 
to the security situation and only secondarily to the weather. Secondly, with the 
exception of sudden outbreaks of large-scale violence, whether or not sown fields are 
harvested is primarily related to floods and droughts, and not to the security 
situation. In short: farmers did everything they could to get a harvest from those fields that 
they started cultivating. As I will show later on in this chapter, this involved actively 
working towards containing violence. 
 
6.4.2 Yield 
Paddy yields in Trincomalee District have been reasonably good despite the conflict. 
As can be seen in figures 6.7 and 6.8, yields increased substantially between 1981 and 
1985 as a consequence of the liberalisation of the economy. This was followed by a 
decrease in yields from about 1985 to the mid-1990s, and a steady increase from 
about 1996 onwards. 
Figure 6.9 shows the difference between district-level yields and countrywide 
average yields (as percentages of countrywide average yield). In the first half of the 
1980s, yala yields in Trincomalee District were better than in the rest of the country, 
probably because the district had comparatively good irrigation facilities and good 
soil. I am not quite sure why, already before the war, maha yields were structurally 
lower than the countrywide average. It is however clear that the growth in yields in 
the district fell behind the national trend as the war progressed.   
Four factors contributed to this: (1) the abandonment of irrigated areas (leading to a 
relative over-representation of rainfed areas); (2) the lack of maintenance of 
irrigation schemes (contributing to both tail-end water shortages and flooding); (3) 
difficulties with the distribution of newer rice varieties, and (4) restrictions on 
fertiliser usage for particularly Tamil farmers. From the late 1990s onwards, and 
particularly after the 2002 ceasefire, the trend in district-wide yields caught up again 
with the rest of the country after the four bottlenecks mentioned above were 
gradually addressed. 
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Figure 6.7. Maha paddy yields in Trincomalee District and Sri Lanka, 1981-2009 (Source: ASD 2009) 
 
Figure 6.8. Yala paddy yields in Trincomalee District and Sri Lanka, 1981-2009 (Source: ASD 2009) 
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6.5 The performance of the Allai Extension Scheme, 1985-2009 
Only very little specific information on the performance of the Allai Extension 
Scheme are available, and (with exception of rainfall and river flow data), none of it 
is available in proper time series. However, the available data in combination with 
the narratives of farmers and Irrigation Department officials do make it possible to 
describe the overall trends. 
Up to maha 1984-1985, the only serious problem in the AES was water shortage in the 
dry season. The violence that broke out in yala 1985 caused a radical break. The 
displacement of most Tamils in the scheme meant that about a third of the command 
area was abandoned – some Tamil farmers claimed that at least part of their crop 
was harvested by Sinhalese. The Sinhalese and Muslim farmers who remained also 
had a problem however, as the sluice in the headworks had been closed, and could 
not be opened for a while due to the tensions206. Most displaced Tamils, as well as 
many Sinhalese who started fleeing in late 1985, were unable to cultivate during 
maha 1985-1986, which meant that probably half of the AES was not cultivated. From 
early 1986, some people started returning; yala 1986 still saw a very small crop, but in 
                                                 
 
206 Some people told me that the army had ultimately opened the sluice by firing a rocket 
into it from a helicopter. I am not sure whether this is true; others whom I asked about this 
claimed that at the time the army did not have helicopters from which a sufficiently large 
rocket could be fired. 
Figure 6.9. Comparison of paddy yields, Trincomalee District and Sri Lanka, 1981-2009 (Source: ASD 
2009) 
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maha 1986-1987 and yala 1987, things slowly picked up. Maha 1987-1988 saw the 
entry of the IPKF, which meant that many Tamils resettled and many Sinhalese 
displaced. The departure of over half of the Sinhala population did not structurally 
reduce the cropped area, as there were enough second-generation settlers who were 
willing to lease the land of the settlers who left. Muslim-Tamil violence at the time 
(and during later episodes) did not cause long-term displacement of Muslim farmers 
from the AES. 
While the cultivated area increased again, yields reduced due to increasing difficulty 
for (particularly Tamil) farmers in accessing fertiliser, pesticides and improved rice 
seed. A further complication for the farmers in the area around Muthur and 
Thoppur was that in 1987 the stores of the Paddy Marketing Board in Muthur were 
destroyed. This meant that farmers became dependent on middlemen to sell their 
harvest, causing a reduction in income and an increase in indebtedness. Although 
the sale of colony land is prohibited, quite a few Sinhala farmers ended up either 
pawning or informally selling their land to local businessmen. One businessman in 
Serunuwara once offered to show me 50 acres of paddy land that he said he owned, 
and I was told of another businessman who controlled over 100 acres.  
Around the fringes of the AES, hundreds of acres that were abandoned in the early 
years of the conflict remained uncultivated. RB tract 8, the RB ‘new tract’, and most 
of LB tracts 14, 15 and 18 (about 900 ha in total) were abandoned because they were 
unsafe, while lack of maintenance meant that most of RB tracts 4-7 (some 200 ha of 
what was still cultivated) were abandoned due to lack of water and an additional 
400 ha spread out over the scheme were abandoned because they were flooded207. 
This meant a reduction in the formal command area by about 2,100 ha; about 300 ha 
of encroachments were also abandoned. The total (official and unofficial) area that 
could be cultivated thus reduced from about 8,400 ha at its peak in the early 1980s208 
to about 6,700 ha around 1988; actual cultivation fluctuated with water availability. 
From 1988 onwards the situation remained fairly stable until the 2002 ceasefire, 
which means that throughout most of the war, the AES functioned at about 80% of its pre-
war capacity. Those involved in the AES found ways of continuing cultivation as best 
they could, and – though fear and violence ruled – there was no more large-scale 
displacement apart from that which occurred during yala 1990. 
After the signing of the 2002 ceasefire agreement, some of the abandoned lands in LB 
tracts 14 and 15 and RB tracts 4-7 were taken into use again, bringing the cultivated 
area to about 7,200 ha. The situation remained like this until 2005, when severe 
tensions between Muslims and Tamils caused displacement and made it impossible 
for Muslims and Tamils alike to prepare their fields in parts of LB tracts 7-11 and the 
                                                 
 
207 About 200 ha around Eechchilampattu and 400 ha of flooded land had already been 
abandoned before 1985. Both the water shortages around Eechchilampattu and the flooding 
in low-lying areas were compounded by the further reduction in maintenance that followed 
the conflict, and the  damage that was caused to the headworks in 1990.  
208 7,000 ha official command area + 2,000 ha unauthorised cultivation – 400 ha flooded land 
– 200 ha land with severe water shortages. 
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purana lands irrigated by the Allai Tank for the maha season of 2005-2006. This 
affected about 1,000 ha. Yala 2006 saw the closure of the sluicegate at the headworks, 
followed by large-scale fighting in Kottiyar Pattu and the displacement of virtually 
the entire population in August and September. Tamils and Muslims had already 
hardly sown any paddy, and most Sinhalese lost their crop due to the channel 
closure. By September, most people had returned, just in time for the maha 
cultivation season. However, as many people had lost assets and most people faced 
financial hardship due to the missed yala crop, not everybody was able to obtain 
sufficient seed paddy and fertiliser in time209. Normalcy started to return by year’s 
end, and the 2008 yala cultivation was quite normal. 
Because of the decline in cultivated area between 1985 and 1988, water availability 
for the remaining fields improved somewhat. Tail-end shortages did exist 
(particularly for about 500 ha near Muthur, Pallikudiyiruppu and Eechchilampattu 
and for about 200-300 ha of unauthorised fields that were too elevated for the 
channel system to handle under normal circumstances), but the rest of the scheme 
was pretty much double-cropped. 
Yields roughly followed the overall pattern for Trincomalee District: decline between 
1985 and 1990 due to restrictions on fertiliser and logistical hardships, stagnation 
until the late 1990s, and an increase as the situation improved. In most of the AES, 
yields are between 35 and 40 bags/acre210 (5.7-6.5 MT/ha) if there is enough water 
and fertiliser; in more sandy areas around Eechchilampattu and Manalchenai, yields 
are around 30 bags/acre (4.9 MT/ha) in a normal year. For Muslims and Sinhalese 
who were able to cultivate, yields remained high and pretty much stable throughout 
the conflict. The decline in overall yields was primarily caused by the army not 
allowing fertiliser into Tamil areas. As a consequence, many Tamil farmers saw their 
yields drop to 20-25 bags/acre (3.3-4.1 MT/ha). Pests and diseases were a problem as 
normal, but their impact was sometimes reinforced by the conflict context: during 
yala 2005, when there was a period of tension between Muslims and Tamils and 
people could not go to their fields, a pest caused widespread damage. 
 
6.6 Why the Allai Extension Scheme kept functioning 
Given the extent of violence and tension that plagued Kottiyar Pattu over the last 
decades, the relatively good and stable performance of the AES is quite remarkable. 
While many people pointed towards the relatively good availability of water as a 
crucial factor, I believe it is not sufficient to explain the whole picture: water 
availability explains potential, not actual performance. Particularly in the aftermath of 
the 1985 violence, people had every reason to try to make life of the ethnic others 
impossible. Death and injury was common, as was – intermittently – widespread 
                                                 
 
209 NGOs did set up seed distribution programmes, but not all of these programmes were 
able to reach the farmers in time. 
210 A bag contains 67 kg of unhusked paddy. 
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damage to property. Even water was sometimes used as a weapon (through the 
blocking of irrigation channels), but – and that is very important – this rarely led to 
complete crop failures because the channel blocks were always resolved. In the 
many conversations that I had with farmers, wattai vidanes/farmer representatives 
and ID staff, it became clear that, each in their own way, a large number of people 
had worked towards maintaining a basic form of normalcy that enabled them to live 
comparatively normal lives given the circumstances, and in the process undermined 
a lot of the potential harm that could have come with the overall atmosphere of 
enmity and fear. I describe the strategies that were used in the next sections. 
 
6.6.1 Irrigation Department staff 
The staff of the Irrigation Department found themselves in a very difficult 
environment. In the AES, as in other schemes, they were surrounded, already before 
the conflict, by farmers who were quite hostile if they did not receive enough water 
(Brewer 1984). After the war broke out, the ID staff attached to the AES had a further 
problem: while most of the ID staff were Tamils, their office and quarters were 
located in the Sinhala village of Somapura (also known as Kallar). This meant that 
they needed to tread carefully so as not to risk being lynched for being Tamil. 
Because of this, pro-active intervention in conflicts over water was not a feasible 
option.  
Benedikt Korf has studied this problem in detail for the case of the Menkamam Tank 
(Korf 2004: 97-144; Devarajah et al. 2001). This is a small reservoir with a command 
area of some 120 acres (49 ha), all of which is cultivated by Tamils. 8 ha is owned by 
a children’s home in Trincomalee, and the remainder is owned by nearly fifty 
families from Menkamam. 
In the 1950s, part of the catchment area was encroached upon by Tamils from 
Menkamam or from the adjoining village of Sivapuram, who subsequently sold the 
land to Sinhalese from the nearby village of Dehiwatte in 1954. Over time, the 
encroachments expanded, and by 2001 there were 40 Sinhala and 10 Tamil farmers 
cultivating this land. When the encroachments expanded into the tank itself, and a 
conflict arose over the water level that could be maintained in the reservoir. If the 
water level was to be maintained at its design level, the Menkamam fields could be 
irrigated but the encroachments (which totalled less than 10 ha and were cultivated 
by no more than 15 farmers) would be flooded. If, on the other hand, the water level 
was reduced, the encroachments could be cultivated but the Menkamam fields 
would suffer from water shortages. The encroachers prevailed: they broke the tank 
bund, and through patronage links with the army ensured that the people from 
Menkamam would not restore it permanently. While, from a legal perspective, the 
encroachers should have simply been evicted, it took until 2006 before the 
Menkamam tank was finally renovated. Korf, who studied this case in 2001 (before 
the ceasefire significantly relaxed tensions) used this as an example to show how 
deeply the situation had got stuck: according to many Tamil people whom Korf 
spoke to, the Menkamam tank was a signature example of “how the state would 
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discriminate against them” (Korf 2004: 109). Neither the people from Dehiwatte nor 
the people from Menkamam could formalise their preferred version of reality, 
because any attempt to do so would guarantee violent retaliation by either the army 
or the LTTE. The situation was, in a sense, one of ‘mutually assured destruction’. 
While there is no denying that the conflict over the Menkamam tank became deeply 
ethnicised in nature, and that the situation remained stuck for so long because of the 
mutual threats of violence, I believe that that is not the entire story. The ID staff did 
intervene, but in an indirect way:  a new channel was cut which supplies 60% of the 
affected fields with with water (Devarajah et al. 2001: 15). By doing so, a large part of 
the problem was made irrelevant.  
This approach of minimising own exposure to (very dangerous) threats and 
managing the scheme in a way that minimised potential for conflict was 
characteristic, and proved useful. The most important choice that was made was to 
simplify water distribution to its extreme: in order to minimise conflicts over water 
shortages, the channels were filled to maximum capacity whenever enough water 
was available, even if this sometimes caused damage to the channel bunds and 
flooding in poorly drained areas. Basically, the gates were opened at the beginning 
of the season and closed at the end of the season; adjustments in between were 
minimised.  
Sometimes parts of the irrigation infrastructure itself were given up. Not far from the 
Menkamam tank, a regulator in the D6 channel used to get blocked regularly by 
Sinhalese who did not want water to go downstream. Being unable to police the 
Figure 6.10. Channel filled over maximum capacity (own photograph) 
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structure without putting themselves at risk, the ID staff found a simple yet effective 
solution: they simply removed one of the gates, making it impossible to regulate 
water flows, but also making it near impossible to block the channel (see figure 6.11). 
This is not a unique solution: Mollinga and Bolding (2006: 31-32) have documented 
how Irrigation Department officials in a South Indian irrigation scheme introduced 
outlet pipes without gates in a water-short distributary channel as a way to minimise 
conflict with farmers. 
The case of the Menkamam tank is interesting for another reason. When I asked 
around about the Menkamam tank issue in 2004 and 2005, people knew about the 
issue but unlike in 2001, nobody presented it as an exemplary case of inter-ethnic 
problems. Within Menkamam, some of the people I spoke to strongly framed it as an 
issue between original farmers and encroachers, and not as an ethnic issue: I was 
referred to the cases of the nearby Kankuveli tank, Kirankulam and Peruveli tank 
that all have the same unresolved problem of encroachment into the tank bed, but 
where downstream farmers and encroachments are all Tamils211. 
                                                 
 
211 One farmer whom I spoke to initially thought that I was Benedikt Korf, for whom he had 
been a key informant. I knew that this man had a reputation of being a smooth talker, so I 
was a little suspicious of what he was going to say. Indeed, he gave me a glowing (and 
Figure 6.11. Evidence of tampering with a structure (picture taken by Prof. L. Vincent, September 
2009) 
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6.6.2 Farmer representatives and wattai vidanes  
In their positions as intermediaries between farmers and the Irrigation Deparment, 
farmer representatives and wattai vidanes play a linking role between the water 
requirements of the farmers within their area of control and the O&M requirements 
of the scheme as a whole (Amarasinghe et al. 1998; Uphoff 1992). Particularly in 
schemes where water is limited and where the irrigation infrastructure is in 
sufficient condition to make detailed water management possible, it is important for 
farmers to have good representation in order to ensure day-to-day access to 
sufficient water. As mentioned above, the channels in the AES are run on (or over) 
full capacity whenever possible, and water management is not a very important task 
for the farmer representatives and wattai vidanes. What is important is ensuring that 
channels are not blocked unreasonably by farmers. This requires not only 
negotiation with the Irrigation Department, but also with farmer representatives and 
wattai vidanes who are responsible for adjoining areas. Channels were blocked for 
two reasons: to irrigate elevated fields on the edge of the scheme’s command area212, 
and sometimes to deliberately deny water to downstream farmers as a form of 
“power politics” during periods of tension (Korf 2004: 106).  
It is important to realise that the intermittent blocking of channels for irrigating high 
fields was a fairly common and accepted practice, and that the blocking of channels 
for ethno-political reasons was fairly rare213. When I asked farmers across the scheme 
and Irrigation Department staff about recent incidents of the Muthur channel being 
blocked214, they all described this as a justified short-term measure that farmers 
applied because they needed the water, and that it did not cause any disturbances to 
downstream farmers because of its temporary nature. Once, I came across a news 
article which stated that the Muthur channel was being blocked and that this was 
causing tensions. Since I had not heard of any tensions, I asked around about what 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
rather exaggerated) account of how good the ethnic relationships in the area now were, that 
the Menkamam tank had been a problem but never a serious one, and that he himself had 
played a crucial role in resolving the conflict. When I told him that I knew Benedikt but that 
I was a different person doing a different research, he was very considerate: “Good, I told 
him the story during the war, now I tell you the peace story so you can add to his research”.  
212 While the farmers who cultivate these areas and their wattai vidanes are vocal about this 
being due to poor channel maintenance by the Irrigation Department and lack of 
government interest to solve the problem, I have come to believe that the Irrigation 
Department staff are genuine when they say they cannot do too much about this: many of 
the fields concerned fall (just) outside the original command area of the Allai Extension 
Scheme, and are simply too elevated to be able to be irrigated under normal circumstances. 
213 One reason for this may have been the risk of retribution by armed actors on the side of 
affected farmers. Devarajah et al. (2001: 15) give an example of the farmer representative of 
Dehiwatte who was abducted by the LTTE, allegedly for organising the blocking of 
irrigation channels. 
214 I deliberately inquired about this in the broadest possible terms (“I heard the channel was 
blocked recently what happened?”) to avoid ‘expected answers’. The uniformity in the 
answers was striking. 
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was happening, only to find out that the journalist had been mistaken. On the other 
hand, it is also very easy for people to misinterpret such a regular practice in 
antagonistic terms during periods of acute tension (see section 7.5.2 for an example).  
That said, it is instructive to look at what a Tamil wattai vidane in charge of an area 
that is fed by the Muthur Channel told me one day:  
 
“During the war, channels were sometimes blocked to prevent water from going 
to the downstream villages. Sometimes it was also people from my village who 
did not want water to go to the fields of the next village. If a channel was 
blocked, the DO [Divisional Officer of the Agrarian Services Department] would 
call a meeting of the wattai vidanes in the area, and we would talk about the 
problem. I know all of the wattai vidanes for a long time already, and we had 
good relations before the war.  
Nobody else was present at the DO meeting, so we could safely interact and 
come to agreements with our fellow wattai vidanes. If I saw a Muslim wattai 
vidane on the market in Muthur, I could not speak to him because someone 
might think either of us was a traitor and get him or me killed. But in this 
meeting, there was no security risk. At night then, the wattai vidane of the area 
where the channel was blocked would open the channel, and close it again 
before morning. In this way, water would go to the other village, and nobody 
would know who did it. Had some people from this wattai vidane’s village found 
out that he had done it, they would surely have attacked him, but now he could 
say ‘it was dark, somebody must have come from the next village and stolen the 
water’ ” (interview, Kottiyar Pattu, February 2005). 
 
Just as much as the regulators and outlets are “signposts of struggle” (Mollinga and 
Bolding 1996), they are also ‘signposts of making do’. There is indeed struggle 
among farmers and between farmers and the Irrigation Department, but just as 
much there are people looking for pragmatic solutions.   
Crucial for the co-operation between the wattai vidanes was the fact that they knew 
each other from before the war: there was a pre-existing level of trust that continued 
to exist despite the conflict. However, they were only able to interact in closed 
meetings, so that nobody outside a small ‘in-crowd’ could know what had been 
discussed and decided. Similarly, as it was considered dangerous to be outside after 
dark, the night provided a literal ‘grey space’ in which things could be done out of 
sight. The importance of this secrecy should not be underestimated. Just before 
Norman Uphoff revisited the Gal Oya Scheme in Ampara District in 1998, a Sinhala 
farmer representative had been assassinated because he had brokered an agreement 
with Tamil farmers downstream about how to share the water in the coming season 
(Uphoff 2001, Uphoff and Wijayaratna 2000). A crippled and nearly-deaf wattai 
vidane told me that he had been severely tortured by every imaginable armed group, 
both on the side of the government and that of the separatists, because they all 
suspected him of helping the wrong people.  
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Since they occupy leadership positions that are not (directly) based on politics, the 
wattai vidanes and farmer representatives are sometimes also able to function as 
intermediaries for wider issues than only irrigation. Below, I give a narrative 
rendering of what a Tamil wattai vidane told me about how, following the 1985 
violence, the people of his village and the Sinhalese people living the neighbouring 
village re-established their lives. 
 
“In 1985, both we (Tamils) and the Sinhalese people in the neighbouring village 
were displaced due to the violence, and our villages were destroyed. We went 
east, the Sinhalese went west to Kantale. However, we could not keep living in 
camps like we were doing. We all need to farm. Therefore, we approached the 
LTTE and the Sinhalese approached the Army and Police, and convinced them 
that we needed to return, and that the LTTE should not harm the Sinhalese and 
the Army and Police should not harm the Tamils. It took some time, but in the 
end we were allowed to return and live in camps in our villages. We jointly 
negotiated for the safe delivery of dry rations to both the Sinhalese and the 
Tamils, and to a certain extent that was successful. This enabled us to continue 
farming and make our living” (Interview, Kottiyar Pattu, November 2005).  
 
What is important in this narrative is the (socio-)economic imperative that generated 
the negotiations to allow food to be distributed to both sides. Pragmatism, rather 
than idealism was the driving force here. This narrative also indicates an inversion of 
Figure 6.12. Meeting between government officials and wattai vidanes (own photograph) 
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part of Korf’s analysis of what happened around the Menkamam tank. Rather than 
Tamils using the LTTE and Sinhalese and Muslims using the army and police to 
pressurise the non-combatants on ‘the other side’ and keep the situation in a 
deadlock, this narrative hints of non-combatants putting combatant groups under 
pressure to give room to ‘the other side’, so that everybody may live in a basic form 
of normalcy. This was, in effect, a subversion of discourses that promoted ethnic 
animosity. This subversion was by no means ideological: right after telling me the 
story reproduced above, the wattai vidane eloquently expressed his support for the 
LTTE and its cause, and his confidence that the LTTE would be able to keep the 
newly reviving Sinhala-nationalist forces in check215. 
As mentioned earlier, the fact that people already knew each other and to some 
extent had established relations of trust was crucial. Had there not been something 
of an old boys’ network among the wattai vidanes and farmer representatives, then it 
would have been much more difficult for them to find solutions. This has its 
bearings on debates on irrigation management transfer. The current move to 
belatedly pull the AES into the INMAS programme is likely to improve interaction 
between farmers and the Irrigation Department, but may undermine interaction 
between the different representatives if election cycles are too short. This in turn 
carries the risk that localised disagreements escalate because they cannot be 
amicably solved locally. 
 
6.6.3 Farmers 
Farmers found three ways to respond to the context of conflict and still continue 
cultivation: abandoning of fringe areas, ethnic segregation of cultivation, and ethnic 
cross-hiring of labour. 
 
Abandoning fringe areas 
Because of the presence of Tamil militants in the jungles of Kottiyar Pattu, those 
parts of the Allai Extension Scheme that bordered these jungles became risky places 
for Sinhala and Muslim farmers who could be attacked or kidnapped for ransom. 
These areas could also be dangerous for Tamil farmers, because government troops 
sometimes conducted patrols there, and might identify any Tamil they encountered 
as a militant. As a consequence, much of LB Tracts 14, 15 and 18 and RB Tract 8 were 
abandoned (see map 6.2). RB Tracts 4, 5, 6 and 7 were also largely abandoned, partly 
for security reasons, and partly because the channel that supplied them silted up and 
could not be maintained. While this reduced the cultivated area, it increased the 
amount of water that was available for the remaining fields, thus counterbalancing 
                                                 
 
215 This interview took place around the time that Mahinda Rajapakse was elected president, 
and in a situation where both the LTTE and Sinhala nationalists became increasingly 
belligerent in their words and acts. 
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the reducing inflow at the headworks to a large extent. For Tamil farmers around 
Eechchilampattu, the abandoning of the fields meant significant hardship because 
they did not really have an alternative to turn to. For the remaining Sinhala farmers 
in the colony areas, the displacement of more than half of the Sinhala population in 
1985 meant that there was enough alternative land available for lease. 
 
Ethnic segregation of cultivation 
In a sense, the possibility of problems arising between farmers of different ethnicity 
was reduced by the conflict itself. Since during tense periods it became difficult for 
people to move around in areas dominated by people of other ethnicity (and by the 
armed actors that claimed to represent them), ethnic segregation occurred in land 
use patterns. Particularly in the areas that were under cultivation before the Allai 
Extension Scheme was developed (between Mallikaithivu and Muthur, and between 
Thoppur and Pallikudiyiruppu), Muslim- and Tamil-owned fields used to be 
interspersed before the conflict (Korf 2004: 110). Some Muslim and Tamil farmers 
sold their lands that were located in areas that had become inaccessible to them. 
Around Mallikaithivu, this generated an interesting dynamic: around the 1960s, 
many Tamil farmers from Mallikaithivu sold their fields to Muslims to raise funds 
for their children’s education, but from the late 1990s onward, they started buying 
the lands back with funds sent by relatives in Canada.  
In the colony areas of the AES, ethnic segregation of lands due to the conflict was not 
an issue. In those areas, there was very little interspersing of Sinhala, Tamil and 
Muslim fields to begin with. Since these areas were only developed some 30 years 
before violence started in Kottiyar Pattu, only a very small (and technically illegal) 
land market had developed. Because of this, there was very little new ‘ethnic mixing’ 
after the colonists were settled, and thus there was little to ‘unmix’. 
A second, and probably more common, strategy was for farmers to hold on to the 
ownership of their lands while leasing them out to people of the other ethnic group. 
As such, leasing out fields to tenants of other ethnicity is not a new thing; see for 
example the case of the elderly Muslim cultivator in section 3.3. In the context of 
conflict however, it became one of the only ways for farmers to still earn something 
from the fields that they could not access. This process of ethnic segregation has 
definitely not been a neutral exchange: there have been winners and losers on both 
sides. Owners who now have to lease out their fields see a loss in income, and 
owners who now need to become lease farmers since they cannot access their own 
fields incur extra expenses (although this may be balanced off to some extent if the 
own fields can be leased out to others). Which side has lost out most generally 
depends on who tells you the story. In that sense, I disagree with Korf’s statement 
that the Muslim farmers were “those most affected” (Korf 2004: 110).  
Given the restrictions on how long the same person can lease the same plot of land, 
farmers who lease out their land will need to find new tenants every two to three 
seasons, and tenants will need to find new land with the same frequency. Despite the 
fact that in the AES over a thousand matches of fields and tenants are made every 
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year, there is no open lease market. In almost all cases, but particularly if land is 
leased out to people of other ethnicity, tenants are selected on the basis of a level of 
trust: either tenants and owners are acquaintances, or there is a person known to the 
owner who can vouch for the trustworthiness of the tenant. Both owners and people 
seeking land to lease can approach the wattai vidane or farmer representative when 
they cannot find tenants or lands within their immediate networks; in other cases, 
temple or mosque committees function as an intermediary. 
 
Cross-hiring of labour 
Apart from leasing out land to people of other ethnicity, cross-hiring of labour also 
took place: Sinhala (and Muslim) farmers hired Tamils to cultivate fields in areas 
that were dangerous for Sinhalese (and Muslims) to go to but were accessible for 
Tamils (Devarajah et al. 2001: 11). As such, this was nothing new: during the harvest 
season, it had been common for decades to hire itinerant group of Tamil and Muslim 
labourers from Kinniya and from different parts of Batticaloa and Ampara Districts, 
irrespective of the ethnic background of the labourers or the farmers. As there were 
slight variations in the timing of harvests, it was possible for such itinerant groups to 
make a harvesting tour every season along the East Coast, move into Polonnaruwa 
District, and even go as far as the rice bowl around the Giant’s Tank in Mannar 
District. Over the last two decades, this practice has reduced. On the one hand, the 
erection of numerous checkpoints made long-distance travel risky for young Tamil 
men (though not so for Muslims); on the other hand, the increasing availability of 
landless labourers within the AES (and other irrigation schemes) meant that demand 
for labourers from outside reduced. 
Both in the case of the itinerant bands of labourers and of labourers from within the 
area, acquaintance was an important factor. As farmers and labourers depended on 
each other in precarious circumstances, a certain level of trust was required. This, 
again, gave rise to pragmatism. Particularly in the early years of the cease-fire, I 
heard many stories of home guards who, after completing their checkpoint or 
bunker duty for the day, would go home, change their uniform and gun for a shirt 
and sarong, and get to work in their fields together with a group of Tamil labourers. 
 
6.7 Inversion: the contribution of shared resources to violence 
In the ‘greed’ versus ‘grievance’ debate, unequal access to resources is identified as a 
key grievance, which may lead to violent conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). This 
debate, which is largely based on a dataset with countries as the unit of analysis, has 
come in for substantial criticism for being too simplistic in its explanation of the 
onset of war216. In his study of Trincomalee District, Benedikt Korf (2004) rightfully 
                                                 
 
216 Apart from this, there is an important problem with the national-level, large-N dataset 
approach that has been used by Collier and Hoeffler’s research. What the analysis of such 
data documents is the correlation between the onset of violent conflict and different kinds of 
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concluded that different kinds of greed and a range of grievances are at play all at 
the same time, and that a more detailed understanding of local dynamics is needed 
to come to a relevant level of understanding of the wider conflict. Local and supra-
local conflict dynamics interact continuously, and in this interaction violence (or its 
absence) takes shape. The local resource conflicts that Korf has studied were clearly 
shaped by the context: entitlements became increasingly ethnicised, and thus the 
conflicts over these entitlements became increasingly ethnic in nature. However, not 
all conflicts are violent (Varshney 2002). A question that thus begs answering is to 
what extent land and water scarcity has caused inter-ethnic violence in Kottiyar Pattu.  
When the chronology of violence as described in chapter 4 is put together with the 
data on land and water availability presented in sections 6.3 to 6.5, some patterns 
emerge. Firstly, it is clear that there was a chronic trend of increasing water and land 
scarcity in the years leading up to the onset of violence in 1985, and that particularly 
land scarcity had reached serious proportions. There were however no direct 
conflicts over land. Rather, the structural lack of livelihood opportunities for the 
younger generation generated frustration. In the ideologically charged years around 
1983, the distribution of weapons and the spread of ethnonationalist propaganda 
were powerful factors in turning this frustration into violence. I therefore contend 
that the long-term trends of increasing scarcity at best only had an indirect relation 
to the occurrence of inter-ethnic violence. Secondly, there have been intermittent 
periods of acute water scarcity (though, admittedly, not as extreme as in other 
irrigation systems). Here, there is no correlation at all with violent episodes. In the 
years before 1985, acute water scarcity rather generated inter-ethnic collaboration 
among farmers who jointly built sandbag weirs across the Mahaweli River. In the 
years after 1985, such large-scale collaboration never re-occurred, but – while people 
did mention conflicts over water – the conflicts never turned violent on a large scale. 
This lends further credence to the view that large-scale violence only occurred when 
it was organised by outsiders with access to weapons. This was not necessarily 
because the people of Kottiyar Pattu were such strong pacifists, but because the vast 
majority had sufficient long-term interest in maintaining some form of stability. 
 
6.8 Reflection: coexistence in the Allai Extension Scheme 
What I have shown in the above paragraphs is that, despite the violence and tension, 
the Allai Extension Scheme has continued functioning to a considerable extent. The 
specific setting of the irrigation system shaped the interaction among and between 
Irrigation Department staff, farmer representatives and wattai vidanes, and farmers. 
At the same time, the interference of the different actors with channels and 
structures shaped the scheme’s performance. The reason for the continued 
functioning of the AES is that many people have, each in their own way, found 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
public discourses about the causes of the conflict. Correlation and causation are however not 
the same thing; nor are public discourses about causes of conflict necessarily the same as the 
actual causes of conflict (Kalyvas 2006). 
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pragmatic solutions that were useful for themselves, and thereby useful for others. 
This did not involve organised inter-ethnic co-operation. Rather, there were a lot of 
individuals engaging in various forms of informal inter-ethnic interaction with 
known others that together kept people’s livelihoods going and prevented the AES 
from collapsing. As long as these interactions remained invisible to the violent 
projects of ethno-nationalist actors, they could continue unpunished. This is 
radically different from the view that “when people cooperate, it is generally a 
conspiracy for aggression against others”, and that this argument “bears substantial 
relevance for civil wars, where war entrepreneurs use social networks to exclude 
those who are not part of a clan, ethnic group etc.” (Korf 2003: 6, referring to 
Hirschleifer). While Hirschleifer and Korf’s arguments are valid in themselves, I 
contend that they are not valid for everybody, and quite possibly only for a minority 
of civilians who live in a context of conflict. 
The findings presented in this chapter stress the importance of trust and pragmatism 
as factors that make inter-ethnic interaction possible. Trust is generated when people 
know each other. Friendship is not a prerequisite for this; acquaintance is. Trust is a 
precondition for inter-ethnic interaction because, in a context of violent ethnicised 
conflict, the consequences of being seen as a traitor are immense. The pragmatism 
among farmers in the AES is shaped by people’s long-term interests in stable 
livelihoods; even if farmers subscribe to ethno-nationalist political convictions, they 
can still interact with other farmers because “they all need to farm”. It is this 
pragmatism that makes it possible to swap from the ethnic category of identification 
(which stresses otherness) to another category of identification in which the 
similarity among farmers is stressed. 
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7 Troubles: inter-ethnic interaction during everyday riots 
and almost-riots 
 
“You have to remember that this happens three times a year in Muthur, ever 
since 1985. Something happens, tension develops, we run to the churches, roads 
get blocked. After a few days people start talking, the problem gets sorted out, 
and we get back to normal. Until the next time” (interview with a Tamil man 
from Kottiyar Pattu, Trincomalee, April 2007). 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The second case study that I look at in this book concerns inter-ethnic interaction in 
situations of acute tension along ethnic lines. When mob violence occurs in such a 
context, one can speak of an “ethnic riot”: “an intense, sudden, though not 
necessarily wholly unplanned, […] attack by civilian members of one ethnic group 
on civilian members of another ethnic group, the victims chosen because of their 
group membership” (Horowitz 2001: 1)217. As Donald Horowitz makes clear in his 
elaborate study of riot patterns, what precisely constitutes a riot and what 
differentiates a riot from other forms of ethnically motivated violence is rather 
ambiguous. I will here stick to the presence of mobs as the key defining factor. The 
difference with a demonstration (which may degenerate into a riot) is the intention 
to inflict damage or bodily harm on an identified other party. 
As documented in chapter 4, Sinhala-Tamil riots occurred in 1976 in Kilivetti, in 1983 
in Neelapola and Kankuveli, and in 1985 in all areas where Sinhala colonists lived 
near Tamil villages. Tamil-Muslim riots occurred in 1985, 1987, 1990, 2001, 2002 and 
2003; these riots were centered around Muthur town, but in some cases the violence 
fanned out into other areas of Kottiyar Pattu. Apart from these riots, there have been 
even more periods of acute tension between Sinhalese and Tamils and between 
Muslims and Tamils that never turned into riots. Despite the ultimate absence of 
mob violence in such ‘almost-riots’, the tension and fear (and regularly, the mass-
displacement of people) that go with them is as real as in the case of actual riots. 
Much has been written about theoretical aspects of riots and almost-riots218. Despite 
this wealth of analysis, I contend that a number of aspects relating to both inter-
ethnic and intra-ethnic interaction during such episodes of tension have not received 
the attention they deserve: (1) the extent of continued inter-group interaction despite 
the tension and violence; (2) local-level patterns of social disintegration prior to 
violence; (3) the end of violence, when ‘civic life’ takes over again, and (4) the 
continued salience of other identifiers. In this chapter, I analyse what happened 
                                                 
 
217 Apart from the English term ‘riot’ that is colloquially used to describe such periods of 
violence, the Tamil word pirechchinai and its Sinhala synonym prashneak are also used. Both 
terms mean “troubles”. 
218 See for example Horowitz (2001), Varshney (2002), Brass (1998), Tambiah (1996), Scott 
(1985 and 1990), and Kalyvas (2006). 
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during the Muslim-Tamil riot of April 2003 (sections 7.2 to 7.4). In enrichment to this, 
I analyse tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils in the area around Serunuwara 
between June 2005 and April 2006 (sections 7.5 and 7.6). I studied this case, and a 
period of Muslim-Tamil tensions in December 2005 and January 2006, as part of an 
evaluation of the work of the Foundation for Co-Existence (FCE), one of the NGOs 
that is active in the peacebuilding sector in Sri Lanka (Bock, Lawrence and Gaasbeek 
2006). Material from this evaluation is re-used with permission.  
The 2003 riot pre-dates my research, which means a comment on methodology is 
required. My wife and I happened to be present in Kottiyar Pattu on a work-related 
visit for several days preceding the riots. During this period, we spent the nights in 
ZOA’s office in Muthur. On the day the riot broke out on April 17th, we attended the 
second day of a peace sports meet that had been organised in Dehiwatte, and left to 
Colombo in the evening. On April 22nd, the day after the riot ended, I returned to 
Muthur in the morning. ZOA’s (expatriate) programme manager for Trincomalee 
District had to catch a scheduled flight to the Netherlands, and I was requested to fill 
in for a week, to support ZOA’s team in Muthur with the emergency relief 
operations that had been started up, and to provide ‘protection by presence’ to the 
staff. I was there as a humanitarian aid worker, not as an ethnographer. However, 
although I was not doing ethnographic fieldwork at the time, I definitely was doing 
a form of participatory observation together with my colleagues. Since the 
environment we were working in was threatening and a misinterpretation of the 
situation could potentially carry serious risks for the security of my Sri Lankan 
colleagues, we spent a lot of time talking about what was going on, and trying to 
gather information from trusted sources in the area. After everything had calmed 
down again, I have spent a lot of time reflecting on what I had seen, because 
witnessing the events generated so many questions. I have no field notes or 
recordings from this time, so I have had to base the parts of the text that deal with 
my observations at the time on memory (triangulated through interviews with other 
people who were present at the time), on photographs I took, on documents and 
notes (like distribution lists) that were generated during the relief operation (which 
were kindly provided by ZOA), and on some e-mails to friends and relatives 
(written in mid-2003) that I was able to recover. 
 
7.2 A riot in Muthur, 17-21 April 2003 
April 2003 was a violent month in Kottiyar Pattu, despite a cease-fire being formally 
in place. Over a period of about a week, five people lost their lives, twenty-nine 
people were injured, 144 houses and shops were destroyed, 83 were damaged and 
312 were reported to have been looted, and about 35,000 people sought refuge in 
schools, community halls, churches and mosques (MIC 2003:30-31). 
Though Muthur has seen periods of tension and violence both before and after the 
events described here, the events of April 2003 can to some extent be treated as a 
bounded case. There was a clearly identifiable trigger event, a period of tension and 
violence, and a clearly identified de-escalation, after which – at least on the surface - 
things remained fairly calm for several months. In the following sections, I describe 
the events in detail. As the geographical location of specific events is relevant, the 
incidents are marked (in chronological order) on maps 7.1-7.4. 
 Troubles: inter-ethnic interaction during everyday riots and almost-riots 
257 
   
Map 7.1. Incidents leading up to the riot of April 2003 
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Map 7.2. Incidents that happened on April 17th, 2003 
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Map 7.3. Incidents that happened from April 18th to April 21st, 2003 
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Map 7.4. Incidents that happened in the aftermath of the riot of April 2003. 
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7.2.1 Setting the stage: March 30th to April 16th, 2003 
The event that started the cycle of events took place in the night of March 30th to 31st, 
2003219. Two Muslim men went to the LTTE-controlled area near Sampoor, and did 
not return (1 on map 7.1). Why they went is not known for sure. Some say they went, 
on the invitation of a businessman from Sampoor, to sell or buy dry fish, others say 
they were involved in the ganja (marijuana) trade (MIC 2003:1), and the leader of 
PLOTE claimed that the men were tax collectors for the LTTE who had 
misappropriated funds and had been called for an inquiry (‘Incidents in Muttur due 
to kidnapping of two Muslim youth’, Island, 22-4-2003). Some people in Muthur told 
me that one of the men was involved in the ‘Osama group’, a group of armed 
Muslim thugs that will figure regularly in what follows. It looks like the men were 
taken into custody after they strayed into an area that the LTTE had declared as a 
High Security Zone (UTHR 2003a:16). The LTTE-controlled coastline east of Muthur 
was known to be dotted with military installations, meant to keep pressure on the 
Navy base in Trincomalee. An additional indication that the LTTE did not want 
outsiders in the area comes from an incident that happened on March 23rd. A three-
wheeler owned by a Muslim was confiscated in Sampoor, because “the confiscated 
vehicle had illegally entered into the LTTE’s High Security Zone” (‘LTTE and its 
HSZ in Sampur’, EPDP news, 3-4-2003). After negotiations, the vehicle was returned 
to its owner.220 
In the weeks following the disappearance, relatives and community leaders actively 
tried to get the men released. The men’s mothers frequently visited the LTTE office 
in Sampoor. At the time, Tamil friends from Muthur told me that they had heard 
from Muslim acquaintances that the two men were involved in drugs trade, and that 
at least part of the Muslims in Muthur did not mind the LTTE arresting and 
punishing them, as long as the LTTE took responsibility for it. The fact that the LTTE 
consistently denied having anything to do with the disappearance was what 
triggered tensions. 
                                                 
 
219 Most of the analytical reports put the date of the disappearance in the night of March 31st, 
but since a complaint was lodged with the police on March 31st (‘Two LTTE cadres 
surrender’, Island, 5-4-2003), the disappearance quite likely happened the day before. Note 
that this event in itself barely received any attention in the press; the disappearance was first 
reported five days after it happened (ibid.). Apart from the very brief newspaper article 
mentioned above, the English-language newspapers and websites that I had access to made 
no mention of the abduction before April 16th, which is strange given the alleged tension that 
the disappearance caused. Some articles date the abduction around April 12th (‘Tense 
situation prevails in Muttur [sic]’, Daily Mirror, 16-4-2003, ‘Two Muslim youths disappear, 
LTTE denies involvement’, TamilNet, 16-4-2003).   
220 In the years before the 2002 ceasefire, Muslims were generally unable to go into LTTE-
controlled areas. Following the ceasefire, restrictions were relaxed, and for a while the 
lighthouse at Foul Point became a popular place for picnics. 
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Seemingly unrelated to this issue, a string of incidents occurred near Thoppur on 
April 5th and 6th. On April 5th, two Muslim fishermen who were fishing in the 
Ullakkalli lagoon were attacked by a group of LTTE members and had their canoe 
confiscated; about two hours later, “a group of Muslim students that was picnicking 
in the area was attacked by the same LTTE members” (UTHR(J) 2003a: 16) (2 and 3 
on map 7.1). The website of the Sri Lankan army reported that three, not two, 
fishermen were attacked, and that the attack took place at at 8 PM, an hour after 
about 500 armed LTTE cadres were spotted crossing from the Ralkuli area into 
Sampoor, through the paddy fields south of Muthur (‘Tigers beat Muslim fishermen’ 
Island, 9-4-2003)221 (4 on map 7.1). The next day,  
 
“the LTTE member Kanthan who was involved in the attack on the Muslim 
students was identified by the victims at Thoppur and badly beaten up. […] 
[Kanthan,] who was attacked on his way home to Pattalipuram, spotted two 
Muslims while passing through Pallikudiyiruppu and detained them. On 
hearing of this, […] 6 Tamil youths passing through Thoppur were detained by 
Muslims. Finally wiser counsels prevailed and both sides released their 
hostages” UTHR(J) (2003a: 17)222.  
 
The detention of the Muslims by Kanthan seems to have fired emotions in Muthur 
town, where Muslims staged a demonstration as tensions in the town increased (5 on 
map 7.1). SLMM spokesperson Teitur Torkelsson is quoted as saying:  
 
“It was an extremely tense situation. However, police backed by troops 
succeeded in preventing the situation getting out of hand […] the incident could 
have triggered a major confrontation in the area” (‘Tit for Tat abductions in 
Muttur’, Island, 12-4-2003).  
 
                                                 
 
221 Two other newspaper articles mention the LTTE troop movement, but make no mention 
of the beating up of Muslims (‘SLMM to discuss night crossings with LTTE’, Daily News, 7-4-
2003, ‘SLMM-LTTE powwow today’, Daily Mirror, 8-4-2003) 
222 During my fieldwork, only one person I spoke to mentioned this incident. A young Tamil 
farmer from Pallikudiyiruppu, a village near Thoppur, placed this incident in a larger 
perspective as follows:  
“There were ethnic tensions after the ceasefire as the army had abandoned Pallikudiyiruppu 
in 1998 and the LTTE took control. Earlier, army presence prevented things from getting 
bad, but now no such thing. Last year April (2003), a Tamil had been beaten up on the main 
road, so we went to Palathoppur to beat the Muslims up. But five days earlier, another Tamil 
had been beaten up in Thoppur, and that had been solved by talking” (Interview, 
Pallikudiyiruppu, October 2004). 
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On Tuesday, April 15th, the mother of one of the missing men died in the 
Trincomalee hospital after having taken poison the previous day (6 on map 7.1)223. 
As the news of her death spread in Muthur, shops closed and public life came to a 
standstill in protest. Minister Rauff Hakeem, leader of the SLMC, immediately went 
to Muthur in an attempt to defuse the tensions (‘Tense situation prevails in Muttur 
[sic]’, Daily Mirror, 16-4-2003)224. He was joined by Minister A.H.M. Azwer (UNP) 
and MP A.R.M. Abdul Cader (UNP), and the Inspector-General of Police (IGP), T.E. 
Anandarajah.  M.A.M. Mahroof (UNP MP for Trincomalee District) either was 
already present, or came separately from the other parliamentarians. Somewhere 
around this time, “police security was tightened at Mutur [sic] to prevent any 
untoward incident” (‘LTTE abducts youth: mother commits suicide’, Island, 16-4-
2003)225. The presence of so many high-profile people raised the stakes rather than 
calming down the situation. 
Right after the funeral rites were completed in the Akkaraichenai mosque, a row 
erupted between M.A.M. Mahroof and Rauff Hakeem (7 on map 7.1). Mahroof 
accused Hakeem that he had failed to ensure security for Muslims in the area, 
should take his responsibility and resign. Hakeem disagreed, and soon a fight 
erupted between supporters of both parliamentarians (‘Misunderstanding led to 
Muttur row – Cader’, Island, 18-4-2003). At this point in time, there was definitely 
Muslim anger against the LTTE, but on this day, the competition over local political 
dominance between SLMC and UNP was the dominant conflict. 
A story that was persistent in Muthur at the time was that, while the fight between 
supporters of SLMC and UNP was going on, some Tamil passers-by were attacked, 
turning a SLMC-UNP fight into a Tamil-Muslim issue (8 on map 7.1). One of my 
sources remembered that two Tamil people who got off a bus that stopped near the 
Akkaraichenai mosque were abducted and killed. In his memory, this was what 
triggered the subsequent incidents (interview, Trincomalee, March 2008). 
On Wednesday, April 16th, things seem to have been comparatively calm. The two 
Tamil MPs for Trincomalee District, R. Sampanthan and K. Thurairetnasingam of the 
TULF, addressed a meeting in Pattitidal (9 on map 7.1), and “appealed to Tamils of 
Muttur area […] to work hard to safeguard and strengthen the support of Muslims 
in their areas”, and not give in to groups that are intent on bringing “a rift between 
Tamils and Muslims” (‘TNA appeals to strengthen Tamil-Muslim unity’, TamilNet, 
17-4-2003, ‘Sampanthan preaching, LTTE shooting’, EPDP News, 19-4-2003). The 
geography of this meeting is important, as will become clear in a little while. 
                                                 
 
223 In CPA 2003:2, April 13th is given as the date on which the mother died, but this seems to 
be a mistake. 
224 UTHR (2003a: 17) claims that Hakeem came before the mother died – possibly after she 
took poison. 
225 It is not clear whether the tightening of security was ordered after the suicide, after the 
funeral, or after the UNP-SLMC fight (see below). 
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Many newspaper articles, as well as the MIC report, state that there was a 
continuous hartal (a shut-down of public life in protest against a perceived injustice) 
on April 15th, 16th and 17th. While this would make sense, it is not true. Had there 
been a hartal, then we would never have stayed overnight in Muthur on April 16th 
and 17th, and the ZOA team from Trincomalee would never have returned to Muthur 
in the evening of the 17th, simply because the risk of getting stuck along the way or 
being attacked for violating the hartal would be too big.  
An e-mail that I wrote from Muthur in the morning of April 17th makes no reference 
to any Muslim-Tamil tensions – which I definitely would have done had they been 
there226. Even if I myself had missed the tensions, my Sri Lankan colleagues would 
have definitely known and told me. 
A colleague from ZOA whom I interviewed later told me that two colleagues who 
were living in Muthur had said something was fishy, but that they did not consider 
things to be threatening enough to stop ZOA staff from working in Kottiyar Pattu 
(interview, Trincomalee, May 2007). There had been a hartal after the two men 
disappeared, but partly because it was a festival period that usually sees a lot of 
sales, Muslim shop owners could not afford to keep their shops closed indefinitely. 
Many ordinary people also did not have enough provisions in their houses to be able 
to sit through a long hartal. According to one person I spoke to, a Muslim 
businessman who had re-opened his shop in the days before Sinhala-Tamil New 
Year (April 13-15) was beaten up by members of the ‘Osama group’ who were 
enforcing the shut-down. After the death of the mother of one of the disappeared 
men, shops closed again, but there was no full hartal. 
This leads me to the conclusion that whatever happened on April 15th and 16th was 
not deeply communal in intent. There was understandable ill-feeling among 
Muslims against the LTTE, and there was a conflict among Muslim politicians over 
who was the real political leader of the Muslims, but there was neither explosive ill-
feeling against Tamils among Muslims nor explosive ill-feeling against Muslims 
among Tamils.  
Shops did close and public life did come to a standstill, but there was no 
enforcement of a general shut-down, and as we left for Dehiwatte on April 17th, we 
had no reason to be worried that anything might happen. However, things changed 
that afternoon. 
 
                                                 
 
226 The e-mail was written in a very relaxed style, and refers to me having spent April 16th 
working in the Muthur office of ZOA. The only problem was that there had been no 
electricity from the evening of April 16th and it was so hot that at night some colleagues had 
decided to sleep outside, and I had been working in the shade of a tree because being inside 
under the asbestos roof was very unpleasant (there was a small generator that I could use to 
keep my laptop running, but this was only used during the day).  
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7.2.2 Day 1: Thursday, April 17th, 2003 
In the afternoon of April 17th, a few comparatively small incidents triggered off a 
wave of rumours, violence and destruction.  
In the course of the day, angry Tamil youth blocked the main road at several places 
including Pattitidal and Mallikaithivu junction (1 and 2 on map 7.2). They did not let 
Muslims pass. This blockade continued over the following two days, and re-
occurred intermittently over the following days. In response, Muslims blocked the 
main road as well in a few locations, notably at Periyapalam (3 on map 7.2). 
None of the textual sources that I have give any explanation as to why Tamils were 
blocking the roads on April 17th. It may have been a spontaneous action, or it may 
have been instigated by the LTTE; I simply do not know. If one limits oneself to the 
textual sources, the blocking of the roads does not seem to make sense. It was the 
Muslims who were upset with the LTTE, and there was no obvious immediate 
grievance among Tamils yet. This is where the story of Tamils being caught up and 
killed in the clash between Muslim supporters of the SLMC and the UNP 
(mentioned above) becomes crucial. If my memory and the memory of one of my 
sources are correct, the death of the Tamil passers-by near the mosque fuelled Tamil 
emotions. The funeral thus became the turning point that transformed Muslim anger 
with the LTTE first into a political conflict between Muslim parties, and then into a 
generalized a Muslim-Tamil conflict. 
At 3.30 in the afternoon, a bus that was on its way from Muthur to Thoppur was 
turned back by Tamil protesters at Pattitidal (4 on map 7.2). About an hour later, two 
Muslims coming from Palathoppur or Thoppur were refused passage at 
Mallikaithivu junction, returned, and vented their anger on two Tamils near the 
predominantly Tamil village of Bharatipuram (MIC 2003:5) (5 on map 7.2). The 
injured Tamils were admitted to the Kilivetti hospital (which is located in 
Bharatipuram, between Mallikaithivu junction and Palathoppur junction).  
From this point onwards, two rather separate sequences of incidents took place, one 
in and around Palathoppur and one in and around Muthur. As by this time 
telephone lines had been cut and transport had trickled down to a minimum, the 
flow of information almost dried up, but rumours about what was happening in the 
other area kept going around and fueled the anger in both locations. 
Around Palathoppur, the first thing that seems to have happened subsequently is 
that a crowd of Muslims burnt about 15 Tamil houses and shops in Bharatipuram (6 
on map 7.2). In retaliation, a crowd of several hundred Tamils (and Sinhalese, I will 
come to that), including armed LTTE cadres, descended on Palathoppur from 
various directions and burnt about 35 Muslim houses and shops (7 on map 7.2). In 
the melee, at least nine Muslims were injured (MIC 2003:31), some with gunshot 
injuries (‘Curfew imposed in Muttur town, suburbs’, TamilNet, 17-4-2003). Three of 
the injured were taken to the Muthur hospital, while at least one man was admitted 
to the Kilivetti hospital. Tamils, hearing that a Muslim had been admitted to what 
they considered to be a Tamil hospital, protested forcefully, and in the end the man 
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was taken to the hospital at Serunuwara, where he died the next day (‘Tamil civilian 
killed in SLA fire’, TamilNet, 18-4-2003). Curiously, it took police and army “several 
hours” to get to the scene according to “security sources” (‘Curfew in Muttur, three 
more killed’, Daily Mirror, 19-4-2003). This was strange, since there were three 
substantial army camps (including a battalion headquarters) within a radius of two 
kilometers from Palathoppur and Bharatipuram, as well as two police posts, and all 
these camps were connected to Palathoppur by good roads. Once the soldiers and 
policemen established a presence, the attacking crowds melted away into the falling 
night. Neither the Muslim attackers nor the Tamil attackers seemed to be willing to 
risk their lives. 
I was in Dehiwatte on this day, about 6 kilometers from Palathoppur and 
Bharatipuram (8 on map 7.2). With a group of ZOA colleagues, we had left Muthur 
by mid-morning227, and driven to Dehiwatte to attend the second day of a large 
peace sports meet that had been organized for the occasion of Sinhala/Tamil New 
Year by some Sinhala and Tamil women’s groups with support of ZOA’s 
psychosocial team. About two thousand people participated in the event – mostly 
Tamils and Sinhalese, and some Muslims. This was the first time since at least 1985 
that such a large inter-ethnic event had been organized. Until the afternoon of April 
17th, the developing tensions had no effect on the sports meet – a further hint that a 
lot of people did not consider the events until that moment to be very grave. From 
about 4 o’clock however, news that something was seriously wrong started coming 
in, and the atmosphere changed. In small groups, and talking in hushed tones, Tamil 
and Muslim participants left to their own villages to wait for what was to happen. 
Interestingly, the news of Muslim-Tamil clashes brought no tension between 
Muslims and Tamils who were present at the sports meet. By 5 o’clock, the sports 
meet ended as scheduled, and I joined ZOA’s psychosocial team in a vehicle to 
Colombo. On our way out, we took an alternative route in order to avoid going 
through Tamil and Muslim areas. A group of (Tamil) colleagues from ZOA’s team in 
Trincomalee, together with the expatriate programme manager, drove back to 
Muthur via back roads, and reached the ZOA office as dusk set in. a Muslim 
acquaintance helped them negotiate their way through some Muslim road blocks.  
Before the injured who were sent to the Muthur hospital arrived there, rumours 
started circulating in Muthur that a Muslim had been killed. This increased the 
tension among Muslims significantly. Among Tamils, a parallel rumour spread that 
Tamils had been killed, which further increased tensions on the Tamil side. 
As tensions escalated, a dusk-to-dawn curfew was called, but this did not seem to 
help much.  
 
                                                 
 
227 By this time the roads had not yet been blocked. A colleague who came from Muthur to 
Dehiwatte around 1.30 in the afternoon had to take an alternative route because the police 
warned him that roads had been blocked (interview, Trincomalee, March 2008). 
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Not long after dark, Vattam, a neighbourhood of Muslim fishermen, was attacked (9 
on map 7.2). Located between the Muthur jetty and the mouth of the 
Kattaiparichchan river, Vattam is a narrow peninsula bounded on three sides by 
water: the sea to the North, the rivermouth to the East, and a lagoon to the South.  
In order to assess the damage and to identify which families should receive some 
form of assistance, government officials and Muslim representatives visited the area 
soon after the violence had ended. ZOA had relief funds available and in 
coordination with the Divisional Secretary, we decided to do our own assessment. I 
visited Vattam in the week after the violence ended, and before the damage was 
cleared. To anybody who visited the area around this time, the geographical 
distribution of the damage proved beyond all doubt that the attackers were coming 
from the LTTE-controlled area228. Near the tip of the peninsula, many houses were 
burnt. Further towards the jetty, stocks of inflammable material ran out, and instead 
knives and axes were used. Particular attention had been given to the cutting up of 
                                                 
 
228 It would have been impossible for Tamils living in Muthur town itself to walk about two 
kilometers through densely populated Muslim area with machetes, axes, and petrol. Had 
they been identified as being directly involved in the attack, the reprisals would probably 
have been much more vicious. 
Figure 7.1. Bicycle race on the ‘Peace Sportsmeet’, Dehiwatte, April 2003 (own photograph) 
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fishing nets and the smashing up of kitchenware like cooking pots. One group of 
people must have run along the beach with the sole purpose of burning fishing 
canoes, because burnt canoes were found much further away from the rivermouth 
than the last burnt house. It was also evident that the attackers were in a hurry: 
where front doors were sturdy, there would be damage from blows with axes or 
machetes, but the attackers had not bothered to keep hacking until they could open 
the door. There also seemed to have been comparatively little looting, which is 
another hint of haste. 
As had been the case in Palathoppur, there were armed troops nearby who did not 
interfere. The main camp of the navy in Kottiyar Pattu was located at the jetty, on the 
western boundary of Vattam. Apart from that, the navy had an outpost at the 
eastern tip of Vattam. The attackers walked past the outpost when they entered and 
left the village. Several of the fishing boats that were burnt along the beach were 
within two hundred metres from the camp at the jetty, and clearly within sight. Yet 
the only intervention by the navy was to use teargas against “people who came 
forward to protect their own village” (MIC 2003:27).  
Around the same time that Vattam was attacked, another group of Tamils crossed 
over from LTTE-controlled area and attacked the Muslim part of the mixed village of 
Alimchenai, just south of Muthur (10 on map 7.2). About twenty houses and shops 
owned by Muslims were damaged and destroyed, and some more houses were 
looted. The inhabitants fled to Periyapalam, a nearby Muslim settlement on the main 
road. 
 
Upset by the attack on Vattam and by the rumour that a Muslim had been killed at 
Palathoppur, gangs of angry Muslims attacked Tamil houses around the Muthur 
market and behind the Muthur hospital, set some houses on fire, and looted a few 
more (11 and 12 on map 7.2). When this attack started, the Tamils who lived in these 
areas ran to the Catholic and Methodist churches, their standard displacement sites 
in case of tension in the area. About thirty families gathered in the community centre 
in Palainagar, on the Eastern border of Muthur. The people of Vattam moved into 
schools, as did the people of Palathoppur. By the time the day ended, about 5,000 
people had got displaced. 
 
7.2.3 Day 2: Friday, April 18th, 2003 
The day that broke, Friday, was a sensitive day in two respects. For Muslims, Friday 
is the day that they go to the mosque for jumma prayers. During periods of Muslim-
Tamil tension, many Tamils tend to be particularly afraid of escalation right after the 
jumma prayers finish, as it is a time when Muslims gather and may get aroused by 
people with bad intentions.  
For Christians, who form the majority of the Tamils living in Muthur, this Friday 
was Good Friday, a very important event in the Christian religious calendar. A day 
on which to visit a church for sure, but not as a refugee.  
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Figure 7.2. Burnt house, Muthur, April 2003 (own photograph) 
Bridging troubled waters?  
270 
 
The first half of the morning was comparatively calm, with people on all sides taking 
stock of the situation after the overnight curfew was lifted. A high-powered 
delegation that had been sent on orders of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe 
himself arrived in Muthur to assess the situation. It was composed of Tilak 
Marapana (the Defense Secretary), the Army Commander, Navy Commander and 
Air Force Commander, the Inspector-General of Police, Minister Mahinda 
Samarasinghe (UNP) and UNP Chairman Malik Samarawickrema. In the 
Kattaiparichchan army camp, right on the border with the LTTE-controlled area east 
of Muthur, they held a meeting with Rauff Hakeem, the four other SLMC MPs, and 
with the two Tamil MPs for Trincomalee District (R. Sampanthan and K. 
Thurairathnasingham of the TULF). A number of Sri Lankan and foreign journalists 
had been flown in on the same helicopter to cover the event (1 on map 7.3). The idea 
of the meeting was to defuse tensions  in the area and to discuss how the violence 
could be contained. One of the decisions that was taken was to deploy more troops 
(‘LTTE-Muslim leaders meet to defuse Muttur tension’, Sunday Times, 20-4-2003, 
‘Ministers, Service Chiefs visit Muttur’, Daily News, 19-4-2003, ‘Curfew reimposed 
after grenade attack kills civilian’, TamilNet, 18-4-2003)229.  
 
While this meeting was in progress, angry posturing between a group of Tamils on 
the eastern side of the Kattaiparichchan checkpoint and Muslims on the western side 
erupted into stone-throwing around 11.30 (2 on map 7.3). A little while later, a few 
shots were fired and handbombs or grenades were thrown230. As the situation got 
out of hand, the UNP ministers, service chiefs, IGP and TULF MPs hurriedly left the 
area and went back to Trincomalee by helicopter. The SLMC MPs remained, and 
                                                 
 
229 It is interesting to see what is and what is not mentioned by the different sources. The 
Daily News and its counterpart the Sunday Observer are government-run newspapers, and 
every single article in these papers that dealt with the Muthur incidents was written in a 
style that understated the extent of violence and fear, and stressed the (impending) return to 
normalcy. It is not for nothing that the first article in these newspapers was only published 
on April 19th, after the Muthur situation had received wide coverage in the news because 
journalists were present when the incident at the Kattaiparichchan checkpoint occurred. As 
the government was under pressure at the time, it was important to portray an image of pro-
active and effective intervention and detract attention from the political crisis. 
230 According to the (Tamil) journalist S.S. Selvanayagam, who was present at the incident, 
the Tamil “marauders … armed with three shotguns, swords, iron bars and other 
improvised weapons roamed around and fired shotguns and exploded bombs around 11.30 
in the morning in the presence of the army personnel. The people from both sides of the 
border were also seen hurling stones” (‘Top ministers in Muttur area to defuse tension’, 
Daily Mirror, 19-4-2003). This description is the most detailed description available of what 
happened. Note that Selvanayagam presents the use of firearms very one-sidedly. He does 
not mention that the only victims in this fight fell when Muslims threw a hand grenade at 
the Tamils, and fired a few shots. 
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Rauff Hakeem gave a press conference in the Kattaiparichchan army camp, where he 
blamed the government (of which he himself was a part!) for not providing sufficient 
security to Muslims (‘Muttur explodes’, Sunday Times, 20-4-2003). After the incident, 
many Tamils in Chenaiyoor and neighbouring villages close to the Kattaiparichchan 
border fled to the Chenaiyoor school. 
Since there were many journalists present at the conference, the incident received 
wide media coverage. On Saturday and Sunday, the newspapers ran big articles 
with photographs of stone-throwing, stick- and knife-wielding Tamils, and one 
protograph of a Tamil firing what looks like a home-made shotgun (‘LTTE controls 
three fourth of its homeland – Balasinham, Island, 21-4-2003). Almost unanimously, 
the fight was represented as an attack by Tamil civilians and LTTE cadres against 
innocent Muslims, who do not appear in any of the photographs except for one in 
the Sunday Times, which shows what looks like a row of Muslim men patiently 
waiting behind barbed wire, with a soldier standing guard in front (‘Muttur 
explodes’, Sunday Times, 20-4-2003). This was a misrepresentation of fact.  
The Kattaiparichchan checkpoint consists of a barbed-wire fence on both sides of the 
road and a few bunkers. To the east there is an open field with some shrubs that is 
bordered by the Kattaiparichchan River. To the northwest are the houses of 
Palainagar, and to the southwest there is the Kattaiparichchan army camp, which is 
the main army camp in Muthur.  The only way to cross the border is by coming 
along the road and passing a barrier very close to the army camp. Any Tamil passing 
the barrier would get himself stuck between the Muslim crowd, the barbed wire and 
the Army soldiers. All the photographs that show armed Tamils show them on the 
other side of the barbed wire, but a group did indeed pass the barrier – only to find 
themselves trapped. In the melee, at least one grenade was thrown and shots were 
fired. Three Tamils died and sixteen others were injured. Two of the photographs 
published show injured Tamils being carried back towards the relative safety of the 
other side of the barrier.  
Apart from the angry posturing and stone throwing, there never was any real fight 
between the Tamil and Muslim mobs. In that case, the numbers of injured (or even 
dead) people would have been much higher than was reported. And more 
significantly, the ethnic distribution of casualties was entirely one-sided. None of the 
newspaper articles or analysis reports that describe the incident mention any 
Muslims getting injured in this incident231.  
                                                 
 
231 The “Admission and Discharge Book” of the Muthur hospital, which a kind member of 
the hospital staff showed me, supports this. On April 18th, only four patients were admitted 
in total. One of them, a Sinhalese male in his late thirties, was admitted around lunch time 
by an officer attached to the Kattaiparichchan army camp. This man may have got injured in 
the clash. A Muslim man and a Muslim boy were admitted separately around 4 o’clock in 
the evening, and the last patient (a Muslim man) was admitted late at night. Had any of 
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Because of the violence, the curfew that had been lifted in the morning was 
reinstated in the early afternoon. In Muthur, jumma prayers did take place, but 
because of the tension attendance was low. The curfew seems to have been enforced 
pretty well during the afternoon. In the evening however, the Muslim settlements of 
Shafinagar and Hairiyanagar on the outskirts of Muthur were attacked and given the 
same treatment as Vattam had been given (3 and 4 on map 7.3). These settlements 
are located very close to the border with LTTE-controlled area to the southwest of 
Muthur, and the damage patterns were very similar to those in Vattam: a zone with 
burnt houses closest to the border, then a zone houses smashed up where it was 
possible to enter easily, then a zone where damage was limited as time ran out and 
the attackers had to return to where they came from. Hand grenades were thrown 
into several houses, which seemed rather strange. These are weapons intended for 
use against human targets, and can hardly cause significant damage to buildings. 
However, as it would be impossible for Tamils coming from LTTE-controlled areas 
to have hand grenades in their possession without explicit approval of the LTTE, I 
contend that the grenades were primarily used as a sort of signature. In the words of 
the movie Apocalypse Now, the grenades were thrown to “let Charlie know who did 
this”. 
As in Vattam, the extent of looting seems to have been limited, though farming and 
household equipment was generally damaged whenever attackers had managed to 
get into houses. One of the more dramatic details of what happened was the burning 
of a collection of books in the house of an elderly Muslim man (MIC 2003:10, and 
personal observation). The poor man’s house had been left intact, but his bookshelf 
in an annex to the house was totally gutted, destroying a collection of Tamil, Arabic 
and English literature that the owner had collected over several decades. 
These attacks significantly increased the number of Muslim IDPs, as several 
thousand people from all the western outskirts of Muthur also fled to schools and 
mosques further away from the border with LTTE-controlled territory. 
 
7.2.4 Day 3: Saturday, April 19th, 2003 
After two hectic days, Saturday was tense, but calm. The presence of police and 
army had increased significantly, and people generally stayed off the streets. Since 
Muthur was virtually isolated for the third straight day, a new problem developed 
as fresh food supplies were running out, and particularly those people who were 
economically dependent on daily wages were running out of money to buy 
whatever food was still available via the back doors of shops – which were officially 
all closed. During the day, most Muslims who had not lost their houses went back 
home to cook, and they only returned to their sites of displacement in the night. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
them been injured in the clash, they would have been admitted when the Muslim crowd was 
sent home and not hours later, during curfew. 
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Tamils who had fled to the churches in Muthur were unable to venture out from 
where they were and had no access to food, even if they had stocks in their houses. 
As the staff of ZOA was able to move around between the office and the two 
churches232, some food could be distributed, but this was limited. 
Around seven in the evening, a lorry owned by a fisherman from Jamaliya, a 
Muslim-dominated coastal suburb of Trincomalee, was attacked with a hand 
grenade, injuring six Muslims (5 on map 7.3). This triggered off tensions, and about 
six Tamils passing through Jamaliya were attacked (‘Entire Trincomalee district 
under curfew’, TamilNet, 20-4-2003). According to the abovementioned article and an 
article in the Daily Mirror, the police in Trincomalee was of the opinion that the 
reasons for the incident were not communal, but a conflict among fishermen over the 
use of illegal fishing methods by some of them (‘Six injured in grenade blast’, Daily 
Mirror, 21-4-2003)233. In response to the incidents, Trincomalee town and its suburbs 
were also put under a night curfew. As tensions did not ease on Sunday, the night 
curfew was widened to cover the entire district. We see here an example of an 
initially unrelated incident becoming reinterpreted in terms of an existing discourse 
of tension. 
 
7.2.5 Day 4: Sunday, April 20th, 2003  
Around midnight, the last major incident in the cycle occurred when a group of 
Tamils whom UTHR(J) identifies as LTTE cadres visited Jinnahnagar and 
Azathnagar (6 and 7 on map 7.3), a Muslim settlement about seven kilometers South 
of Muthur, and had some tea in a teashop234. I quote from UTHR(J): 
 
“At about 1.00 AM the two agricultural settlements were raided by a crowd of 
300 led by the same LTTEers, following the throwing of a petrol bomb. The 
Muslims began running to the nearest army camp. The attackers removed 
jewellery from several of the fleeing women. The raiders looted the place 
removing valuables, paddy and tractors. 
About 650 gunny bags of paddy were burnt. The raiders also polluted the wells 
by throwing into it products of their destruction of shops and houses” (UTHR(J) 
2003a:18). 
 
                                                 
 
232 The Methodist Church compound borders the compound of the ZOA office; the Roman 
Catholic Church compound is about 200-300 metres away on the same road. No Muslims 
live along this stretch of the road, so the risk of getting attacked was limited. 
233 Note that the Daily Mirror places the incident on Sunday instead of Saturday.   
234 MIC (2003:6-7) places the incident in the night of April 17 to 18. Based on other sources 
available to me, I am farily sure that the dating as given by UTHR(J) is the correct one. I do 
not know what explains the difference in dates. 
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According to various people whom I spoke to, the attackers came both from the 
direction of Pallikudiyiruppu in LTTE-controlled area and from the direction of 
Mallikaithivu and Pattitidal in government-controlled area, and were both LTTE 
cadres and ordinary civilians. Note that the pattern of attack is very different here. 
While damage was definitely caused to some houses, what was burnt was primarily 
left-over paddy stocks from the previous harvest (and possibly seed paddy for the 
upcoming season). And, more importantly, this time there was looting, even to the 
extent of robbing fleeing women of their jewelry. In the earlier instances where 
Muslim settlements were attacked, the people were allowed to flee and looting was 
limited. 
The inhabitants of Azathnagar, Jinnahnagar and the Muslims part of Bharatipuram 
fled to the army camp that is located between the two villages. It does of course beg 
a question why the soldiers in the camp were unable to do anything about the attack, 
but this issue is not dealt with in any of the available documents. The first two 
villages are basically long rows of houses along the main road, and are surrounded 
on all sides by wide swathes of paddy fields, while the third is a little off the main 
road, surrounded on two sides by a Tamil settlement and on two sides by paddy 
fields. Fearing a reprisal attack, Tamils from nearby settlements fled to the schools at 
Kilivetti, Mallikaithivu, Pattitidel and Iruthayapuram. However, no retaliation 
followed. 
During the day, leaders of the Muslims and the LTTE met in the SLMM office in 
Trincomalee, and agreed to finalise an agreement on calming down the situation the 
next day. By 2 PM, the curfew that had been lifted to enable people to buy food was 
re-imposed in the Muthur region. 
 
7.2.6 Day 5: Monday, April 21st, 2003 
Monday was tense but quiet. School exams commenced, and the army provided 
security to school children traveling through areas of other ethnicity, so that they 
could reach the exam centres. During the day, a Muslim man was shot dead near 
Thoppur (8 on map 7.3), which increased fears, but did not lead to violent reprisal.  
In the evening, leaders of the Muslims and of the LTTE met again, and signed a sort 
of ‘peace agreement’, that contained six points: 
 
‘Tamil and Muslim peoples live together free of fear and suspicion and build 
mutual trust in each other.  
To continue to be in close contact with each other in order to achieve and sustain 
the above.  
To prevail upon the Tamil and Muslim peoples to terminate all acts of violence 
against each other and ensure that peace prevails.  
To jointly request the law enforcement agencies in areas under government 
control to impartially enforce the maintenance of law and order.  
In areas under the control of the LTTE, the LTTE will ensure the security of the 
Muslim people.  
To seek the co-operation of all concerned to achieve the above’ (‘LTTE and 
Muslim leaders reach peace agreement’, TamilNet, 21-4-2003).  
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Though the agreement was widely disseminated in the media the next day, CPA 
(2003:5) notes that it was not given much publicity in Muthur. Curfew was again 
imposed, but only from 6 PM onwards, and as a “precautionary measure” 
(‘Fisherman killed in Trincomalee’, Daily Mirror, 22-4-2003). 
 
 
7.2.7 Aftermath 
The next day, one more Muslim man was killed, and a young Muslim woman was 
injured near Thoppur (1 on map 7.4). This seems to have been more like a theatrical 
act of violence aimed at instilling fear and making sure that all Muslims did not 
forget the message, because the victim was beheaded and not simply shot. Who 
killed the man was never officially established, but a lot of people at the time were 
pretty convinced that it was the LTTE. Beheading of victims was at the time seen as 
being a key ‘signature’ in the repertoire of theatrical violence that the LTTE used to 
instil fear into a large population without actually having to physically harm a lot of 
people, putting a lot of own cadres at risk or becoming forced to use a lot of cadres to 
enforce obedience from civilians in areas under their control. Other forms of 
theatrical violence, generally used by the LTTE and Tamil militant groups, are lamp-
post killings and (in areas under militant control) public executions. The Sri Lankan 
armed forces seem to have resorted more to rape, and to random killings in public 
Figure 7.3. Displaced Muslims from Asathnagar and Jinnahnagar staying in the 59th Milepost Army 
Camp (own photograph) 
Bridging troubled waters?  
276 
 
places (such as the shooting of five students on the Trincomalee boulevard in 
January 2006 in front of 300 witnesses – see UTHR 2007a) as theatrical signatures. 
The situation remained tense in the following weeks, but no further violent incidents 
happened.  
The number of people who were registered as displaced peaked in the last days of 
April, after the ‘peace agreement’ had been signed.  On April 22nd, the government 
announced that food rations were to be distributed to those who were displaced and 
that compensation would be given to those whose houses had been damaged. Since 
thousands of people who were dependent on daily wages had been unable to go for 
work and were out of stocks, registering as displaced was the easiest way of getting 
access to free food. Except for about 2,500 Tamils and about 4,500 Muslims who were 
unable to return to their homes235, there were another 25,000 Muslims who were in 
their homes during the daytime, and claimed to stay in the camps at night. Since it 
was difficult to venture out during the night, independent verification of IDP 
numbers was difficult, but when we visited some sites (like the Thahanagar 
community centre and the Nadutheevu Saddam Vidyalayam) early in the morning, 
there were hardly any people, there was no garbage, and the only proof of any 
presence of people consisted of a few places where three bricks had been arranged in 
the traditional way to make some fire for making tea. Of course, as soon as an NGO 
vehicle was seen near these sites, a crowd would mass and complain that no 
assistance had been received yet. Further evidence that cast serious doubt about the 
numbers of people actually staying in some sites was the fact that temporary toilets 
were either not requested for, or when they were requested and materials were 
delivered, it took many days before they were completed, and yet the sites did not 
show any signs of open defecation. In those places were people were staying day 
and night, like the 59th Milepost army camp where about 2,000 people were staying, 
this was very different: within two days, the place became one big mess, and open 
defecation did happen in the fields around the camp.  
                                                 
 
235 These were the Tamils who were staying day and night in the churches in Muthur and in 
a few Tamil schools in Kilivetti, Mallikaithivu, Pattitidal, Iruthayapuram and Chenaiyoor. 
The Muslims who were displaced day and night were those who had fled from border areas 
in Vattam, (part of) Thaqwanagar, Shafinagar, Hairiyanagar, Alimnagar, Asathnagar, 
Jinnahnagar, Bharatipuram and Palathoppur; they were staying in various schools and 
mosques, and in the 59th milepost army camp. Note that MIC (2003:8) claims that the 
displaced Tamils who stayed in the Kilivetti school had been forced to go there by the LTTE 
in order to create the impression that they had been chased away by the Muslims. The 
argument of a set-up by the LTTE is further strengthened by the claim that the LTTE media 
division filmed Tamils in front of burning Muslims houses and pretended that the Muslims 
had put Tamil houses on fire. I have not heard this from anyone else, and can neither prove 
nor disprove it. Though I judge the LTTE to be capable of doing this, I have no reason to 
believe that it did happen in this instance. 
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From about April 25th onwards, other humanitarian agencies started to return to 
Muthur to resume their work, followed – after a while – by a few groups of analysts. 
The ‘April violence’ (later termed the ‘2003 violence’) became a case that was 
discussed among a select few for a while, and then faded into irrelevance, overtaken 
by bigger and newer events: the LTTE stepping out of peace talks on April 21st, a 
debate on the rights of the LTTE to the sea, an impending crisis in the government, 
and severe floods in the South-West of Sri Lanka in mid-May. Even though in the 
week after the riot, both Muslims and Tamils from the area described it as the worst 
violence since 1990, nearly everybody whom I spoke to about it in 2007 had 
forgotten about it.  
As the children sat for their exams and farmers ploughed their fields, life in Muthur 
slowly returned to normal. People started earning again and rations stopped, so only 
those genuinely displaced remained after two weeks. In late May, about a month 
after it all had started, the last camps closed and only those whose houses had been 
destroyed remained displaced until repairs were completed. 
All was not well however. The LTTE instituted a boycott against Muslim shops, 
forbidding any Tamils living in LTTE-controlled areas to buy from or sell to Muslims 
from Muthur236. At the same time, civilians in LTTE-controlled areas received 
military training and were made members of the maravar padai, a kind of uniform-
less home guards. The message was clear: the LTTE was not going to let the Muslims 
have an easy time, but for three months there was no violence. On August 3rd, a 
Muslim who had been attached to the police intelligence unit was shot dead at 
Jinnahnagar as he was cycling to his restaurant (2 on map 7.4). In reprisal, a Tamil 
boy who had been active in the April violence was shot dead by Muslims the next 
day. Nine days after this, two Muslim youth were killed outside Trincomalee town 
(3 on map 7.4). They were allegedly on their way to buy a gun from the LTTE. Two 
hours later, another Tamil boy, Adrian Sellar, was kidnapped in Muthur (4 on map 
7.4). Several days later his parents received a letter stating that the boy had died 
(Subramanian 2005:206-209, UTHR(J) 2003a:22-23). Again the Tamils in Muthur fled 
(but not the Muslims), and they stayed in the churches for about two weeks. On 
August 15th, a Muslim man was stabbed and injured at Palathoppur, and the next 
day two Muslim fishermen were abducted by the LTTE (5 on map 7.4). In response, 
a bus was stoned by Muslims, after which the police teargassed the crowd. Nine 
people were injured in the melee. Also, two Tamils were abducted by Muslims. 
Finally, sense prevailed and the four people who had been kidnapped were released.  
This time, there was very little property damage, but the fear among Tamils was 
much stronger: “earlier their properties were at risk, but now there was no guarantee 
for their life” (UTHR(J) 2003a:22).  
                                                 
 
236 This boycott was lifted in mid-August, under pressure from Tamil civilians who were 
finding it hard to get goods from elsewhere. 
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In October, during the Muslim holy month of Ramadhan, there was a string of 
attacks by the LTTE against Muslims in Kinniya (6 on map 7.4), which ended 
without reprisal attacks when school exams started (UTHR(J) 2003c).  
 
7.3 What happened in Muthur? 
In order to understand why the riot happened, it is important to look at wider 
context factors and at the roles that key actors played in the riot. In sections 7.3.1 to 
7.3.3, I describe three context factors: changes in the way the LTTE dealt with the 
Muslims after the ceasefire, the struggle over the leadership of the Muslim polity, 
and the faltering peace process. In sections 7.3.4 to 7.3.6, I discus the roles that three 
key types of actors had in the riot: the LTTE, Muslim thugs, and the armed forces.  
 
7.3.1 The LTTE’s attitude to the Muslims 
As Horowitz (2001: 308-317) has made clear, many riots take place in a context where 
power balances change. The riot is then a tool for the aggressor to establish his 
dominance over the victims. Such a process was very much happening between the 
LTTE and the Muslims in eastern Sri Lanka from the signing of the ceasefire 
agreement in February 2002. Ever since the first Muslim-Tamil violence, the relations 
between Tamil militants and Muslims had been strained. The militants collected 
‘taxes’ and otherwise put pressure on the Muslims, but this was kept in check 
somewhat by Muslim links with the armed forces. Since the ceasefire constrained the 
Sri Lankan armed forces in their possibilities to use violence, the Muslims lost a 
protective shield. ‘Tax collection’ by the LTTE became increasingly blatant, and 
kidnappings of Muslims for ransom escalated. Also, the LTTE continued to deny 
thousands of Muslim farmers access to their lands in LTTE-controlled territory, 
despite promises to the contrary. In June 2002, this pent-up frustration over 
continued harassment and provocation to a riot in the town of Valaichchenai, but the 
LTTE did not change its attitude in the aftermath. The Muthur riot therefore did not 
take place in a vacuum. Muslim anger over the disappearance of the two men must 
be placed in a substratum of more general frustration and anger about the LTTE’s 
unchecked arrogance. In return, the intensity of the attacks against Muslim villages 
is an indicator of the LTTE’s intent to ‘teach the Muslims a lesson’ for daring to stand 
up against the LTTE. 
 
7.3.2 The struggle over the leadership of the Muslim polity 
A somewhat curious aspect of the Muthur riot is the determination with which Rauff 
Hakeem, leader of the SLMC, associated himself with the case of the disappeared 
Muslim men. In itself, the disappearance of two Muslims was a comparatively minor 
incident, and no obvious reason for a party leader and government minister to link 
his political fate to the resolution of the issue. To understand this, it is necessary to 
have a broader look at the Muslim politics at the time. From the time the SLMC was 
established until his death in 2000, M.H.M. Ashraff, the party’s first leader, built up a 
 Troubles: inter-ethnic interaction during everyday riots and almost-riots 
279 
   
reputation for being the undisputed leader of Sri Lanka’s Muslims. After Ashraff’s 
death, a power struggle developed between Rauff Hakeem who had been Ashraff’s 
deputy, and Ashraff’s widow Ferial. Ultimately, Ferial Ashraff started her own party 
(with its power base centered around Kattankudy and Kalmunai, her late husband’s 
home town), and Rauff Hakeem became the SLMC leader. His claim to be leader of 
Sri Lanka’s Muslims remained fragile (Ameerdeen 2006). Just before the Muthur riot, 
Hakeem’s authority was further undermined when Athaulla, another important 
parliamentarian in the SLMC who has a strong power base in Akkaraipattu, broke 
off and started his own party. The situation in Muthur provided Hakeem with an 
opportunity to reassert his leadership claims, and he seems to have jumped into it 
with vigour. Muthur provided a safe place for Hakeem to take the battle for 
supremacy public, because the Muslims of Muthur were predominantly behind 
Hakeem’s faction, and neither Ferial Ashraff nor Athaulla, nor any of the majority 
parties had much support: it was like a soccer match on the ‘home grounds’. 
Some Tamils whom I spoke to went so far as to suggest that Hakeem himself 
instigated the tension in order to come in and save the day for the Muslims, in the 
process re-establishing his dominance. I have the impression that this is a case of 
‘reasoning after the fact’. While Hakeem definitely needed to reassert his dominance 
and seems to have used the opportunity that offered itself in Muthur, I have not 
found evidence for his direct involvement in instigating the riots. However, I do 
think that Hakeem’s presence in Muthur seriously raised the stakes for both local 
Muslims and the LTTE, and significantly reduced chances for an early de-escalation. 
As soon as Hakeem arrived in Muthur, he was put in his place by MP Mahroof 
(UNP), who told him on the funeral on April 15th to give up his seat in parliament if 
he could not ensure the security of the Muslims. It was this attack on Hakeem’s 
status as leader that triggered the fight around the Akkaraichchenai mosque that had 
such unintended disastrous consequences.  
For the UNP of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, this battle for political 
supremacy over the Muslim polity was a delicate issue. The UNP, which was in a 
coalition government with several other parties, among which the SLMC, could ill 
afford losing the SLMC’s support, but neither could it afford the SLMC (personified 
in Rauff Hakeem) to lay claim to the leadership of all Muslims, since a fairly sizeable 
fraction of Sri Lanka’s Muslims were part of the UNP voter base. This probably 
explains why Wickremasinghe sent such a high-powered delegation to Muthur on 
April 18th. 
 
7.3.3 The faltering peace process 
An additional reason why an early resolution of the problems in Muthur was 
important for the UNP government was that the peace process, which had made 
much progress in 2002, had started faltering by early 2003, and things like the 
Muthur riot provided further ammunition for opposition parties opposed to the 
peace process.  
The LTTE’s formal withdrawal from peace talks with the government on April 21st 
(over an unrelated issue) overshadowed the problems in Muthur, and suddenly 
Muthur was all but forgotten in the public discourse. This may have contributed to 
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the fact that tensions did not flare up again after the school exams were over: both 
the LTTE and the SLMC leadership had other, much more pressing issues on their 
minds.  
 
7.3.4 The role of the LTTE in the riot 
There can be little doubt that the LTTE was involved in the preparation and logistics 
of the attacks on Muslims that took place during the riot. If the patterns of damage in 
Vattam, Shafinagar and Hairiyanagar are sufficient evidence that the attacks 
originated from LTTE-controlled territory, the use of hand grenades and theatrical 
violence served as symbolic signatures. Not only was the LTTE involved in the riot, 
it wanted the Muslims to know who was behind the violence. The attacks on Muslims 
were not just angry responses to the Muslim hartal. The intention was to force the 
Muslims of Muthur to accept their subservient position in the local hierarchy of 
power. 
 
7.3.5 The role of Muslim thugs in the riot 
On the side of the Muslims, a key player in the riot seems to have been an obscure 
group of men that was known among Tamils as the ‘Jihad Group’ or, after 9/11, as 
the ‘Osama Group’. Tamils from Muthur whom I spoke to were able to identify key 
leaders in this group, and alleged that the ‘Jihad Group’ had also been involved in 
earlier incidents of anti-Tamil violence. But what jihad was there to fight in Muthur? 
Islam was not threatened in any way that warrented a violent defence. With the very 
possibility of the existence of a Muslim armed group being strongly contested by 
many Muslims, it took me several years before the pieces fell into place. I have little 
reason to doubt that the ‘Jihad Group’ existed. A friend from Muthur told me that he 
had personally witnessed how Muslim men were involved in firing practice, and the 
name of ‘Butcher’ Hakeem (the local market thug, not the SLMC leader) as their 
leader came up too often to be a mere coincidence. In addition, the fact that the LTTE 
organized a manhunt for (from its perspective) harmful Muslims after taking over 
the town in August 2006 indicates that the LTTE took this group very seriously. An 
acquaintance who was very familiar with the situation in Muthur and who had 
access to Tamil and Muslim community leaders even told me that there were three 
armed groups: apart from the ‘Jihad Group’ (which was the most prominent of the 
three), there were also the so-called ‘Jetty Group’ and the so-called ‘Knox Road 
Group’. According to this person, the people in these groups were not islamists, but 
primarily petty criminals who were engaged in involved in the extortion of 
‘protection money’ from Muslim businessmen in their respective territories: the 
‘Jetty Group’ in the area around the Muthur jetty, the ‘Knox Road Group’ in the area 
around Knox Road and Jaya Road, and the ‘Jihad Group’ in the rest of Muthur, but 
centered around the market.  
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According to some of the people I spoke to, one of the men whose abduction 
triggered the riot was a member, or even an “area leader” of the ‘Jihad Group’ 
(interview with former resident of Muthur; see also MIC 2003 for a reference to the 
alleged membership of an armed group). This would explain the initial strong 
enforcement of the hartal by the ‘Jihad Group’ and the story of the beating up of a 
Muslim businessman who defied the orders to close his shop. 
A long conversation on organized crime in Colombo with a talkative ex-policeman 
who had been friends with a local thug in his teenage years put things in 
perspective. He told me that criminal gangs exist all over Sri Lanka, and they 
generally have the same set-up: a clearly identified leadership (the thugs), 
surrounded by a group of lower-ranking members or goondas, exerting control over a 
defined territory. Businesses in the territory are forced to pay protection money to 
the gang, but in return the gang will defend the businesses under their patronage 
against unwanted interference by outsiders. In origin, this may not always have been 
a very criminal affair: in situations where the law and order apparatus of the state is 
not very strong, such gangs can function as a kind of local ‘neighbourhood watches’. 
As control over votes became increasingly important in the decades after 
independence, political parties gravitated towards the gangs and (particularly local) 
politics increasingly criminalized (Uyangoda 1997). In Muthur in 2003, the ‘Jihad 
Group’ was openly associated with the SLMC237. Another group of local toughs was 
associated with the UNP, though I have not been able to find any explicit links 
between the UNP and any of the armed groups. 
The fact that the SLMC identified so strongly with the protest in Muthur lends 
further credence to the stories about the involvement of ‘Butcher’ Hakeem and his 
goondas in the hartal and in the demonstration at Kattaiparichchan on April 18th. 
With the developing conflict in Sri Lanka, links were also established between the 
parties to the conflict and some of the gangs. Just like smugglers from Valvettithurai 
were recruited into the LTTE, Sinhalese and Muslims living on or over the edge of 
legality were sometimes among those who were recruited as home guards. 
                                                 
 
237 This link between the SLMC and a group using the term Jihad in its name may be more 
than a coincidence. In the aftermath of a massacre of Muslims in 1992 (and taking into 
account the larger context of a string of massacres of Muslims in mid-1990 and the expulsion 
of the Muslims from the Northern Province in October 1990), Ashraff stated in parliament: 
“If the LTTE is killing us, if the LTTE is leaving us out of our homes, simply because we 
happen to be Muslims, simply because we say “La ilaha illallahu, Mammmdur-Rasoolullah 
[sic]” because of our belief in Allah and Prophet Muhammed (peace be on him) … if that is 
the only reason, it is the commandment of the Holy Quran that we should declare Jihad against them 
and kill every LTTEr. We shall now intend to slaughter every LTTEr including Mr. Prabhakaran. In 
a personal note, I will be the happiest if I can die in battle at the time of slitting the neck of 
this bloody Prabhakaran. These are my feelings” (Ameerdeen 2006: 208, emphasis mine) 
I have however found no indications that either Ashraff or any other prominent SLMC 
member ever followed up on this statement. 
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According to local people and human rights activists whom I spoke to, the military 
also established links with some of the gangs, who provided intelligence and various 
other kinds of support. In Muthur, particularly ‘Butcher’ Hakeem had a reputation 
for being linked to the intelligence unit at the Kattaiparichchan army camp238. Some 
Tamil sources interpreted this link as the reason why the demonstrating Muslims at 
Kattaiparichchan were suddenly able to access a few hand grenades and guns, and 
use them with impunity in full sight of the military. 
A final clue about the (lower-ranking) membership of the groups came in early 2006. 
At this time, some 1,600 youths from Muthur and Thoppur had been recruited as 
home guards. However, the vast majority quit when they realized that they would 
not be posted in their own hometowns, but be made part of a proposed Muslim 
regiment of the army. Suddenly, stories emerged about a number of armed groups 
that had come up in Thoppur. People who told me about this mentioned that these 
were neither criminal gangs nor militant Islamists. Rather, there were groups of 
bored youth who wanted some excitement, and found it by declaring that they were 
part of ‘a group’, and by getting themselves one or two guns. These groups had no 
particular political agenda, nor any particular enemies that they intended to defend 
themselves against; the main objective seemed to be to show off to other Muslim 
youths in Thoppur. While I am convinced that the three groups in Muthur were not 
simply bored youth who wanted to show off, the excitement factor must be an 
important reason for some youth to join. 
As said, there is no jihad in Muthur, and the members of the three armed groups are 
not militant Islamists. Still, there does seem to have been an indirect link between the 
spread of reformist Islamic thought and the development of the armed groups in the 
first years of the millennium. Those who promote reformist Islam in Muthur are not 
militant Islamists. Throughout, their focus has been on how to make better Muslims, 
not on how to fight non-Muslims. In the process, the own (Muslim) identity has 
become an important issue for many youth. This is primarily in engagement with 
other Muslims, and revolves around how to practice Islam in the proper way. 
However, in the process of emphasizing own identity, differences with others will 
inevitably come to the fore. For the Muslim gangs, own identity is not a primary 
issue, but – particularly after the development of Tamil militant violence and after 
the development of links with the armed forces – the distinction from the ‘enemy’ is. 
In a situation where impressionable and enthusiastic youth are engaging with 
identity, it is not surprising if some make the jump from focusing on own identity to 
focusing on distinguishing the self from the antagonist other (the LTTE), and join 
one of the gangs. After the leader of the ‘Jihad group’ was killed, the group 
disintegrated, and while some of the members continued the gang, others turned 
their backs to the violence and focused on religious teaching.  
 
                                                 
 
238 This man was a butcher in day-to-day life, but his employment became a nickname (“the 
Butcher”) with sinister meaning, based on acts of violence that he was alleged to have 
committed in collusion with the intelligence unit.  
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7.3.6 The role of the armed forces in the riot 
As mentioned before, the armed forces largely stood by and watched as 
neighbourhood after neighbourhood was attacked. With the exception of one village 
(which I describe in section 7.4.2), effective patrolling only started after attacks had 
ended. Viewed positively, the security forces did not take part in the violence, unlike 
the cases that Paul Brass (1998) and Stanley Tambiah (1996) describe. This is not 
entirely surprising: the problems were between Muslims and Tamils, and the Sri 
Lankan armed forces are predominantly composed of Sinhalese who had no 
particular reason to choose sides in this riot. In 2003, the armed forces were 
constrained by the ceasefire agreement that the UNP government of the time seemed 
to take very seriously. Any attempt to stop the marauding mobs could have easily 
led to accusations of partiality that could easily escalate and derail the peace process. 
Nevertheless, given the fact that mobs melted away every time the troops did show 
up, one may wonder whether a quicker response by the armed forces could have 
reduced the damage. 
In the period after the riot had ended, the forces acted commendably, particularly by 
providing security to people who had to travel through areas that were dominated 
by the other ethnicity. Particularly the Tamils whom I spoke to at the time were 
positively surprised by the behavior of the troops during this period. 
 
7.4 Lessons from Muthur             
A key reason why I re-analyse the events of April 2003 despite the availability of 
several elaborate analysis reports is the fact that, in my view, three key elements are 
missing from the available descriptions and analyses of what happened. These 
missing elements carry important lessons about the nature of inter-ethnic relations 
during periods of acute tension and violence. In this section, I start with an analysis 
of the process of de-escalation at the end of the ‘riot cycle’. This is followed by an 
analysis of boundary crossing events. Lastly, I deal with intra-ethnic divisions.  
 
7.4.1 De-escalation 
Quite obviously, the violence (but not the tension) reduced after additional troups 
were called in on April 18th, after the clash at Kattaiparichchan. This was however 
not enough to end the riot, as violence continued even after troops were deployed. 
Journalists and analysts alike have been unanimous in identifying the signing of an 
agreement between Muslim leaders and the local leadership of the LTTE on April 21 
as the cause of the de-escalation after the riot. While I do agree that the agreement 
that was signed had symbolic value in formalizing the end of the riot, there is a 
fundamental flaw in the analysis: the chronology does not work. The agreement was 
signed on Monday night (April 21st), after Muthur had already calmed down 
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significantly on Sunday evening. On top of that, the peace agreement was not given 
prominence within Muthur (CPA 2003: 5)239. 
I returned to Muthur on April 22nd around 9.30 in the morning. At the time, the 
situation was tense but calm, and the explanation that I was given was that 
(Advanced Level) school exams had started, and that because everyone wanted the 
children to be able to do their exams, a ‘time-out’ had been taken. In the subsequent 
days that I spent in Muthur, this view was repeated many times, often with a 
subsequent remark that people were sort of expecting things to flare up again after 
the exams were over. It was only after the exams ended and things stayed calm for a 
few days that people became convinced that the riot had really ended. I was 
strengthened in my opinion on the importance of the school exams as a key element 
in de-escalation when six months later a similar narrative (again similarly ignored by 
analysts) went around. This time the tensions were in Kinniya, and they were ‘put 
on hold’ because the (Ordinary Level) school exams had started240. 
In the agricultural villages around Muthur, an additional argument was given: the 
cultivation season was starting, and farmers needed to get back to their fields before 
the time window for land preparation closed.  
For the villagers whom I met at the time, the end of the violence was a practical 
necessity. Whether or not Tamils and Muslims felt like trusting each other, they 
needed to get on with their lives and in that line of thought, continued hostility did 
not fit. The suspicion remained until it became clear that the ‘time-out’ had ended 
and the ‘other side’ had not taken to violence again. When in early August there was 
another (brief) string of killings and counter-killings, no mass violence ensued, and 
though in October and November the anti-Muslim violence in Kinniya brought 
tension in Muthur, there was no violence. Over the course of 2004 and the first three 
quarters of 2005, people told me that Muslim-Tamil relations had improved 
significantly. During this period, not many provocations by either the LTTE or 
militant Muslims triggered tensions, and when things did happen that might get out 
of hand, the Muthur Peace Committee (MPC)241, which had been reinvigorated after 
                                                 
 
239 This does not mean that I believe that formal calls to stay calm do not work, but the effect 
is in the  dissemination, not in any formal agreement. One very clear case in which a public 
announcement helped calm things down was in Akkaraipattu, after six people had been 
killed when a hand grenade was lobbed into a mosque (Bock, Lawrence and Gaasbeek 2006: 
24-30). Because the mosque leadership immediately intervened and urged the Muslims not 
to attack Tamils, there was no retaliatory violence. But even in this case, there was no peace 
agreement; the decision to broadcast the announcement was entirely one-sided. 
240 I do find it very interesting that despite the stress that was put on allowing children to do 
their exams because exams are very important for their future, not much attention seemed to 
be given to the importance of allowing the children to prepare for their exams in peace so 
that they can actually have a fair chance to pass the exams. 
241 Peace Committees are formal structures that were set up in every DS Division in the 
conflict zone by the Sri Lankan government after the 2002 cease-fire agreement was signed. 
The idea of Peace Committees seems to have been older though; I have come across 
references to the existence of DS Division-level Peace Committees in newspaper articles 
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the 2003 riot, was capable of defusing the situation. Even when, triggered by a 
countrywide increase in violence, the situation escalated beyond control in 
December 2005 and January 2006, the MPC was capable of getting people out of 
harm’s way a number of times242.  
 
7.4.2 Boundary crossings 
A second missing element in the analyses of what happened in Muthur is the 
recognition of elements of ‘positive’ inter-ethnic interaction that did take place 
during the riot. I came across five examples, none of which were reported in the 
newspapers or documented by analysts: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
from the late 1980s. Formally, the Officer-in-Charge of the local police station chairs the 
committee, which further has representation from the ethnic communities present in the DS 
Division, as well as people representing the local administration. In some DS Divisions, 
these committees did become quite efficient. My impression is that this generally was the 
case in places where the citizen’s representatives were able to function as a sort of informal 
peace committee, beyond the formal meetings where police and local government were 
represented. The Peace Committee in Muthur (since mid-2003) and that in Seruwila (since 
mid-2005) were among the more effective ones. They received formal and informal support 
from various agencies with a mandate for promoting peace and reconciliation.  Staff from 
these agencies were fairly open that this was very much a situation where every agency 
contributed its part, and the Peace Committee members really did the work. However, for 
reasons of reputation and possibly access to donor funding, a situation ensued where 
different agencies (some more than others) started laying claims to having been responsible 
for key feats of the Peace Committees. Unfortunately, both Peace Committees lost a lot of 
their effectiveness when key members vacated their positions in the second half of 2006. 
242 As tensions escalated, a large group of Tamil and Muslim students were jointly attending 
exam preparation classes in Muthur that were organized by the MPC. The first thing the 
MPC did was to negotiate safe passage for the Tamil students and the Muslim students from 
Thoppur to return home without being attacked on the way. A few weeks later,  
“[A] Muslim who passed through the village of Manalchenai was attacked by a group of 
drunk Tamils, who wanted to kill him. As soon as Mr. Elilan [the local head of the LTTE 
political wing] heard of this, he called two active senior members of the Muthur Peace 
Committee, one Muslim and one Tamil.  Mr. Elilan told them what had happened and that it 
was a personal affair and not communal, and asked them to go and rescue the man and calm 
down the situation. They went together to [the Muslim village of] Periyapalam, where news 
had already filtered through about the attack, explained what had happened, and asked 
people to stay calm until they came back with the injured man. At the same time, a vehicle of 
NVPF was returning to Muthur from Colombo, and was stopped on the way. [One of the 
NVPF staff], who was in the vehicle, decided to go and have a look, and managed to get the 
attackers to stop (with the help of a group of soldiers who had come to check the situation), 
and let him take the injured man to the hospital in Muthur. This joint intervention prevented 
a new escalation of communal violence” (Bock, Lawrence and Gaasbeek 2006: 59). 
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Example 1: securing access to relief aid 
On the second day of the troubles (April 18th), two teachers and a retired government 
servant, all Muslims, got in touch with the staff of ZOA (who were, at the time, all 
Tamils), and asked them to help the displaced Muslims243. Over the next two weeks, 
these three men played key roles in negotiating access for ZOA to Muslim IDP 
camps. Particularly during the first days, they often accompanied ZOA staff as 
‘human shields’, and literally talked their way into the camps. All three men knew 
ZOA through their work, and they all knew some of the ZOA staff personally. While 
based on personal contacts, this act of ‘boundary crossing’ was very much a 
pragmatic win-win situation for those involved.  
The contact that was established gave the displaced Muslims access to relief aid – as 
mentioned earlier, there were no other NGOs active in Muthur in those first days, 
and it took until April 22nd before the government and local politicians started 
distributing food rations and tents respectively. For the ZOA staff, the contact with 
                                                 
 
243 In early 2006, the opposite happened, when a community leader requested humanitarian 
agencies not to provide food to displaced people in Muthur, because this would only 
prolong displacement and sustain the status quo that had developed. If no food was 
distributed, then people would be forced return home, sort out their differences, and pick up 
their lives again. The NGOs followed his advice, and indeed most people returned home 
and the situation significantly improved within days. 
Figure 7.4. Board with information on displaced people staying at the Arabic College, Muthur, April 
2003 (own photograph) 
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the Muslim men provided an opportunity to do the work that the organization is 
there for (meeting the needs of those affected by conflict and disaster), and it 
provided safety to the staff in a very risky situation. 
The contact between ZOA and the three Muslim intermediaries was very strong for 
about a week and a half, and then it slowly faded away for two reasons. Firstly, the 
security situation had improved so much that it had become possible for the ZOA 
staff to visit the Muslim camps independently, and secondly, it was realized that the 
intermediaries came under increasing pressure from displaced Muslims to 
exaggerate the numbers of affected people, so that they would get access to more 
aid. Since resources were limited, priorities had to be set, and it became important to 
focus on those who were genuinely displaced. 
 
Example 2: Sinhalese teaming up with Tamils against the Muslims of Palathoppur  
Not at all positive in terms of the outcome, but still significant because of what it 
says Tamil-Sinhala relations, was an incident that happened in Palathoppur on the 
first day of the riot. I was told of this by a person who heard the story from several 
participants, both Tamils and Sinhalese, directly. 
As mentioned earlier, a Muslim mob attacked and burned a few shops in 
Bharatipuram early in the evening on April 17th, and in response a Tamil mob led by 
armed LTTE cadres attacked shops and houses in Palathoppur. One of the shops that 
was burned in Bharatipuram was owned by a Tamil man who had a Sinhala wife, 
and as soon as Sinhala youth from Dehiwatte heard about this, they teamed up with 
Tamil youth from neighbouring villages and joined in the rampage at Palathoppur. 
This led to a bizarre situation where Sinhala youth and, among the Tamil mob, LTTE 
cadres were on the same side in a fight244.  
Among the people in the mob were some of the same youth who had had a rather 
serious disagreement earlier in the day during the sports meet that I had attended. 
One of the contests at the sports meet was a typical Sinhala/Tamil New Year game, 
in which competing teams take turns in climbing into a tall wooden pole that has 
been covered in grease. The first team to reach the top can take the prize, which has 
been fixed to the top of the pole. The competition had started in the evening of April 
16th, but since it was not possible for any of the teams to reach the top before 
nightfall, the contest was continued in the morning of April 17th. Overnight, part of 
the grease had been absorbed into the wood, and the first team that was to climb the 
tree (which happened to be a Sinhala team) won easily. This sparked off a heated 
                                                 
 
244 Two weeks after the tsunami, a friend of mine encountered something similarly strange 
when he was waiting to pass the LTTE checkpoint on the road to Eechchilampattu. There, 
lounging on the sandbags, were a group of Sinhala JVP supporters, on their way to 
distribute tsunami relief goods, casually chatting to a bunch of LTTE cadres manning the 
checkpoint. 
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argument between Tamil and Sinhala youth, in which ethnicity was one of the key 
issues. 
All this was forgotten when the shop started burning, and suddenly Tamil and 
Sinhala youth who had got to know each other through a project focused on 
bringing reconciliation to the area teamed up. The Tamil and Sinhala youth who 
were involved were acquaintances, not friends245. The key to the boundary-crossing 
in this case was the sudden emergence of a ‘common enemy’. It only lasted as long 
as it took to burn Palathoppur.  
 
Example 3. Police protecting Tamils  
Another otherwise unreported episode happened around the same time, when the 
Officer-in-Charge of the Dehiwatte police station came to Sivapuram and posted his 
men around this Tamil village, to ensure that no harm would come to it. As part of 
the peacebuilding project mentioned above, contacts had been established with the 
police in order to build confidence between the police and the Tamil inhabitants of 
the area. This was probably one of the first times since at least 1985 that the people of 
Sivapuram felt positively protected by the police. 
Since – as documented above – in many other places the police and armed forces 
simply stood by and watched, their hands tied by the cease-fire agreement246, there 
was no obvious reason for the police officer to pro-actively protect this one village. 
The crucial factor that made the difference was that the responsible officer had 
become friendly with some of the people in the village, and with NGO staff working 
in the village, and he wanted to make sure that his new acquaintances (or even 
friends) were not harmed. 
 
Example 4. The non-attack on the Tamils in Palainagar 
Possibly the most bizarre event in the entire riot episode happened on April 18th, in 
the aftermath of the clash at the Kattaiparichchan checkpoint. After the army had 
stepped in and ended the confrontation, the Tamil mob returned to Chenaiyoor and 
beyond, while the Muslim mob went back to their homes in Muthur. Less than 200 
metres away from the checkpoint, the Muslim mob passed a small neighbourhood 
where about thirty Tamil families lived along the Palainagar Main Road, surrounded 
by Muslim families. Surprisingly, the mob did not attack these families who were 
                                                 
 
245 At least, not yet. Over the following years, inter-ethnic friendships did develop, even 
leading to a mixed marriage that – unusually – was attended by many Tamil and Sinhala 
villagers. Unfortunately, because the mother of the groom did not agree to the match, the 
marriage ended in disaster when the boy committed suicide because he could not deal with 
the pressure. 
246 At least, to some extent. While it was true that there was much pressure on the armed 
forces and police to exercise restraint in dealing with the LTTE, this should not have been 
sufficient excuse to ignore the maintenance of law and order. 
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like sitting ducks, but walked straight past them. Later on, a few soldiers were 
posted in the area to protect the Tamil families. 
This was strictly not a case of positive inter-ethnic interaction, but rather a case 
where expected negative inter-ethnic interaction did not take place. In May 2007, I 
interviewed several people from this small community, and they ensured me that – 
at least until 2006 – they had never been targeted for violence by anyone, despite the 
fact that the other Tamils have been attacked many times247. When I asked them why 
this was the case, the answer was unhesitating and very clear. The people in this 
particular community are the labourers of the Pradeshiya Sabha – they collect the 
garbage and sweep the roads, and thus keep Muthur clean. Whatever other tensions 
there may have been, this small community was highly useful for the Muslims 
throughout the conflict, so to attack them would be to cut into their own fingers. 
Apart from this, there may have been a class (or wealth) issue. The Tamils in 
Palainagar are desperately poor (as were many of the Muslims in the area), and had 
few if any assets worth stealing. Because of this, they were no threat to anyone.  
The non-attack in Palainagar does beg a question with regard to the emotional state 
of the people who participated in the clash at the checkpoint that day. Even 
immediately after the climax of the clash, people were sufficiently rational to avoid 
attacking this small and defenceless group of people. There may have been anger, 
but there does not seem to have been blind rage. I see this as a further hint that the 
clash (though not necessarily its violent end) was not entirely spontaneous; it may 
have been orchestrated to impress the visiting delegation and the press. 
 
Example 5. The bringing in of Sinhala traders  
A fifth and last example that I want to give is the fact that both Muslims (in Muthur) 
and Tamils (in the outlying villages) got in touch with Sinhala traders in the 
aftermath of the riot, and asked them to bring in goods. In ordinary circumstances, 
this would mean inviting unwanted competition for ‘own’ businessmen. However, 
in this situation it was a very practical solution, as everyone knew that this was 
‘between Muslims and Tamils’, and Sinhalese would be kept out of it. Inviting 
Sinhalese traders thus was the safest way of ensuring uninterrupted supply lines. 
This situation continued for several weeks. When the situation normalized, the 
Muslim and Tamil traders slowly started doing their own business again. 
                                                 
 
247 In 1990, several people of this community had been killed in an incident that was 
interpreted as indiscriminate violence; while in that case the community suffered badly, they 
did not feel targeted. This changed for the first time in May 2006, when a young man was 
shot dead, and the community interpreted this as an act of selective violence. In response, 
the entire community fled: some to Trincomalee, and others to the Methodist Church in 
Muthur (interview, Muthur, May 2007). 
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The key aspect of this example is that the Sinhalese traders had suddenly become 
‘common non-enemies’. Because of their neutrality in the Tamil-Muslim issue, they 
were the ideal go-between. 
 
7.4.3 Intra-group fissures 
The days that I spent in Muthur from April 22nd onwards were spent conducting 
needs assessments and distributing relief goods. Every time information about new 
camps or new needs came in, it was added on a large map that was kept in the ZOA 
office. By the time I left Muthur, 22 sites had been identified where displaced people 
were staying.  
By April 25th, the government machinery had come up to speed, and ZOA could stop 
distributing food. Shelter needs were also mitigated when 200 tents that had been 
donated to the Sri Lankan government by the Saudi government just a few weeks 
before the riots were distributed (only to Muslim camps, but then again they had the 
biggest shelter needs) by MP Thowfeek and his supporters. There were still big 
shortages where water supply, latrines, hurricane lanterns (for safety at night) and 
household items like mats and bedsheets were concerned, so the ZOA team focused 
its attention on meeting these needs. In parallel, one team was especially dedicated 
to go and visit each and every damaged house and assess the extent of damage, so 
that appropriate forms of assistance could be provided to the relevant families. 
Although officially over 30,000 people were registered as displaced, we soon found 
out that the majority of these people went home during the daytime and only 
returned to the camp sites in the night, if they went there at all. People who were 
able to go home during the day could be expected to bring sleeping mats, bedsheets, 
and other relevant items with them in the evenings, which meant that there was no 
need for ZOA to provide these items. In addition, requirements for drinking water 
supply and sanitation facilities would be much smaller than was the case for people 
who were full-time displaced. As resources were limited, it was therefore very 
important to distinguish between ‘night-time displaced’ and ‘full-time displaced’. 
This was not easy. Often when we let people know that we planned to do an 
assessment (for example when some people came to our office asking for assistance 
and ZOA staff told them that they would come to have a look), it happened that 
large crowds were drummed up to be present on our arrival. It was the lack of faeces 
(combined with the lack of interest for putting up emergency latrines), the lack of 
garbage, and the lack of remains of cooking fires in the camp sites that gave them 
away.  
In order to solve this problem, we started making random visits separate from the 
announced assessments and distributions. If there were discrepancies in what we 
saw during announced and unannounced visits, they are discussed with community 
leaders and generally some level of agreement on the real needs was reached. 
A third element that I found missing in analyses of the events of April 2003 concerns 
pre-existing intra-ethnic dynamics. In general, analyses of violent events in Sri Lanka 
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tend to treat those involved (either as participants or victims) as rather homogeneous 
blocks: Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims, LTTE, and Sri Lankan Armed Forces. As the 
examples below make clear, such abstractions can be misleading, and does not take 
into account tensions that exist within groups. It also means that other boundaries 
than the standard ethnic ones remain valid and important, even in acute crisis 
situations where ethnicity seems to dominate everything. 
 
Somewhere around April 25th, we were on our way to the Saddam school in 
Naduthivu, in the north-west of Muthur. In order to get there, you need to drive 
over a rather long road without many sidelanes and without any other schools or 
mosques nearby, so the moment people saw a ZOA vehicle they knew where it was 
going. As we drove along, we could see many people coming out of their houses and 
walking in the direction of the school. We had been here the day before, and had 
noticed that the compound of the school was much cleaner than you would expect if 
the entire neighbourhood was displaced. Before we got to the school this time, we 
were stopped by a man on the road. He told us that he was a fisherman from the 
coastal neighbourhood Thaqwanagar who had fled to the school in Naduthivu with 
the other people living near the beach. The LTTE had built new bunkers on the other 
side of the river mouth, and the people feared that their village would also be 
attacked. The previous day however, the people from Naduthivu had told them to 
find a place in their own neighbourhood. The Naduthivu people were farmers and 
Figure 7.5. Tea being made in a school occupied by displaced people, Kottiyar Pattu, April 2003 (own 
photograph) 
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economically better off than the fishermen from Thaqwanagar, but they were jealous 
that the fishermen received assistance while they did not. We were then taken to a 
small mosque that was clearly overcrowded. There was not enough shelter, nor even 
shaded spaces, for everybody; men had had to sleep outside on the road. 
Interestingly, the requests for assistance were very modest: material to expand the 
shelter area, some kerosene lanterns to light the camp at night, and some temporary 
latrines. Because the fishermen had been unable to go fishing for quite a while, we 
requested the DS to include this group of people in the list for food distributions, 
which he did. 
Something similar happened among the Tamils in Muthur. As mentioned earlier, not 
all the Tamils of Muthur fled to the Roman Catholic and Methodist churches. The 
small community that lived in Palainagar stayed where they were until after the 
violence was over. To get to the churches from Palainagar, one only needs to walk 
down one straight road. The distance is less than the distance that some Tamils 
staying behind the hospital needed to cover to get to the churches, and it is also less 
fraught with dangerous bends and corners where one could easily get cornered and 
attacked.  
The Tamil community in Palainagar, which finds itself at the very bottom of Kottiyar 
Pattu’s caste hierarchy, did not displace to the churches because of caste. The issue 
was however played out subtly. There was no explicit prohibition on them coming 
to the churches, and I am very sure that both the Catholic and the Methodist priest 
who were there at the time would accept people regardless of caste or creed. In May 
2006 the Tamils from Palainagar did flee to the Methodist church, after a young man 
from their community had been shot dead. They ended up staying in the church 
compound for about a year, interrupted by the displacement during the battle for 
Muthur in August of that year. In 2003 however, the shame of being among high-
caste Tamils was bigger than the fear of being attacked by Muslim mobs. 
 
7.5 Tamil-Sinhala relations around Serunuwara, June 2005 to April 
2006 
7.5.1 Background to the case 
The case that is dealt with in this section is about a series of incidents that took place 
in and around Serunuwara between June 2005 and April 2006 (Bock, Lawrence and 
Gaasbeek 2006: 43-52). Serunuwara (or Ali Oluwa, as it is also called) is a small 
market town on the junction of the road from Kantale to the ancient temple of 
Seruwila and the road from Muthur to Verugal and on to Batticaloa. The town was 
established in the early 1950s, with the development of the Allai Extension Scheme. 
Its location makes Serunuwara an important logistical and strategic node that serves 
the entire southern half of the Allai Extension Scheme: it has a weekly market, a 
petrol shed, banks, shops, a small hospital, a police office and a series of government 
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offices (including the Seruwila Divisional Secretariat and an Agrarian Services 
Centre). 
Until the parliamentary elections of 2004, the dominant political parties in the 
Seruwila electorate (which covers all the colony schemes in Trincomalee District) 
were the UNP and the SLFP. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in 2004 
however, the colony schemes in the North-East became a major recruiting ground 
for the JVP, which was strongly opposed to the ceasefire that was in place at the 
time. Among Sinhala youth in the colonies, who were frustrated with the hardship 
caused by market liberalisation and increasing input prices and concerned about the 
increasing presence of the LTTE, the JVP built up a strong support base. The active 
presence of an anti-LTTE and anti-NGO political party in the area put Serunuwara 
on the map as a place where trouble could be expected. 
In May 2005, a Buddha statue was put up overnight at the bus stand in the heart of 
Trincomalee town. This caused severe unrest, as many Tamils considered the setting 
up of the statue a way of claiming Trincomalee as Sinhala-Buddhist, and thus as 
distinctly non-Tamil. Its location (next to a fish market, where living beings are 
killed, and next to a bar, where people get drunk) was highly inappropriate for the 
placement of a Buddha statue. That strengthens the argument that the placing of the 
statue was for political, space-claiming reasons rather than for religious reasons. For 
several years, the statue was provided with security worthy of a VIP: barbed wire, 
road blocks, bunkers and a permanent detachment of about 10 soldiers and 
policemen. 
With backing of the LTTE, groups of local Tamil nationalists organised protests, 
which in turn generated counter-protests by local Sinhala-nationalist groups with 
the backing of Sinhala-nationalist political parties such as the JVP and the JHU. As a 
result, Trincomalee town was paralysed by a near-continuous sequence of strikes 
and curfews for about two weeks, and remained tense for several months 
afterwards. After the campaigns of hartals and counter-hartals ended in late May, a 
string of hand grenade attacks against sentry points and army bunkers started that 
continued for months248. Almost every night after about 7 pm, one could hear a few 
hand grenades exploding, sometimes followed by retaliatory gunfire. The rest of the 
district remained comparatively calm, except for some acts of provocation by the 
LTTE. At this time, the LTTE had been seriously weakened by the breaking away of 
most of the cadres from Ampara and Batticaloa Districts under leadership of Karuna. 
Though the cadres from Trincomalee District had largely remained loyal to the LTTE 
leadership, the fact that the LTTE had lost about a quarter of its fighting cadre with 
                                                 
 
248 A Tamil friend from Trincomalee told me at the time that LTTE cadres had moved around 
Tamil neighbourhoods in the town with boxes full of hand grenades, and distributed the 
grenades to whoever wanted to take them. People were told to throw the grenades 
whenever a suitable opportunity offered itself. Given the sheer frequency of grenade attacks, 
I am inclined to believe the story was true. 
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the split meant that the remaining members had to be redistributed, and fewer 
cadres were available for posting in Trincomalee District. The LTTE, which could no 
longer use its impression of overwhelming presence, reverted to targeted small-scale 
provocations to assert its power.  
The context changed dramatically from November 2005 onwards, when Mahinda 
Rajapakse won the presidency on a hardline Sinhala-nationalist ticket. Apart from a 
further increase in provocations by the LTTE, (para)military forces linked to the state 
became increasingly involved in attacks on Tamils, of which the pre-planned 
execution of five innocent students in Trincomalee town and the subsequent 
intimidation of witnesses and relatives was the most prominent (UTHR(J) 2007a and 
2008). On April 12th, 2006, a bomb explosion on the Trincomalee market was 
followed within minutes by a rampage in which about twenty Tamil-owned 
businesses in the town were burnt. In the violence, about twenty people were killed 
and over forty were injured; most of the victims were Tamils (UTHR(J) 2006b, 
chapter 2; ’19 killed, 45 wounded, 20 shops burned in Trincomalee’, TamilNet, 12-4-
2006). Two weeks later on April 25th, an LTTE suicide bomber tried to assassinate 
Sarath Fonseka, the Army Commander (‘Who in Army HQ tipped off bomber?’, 
Sunday Times, 30-4-2006). Within hours from this attack, an intermittent 
bombardment of the LTTE-controlled areas of Kottiyar Pattu by artillery, ships’ guns 
and, initially, air strikes commenced that only ended after the LTTE was driven out 
of the district towards the end of the year249. 
The string of incidents described in this section took place in this context of slowly 
escalating confrontation, up until the moment that open warfare started. 
 
7.5.2 Chronology of events 
Around 7.45 in the evening on June 17th, 2005, M. Muthubanda, a police sergeant 
attached to the Serunuwara police station, was shot and killed, allegedly by a 
member of an LTTE pistol gang, at Ali Oluwa Junction in Serunuwara (‘Police 
Sergeant shot dead in Serunuwara’, TamilNet, 17-6-2005). He was quite popular 
among the Sinhalese living in the area. As the news of his death spread, mobs of 
angry Sinhalese gathered on the roads in Serunuwara and the neighbouring village 
of Mahindapura, and attacked Tamil civilians passing through the area. Several 
lorries transporting cadjans (coconut fronds) and boats to tsunami-affected Tamil 
areas were attacked. A lorry of TRO transporting tsunami relief goods was attacked 
and damaged the following morning around 7.50. On hearing this news, a team of 
                                                 
 
249 On April 26th, air strikes on the area around Muthur were stopped temporarily after an 
Air Force jet accidentally dropped a bomb on a Navy outpost in Vattam, killing 4 sailors and 
3 Muslim civilians, and injuring another 6 sailors and 9 Muslim civilians (SMS received from 
the ‘Trincomalee humanitarian security tree’, 26-4-2006, 13.58). Artillery fire and naval 
attacks continued. 
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SLMM went to the area to investigate. As they arrived in Serunuwara around forty 
minutes later, their vehicle was attacked, and the army had to be called in to provide 
security to the SLMM staff. Following these attacks, NGOs suspended their tsunami 
rehabilitation work in Eechchilampattu. 
The next morning (June 19th), a home guard who had gone to collect firewood with 
his wife and mother was kidnapped, allegedly by a group of about 15 armed LTTE 
cadres. His decomposed body was found with cut injuries on June 27th. 
On June 20th, a group of women from Mahindapura were chased away by suspected 
LTTE cadres when they went to collect water from a nearby irrigation channel. This 
area is on the border between government-controlled and LTTE-controlled territory. 
Subsequently, security forces were deployed into the area to provide additional 
security. 
The next day, a large group of about 200 armed LTTE cadres was observed roaming 
around in government-controlled territory near Mahindapura, Neelapola and 
Dehiwatte after dark.  
Around 9 in the morning after this incident, a bus traveling from Kantale to Muthur 
was stopped near the so-called ‘CID bridge’ at Dehiwatte (about 5 km from 
Serunuwara) by a group of Sinhalese people. Three Tamil women who were on 
board were assaulted. Three and a half hours later, a group of Sinhalese youth was 
attacked with a hand grenade. Three were injured, and taken to the Kantale hospital.  
During this period, another incident happened that contributed to fear among 
Tamils in Eechchilampattu DS Division. A number of fishermen who were catching 
fish near the headworks of the Allai Extension Scheme opened the radial gates in the 
Verugal anicut so that water would flow out and it would be easy to catch fish by 
keeping nets in the flow of water. Because of this, the water level in the main 
channels dropped, and the branch channel from Serunuwara to Eechchilampattu ran 
dry. Because of the tension, it was impossible for staff of the Irrigation Department 
to go to the head sluice and close the gates again. The Tamil farmers in 
Eechchilampattu DS Division did not know about the fishermen, and thought the 
channel had been blocked in Serunuwara by angry Sinhalese. A Tamil wattai vidane 
who went to check the sluice gates at the beginning of the branch channel was 
beaten up by a gang of Sinhalese people when he got to Serunuwara. It took until 
after the tensions were over before people found out the real reason why the 
irrigation water had stopped coming. 
On June 23rd, a meeting of representatives of the Sinhala villages in the area was 
convened in Seruwila to discuss the situation. Those present decided that 
negotiations should be held with the LTTE and with leaders from the Tamil villages. 
A follow-up meeting was held the following afternoon in Serunuwara with ten 
community leaders each from ten villages and five Buddhist monks in attendance. 
Here, a meeting was planned to be held with the participation of ten community 
leaders (one from each village), five Buddhist monks and representatives of the 
LTTE. 
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Because the LTTE leadership did not want to take the risk of coming to government-
controlled territory, it was agreed that the proposed meeting would be held at the 
LTTE office in Sampoor on July 1st. In this meeting, both sides agreed to work on 
defusing the tensions. Importantly, direct telephone numbers were exchanged, so 
that the next time something happened, tensions could be defused immediately.  
I should note that a Sinhala community leader indicated that it was primarily the 
policeman’s family who was behind the angry reactions. Viewed from this 
perspective, the ‘communal tension’ was really a matter of relatives being upset, and 
non-relatives disengaged from the issue relatively quickly. The incident was 
however important because it was the first time since the 2002 ceasefire that serious 
Sinhala-Tamil tensions had come to the fore in the area. According to one source, 
this also marked the first time ever that Sinhala civil society in the area dealt directly 
with the LTTE. When the subsequent incidents occurred, contacts existed that could 
be activated immediately to help defusing the situation. 
After the string of incidents described above, the situation calmed down again. From 
July to early October, there were several incidents of note in the area, none of which 
caused serious disturbances in Kottiyar Pattu. I describe these below.  
On July 10th, three LTTE cadres and an LTTE supporter were assassinated in 
Trincomalee town by people who were suspected to be in collusion with the armed 
forces. A friend from the area told me that the killers had passed a checkpoint as 
they turned into the dead-end lane where the killings took place, and left through 
the same checkpoint undisturbed. This killing triggered a string of grenade attacks 
against security forces in and around Trincomalee over the next few days. Two of 
these attacks took place on the Muthur-Palathoppur road on July 13th. One officer 
and nine soldiers were injured in one attack, and in the other attack two soldiers and 
a child were injured at the Paddy Marketing Board tsunami-camp at Periyapalam. 
Over the next few days, the LTTE closed down its offices in government-controlled 
areas in the East of Sri Lanka. This led to further tensions. A one-day hartal was 
observed in Muthur on July 19th to protest the attack at the Paddy Marketing Board 
camp. No violence followed. 
On July 22nd, a troop patrol was fired at near Iruthayapuram, causing no injuries. 
Three days later, in the morning of July 25th, a home guard was fired at by four LTTE 
cadres near the Seruwila Police station, but does not seem to have been injured250.  
On August 11th, two Sinhala youth were shot and injured somewhere between 
Menkamam and Mallikaithivu as they were riding a motorbike. Initially, there was 
suspicion that they were shot by members of an LTTE pistol gang, but a very 
knowledgeable source who works in the region provided an important piece of 
additional information regarding this incident. There was some tension in Dehiwatte 
                                                 
 
250 The text of the FCE Daily Situation Report is not entirely clear, but it looks like the home 
guard escaped injuries. I have not found reference to this incident in any newspaper, nor on 
TamilNet. 
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after incident, but it subsided when the boys – from their hospital bed – told visiting 
relatives that they had been shot because of a personal dispute over cattle, and asked 
them to inform the people in the area that there was no communal violence 
involved. I visited the area within days of the incident happening, and observed 
with my own eyes that there was no tension. 
On August 16th, a soldier was shot dead in the army camp near the ‘third mile hill’, 
south of Muthur, and three were injured by LTTE sniper fire. As if to underline how 
brief such incidents are, I passed through the line of fire about 15 minutes before the 
shooting and only realised I had been so close when I was told about the incident in 
the evening. 
On September 21th, a home guard from Sirimangalapura went missing in 
Athiyammankerny. His body was found on October 5th. 
By the end of September, though incidents continued to happen elsewhere in 
Trincomalee District, things seem to have really calmed down in the southern fringe. 
On September 28th, the FCE Daily Situation Report made it a point to note that 
“[a]ccording to sources, the LTTE activities in Kantale, Thambalagamuwa and 
Seruwila areas have seemed to have declined during the recent past. Reportedly, 
violent incidents have not been reported for few days [sic]” (FCE Daily Situation 
Report, 28-9-2005: 2). 
On October 4th, finally, suspected LTTE cadres waylaid a bus carrying prisoners to 
Muthur near Kilivetti, and freed two Tamil prisoners. One jailor was injured in the 
incident. 
The next incident that generated potentially serious tension happened on October 
5th, when a Sinhala tractor driver, R.P.B.R. Jayasiri, disappeared while he was 
transporting a load of stones for a tsunami project in the LTTE-controlled area 
between Eechchilampattu and Verugal. He never returned. Jayasiri’s disappearance 
became known the next day, when his assistant, who had escaped, returned to 
government-controlled area and told the people that Jayasiri had been taken by 
unknown armed men. As it was very unlikely that armed men who moved freely in 
LTTE-controlled territory were not LTTE cadres, the LTTE was immediately blamed 
for the disappearance.  
This was not entirely surprising. Jayasiri had been a home guard until 1989, and 
while Sinhalese sources generally described Jayasiri as a do-no-wrong kind of man, 
Tamil sources made various allegations against him. Each of these can be interpreted 
as a possible explanation for his disappearance, which was seen as a punishment for 
past misdeeds. The most common allegation was that he had been involved in 
beating up Tamils in June 2005 (after the Muthubanda’s killing); a second allegation 
was that he had once arrested two girls and detained them in a house on request of a 
couple of soldiers who subsequently raped them. A third allegation (which a 
number of knowledgeable outside observers whom I spoke to considered to be true) 
was that Jayasiri had been involved in a massacre of Tamils at Mahindapura during 
his time as a home guard – he was said to have driven the tractor that took the killers 
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to the place of the massacre. In this case, the story was that an LTTE cadre whose 
father had died in this massacre recognised Jayasiri and killed him251.  
Almost immediately, several agencies (among them SLMM, ICRC, FCE and NVPF) 
got in touch with Jayasiri’s relatives and the LTTE, and tried – in vain – to find 
information about Jayasiri’s whereabouts252. For some reason, it was only after a 
week that there was any kind of disturbance in the Sinhala areas of Seruwila DS 
Division. Quite possibly, the people who were close to Jayasiri had wanted to first 
wait and see whether he returned or not. When Jayasiri did not return, a hartal was 
planned for October 13th. People in Serunuwara told me that, as had been the case in 
June, people with links to the JVP were behind this. However, members of the 
Seruwila Peace Committee heard about it, and seem to have managed to convince 
the Seruwila Traders’ Association not to back it. The shops remained open, and the 
hartal never materialised.  
On the same day, FCE organised a meeting between Sinhalese members of the 
Seruwila Peace Committee and a group of Tamils from the area around Kilivetti. In 
this meeting, it was agreed to exchange information in order to prevent tensions, and 
“to put pressure on the LTTE (especially through the Tamils) to release [Jayasiri] and 
to prevent the spreading of rumors [sic]” (FCE Daily Situation Report, 13-10-2007: 2). 
Another meeting was held on October 17th, in which people from the Sinhala villages 
in Seruwila DS Division were able to express their grievances. By this time, the 
situation had calmed down. Less than a week later, JVP activists launched a door-to-
door campaign in support of Mahinda Rajapakse’s candidacy for the upcoming 
presidential elections (FCE Daily Situation Report, 24-20-2005: 1). Despite the flurry of 
pro-war propaganda, no communal tension followed. Harassment of Tamil civilians 
by soldiers of the army checkpoint at Mahindapura was reported twice (FCE Daily 
Situation Report, 11-11-2005 and 1-12-2005) and the LTTE killed several home guards 
around Serunuwara in the first four months of 2006, but the general situation stayed 
calm253. 
                                                 
 
251 An interesting point that might have influenced the situation is the fact that Elilan, the 
local leader of the LTTE’s Political Wing was not in the district at the time of Jayasiri’s 
disappearance (he returned shortly afterwards). At the time, there was a lot of speculation 
about him having been shot by Sornam, the local military commander. People with whom I 
spoke during this period said that dealing with the LTTE was considerably more confusing 
than when Elilan was there. It is not unthinkable (though unverified) that with the 
temporary re-shuffles in the local LTTE leadership, an individual LTTE cadre took his 
chance to take matters into his own hands. 
252 I have spoken to representatives of all these four agencies about the case, and their 
interventions. For reasons of confidentiality, the ICRC delegate whom I spoke to was not 
able to tell me anything about ICRC’s interventions, but several people in Serunuwara told 
me that ICRC had visited the area in connection with Jayasiri’s disappearance. 
253 While things were calm in Serunuwara, a string of attacks and abductions in December 
2005 and January 2006 caused very serious tension between Muslims and Tamils in Muthur 
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The bomb attack and subsequent anti-Tamil rampage in Trincomalee town on April 
12th led to a new string of attacks on isolated military targets throughout the district. 
On April 21st, a claymore mine killed a young homeguard from Dehiwatte who was 
patrolling the road along the Muthur channel. The same day, a Sinhala mob led by 
home guards and soldiers stormed into Menkamam and Bharatipuram, and burnt 
down at least five houses near the site of the attack (a local human rights activist 
who did an assessment afterwards told me that he counted as many as 45 houses 
that had been burnt). At least one Tamil was killed, and for the first time in quite a 
while, I heard allegations of Tamil women having been raped. After this, Sinhalese 
and Tamils living in the border areas fled to safer places. This time, a climate of fear 
persisted. Two months later, when people had just started to return home, the LTTE 
closed off the sluice gates of the Allai Extension Scheme main channel, and triggered 
off an offensive by the Sri Lankan military that ultimately ended with the 
annihilation of the LTTE. I end the story here, though there is undoubtedly more to 
say about what happened in subsequent months. 
 
7.6 Lessons from Serunuwara  
7.6.1 Triggers of tension 
The string of incidents described in section 7.5 makes one thing very clear: 
provocations (in this case Sinhalese being killed by the LTTE) do not always trigger 
tension or violence. Three times (after the killing of Muthubanda in June 2005, after 
the disappearance of Jayasiri in October 2005, and after the killing of a young home 
guard in April 2006), tension was triggered, and only in the first and last instance 
violence followed. In between, half a dozen other home guards were killed in the 
area, and their deaths went virtually unnoticed. Were the relatives of these home 
guards less upset than those of Muthubanda, Jayasiri, and the young home guard 
from Dehiwatte? I seriously doubt it.  
There was one key difference between those killings that did trigger tension and 
revenge violence and those that did not: external stimulus. In the first two cases, 
(some of the) relatives of the victims had active contacts with the JVP, which wanted 
to make an issue out of things to criticise the cease-fire, and to highlight the need for 
the government to treat the LTTE more harshly. In the third case, there was active 
support from the Sri Lankan military, which by this time had become openly hostile 
to the LTTE again, and was involved in a string of attacks against Tamil civilians in 
Trincomalee District aimed at striking terror in the Tamil community (UTHR 2006b). 
In the case of Jayasiri, the tension was contained because the dominant local 
interpretation of the case was successfully re-phrased from ‘we, the Sinhalese being 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
DS Division, and led to the displacement of several thousand people (Bock, Lawrence and 
Gaasbeek 2006: 53-62).  
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angry’, to ‘Jayasiri’s relatives being angry, and the JVP supporting them’. Because 
this was brought in the open, others (and notably the Seruwila Traders’ Association) 
decided that they did not want to let things blow up, and to some extent distanced 
themselves from the affair. 
 
So why was there no revenge violence in the majority of the cases? My hunch is that 
the Sinhalese in the area are not necessary supporters of nonviolence. Rather, I agree 
with Benedikt Korf’s hypothesis  that people were probably very well aware that 
revenge violence, if allowed, would breed more violence which would put their own 
community at risk (Korf 2004: 115-144). 
In addition, most Sinhalese whom I spoke to in the area made a clear distinction (at 
least from the start of the ceasefire until early 2006) between the aggressor (the 
LTTE) and the Tamil population in general. Until violence really got out of hand in 
April 2006, many home guards would go home after their duty, change their 
uniform for a sarong and a shirt, and go to work in their paddy fields together with 
Tamil labourers, as if there was nothing wrong, and similarly, many Tamils whom I 
spoke to very strongly stated that they did not fear the Sinhalese people living in the 
area after the cease-fire. 
A further detail that needs to be noted is that the mob that attacked Menkamam and 
Bharatipuram bypassed the Tamil village of Sivapuram that is located between 
Dehiwatte and Menkamam. Revenge was exacted on the site of the original attack, 
and not randomly against Tamils living in the area. The fact that, at the time, 
relations of the people of Dehiwatte with the people of Sivapuram were generally 
better than those with the people of Menkamam and Bharatipuram may have played 
a role, though I have never heard this being mentioned. Revenge did come to 
Sivapuram ultimately. When a young man from Sivapuram was shot dead in front 
of his house a year after the incident, I was told that this was because he was the 
brother of the LTTE cadre who was suspected to have placed the claymore mine. 
 
7.6.2 Patterns of disintegration 
The second lesson from this string of incidents came to me as things unravelled in 
the second half of April 2006. At the time, Erik Dekker, an MSc student from 
Wageningen University, was conducting research on irrigation water management 
in contribution to my own research. For his fieldwork, he was staying with a Sinhala 
family in Dehiwatte. After the bomb blast on the Trincomalee market and the 
subsequent anti-Tamil rampage on April 12th, there was tension in the district. 
However, since things remained calm in Kottiyar Pattu, neither of us expected things 
to flare up around Dehiwatte, nor did any of our contacts from the area give us the 
impression that something was up. On April 21st, Erik was measuring discharge in a 
field channel when he suddenly heard some gunshots in the distance – this was the 
retaliatory shooting after the claymore blast which killed the young home guard 
whom I wrote about above. Upon hearing the shooting, he decided to return to the 
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house where he was staying. When we got in touch by telephone late in the evening, 
I told him that he should come out of the area for his own safety. According to Erik 
however, everything was calm in Dehiwatte, and the only thing that was a little odd 
was that there were about forty people staying in the house of his landlord. Since 
being on the road was probably more dangerous than staying in the village, we 
decided that he would stay for another day, and come out on the first opportunity. 
The next day, things were calm, “except for some suspected LTTE cadres who were 
seen in the jungle outside Dehiwatte, but the home guards fired at them and they ran 
away” (telephone conversation with Erik Dekker, 22-4-2006). Erik went back to 
check the flow measurement devices that he had installed on April 22nd and 23rd, 
including one flume near Menkamam254. On his way, he visited an English-speaking 
acquaintance in Sivapuram who told him that the population was planning to move 
to the school in Kilivetti for safety. By lunchtime on April 23rd, Erik rode his bike to 
Kantale, where I picked him up. 
My wife knew the wife of Erik’s landlord, as well as some Tamil women living in 
Sivapuram, from a number of trainings that she had conducted in Sivapuram and 
Dehiwatte in 2001 and 2002, as part of ZOA’s psychosocial pilot project. Since we 
knew that the women’s groups from Dehiwatte and Sivapuram had developed fairly 
strong ties over the past couple of years, my wife called the women she knew and 
spoke to them several times during the days after April 21st, to see how they were 
doing, but mainly to encourage the women to stay in touch with each other. We 
quickly discovered that this encouragement was not really necessary, because the 
women were already calling each other regularly, and reassured each other that their 
friendship still stood.  
Both the Sinhala women and the Tamil women told my wife that something had 
fundamentally changed. Between the start of my research and April 2006, many 
people I interviewed told me spoke about Sinhala-Tamil relations in the area as if 
there had never been a conflict; talking about friendship, about visiting each other’s 
weddings “like we used to do before the war”, and even mentioning quite a few 
intermarriages. Now, for the first time since the cease-fire agreement had been 
signed in 2002, Sinhalese and Tamils were seriously afraid again. The women my 
wife spoke to stressed that there was no hatred against the other group255, but only a 
                                                 
 
254 Eriks field notes (of which he gave me a copy) make no reference to the attack on 
Menkamam that took place on April 21st. The flume that Erik visited was to the west of the 
village; the houses that were attacked were on the eastern side of Menkamam, and Erik 
cannot have seen these houses. It is also an indication that not the entire village participated 
in the revenge attack.  
255 This was not mere words. Right throughout this period, a Tamil boy who worked as an 
apprentice with Erik’s (Sinhala) landlord stayed with the family. He was never harmed, and 
returned to his village when it became safe to travel on the road again. 
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deep-rooted fear of being attacked: the Sinhalese were afraid of the LTTE, and the 
Tamils were afraid of the Army and the home guards. 
In the end, the links were broken. Group by group, the people in Sivapuram fled to 
safer areas further away from the border with Dehiwatte. One of our acquaintances 
literally ‘turned off the light’, making one last call from the village to inform us 
where she was going to, after which she packed the telephone and joined the last 
group of people to leave the village. As soon as she reached the school in Kilivetti, 
she called her Sinhala acquaintances and us again.  
Not long afterwards, our Sinhala and Tamil acquaintances stopped calling each 
other. This was not because they no longer liked each other, but because people in 
their own communities were accusing them of being traitors, and informants of ‘the 
other side’. I think this is key. Positive inter-ethnic interaction stopped when people 
in the own group started ‘policing the boundaries’ and declaring anyone who 
interacted with people outside the own group ‘traitors’. As soon as the ‘policing’ 
reduced, contacts were re-established. To me, this is a hopeful sign. Absence of 
contact does not mean that people have started hating each other. It merely means 
that interaction has become too dangerous. 
As things calmed down a little, contacts were again re-established, but the blockage 
of the main inlet channel of the Allai Extension Scheme by the LTTE in mid-July and 
the subsequent military offensive at Mavil Aru and Muthur caused mass 
displacement and massive disruption. After the fighting subsided and the displaced 
population of Kottiyar Pattu returned home, I was able to visit the area in the 
beginning of September. To my big surprise, we could see Tamil people doing their 
shopping in a Sinhala village without any problem. Tamil friends in Sivapuram told 
me that they were not sleeping at home, but this was not out of fear of their 
neighbours from Dehiwatte. The Army had set up a sentry point between the two 
villages, and the soldiers had threatened the Tamil villagers with a repeat of the 1996 
Kumarapuram massacre if the LTTE were to attack the sentry post (see section 4.2.8). 
 
7.7 Reflection: retaining normalcy, and the importance of looking at 
the local and the supra-local at the same time 
In this chapter, I hope to have shown that what happened in Kottiyar Pattu in April 
2003 (and later, in 2005 and 2006) was a lot more complicated than it has been 
represented to be in the media and in analysis reports, in line with what Paul Brass 
has written about his own research into riots in Uttar Pradesh:  
 
“What we have, therefore, are beliefs, more or less justified, more or less fixed, 
subject to testing through logic and the logic of others who may detect flaws in 
our reasoning, on the one hand. On the other hand, more abstract, but more 
certainly, we have representations. We can chart the interpretations, the 
contextualisations, the discourses, of, by and about violence and communalism 
[…] and the interests served by different representations of them, but we cannot 
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certainly find the truth of events. It is a curious thing to have reached such a 
point, that the lies, the distortions, and the approximations to some truth have a 
greater reality – a verity that can be documented precisely – than the events 
themselves” (1998: 266).  
 
Still, despite the gaps in understanding that inevitably remain, I follow Brass’ stance 
that the best way to draw lessons about social processes is to delve into it as deeply 
as possible before coming to conclusions that are then tested for generalisability 
(idem: 267, see also Kalyvas 2006). Any social theory that is not based on sound 
empirical evidence is a theory about (often external) representations, not about the 
day-to-day reality of the people it purports to speak about. What, then, are the 
conclusions that can be drawn from this chapter about particularly the more positive 
forms of inter-ethnic interaction during acute, ethnicised, violence and tension in 
Kottiyar Pattu (in a context of a long history of recurrent violence)? 
First of all, inter-ethnic interaction, whether positive or negative, is comparatively 
scarce. Even during the worst part of the violence, not more than about 3% of the 
population of Kottiyar Pattu participated in attacks against others, and even during 
the ‘least worst’ part of the violence, a much smaller fraction of the population 
maintained positive contact across  ethnic boundaries. The rest of the population just 
try to live their lives without getting hurt.  
Secondly, positive forms of inter-ethnic interaction in a context of violence are 
extremely vulnerable. It takes but a single meaningful threat to force them 
underground. Whenever the threat of punitive violence towards those engaging in 
(positive) inter-ethnic interaction recedes however, the interaction bounces back. 
Tentatively and carefully, that’s for sure, but definitely. An important detail here is 
that the threats against positive forms of inter-ethnic interaction often originate from 
people’s own group, not from the ‘ethnic other’. To the ‘ethnic other’, people 
engaging in inter-ethnic interaction are themselves an ‘ethnic other’, and no different 
from co-ethnics who do not engage in inter-ethnic interaction. The general threat 
that emanates from the ethnic other prevents a lot of people from engaging with ‘the 
enemy’ in the first place. To co-ethnics however, those who engage in inter-ethnic 
interaction are traitors. Threats against ‘traitors’ are the most important factor in 
breaking up whatever inter-ethnic interaction develops despite the general inter-
ethnic threat levels. 
 
The third conclusion has to do with people’s struggles to maintain a form of 
normalcy despite surrounding violence. Even during acute ethnicised tensions and 
violence, other identifiers than ethnicity remain relevant and to some extent 
powerful. As I have shown, intra-ethnic divisions remained important during the 
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riot of April 2003. For me, this is a powerful (though negative from a social 
perspective) indicator that normal life continues even during a riot256.  
 
Linked to this is a fourth point: except when outsiders move in and inflict 
indiscriminate violence on people because they belong to the ethnic group of the 
enemy (as happened in 1990), and except when individuals lose their minds in blind 
rage, violence is reasoned and to some extent restrained (at least where killing is 
concerned). This has little to do with people liking each other. Rather, people need to 
think of their own future. To risk an escalation of violence is to put one’s own future 
(and that of relatives and friends) at risk. And sometimes there are even more 
mundane reasons: attacking the Pradeshiya Sabha labourers would have meant that 
Muthur would no longer be kept clean. I contend therefore that Kalyvas’ claim (2006: 
116) that in times of acute violence people shift to pure survival mode needs to be 
qualified. Except during the actual occurrence of violence itself, the survival that 
people seek to ensure is not mere physical survival, but the survival of a livable form 
of normality: though economic fortunes change, people keep marrying each other, 
people keep going to their temple, church or mosque, people keep making friends 
with some people and fighting with others (and sometimes with the same people). 
This is particularly the case if people already have gotten used to living with 
recurrent violence. The closing window of the land preparation period and the 
school exams that were respected are examples from Muthur where people let 
normalcy have the primacy over violence. Practical necessity here had a clear 
primacy over formal peace agreements. People’s resilience shows not merely in the 
way they pick up the pieces after violence, but perhaps more importantly in the way 
the vast majority of people manage to maintain reasonably normal lives during 
violence and tension.  
This has everything to do with (positive) inter-ethnic interaction. Though it must be 
said that a lot of people hardly engage in forms of inter-ethnic interaction, some of 
those who did explained it as (in part) a form of subverting the dominance of the 
ethnic that was being imposed by the violence around them. Maintaining inter-
ethnic links is risky, and at odds with a focus on mere survival.  
Fifthly, all of this has an important methodological consequence: to understand what 
happens during violence, it is fundamental to look at events in great detail, and to 
incorporate narratives of ordinary people as a core source of information. 
Representations in the press (and in a lot of analysis reports) miss out on the 
                                                 
 
256 More positive indicators of the struggle to maintain normalcy was pointed out by Becky 
Walker: during the height of the army offensive to flush the LTTE out of the jungles in 
Batticaloa, children in the town continued playing cricket, people continued going to the 
market, marriages continued to take place, and so on and so forth (personal communication, 
Batticaloa, January 2007) 
 Troubles: inter-ethnic interaction during everyday riots and almost-riots 
305 
   
ordinary activities of the ordinary people who form the majority of the population in 
violence-affected areas. 
At the same time, any study of communal violence should take not only local 
dynamics but also wider regional or national dynamics into account. It is impossible 
to explain the Muthur riot only by looking at local competition and enmities, just as 
it is impossible to explain the riot only by looking at the sudden increase in the 
LTTE’s self-assertion and the sudden surge in the struggle over the leadership of the 
Muslim polity. Local dynamics generate windows of opportunity in which wider 
dynamics are played out, just as much as wider dynamics generate windows of 
opportunity in which local dynamics are played out. Importantly however, local 
dynamics are rarely sufficient to trigger large-scale violence in a situation where 
neither side is in a position to decisively chase the other side out. If you are unable to 
chase your opponent out, the only way to enjoy a relatively peaceful life for yourself 
is to learn to live together. Local dynamics generate tensions, but wider dynamics 
are needed to escalate tensions into large-scale violence. At the same time, wider 
dynamics have little opportunity of generating violence if local tensions are 
managed well or if they are absent. 
The sixth conclusion is that a lot depends on individual people and their personal 
relations. Inter-ethnic interaction in a context of ethnicised conflict is potentially 
dangerous, and requires trust. Most of the cases of inter-ethnic interaction that I have 
documented in this chapter took place because people had personal relationships. 
Institutional support for inter-ethnic interaction may play a facilitating role, but I 
disagree with Varshney’s claim that inter-ethnic peace depends on inter-ethnic 
institutions (Varshney 2002). It is not the institutions themselves, but the right people 
in the institutions who make or break inter-ethnic interaction and inter-ethnic peace. 
The moment such people leave, the effectiveness of the institution in maintaining 
ethnic peace collapses if there is nobody else who takes up the challenge. 
Lastly, I believe that it is important not to get too idealistic about positive forms of 
inter-ethnic interaction. Some of the people who engaged in positive inter-ethnic 
interaction in the cases described above did so for personal reasons: they had friends 
on the ‘other side’. Others did so because they wanted to help their own community; 
the fact that others benefited as well was a side benefit, not a primary objective. The 
securing of aid can be seen from this perspective. The Sinhalese youth who teamed 
up with Tamils in Palathoppur (effectively creating the near unthinkable situation of 
a mob of Sinhalese joining up with the LTTE, which led the Tamil mobs257) were 
                                                 
 
257 This may be less unthinkable than it seems. A friend who was in Kottiyar Pattu in the 
weeks after the tsunami gave me another example of friendly interaction between Sinhala 
youth and LTTE cadres. On his way to visit some tsunami-affected villages near 
Eechchilampattu, my friend passed the LTTE checkpoint near Mahindapura. To his surprise, 
he saw a group of Sinhala youth who had been mobilised for tsunami relief work by the JVP 
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attacking a shared enemy, and the Sinhala-Tamil collaboration in this case ended as 
soon as the army restored order. 
I did come across cases where individuals really stuck out their necks and went out 
of their way to help people of other ethnicity without a direct benefit to their own 
community, and despite the risk to their own safety. Because the risk of being 
singled out for violent retribution still exists in Sri Lanka, I am unfortunately not 
able to include these examples in this dissertation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
lounging on the sandbags, and having very informal chats with the LTTE cadres 
(conversation, Colombo, 2005). 
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8 Bridging? Inter-ethnic marriages 
“Where two persons love each other deeply neither custom, nor convention, nor 
law are great enough barriers to keep them apart.” (W.M. Ashby, in Golden 
1959: 280) 
8.1 Introduction 
Sarajevo, May 1993. While crossing a bridge on the frontline between the Muslim-
dominated town and its Serbian-dominated outskirts, the Bosnian Serb Bosko Brckic 
and Admira Ismic, his Bosnian Muslim girlfriend of eight years, are shot dead, just 
as they are on their way to leave the war behind them and start a new life in more 
peaceful surroundings. Bosko dies immediately; Admira crawls to her high-school 
sweetheart, and dies while hugging him. The situation is so tense that it takes days 
before anybody can recover their bodies (Schork 1993). Schork’s dispatch and the 
accompanying photographs of the dead couple become world news, and turn the 
couple into a tragic icon of inter-ethnic love caught up in violent conflict. 
When looking at everyday inter-ethnic interaction, it is impossible to ignore the – at 
least ideally – most personal form that it can take: the inter-ethnic marriage. Where 
co-operation over resources (chapter 6) and acts of goodwill in times of acute crisis 
(chapter 7) can to some extent be kept distant from the self, the deliberate choice to 
marry someone from outside the own group brings the ethnic boundary within the 
threshold of the home, and renders its crossing permanent. It is therefore not 
surprising that intermarriage “has come to represent the surest index of 
assimilation” (Marcson 1950:75). Intermarriage has broader implications than only 
for the spouses involved:  
 
 “[m]ixed marriages not only link together two individuals, but also the larger 
groups to which these individuals belong. Such marriages form a bridge 
between these larger groups over which family members and friends of the 
partners may come into contact with each other and new – group-boundary-
transcending – personal contacts and collaborations may come into existence. 
For this reason, intermarriage is expected to promote the social cohesion of 
societies in which different ethnic groups live together, or which consist of a 
number of smaller units, like clans” (Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits 2002: 419) 
 
Because the boundary-crossing involved is a core element of mixed marriages, it is 
worth asking who get involved in mixed marriages, and what happens to those who 
step into such a marriage, particularly if the couple is surrounded by inter-ethnic 
tensions and violence. The key questions that I wanted to find an answer to are: 
How have mixed-ethnic couples managed to live as a mixed couple in a context of ethnicised 
violent conflict? 
To what extent do mixed couples, positioned as they are between two ethnic communities, 
perform a bridging function, especially given the violent context? 
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I base this chapter on detailed interviews with nine mixed couples in Kottiyar Pattu: 
four Tamil-Sinhala, four Muslim-Tamil, and one Sinhala-Muslim. Two interviews 
were with both husband and wife, four were only with the husband (in one case the 
wife was not at home but a daughter joined in the conversation, and in the other 
cases the wife and/or husband considered it inappropriate to speak with my research 
assistant and me), and three interviews were with only the wife (once because the 
husband had already passed away, once – with prior permission from the (Muslim) 
husband – because the husband was out of town, and once because we met the wife 
in the office where she worked and she just started talking to us258. Apart from these 
in-depth interviews, I twice discovered that a person whom I was talking with was 
in a mixed marriage. Unfortunately, in both cases I was unable to conduct an 
elaborate interview, and had to limit myself to a few questions.  
In order to get an understanding of general trends in intermarriage in Kottiyar Pattu, 
I raised the topic of mixed marriages in about 25 chats and interviews with 
community leaders and elderly people.  
Finally, broader reflection on inter-ethnic marriage was greatly stimulated by 
discussions with mixed-married colleagues and friends, and especially with my wife 
and her family: my wife and I form a mixed couple ourselves, as do her parents, all 
her siblings, a number of uncles and aunts, and at least one first cousin. 
For ethical reasons, I did not do any extensive triangulation of the stories that the 
couples told me: I had no intention of digging into anybody’s private life in public. 
Of course, sometimes specific couples were referred to in conversations with other 
people, as mixed marriages are rare enough for the exceptions to be fairly well 
known in their community. Whenever unprovoked comments were made, I have 
taken note. Also, in one case I interviewed a mother and her daughter, as both were 
in mixed marriages. As we were talking about their own marriages, a few things 
were said about the marriage of the mother (by the daughter and her husband) and 
that of the daughter (by the mother).  
 
8.2 Prior research on mixed marriages 
The topic of inter-group marriage has received some attention in the social sciences 
throughout the twentieth century, but the attention has been limited in focus and in 
methodology. Though it is acknowledged that mixed marriage is often not easy 
(many mixed couples face opposition from close relatives and divorce rates for 
                                                 
 
258 The interviews that I conducted for this chapter were the most formally organised 
interviews that I did during my fieldwork. All interviews were done after people (with a 
reputation for being favourable to inter-ethnic harmony) who personally knew the 
respective couples provided an introduction. When I explained that I myself was in a mixed 
marriage, and that my wife was from a very mixed family, that immediately made things a 
lot more informal because in a sense we were speaking about shared experiences. 
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mixed couples are higher than for homogamous couples), many authors do not seem 
to consider the deviance constituted by intermarriage as particularly negative: it is 
often described as a key indicator of inter-group integration, which is seen as a 
positive thing259.  
The oldest articles on intermarriage that I have come across looked at marriages 
between Jews and gentiles in the United States and to some extent in Europe 
(Engelman 1928; Resnik 1933; Slotkin 1942a and b; Wolff 1946; Barron 1946), and at 
marriages between (offspring of) white immigrants of different national or ethnic 
origin in the United States (Panunzio 1942; Nelson 1943; Kennedy 1944; Kennedy 
1952; Johnson 1946; Marcson 1950). The main question in both these strains of 
research was to what extent intermarrying people will retain their own identity, or 
assimilate into another identity group. It soon became clear that ethnic 
amalgamation did take place, but in three distinct “melting pots”: immigrants did 
intermarry with people of other ethnicity, but generally Jews, Catholics and 
Protestants married within their religion (Kennedy 1944 and 1952). This in turn 
triggered a string of research on inter-religious marriage (e.g. Croog and Teele 1967; 
Salisbury 1970; Greely 1970; Rosenthal 1970; Bahr 1981; McCutcheon 1988).  
With the inter-racial emancipation of the 1950s and 1960s in the United States, a new 
trend of intermarriage was observed that promptly became the topic of research: 
interracial marriages between whites and African Americans260, and to a lesser extent 
Asian Americans (e.g. Burma 1952; Golden 1953, 1954, 1958 and 1959; Hunt and 
Coller 1957; Annella 1967; Aldridge 1978; Saenz et al. 1995; Goldstein 1999).  
From about 1970 onwards, the geographical spread of research on intermarriage 
slowly spread across the world, but it has remained heavily focused on the more 
developed countries with a recent history of immigration, such as Singapore, 
Australia, Israel, and a range of countries in the European Union261. A notable 
exception has been research on inter-caste marriages in South Asia and places with 
substantial populations of Indian origin (e.g. Gist 1954; Corwin 1977; Caplan 1984; 
Hollup 1994;  Barber 2004; Chowdhry 2004). 
This focus on western countries is not entirely surprising: intermarriage as a topic of 
research has largely stayed within the domains of (western) sociology and 
                                                 
 
259 The wide range of articles that I have found on the topic leads me to disagree with the 
claim of Roer-Strier and Ben Ezra that “[t]he overriding impression among most writers is 
that intermarriage challenges norms about endogamy and creates problems both for families 
and for society as a whole” (2006: 41-2). 
260 Note that in many states, interracial marriage was illegal until 1967 (Aldridge 1978: 356)  
261 I came across articles on mixed marriages in Singapore (Hassan and Benjamin 1973; Lee, 
Potvin and Verdieck 1974; Kuo and Hassan 1976; Lee 1988), Australia (Mol 1970; Gray 1987; 
Jones 1991), Israel (anon. 1972; Yinon 1975; Weller and Rofé 1988; Okun 2004), France 
(Muñoz-Perez and Tribalat 1984; Neyrand and M’Sili 1998), Great Britain (Smith et al. 1996), 
Ireland (O’Leary 2000 and 2001), Latvia (Monden and Smits 2005), the Netherlands (Kalmijn 
1998; Kalmijn, de Graaf and Janssen 2005) and Sweden (Dribe and Lundh 2008). 
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demography. This often involved statistical analysis requiring sufficiently large and 
reliable datasets, which are not available in many developing countries. Particularly 
the field of anthropology has for a long time tended to focus on bounded groups, 
rather than on people on the definitional margins of such groups, and while 
ethnicity is an increasingly important element in the study of development 
interventions and in the larger fields of economic and political science, intermarried 
people are largely irrelevant to these debates. 
In the context of my own research, it is relevant to note that, while intermarriage has 
been observed to occur in conflict-prone countries such as Rwanda (Magnarella 
2005) and the former Yugoslavia (Botev 1994; Oberschall 2000; Pickering 2006), I 
have been unable to find any research on how mixed couples cope in a context of 
violent conflict. On the other hand, a series of articles about a study of fifty 
interracial couples in the city of Philadelphia (Golden 1953, 1954, 1958 and 1959) 
proved valuable. Though the couples studied by Golden did not live in the midst of 
war, many did experience (sometimes severe) hostility over the line that they 
crossed by intermarrying.  
In Sri Lanka, inter-ethnic marriage has hardly been studied as a separate topic. The 
only studies that I am aware of are Yalman’s work on kinship in the mixed-ethnic 
village of Panama in the far south of the Eastern Province (1971: 310-324), and a 
follow-up study on the impact of the conflict on the same village (Abeyrathne 
2003)262. Yalman found that Panama had been a thoroughly ethnically merged 
community: “a halfway mark had been reached in kinship terms; in terms of caste 
the two systems had been merged without difficulty; and even in worship an 
excellent solution had been found” (1971: 319). Still, with the spread of ethno-
religious discourses (visualised in for example the setting up of separate Tamil and 
Sinhala schools, forcing people to choose), a process of ethnic separation was visible 
when Yalman visited the village in 1955, which he expected “to be speeded up” after 
the Sinhala Only law of 1956, the riots of 1956 (which saw violence not far from 
Panama) and 1958, and the gathering momentum of Tamil protest in the early 1960s 
(ibid: 324, n.8). Abeyrathne observed that, particularly for the younger generation, 
this separation had become virtually complete: for all intents and purposes, Panama 
is now a Sinhala-Buddhist village with some Tamil families living in the margins.  
Contentwise, research on intermarriage has largely focused in three elements. The 
first element deals with explaining why intermarriage occurs in a given marriage 
market. As Gray (1987) has pointed out, explanatory factors are arranged along two 
axes: opportunity and preferences. Opportunity is related to the relative share of a 
group in the total marriage market: if the proportion of in-group potential spouses is 
small, the chances of meeting a suitable in-group spouse are reduced, and 
opportunities for chance encounters with otherwise suitable out-group spouses 
                                                 
 
262 Obeyesekere (1984: 385-394) also conducted research in Panama, but his description is 
limited to rituals relating to the worship of the goddess Pattini. 
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increase. Preference is related to “the combination of social barriers and social 
distance between groups” (ibid.: 368). Kalmijn (1998) has further refined the 
preference axis by distinguishing between individual preferences and preferences of 
third parties: the family, the surrounding (religious, ethnic, caste) community, and 
the state. Gray’s model is useful in understanding how many people intermarry, but 
it focuses on in-marriage: both opportunity and preference rates dictate to what 
extent people marry within their own group, and even in the explanatory model, 
intermarriage forms the left-over component for those unable or unwilling to marry 
within their own group. Blau, Blum and Schwartz (1982) have highlighted that 
heterogeneity within the (sub-)ethnic category leads to an increase in intermarriage 
because the in-group is comparatively small. Based on Simmel’s insight that “the 
social structure of complex societies and communities entails multiple group 
affiliations with intersecting boundaries”, Blau, Beeker and Fitzpatrick (1984: 585) 
have stressed that intersecting group affiliations (of for example education and social 
status) contribute to intermarriage. Ethnicity is not the only factor that people look at 
when selecting a spouse: if there are many people in the same ethnic group but few 
of the same educational level or social status, the likelihood of someone looking for a 
spouse of the same educational or social status but a different ethnic group increases. 
Kalmijn turns the argument around: “[p]eople have a tendency to marry within their 
social group or to marry a person who is close to them in status” (1998: 395). If there 
are however intersecting group affiliations, homogamy along the lines of one group 
affiliation automatically causes intermarriage along the lines of other group 
affiliations. For some, ethnicity is the overriding identifier, for others religion, for 
others education, and for yet others it is social status. 
The second element of research into intermarriage focuses on broader patterns of 
societal integration between groups. Results are varied: in some cases, intermarrying 
minority groups were found to assimilate into the majority group. In cases where 
there is no real dominant group, one may find one or several “melting pots”, in 
which differences are mitigated and a joint new identity is built. Thus, among white 
immigrants of highly varied ethno-national origin in the United States, three 
overarching groups formed: one Protestant, one Catholic, and one Jewish (Kennedy 
1944, Kennedy 1952). In yet other cases, intermarriage does not fundamentally alter 
pre-existing group identities, because the group of intermarried people is not 
significant enough to pose a challenge to group identities (Okun 2004: 185). One 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the impact of intermarriage on larger society 
depends to a very large extent on the nature of society itself. 
The third element of research into intermarriage is in a sense somewhat pathological 
in focus, looking at the question to what extent mixed couples and their children are 
more prone to trouble (divorce, marital unhappiness, marginalisation) than other 
couples.  
It is striking to note how little research on intermarriage has been interested in mixed 
couples themselves and how they deal with being in a mixed marriage: among 
slightly over 80 articles that I found with intermarriage as the core topic, less than 
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one fifth are based on qualitative interviews with mixed couples. Four of these 
articles are by the same author (Joseph Golden) and deal with one research project, 
and another three articles use qualitative information primarily as anecdotes. 
 
8.3 The occurrence of inter-ethnic marriages in Kottiyar Pattu 
8.3.1 Current intermarriage rates 
Even before the conflict broke out, inter-ethnic marriages were not very common in 
Sri Lanka. They “constituted about 3% of those registered each year during the 
period 1960-1975. In view of the pressures towards traditional behaviour in rural 
areas, it may be assumed that such marriages are rare in these areas and that the 
majority take place in urban centres” (Fernando 1980: 434). I doubt however that 
ideals of ethnic homogeneity are the sole, or even the primary reason for this low 
percentage. For the vast majority of people, it was (and still is) very important to 
marry within the own community as defined by language, religion, caste, class – and 
(to a lesser extent) even blood ties. Group homogeneity along these lines nearly 
automatically leads to ethnic homogeneity.  
In Kottiyar Pattu, which – where marriage was concerned – was a very conservative 
rural area until at least the 1980s, the rate of intermarriage is low. This pattern seems 
consistent with most other parts of the Eastern Province. In the (Muslim-Tamil) 
mixed-ethnic region around Akkaraipattu, Dennis McGilvray rarely encountered 
mixed marriages during nearly forty years of intermittent ethnographic fieldwork: 
some Roman Catholic couples of Sinhala-Tamil background, and a very few Tamil 
women who had married Muslims, and who had converted to Islam (McGilvray 
2008). There is one noteworthy difference between Akkaraipattu and Kottiyar Pattu, 
as one of my research assistants who originates from Akkaraipattu pointed out one 
day when we were discussing mixed marriages. In Akkaraipattu, intermarriage is 
generally considered a shameful topic that should not be discussed in public, while 
in Kottiyar Pattu many people spoke very freely, and neutrally, about it. 
During the two years that I lived in Batticaloa, I encountered but a handful of mixed 
couples; I did hear of quite a few Sinhala-Tamil mixed couples in Kalmunai, and 
during work-related visits to the town after the tsunami I came across about four 
such couples without looking for them263. Another enclave of Sinhala-Tamil mixed 
                                                 
 
263 Two weeks after the tsunami, I met an intermarried Sinhala woman who was staying in a 
refugee camp in Kalmunai. On subsequent visits, I came across a few more mixed couples. 
In mid-2007 I visited Kalmunai for a project evaluation and had a long conversation with an 
intermarried Sinhala man whom I happened to stumble across. Unfortunately, I did not take 
notes of this conversation. 
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families exists near Valaichchenai. In this village I met quite a few Sinhalese who 
came to work in the Valaichchenai paper factory, intermarried and settled down264.  
 
Based on the estimates that people have given me for their villages, I estimate that 
there are about 120 mixed-ethnic couples in total: about 60 in Muthur DS Division, 
50 in Seruwila DS Division, and 10 in Eechchilampattu DS Division; about 0.4% of all 
marriages in Muthur and Eechchilampattu, and about 1.4% of all marriages in 
Seruwila. Importantly however, this low percentage does not mean that mixed 
couples are out of people’s sight: with exception of the (Tamil) villages that were 
LTTE-controlled between the late 1990s and 2006, every village in Kottiyar Pattu has 
between two and five mixed couples (and some even more), so it is almost 
impossible for people in the area not to know at least one mixed couple.  
By classificatory ethnicity265 of the spouses, the estimated breakdown is as follows: 
 
Ethnicity of 
husband 
Ethnicity of wife Number of 
couples 
Muslim Sinhala < 5 
Sinhala Muslim < 5 
Muslim Tamil 50-65 
Tamil Muslim < 5 
Sinhala Tamil 50-65 
Tamil Sinhala < 5 
Total  120 
Table 8.1. Estimated breakdown of mixed couples in Kottiyar Pattu by classificatory ethnicity of the 
spouses (source: own estimate, based on a range of interviews in Kottiyar Pattu) 
 
Apart from this, about 25 mixed couples with one or both spouses originating from 
Kottiyar Pattu live outside the area. About ten of these couples are Roman Catholics 
with one Tamil and one Sinhala spouse; they used to live in and around 
Iruthayapuram, but moved to Trincomalee during the war. The rest either married 
an ‘outsider’ spouse (mostly Sinhala, in some cases Muslim) and moved to his or her 
home town, or moved to a new location altogether. As I lack sufficient details on 
these couples, I have excluded them from my analysis. 
 
                                                 
 
264 I visited this village a couple of times in 2000 and 2001, because one of the projects that I 
was managing  involved some activities in the village. Unfortunately, I never took any notes 
of the few conversations that I had there about intermarriage.  
265 By ‘classificatory ethnicity’ I refer to the emic categorisation of people’s ethnicity before 
marriage. Where parents are of mixed ethnic background, this is obviously problematic. In 
most cases, a person’s classificatory ethnicity is the ethnicity of the father. Thus a child of a 
Sinhala father and a Tamil mother is classified as a Sinhalese. If this person decides to marry 
a Sinhalese, the marriage will generally be considered to be mono-ethnic, but if this person 
decides to marry a Tamil, the marriage will be considered mixed-ethnic. 
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When comparing the figures from table 8.1 with data on the number of families by 
ethnicity (extracted from CIRM 2004a, CIRM 2004b and CIRM 2004c, and corrected 
for the increased population reflected in table 2.2), it is possible to estimate the 
percentage of married Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim men and women who have 
intermarried. The results are presented in the table below. 
 
Ethnicity Estimated 
number of 
married men 
Estimated 
number of 
married women 
% men who have 
intermarried 
% women who 
have 
intermarried 
Tamil 11,360 11,460 < 0.1% 1.0% 
Muslim 9,155 9,105 0.6% < 0.1% 
Sinhala 2,330 2,280 2.5% 0.2% 
Table 8.2. Intermarriage rates in Kottiyar Pattu by ethnicity and gender (source: own estimate) 
 
From the table, it can be concluded that particularly Tamil men and Muslim women, 
and to a slightly lesser extent Sinhala women show extremely strong rates of ethnic 
homogeneity in marriage partner choice, while Sinhala men and to a lesser extent 
Tamil women and Muslim men have a much larger (though still small) tendency to 
marry outside their own ethnicity. As Alan Gray (1987) has made clear however, 
rates of intermarriage vary not just with preference, but also with opportunity. If a 
group is small, the options for selecting a spouse from within the own group will be 
limited, and even if there is a strong preference for homogenous marriage, some 
people will end up intermarrying anyway because they cannot find a spouse within 
their own group. Inversely, among a numerically dominant group, intermarriage 
rates will be low even if people have no problem with intermarrying, simply because 
there are not many candidates available to intermarry with. Using the formulas 
provided in Gray’s article (ibid: 367-371), the calculated values for in-marriage 
rates266, shares in the marriage market267, and indices of social distance268 for men and 
women of all three ethnicities are as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
 
266 The in-marriage rate is the fraction of people who marry within their ethnicity. An in-
marriage rate of 0.999 for Tamil men means that 99.9% of all Tamil men marry a Tamil wife 
267 The share in the marriage market (of an ethnic group) is the fraction of married people of 
the same gender. A marriage market share of 0.399 for Muslim women means that 39,9% of 
all married women are Muslim. 
268 The index of social distance indicates preference for marrying within the same ethnic 
group, corrected for the availability of spouses of the same ethnic group. An index value of 1 
means that people of that particular gender and ethnic group will only marry within their 
ethnic group, while an index value of 0 means that people do not look at the ethnic 
background of their spouse at all. 
 Bridging? Inter-ethnic marriages 
315 
   
 
Ethnicity In-marriage 
rate (M) 
In-marriage 
rate (F) 
Marriage 
market 
share (M) 
Marriage 
market 
share (F) 
Index of 
social 
distance 
(M) 
Index of 
social 
distance (F) 
Tamil 0.999 0.990 0.497 0.502 0.942 0.822 
Muslim 0.994 0.999 0.401 0.399 0.881 0.962 
Sinhala 0.976 0.998 0.102 0.100 0.902 0.969 
Table 8.3. In-marriage rates, marriage market shares and indices of social distance in Kottiyar Pattu by 
ethnicity and gender (source: own estimate) 
 
As can be seen, the in-marriage rates are the inverse of the out-marriage rates 
presented above, and the shares in the marriage market closely follow the general 
distribution of the population over the three ethnic groups. The index of social 
distance, which shows how ‘approachable’ men and women of the different ethnic 
groups are269, gives a clear picture. For all six groups, the index of social distance is 
high, which means that it is not very easy for an outsider to marry them; this is not 
surprising. Among these six groups, Sinhala and Muslim women, and to a slightly 
lesser extent Tamil men, are virtually unapproachable by potential suitors of other 
ethnicity. Sinhala men are somewhat approachable, but less so than Muslim men. 
The higher rate of intermarriage among Sinhala men is entirely due to a smaller 
group size, and not to a higher approachability. Tamil women on the other hand 
have a lower intermarriage rate than Sinhala men, but are a lot more approachable. I 
will get back to why this is the case in section 8.4.1. 
 
8.3.2 Historical trends in inter-ethnic marriages 
In the first half of the 20th century, inter-ethnic marriages were very rare. There was a 
small increase in the 1950s, but only after the upheaval of the mid-1980s, and still 
more so after the 2002 ceasefire, did intermarriage rates increase to their current 
levels. I came across three remembered inter-ethnic marriages that took place in the 
first half of the twentieth century. The first marriage, which probably took place in 
the 1930s or 1940s, was between a Tamil woman from the area and a Sinhala man; I 
got no further details on this marriage (interview, Serunuwara, August 2007). The 
second marriage, which probably took place between 1910 and 1925, involved a 
British soldier who was based in Trincomalee. He lived with a Vedda woman from 
Ilakkanthai, and had two children with her. When he returned to Great Britain, he 
                                                 
 
269 Note that this is an index of physical, not of moral approachability. Obviously though, 
moral limitations (and related policing) have great impact on physical approachability. I will 
get to this point in section 8.3.2.  
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left his wife and one son behind, and took the other son with him270. The son who 
stayed behind was classified as European, and died in the area around 1990. He 
married a woman from the area (thus forming the third remembered inter-ethnic 
marriage), and their children were classified as ‘mixed’ (interview, Muthur, August 
2005).  
In this period, a group of Catholic fishermen from Negombo who used to come to 
the mouth of the Mahaweli River for seasonal fishing established a more permanent 
(but still largely seasonal) presence by building a church. As the Catholics of Muthur 
and this group actively participated in each other’s church festivals, it is not 
unthinkable that some of the fishermen married local women (who were of the same 
caste and religion)271. There were also some Sinhala traders who set up shop in 
Kottiyar Pattu, and some of them may have found a local wife as well. It must be 
remembered though that there were very few Sinhalese in Kottiyar Pattu at this 
time; even if some of them intermarried, this was unlikely to make a big dent in the 
total picture of marriages.  
The reason why there were hardly any intermarriages between Muslims and Tamils 
was not ethnic enmity (which did not exist), and not just the refusal from religious 
leaders and relatives to accept spouses of the wrong religion. Until at least the mid-
1980s, almost all marriages were arranged by the parents of the spouses or, if the 
parents had already passed away, by a maternal uncle. So-called ‘love marriages’ 
(even between spouses of the same ethnicity) were very rare, and nearly always 
resulted in elopement. In order to make sure that adolescent women did not get up 
to any mischief with unsuitable candidates, they were closely guarded from the time 
that they attained age until their wedding day (this time gap was rarely more than 
about five to seven years). The women were generally kept inside the cluster of 
compounds where the extended family lived (interview with middle-aged lady, LB3, 
August 2007). If they left this area, they were virtually always chaperoned, and if a 
girl happened to walk alone, she would do so cautiously: “earlier, when a Muslim 
girl walked on the road and a man came her way, she would go into the nearest 
house so that she would not be seen. Now they go on motorbikes” (interview with 
elderly lady, Muthur, May 2007). It was thus almost impossible for a girl to strike up 
a conversation with a stranger, let alone start a romantic relationship, unless the 
stranger was so familiar that he could casually come to the compound. The only strangers 
                                                 
 
270 This must have happened somewhere in the first or second decade of the twentieth 
century. I was told that the son who was left behind died in Kottiyar Pattu at a ripe old age, 
just a few years before I started my research. 
271 In terms of ethnicity, this is however little tricky. Many of the Catholics on the western 
shore of Sri Lanka trace their origins to the Paravar and Mukkuvar fishing communities 
along the southern coast of present-day Kerala and Tamil Nadu, and spoke Tamil until the 
mid-twentieth century. A process of Sinhalisation only gathered serious momentum after 
Sinhala became the language of education at many Catholic schools in the 1960s. 
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who could do so were members of migrant harvesting gangs (who often kept 
coming back to the same families at harvest time), and itinerant traders. 
The only times when adolescents could really mingle without too much social 
control was during religious festivals and weddings; it often happened that future 
weddings were planned during someone else’s wedding celebration (interview with 
middle-aged lady, LB3, August 2007). Particularly among some of the Tamil castes, 
spouses were sourced from same-caste villages that could be as far away as Pottuvil, 
in the extreme south of the Eastern Province, and Jaffna, in the extreme north of the 
Northern Province; a few Muslim families also had long-lasting marriage links with 
Muslim communities along the entire east coast. Initially, Sinhala settlers often 
sourced spouses for their children from their home areas. Weddings thus brought 
suitable people together who would normally not meet each other very often. 
Itinerant traders or labourers played a vital role in spreading information about 
available potential brides or grooms. Regional religious festivals (such as the 
thiruvila at Verugal, kandooris at Sufi shrines, or the festival at the shrine of Our Lady 
of Lourdes at Palaiyoothu, near Trincomalee) brought comparatively large groups of 
people together who were not necessarily suitable marriage partners for reasons of 
caste, class or even religion. The festivals thus provided virtually the only 
opportunity for subversion of the mores about choosing a spouse. 
After the development of the Allai Extension Scheme (AES) saw the influx of several 
thousand Sinhalese in the early 1950s, interaction between Sinhalese and particularly 
Tamils increased significantly. This did however not lead to many marriages, as all 
the settlers were married couples with children. With the settlers however came 
some itinerant traders, of whom at least one married a girl in a Tamil family with 
whom he did regular business.  
Another Sinhala trader settled in Kilivetti with his Tamil wife (whom he had 
married before he came to the AES); in the same village, a few more Sinhalese settled 
of whom some found Tamil wives. 
Intermarrying children of the original settlers formed the next round of mixed 
couples in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some of these were themselves children of 
mixed couples.  Around this time, a number of marriages between Sinhala and Tamil 
Catholics also took place in Iruthayapuram and LB3 (where there were 
concentrations of Tamil Catholics), and possibly also Somapura (where a number of 
Sinhala Catholic families had been settled). As stated before, all these mixed couples 
have left the area after the war broke out, and I have not been able to meet any of 
them. The earliest Muslim-Tamil intermarriages that I came across happened in the 
late 1980s, after Muslim-Tamil relations had become seriously strained following 
periods of Muslim-Tamil violence272.  
                                                 
 
272 There may have been earlier marriages on the periphery of Muthur town. I was told of 
Muslim-Tamil couples living in Periyapalam, but I have not been able to meet any of them. 
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After the ceasefire of 2002, inter-ethnic interaction became a lot easier. Somewhat of 
a surge in mixed marriages followed, especially between (third-generation) 
Sinhalese and Tamils. While the trend in Sinhala-Tamil intermarriages seems to run 
parallel with (and thus be an indicator of) greater inter-group integration, the same 
is not true for Tamil-Muslim intermarriages. The bizarre thing with Tamil-Muslim 
intermarriages is that they started becoming more common at the same time that 
Tamil-Muslim relations degenerated, and thus the intermarriage trend is inverse to 
the trend of integration!  
 
8.4 Love stories 
8.4.1 Meeting each other 
There is one single factor that enabled mixed couples to meet each other: mobility. 
Of the nine couples, two husbands were itinerant labourers at the time of courtship, 
one was an itinerant peddler, and one was a policeman; they met their wives in the 
course of their work. Mobility of the women was equally important: three were in 
secondary school (of whom two met their husbands in a shop near their school), one 
used to come to a town with her mother and met her husband in the grocery shop, 
and one was a teacher who met her husband at the house of her school’s principal273. 
Another couple met while working in the same government institution. The ways in 
which couples met each other are summarised in table 8.4. 
 
Way in which the couple met Frequency of 
occurrence 
Husband 
mobile? 
Wife mobile? 
Husband itinerant labourer or itinerant trader, regular 
(work-related) visits to wife’s family  
3 Yes No 
Wife going to school, met husband in nearby shop 
during school breaks 
2 No Yes 
Husband policeman, met wife on the road when she 
was going for secondary school 
1 Yes Yes 
Wife regularly going grocery shopping in town, met 
husband in shop 
1 No Yes 
Wife teacher, met husband (colleague’s wife’s brother) 
in colleague’s house 
1 No Yes 
Husband and wife both working in the same 
government institution 
1 Yes Yes 
Total 9 5 6 
Table 8.4. Ways in which interviewed mixed couples met each other 
                                                 
 
273 The teacher became friends with the principal’s wife and her sisters (who lived in a 
cluster of dowry houses around their parents’ house), and thus visited these ladies regularly 
at their homes. Her future husband was a younger brother of the principal’s wife; he lived 
with his parents. 
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Among other mixed couples whom I heard about, this pattern was similar: either the 
husband had a mobile job (quite often as home guard or soldier) and visited his 
wife’s village, or the wife met her husband while she was in secondary school or 
while she went to town to do grocery shopping. After the 2002 ceasefire, mobility 
increased and chances for youth of different ethnic background to meet each other at 
markets or festivals increased significantly. Also, a number of peacebuilding projects 
were implemented in the area, some of which focused on bringing youth of different 
ethnicity together. In a few cases, this also led to mixed marriages274. What is very 
important to note here is the emancipating role that the war has played, particularly 
among Tamils and Sinhalese. The experience of displacement (for Tamils) as well as 
the experience of being posted in Tamil areas (for Sinhala soldiers) has torn people 
away from norms that traditionally bound them (Golden 1959: 273). Most of the 
time, this had devastating consequences, but for a few people, it proved to be an 
opportunity275. As mentioned in section 3.10, the high risk for Tamil men of getting 
arrested at checkpoints or in Muslim or Sinhala settlements also significantly 
increased the mobility of Tamil women (who suddenly became responsible for doing 
purchasing outside the own village). The gender differentiation in risks involved 
with this form of segregation (Golden 1958: 267) goes a long way in explaining the 
difference in intermarriage rates between Tamil women and Tamil men.  
 
8.4.2 Getting married, and the reactions of others 
Eight of the nine mixed couples whom I interviewed were in so-called ‘love 
marriages’, which means that the spouses selected each other, rather than the 
marriage being arranged by the parents. Only one marriage (in which both spouses 
were children from mixed parents) was “semi-arranged” (Corwin 1977: 827 n.6), 
much like how De Munck (1996) describes couples from the Muslim town where he 
did his research falling in love and then suggesting to their relatives to arrange the 
marriage. This pattern was the same for all the other mixed marriages that people 
told me about. In a context where arranged marriages are still the norm (though with 
more and more exceptions), this is significant. 
                                                 
 
274 Note the similarity with the list of facilitating  factors found in Golden (1959:274): shared 
employment, interaction between customer/client and staff, meeting in schools, shared use 
of recreation facilities, meeting through mutual friends, and shared membership of an 
organisation.  
275 Apart from inter-ethnic marriages, the incidence of inter-caste marriages also increased 
significantly during the war, as did the incidence of extramarital affairs, brothel visits and 
rape. In a sense, intermarriage and rape are morally opposite responses to the same 
fundamental problem of young men being away from their ‘own category of women’.  
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With exception of the one couple mentioned above, all the couples whom I spoke to 
got married against the wishes of immediate relatives on at least one side276. In order 
to get married without the approval of the immediate family, most had to run away 
and get married elsewhere. Courtships were typically brief: from two months to 
about half a year. This is in line with general practice in rural Sri Lanka. Being 
(young and) single and being married are auspicious states, but being in a 
relationship without being married is a state where people risk serious damage to 
their reputation due to gossip and character assassination. It is not for nothing that 
Sri Lankans use the English term ‘affair’ (with all the potentially negative 
connotations) to describe romantic relationships between people who are not 
married to each other, even those that are perfectly honourable. A number of the 
mixed couples had an extra reason to marry quickly. Some wanted to be married 
before their family found out, in order to prevent disagreeing relatives from 
physically ending the relationship277.  
The disapproval by immediate relatives is often so strong that they disown their son, 
daughter or sibling (at least temporarily). Sometimes this goes very far. One lady 
whom I spoke to was not only disowned where dowry and inheritance are 
concerned, but was even not allowed to attend the funeral when her mother died 
years after the marriage had taken place, and after several children had been born 
(interview, Muthur, March 2008). In another case, a young mixed couple was widely 
accepted in both the husband’s and the wife’s village. Their wedding had been a 
very festive and very inter-ethnic celebration. The boy’s mother however 
disapproved so strongly that he ended up committing suicide because he could not 
handle the pressure (conversation with a friend of the couple, August 2007). 
Going ahead despite opposition by the family points to another important enabling 
factor for inter-ethnic marriages. In the interviews with mixed couples in Kottiyar 
Pattu, but also in conversations with mixed-married friends and in-laws, I was often 
struck by the strong-willed and independent character of particularly the wives278. 
The inter-ethnic relationships that I encountered were triggered by romantic love, 
not by deliberate reasoning (which fundamentally undermines claims at causal 
explanatory value of demographic models: proximity, similar status levels, similar 
education levels etc. are conditions under which people meet, not reasons why 
                                                 
 
276 This disapproval may not always have been caused by mere prejudice; Golden has 
pointed out that relatives may well be genuinely concerned about the welfare of the couple 
(1958: 268-9) 
277 In one case where the courtship lasted longer, the wife’s family packed her off to the 
Middle East for a year as soon as they found out about the relationship. When she returned, 
her future husband picked her up from the airport and eloped with her (interview, Thoppur, 
August 2008). 
278 This comes close to what Golden (1959: 274) calls “weak endogamous attitudes”. 
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people fall in love). Still, deciding to get intermarried in the face of opposition 
constitutes a clear act of defiance, and requires commitment and a strong will.  
In the case of Muslim men marrying non-Muslim wives, the conversion of the wife 
to Islam is generally a precondition for acceptance in the wider Muslim community. 
The Muslims whom I spoke to about mixed marriages knew of two cases where they 
suspected that the wife had not converted, and of one or two cases where a Muslim 
girl had married a non-Muslim and given up her religion; the reaction was 
unanimously negative. Between Buddhists and Hindus, this is not such a big issue 
(most Sri Lankan Buddhists worship Hindu gods, and many Hindus have at least 
some respect for the Buddha). Among Catholics, marrying someone of another 
religion used to be as big an issue as it is for Muslims, but this seems to have 
changed over the last two decades. 
While the opposition by relatives has caused a lot of suffering for the mixed couples, 
it was – to some extent – to be expected. What is more interesting is the fact that in 
the case of at least five of the nine couples whom I spoke to, one side of the family 
either did not enforce their disapproval of the marriage, or openly approved of it. 
This lack of disapproval (or rather quick acceptance of the marriage as a fait accompli) 
may have had something to do with something else: in seven of the nine cases, at 
least one of the parents of at least one of the spouses had passed away before the 
mixed marriage took place279. Since the authority of the remaining parent (if there 
was one) over the son or daughter was weakened, the eldest (male) sibling or a 
maternal uncle had to take over part of this responsibility. These relatives, being in a 
less direct position of authority, generally disapproved, but were not able to put as 
much negative pressure as a parent would have been able to. At the same time, an 
elopement relieved the uncle or brother of the responsibility to find a good spouse, 
and – in cases where the woman was orphaned – of the responsibility to collect a 
dowry. 
 
8.4.3 Being married 
After marriage, eight of the nine couples whom I spoke to lived neolocally; the 
teacher whom I mentioned earlier moved in with her husband, whose family had no 
problem with her. After a while, five of the neolocal couples ended up living in the 
husband’s original village. Neolocal residence or residence in the husband’s village 
seems to be a general pattern among mixed couples in Kottiyar Pattu. The only 
exceptions I came across are about five to ten Sinhala youth who married Tamil girls 
after about 2005, and who were living in their wife’s village by the time I finished 
my fieldwork. Apart from the presence or absence of links with relatives, the place of 
residence of the couple was important for another reason: most villages in Kottiyar 
                                                 
 
279 In an eighth case, the wife’s father was so conspicuously absent from the narrative that I 
suspect that he had either died or run away before the marriage of his daughter. 
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Pattu are largely mono-ethnic, and in many cases the choice of residence implies a 
choice of dominant ethnic self-representation of the couple. 
In the cases where couples end up in the original village of either spouse, the 
defining element that brought about rapprochement with disapproving relatives 
was the birth of the first child. This is a standard pattern following elopement in Sri 
Lanka. The birth of the first child brings about child-rearing responsibilities, and 
thus the elopement has visibly become a relationship with long-term commitments. 
Since trying to break up the relationship no longer makes sense (a daughter or sister 
with child is very hard to marry off), the alternative is to make the best of it all 
(Baber (1937) observed a similar pattern among the mixed couples that he studied). 
The habitation patterns of mixed couples are interesting. Among Muslims and 
Tamils in the East of Sri Lanka, it is customary for couples to live in the wife’s native 
village. Land is generally divided among the daughters as dowry, and whenever 
possible the parents will try to build a dowry house for the daughters as well280. 
Moving out to the husband’s village means that the couple will have to do without 
land and/or a house, and thus will have no resources to fall back on in case of 
emergencies. Also, when children are born, it means that the wife will be dependent 
on her mother-in-law rather than on her mother (and sisters) to help her with the 
baby. All this puts the mixed couples in a vulnerable position.  
If living in the wife’s village is so much more advantageous than living in the 
husband’s village, then why this pattern of settlement? It seems to be linked to the 
couple’s chances of getting accepted (or at least tolerated) in the wider ethnic 
community that they live in.  
What happened is that the wives ended up taking on the ethnicity of their husbands, in 
the process critically undermining essentialist interpretations of the concept of 
ethnicity. Where there was a language difference, the wives took on their husband’s 
language: I had an interview with a Tamil woman in Sinhala281, and three interviews 
with Sinhala women in Tamil. As said earlier, most non-Muslim wives of Muslim 
men converted to Islam: two of the husbands told me that their wife was a better 
Muslim than they were. The women’s choice of clothes also changed: one Tamil lady 
was wearing distinctly Sinhala dress, a Sinhala lady was wearing distinctly Tamil 
dress, and others (both Sinhala and Tamil) were wearing distinctly Muslim dress. 
Most dramatic of all, some of the women who converted to Islam formally changed 
their ethnicity by adopting a new name, and obtaining a new identity card. 
                                                 
 
280 Among Sinhalese settlers in Kottiyar Pattu, land is generally passed on to the youngest 
son as inheritance, and dowry is given more in terms of gold, cash or other movables than in 
the form of a house. Neolocal residence is therefore the norm. 
281 This lady’s television gave her away: when we entered the house, she was watching 
Shakthi TV, a Tamil television channel. 
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For the husbands, changing ethnicity does not seem to be an option; the only thing 
that some of the husbands who married across the Sinhala-Tamil language divide 
did was to learn their wife’s language.  
There is a serious gender difference here: it is possible for a wife to take on her 
husband’s ethnic identity, but it is impossible for a husband to take on his wife’s 
ethnic identity. I am not sure why this is. It may have to do with male pride, it may 
have to do with status differences between the wife’s ethnicity and the husband’s 
ethnicity (but the examples of Sinhala women marrying Tamils and becoming Tamil 
undermine this), or it may be something entirely different. 
 
8.4.4 Raising children 
The arrival of children brings acknowledgement to an inter-ethnic marriage, but it 
also brings up a new problem: children need to be raised, and parents need to decide 
how much of both cultures they want to pass on.  
The way in which mixed parents raise their children, and the extent to which they 
are willing to let their children marry someone of another ethnicity, are strong 
indicators of the extent to which the parents perceive themselves to be a 
multicultural couple. 
The responses were interesting. With the exception of three Sinhala-Tamil couples, 
all couples indicated that they raise(d) their children according to the ethnicity of the 
village where the children grow up – and thus according to the ethnicity of the 
father. There where one of the spouses is Sinhala, the children are generally raised 
bi-lingually, but as the wife generally takes on the religion of the husband and (with 
exception of Christianity) religious affiliation is pretty much divided along ethnic 
lines, most children are taught one religion. The mono-ethnic child rearing practices 
go further: with exception of some of the (Hindu-Buddhist) Sinhala-Tamil couples, 
the wives by and large refrain from teaching their children songs, customs, games, 
stories, etcetera that are considered unique to their own culture. 
With regard to the spouse choice of the children, the answers were again nearly 
uniform: with one exception, the fathers had a strong preference that the children 
marry someone of the same ethnicity. Some fathers did not want their children to 
have to go through the hardships that they themselves had gone through, and some 
insisted that their children maintain their father’s religion. Sometimes, I got the 
impression that there was a more fundamental ambiguity: even though they 
themselves had engaged in a mixed marriage, that did not make it the preferred 
option. The exception was a man who identified himself as Tamil, whose father was 
Malayali, whose mother was Sinhala, whose (“Sinhala”) wife’s father was Sinhala 
and whose wife’s mother was Tamil. This man was perfectly all-right with the 
children marrying whoever they chose. 
The mothers were not as rigid. One woman who married a Muslim and adopted the 
Muslim faith gave a slightly embarrassed smile when I asked her, and then 
answered “as long as he or she is a Muslim”. The smile betrayed more ambiguity 
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than she could express verbally. As soon as she said this, an elderly lady who 
evidently had been listening in to make sure she said the right things popped her 
head around the door of the back room. A Tamil lady who had married a Sinhalese 
and who had become very Sinhala in her demeanour said that her first child had 
married a Tamil against the father’s wishes, but she was perfectly fine with it. Her 
other children all married Sinhalese. 
 
8.5 Reflection: boundary jumping, but very little bridging 
As I have shown in the above paragraphs, inter-ethnic marriages are comparatively 
rare in Kottiyar Pattu, but still so common that almost every village has a few mixed 
couples, and is thus linked to villages of other ethnicity through marriage. 
Historically, the normative environment that people in Rural Sri Lanka grow up in 
prescribes the selection of spouses from within the same caste, religion and class; a 
derived consequence of this is that most marriages are mono-ethnic. The fact that 
inter-ethnic marriages occur despite this normative environment is intimately linked 
to three factors: above-average geographical mobility of at least one of the spouses, 
below-average moral surveillance of the adolescents involved, and (particularly 
among the wives) personalities that are strong-willed and independent. 
While personality characteristics make individuals more or less likely to pursue a 
relationship (and marriage) that goes against the norm (and is therefore subversive), 
mobility (enabling, at some point, physical proximity between the spouses-to-be 
outside the surveillance of norm-enforcing relatives) is a factor that explains broader 
trends in intermarriage. In the latter part of the twentieth century, the development 
of secondary education infrastructure greatly contributed to the mobility of 
adolescent girls. Parallel to this, the conflict induced mobility for fleeing civilians, 
patrolling combatants, and Tamil women who had to take on the marketing role to 
protect the men in their families. At the same time, the conflict made making norm 
enforcement harder because bigger issues (primarily physical security and food 
security) demanded surveillance, and because it became more common for the 
surveyed to be physically separated from the surveying. Apart from this, I found a 
remarkably frequent occurrence of below-average moral surveillance caused by the 
death of one or both parents of one or both spouses. 
This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that, apart from personal characteristics and 
general development, ethnicised conflict directly contributed to an increase in 
marriages across the very same boundaries that were the locus of so much 
violence282.  
                                                 
 
282 This conclusion is only valid in cases where intermarriage was rare and generally 
considered inappropriate. In situations like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, where 
intergroup marriage was not considered inappropriate before conflict breaks out, and where 
pre-conflict intergroup marriage was fairly common, the general hardening of group 
boundaries will lead to a significant reduction in intergroup marriages. The same thing 
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The context of ethnicised conflict also had as a consequence that individual 
boundary crossing by mixed couples rarely led to a broader spreading of inter-ethnic 
understanding or interaction. The gun-enforced policing of ethnic boundaries by 
soldiers, home guards, rebels, ethno-nationalist politicians and local thugs forced the 
mixed couples to keep their multiculturalism ‘below the radar’, and remain 
irrelevant to macro-level concerns about ethnic purity by making sure that they were 
not identified as a distinct group (Golden 1958: 269, Okun 2004: 185). In practice, this 
almost always meant that the wives ‘jumped the boundary’ and adopted the ethnic 
identity of their husbands, while all but cutting off interaction with their own 
communities. By doing so, they assimilated, rather than culturally adapted (Roer-
Strier and Ben Ezra 2006). 
Rather than acting as a bridge between their communities, mixed couples (and their 
children) were faced with suspicion from both sides during most of the war. Most of 
the mixed households whom I spoke to had been faced with threats against their 
safety. At least two of these households had faced selective violence that they 
interpreted as almost a form of exorcism, aimed at driving out the elements that 
subverted claims to ethnic purity283. 
In periods of comparative peace, some non-confrontational forms of bridging do 
take place. Two ladies whom I spoke to were or had been teaching Sinhala to 
children in their husbands’ Tamil-speaking villages. A few people in Hindu (Tamil) -
Buddhist (Sinhala) mixed marriages spoke of taking Hindu friends to Buddhist 
festivals, and of taking Buddhist friends to Hindu festivals. Finally, some mixed 
people living in Serunuwara and Muthur had a reputation of helping Tamils from 
outside gain access to public services in these places. 
This leads me to the conclusion that, while mixed-ethnic families can contribute to 
broader inter-ethnic understanding in times that peace is the norm, the need to ‘stay 
below the radar’ of ethnonationalist forces makes it impossible for them to perform a 
conflict-mitigating role in times of crisis.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
happened in the village of Panama, particularly after an army camp was placed in the 
village in the late 1980s (Yalman 1971: 310-324, Abeyrathne 2003) 
283 My impression is that what was exorcised was a perceived (multicultural) subversive 
attitude of the targeted couples, and not the mixed marriage per se: even among 
ethnonationalist hardliners, some people have spouses of another ethnicity, without this 
being seen as a problem. A prominent example was Nadesan, the last head of the LTTE’s 
Political Wing, who was married to a Sinhala woman. Similarly, the prominent anti-
immigrant Dutch politician Geert Wilders is himself married to a foreign wife. 
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9 Everyday inter-ethnic interaction: discussion and 
conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
In this book, I have documented and analysed everyday forms of inter-ethnic 
interaction in the area known as Kottiyar Pattu. In chapter 1, I have shown that 
Kottiyar Pattu sits in a wider Sri Lankan context of Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim ethnic 
identifications, and within a wider context of ethno-nationalist discourses and two 
and a half decades of ethnicised politics and violence. An understanding of inter-
ethnic interaction may lead to deeper understanding of what ethnicisation means in 
people’s everyday lives, and offer insights for outsiders aiming at contributing to the 
area’s peaceful development.  
I have approached everyday inter-ethnic interaction from four viewpoints. The first 
viewpoint is that everyday life continues in and interacts with a context of conflict. 
Both everyday life and violent conflict deserve attention, but neither should be 
foregrounded. Focusing on everyday life alone when studying life in war risks 
ignoring the intense fear and suffering that people need to live with. At the same 
time, foregrounding violent conflict risks ignoring that a lot of aspects of everyday 
life go on despite the conflict and to quite an extent independent of the conflict 
(Richards 2005). 
Secondly, inter-ethnic interaction involves the crossing of an ethnic boundary, and 
therefore draws attention to how people deal with sameness and otherness. As I 
have documented in chapter 3, the people whom I met in Kottiyar Pattu define 
sameness and otherness in a wide variety of ways. This means that for every person, 
there is a large group of people who can be defined either ‘same’ or ‘other’, 
depending on which category of identification is used. I have therefore taken the 
viewpoint that social life is about a lot more than just ethnicity, but rather that it is 
constituted by “multiple” and “intersecting” realities (Long 2001: 19).  
My third viewpoint is that interaction involves individual people’s agency: their 
capacity to interpret, negotiate, and at least partly shape their lives. In chapters 6, 7 
and 8, I have described three situations in which people engage in and shape inter-
ethnic interaction: the day-to-day pursuit of (agricultural) livelihoods, periods of 
acute tension and violence, and inter-ethnic marriages.  
The last viewpoint is that interaction takes place in specific settings (or arenas), in 
which wider contexts are interpreted and negotiated. In chapters 2, 3 and 4, I have 
dealt at length with the geographical, historical, social and violent context within 
which everyday life and everyday inter-ethnic interaction take place. As exemplified 
by the narratives in chapter 5, this complex context has profound consequences for 
the way people perceive and represent themselves and others. Isolated from the 
wider history, key stories about Kottiyar Pattu have given rise to competing ethnic 
claims on supremacy. At the same time, the area has always been something of a 
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melting pot with many consecutive waves of people moving into the area and 
finding a space for themselves. As official interest waxed and waned with strategic 
(military and trading) interests in this region that is both on the frontier and the 
periphery of Sri Lanka, every new wave of immigrants has had to find ways to make 
do when the backing from the state that brought them into the area fell away. This 
has given rise to pragmatism and, as far as available documents show, a long history 
of fairly peaceful coexistence.  
This coexistence has been seriously threatened since violence broke out in the area in 
1985. As I have documented in chapter 4, ethnicity and otherness were not just 
abstract discourses that were fought over in Jaffna and Colombo and came to people 
through newspapers, radio and television. Though the extent to which people have 
been directly affected by the violence is not equally distributed across ethnicity, gun-
toting ethnic others have been an everyday reality that everybody in Kottiyar Pattu 
has had to deal with for almost twenty-five years. What is important to realise is 
that, even though memories of past violence and the threat of future violence created 
a general situation of fear and intimidation, actual violence has been episodic. In 
between, there have been long periods of time in which most people were able to 
more or less pick up the pieces of their everyday lives. It is also important to realise 
that violence has rarely been spontaneous (as is illustrated by the differential 
responses to incidents around Serunuwara in section 7.6.1) 
 
In the rest of this chapter, I will draw upon these case studies and return to the main 
research objective: to come to an understanding of everyday inter-ethnic interaction in a 
context of violent ethnicised conflict, its implications for the everyday lives of those living 
with conflict, and its implications for peace-building interventions. 
Section 9.2 looks at how everyday inter-ethnic interaction can be understood: who 
engages in it, how they do it, and why they do so. Section 9.3 looks at the 
consequences of inter-ethnic interaction for people’s everyday lives: how does the 
context influence inter-ethnic interaction, and what impact does inter-ethnic 
interaction have on the context? Section 9.4 deals with methodological implications 
that flow from my research, and section 9.5 discusses topics that are worthy of 
further study. Finally, section 9.6 looks at the wider implications of everyday inter-
ethnic interaction for those who aim to work on issues of peace and reconciliation in 
conflict-affected areas. 
 
9.2 The practice of everyday inter-ethnic interaction 
9.2.1 Those who engage in everyday forms of inter-ethnic interaction 
As will have become clear from the empirical data presented in this dissertation, 
those who engage in everyday forms of inter-ethnic interaction come from all walks 
of life, and most are otherwise quite ordinary people. Despite the violent ethnic 
“unmixing” that has taken place (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2004: 46), the numbers of 
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people engaging in deliberate inter-ethnic interaction beyond random encounters are 
quite substantial. How many people this involves exactly is hard to guess, but based 
on what I have seen and heard I estimate that between a third and half of all 
households in Kottiyar Pattu have inter-ethnic links with others whom they meet in 
the pursuit of their everyday lives and livelihoods. Though comparatively rare, even 
mixed-ethnic marriages can be found in nearly every village that was not under 
LTTE control. Inter-ethnic interaction is thus pretty much in everybody’s face. Of 
those who do not engage in non-random inter-ethnic interaction many have no need 
to do so; there is not necessarily a lack of willingness.  
While the intense suffering that ethnicised violence has caused for so many people in 
Sri Lanka’s war zone cannot be denied, the spread of inter-ethnic interaction 
fundamentally complicates any simple narrative of ethnic enmity and segregation. 
As I have shown in chapters 4 and 7, violence in Kottiyar Pattu has been episodic in 
nature, with regular periods of acute tensions and (sometimes) intense violence 
separated by periods in which memories of past violence and expectations of 
potential future violence did cast a dark shadow over people’s lives, but in which 
there was comparatively little actual violence. During peaks of tensions and 
violence, most of the ‘ordinary’ people put their cross-ethnic interactions on hold 
until things calmed down again. During such periods, a small group of people with 
social roles of intermediaries (like wattai vidanes, religious leaders, and teachers) 
continued their interactions with each other under the right circumstances. 
 
9.2.2 How everyday inter-ethnic interaction is given shape 
In chapters 6, 7 and 8, I have documented a range of inter-ethnic “tactics” (de 
Certeau 1988) that people engage in. In the AES, Irrigation Department staff adjusted 
water management practices (and sometimes the physical infrastructure of the 
scheme) to minimise potential for conflict. Farmer representatives and wattai vidanes 
were sometimes able to find ways to reduce the impact of channel blockages, and to 
frame such blockages as understandable attempts to get water to illegitimate paddy 
fields rather than as indicators of ethnic conflict. Farmers engaged in cross-ethnic 
hiring of labour and cross-ethnic leasing of land to keep cultivation going. 
During the 2003 riot in and around Muthur, Muslim community leaders asked ZOA 
for help and negotiated safe passage for ZOA’s Tamil staff members. A group of 
Sinhalese teamed up with Tamil youth to attack what had suddenly become a 
common enemy. A Sinhala police officer offered security to one Tamil village that he 
had special contacts with. A mob of angry Muslim youth did not attack a small and 
vulnerable group of Tamil road sweepers because otherwise the town would get 
messy. The riot ended because farmers needed to plough and because children 
needed to sit for their school exams. Finally, Muslims and Tamils both brought in 
Sinhala traders in the aftermath of the riot, because the Sinhala traders were able to 
safely pass through both Muslim and Tamil areas. 
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Despite the ethnic segregation, there are over 100 mixed-ethnic couples living in 
Kottiyar Pattu today who are somehow managing to live their lives. 
An important characteristic of everyday inter-ethnic interaction is that it generally 
takes place between people who already know each other before they engage in 
inter-ethnic interaction. Trust is crucial: in a context where anyone might be a deadly 
enemy, it is simply too dangerous to engage in substantial interaction with unknown 
people. The same is true for intra-ethnic interaction, but there is a difference: since 
1985, the opportunities for getting to know each other across ethnic lines have 
dramatically reduced. Because of this, inter-ethnic interaction tends to be 
concentrated among people who were already adolescents or older when the 
violence broke out. As I have mentioned in chapter 8, inter-ethnic marriages have 
followed an opposite trend, but this was for a very specific reason. Due to the 
conflict and the growth of secondary education, cross-ethnic gender segregation 
among adolescents and the moral policing of adolescent girls has weakened at the 
same time that overall ethnic segregation increased, thus creating new opportunities 
for mixed couples to meet and fall in love. 
The prerequisite of trust points to another key aspect of everyday forms of inter-
ethnic interaction: despite being fairly common, the links tend to be between 
individuals, not groups. Norman Uphoff (2001) was thus mistaken when he 
identified inter-ethnic interaction in Sri Lanka’s conflict zone as a form of collective 
action. Because of the ever-present threat of violent retribution by those policing the 
ethnic boundary, it is extremely dangerous to have your head stick out above the 
grass, whether in the capital or at grass-roots level. The farmer representative whom 
Uphoff wrote about was shot dead for crossing the ethnic boundary. The wattai 
vidane whom I interviewed was tortured because he was suspected of helping the 
wrong people. And an activist friend from the area has had to leave the country for 
his own safety. Inter-ethnic interaction must therefore remain ‘below the radar’ of 
those policing the ethnic boundaries. The radar, in this case, has the shape of an AK-
47. 
Staying below the radar sometimes means that people restrict the number of others 
who know about the interaction, as was the case with the wattai vidanes who met in a 
closed room. A lot of interethnic interaction is however quite visible: there is little 
that is secretive about hiring labourers from another ethnicity to cultivate fields near 
the front line, or about mixed-ethnic marriages. What happens here is that the inter-
ethnic interaction is presented as irrelevant to ethnonationalist discourses. This is 
done through a ‘swapping trick’, in which ethnic otherness is reframed into 
similarity in another category of identification. Farmers speak about being farmers 
who need to farm (and not about being Sinhala, Tamil or Muslim), parents speak 
about their children needing to sit for their exams, and mixed couples speak about 
married life, not about being of mixed ethnicity. In the case of most mixed couples, 
an additional process takes place: ethnic difference is eliminated because the wife 
adopts her husband’s ethnic identity.  
By more or less ignoring ethnic difference in situations of inter-ethnic interaction, 
people create a situation where ethnonationalist discourse (which they cannot do 
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much about) and inter-ethnic interaction exist in “amiable incoherence” (Whitaker 
1999). 
Particularly from chapters 3 and 7, another element comes forward: widespread 
ethnic segregation does not mean that there is intra-ethnic harmony. High-caste 
Tamil farmers still resent the rise to farmer status of low-caste Tamils. Original 
inhabitants resent settlers, irrespective of ethnicity, because they took up all 
remaining room for expansion. In April 2003, Muslim farmers did not want to have 
fleeing Muslim fishermen in their school, and low-caste Tamils did not flee to the 
churches to avoid the awkward situation of being among high-caste Tamils. 
Reformist and Sufi Muslims in Muthur are locked in an intense struggle over the 
shape that the Muslim religion should take. And so it goes on. This underlines that 
ethnicity should also not be foregrounded when studying a multi-ethnic setting. 
 
9.2.3 Why people engage in everyday inter-ethnic interaction 
Just like war is often waged for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons, so is 
peace. Even though everyday inter-ethnic interaction in a context of violent 
ethnicised conflict is fundamentally subversive in nature, I found that it is primarily 
pragmatic in intent. Most of the farmers engaging in the cross-ethnic hiring of 
labourers, the Muslim civil servants approaching my Tamil colleagues to access 
emergency relief for their community, and the many others whom I have described 
who engage in inter-ethnic interaction do so for very practical reasons. While some 
are clearly driven by ideological convictions and some are ‘ethnically blinded’ by 
love, most people simply want to live reasonably normal lives. In most cases, I 
would therefore consider everyday inter-ethnic interaction as a prosaic reality, not 
“poetics” (Ring 2006: 3). This yearning for normalcy goes beyond mere economic 
considerations. It is also about disengaging from the context of conflict and creating 
a mental breathing space, even if only to get through the day (Walker 2010).   
 
9.3 The consequences of everyday inter-ethnic interaction for people’s 
everyday lives……………….. 
Many people who told me about individual acts of inter-ethnic interaction 
considered these acts insignificant in the greater scheme of things. Viewed 
individually, acts of inter-ethnic interaction rarely had any impact on the fighting 
parties, on ethno-nationalist discourses, or on socio-economic well-being. Taken 
together though, inter-ethnic interaction had clear and substantial consequences.  
While not undoing all the negative effects of conflict (such as access restrictions in 
some areas and constraints for getting inputs or selling produce), inter-ethnic 
interaction made it possible to keep most of the Allai Extension Scheme functioning 
throughout the war years, thus enabling thousands of farming families to sustain 
their livelihoods at least to some extent. Had there been no exchange of lands, cross-
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hiring of labour, negotiations by wattai vidanes, and interventions by Irrigation 
Department staff, then cultivation would have been reduced even more, and people 
would have sunk into even greater depths of poverty and despair. On a much 
smaller scale, the same is true for the Tamil goldsmiths and Muslim jewellers 
mentioned in section 3.2.1.  
While inter-ethnic interaction was rarely able to avoid tensions and outbreaks of 
violence, it did have clear mitigating effects. Sinhalese, who in May and June 1985 
warned Tamil neighbours that something was up, were not able to stop the looting 
and burning, but probably did save a lot of lives, as did the Muslims who sheltered 
the fleeing Tamils at the time. Broad consensus (though hardly discussed openly) 
about the need to take a time-out from the violence in April 2003 allowed school 
children to sit for their exams and farmers to prepare their fields, and allowed the 
tensions to calm down somewhat.  
Both in regular life and in situations of acute tensions and violence, inter-ethnic 
interaction thus contributed to the maintenance of a substratum of normalcy in 
which people could live their lives as normally as possible given the circumstances. 
Probably the form of inter-ethnic interaction with the least impact on wider society 
in Kottiyar Pattu is the inter-ethnic marriage. Although some mixed-married people 
do try to bridge ethnic differences and stimulate understanding between the 
different groups they represent, living normal lives requires most couples to keep 
their position of being inter-ethnic bridges away from the public eye. As I have 
shown, this goes to the extent of wives changing their ethnicity. As with other forms 
of inter-ethnic interaction however, there is quite a bit of tacit acceptance. Mixed 
couples who establish themselves as proper couples (generally symbolised by the 
generation of offspring) are generally accepted by the people in their village, though 
not always by their blood relatives. 
 
9.4 Wider academic implications of this research 
In the data that I have presented, I have shown that despite the constraining context 
of violence and ethnonationalist discourses, people find room for manoeuvre to 
exercise agency in the shaping of their everyday lives. 
With my research, I have underlined a crucial premise of the actor-oriented 
approach: to understand any social reality, you need to understand alternative 
realities that are equally part of people’s everyday lives. These alternative realities 
are spaces for reinterpretation, negotiation and disengagement, and it is in this 
ambiguity that people find room for manoeuvre, even in very oppressive 
circumstances. It is here that Mark Whitaker’s notion of “amiable incoherence” 
(1999) comes to mind as particularly useful. While many realities intersect and 
interact, some realities can only exist precisely because they are invisible or 
irrelevant to dominating realities. Thus it is possible for Sinhala home guards to 
enforce the ideology of ethnic segregation when they are on duty, armed and in 
uniform, and to engage in inter-ethnic interaction when they come home, change 
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their uniform and gun for a shirt and sarong, and go to work in their fields together 
with Tamil labourers who have been working in their fields for years. This is not a 
deliberate act of bridging (ethnic) difference. Rather, people perform a ‘mental 
swapping trick’, and replace otherness in one category of identification by sameness 
in another: “we are all farmers”, “we are both Catholics”, or “he may be a Sinhalese / 
Muslim / Tamil, but he is still my friend”. As I have said in section 1.3.2, this is the 
main reason why I have avoided the use of the term ‘bridging social capital’. In 
individual people’s everyday lives, inter-ethnic interaction is bridging and bonding 
at the same time, depending on which social reality you take as your starting point. 
While I see value in the use of the dichotomy between bridging and bonding for 
studies at higher social levels of abstraction (see for example Varshney 2002), the 
concept is unhelpful at the level of the individual or the household, because it 
imposes a hierarchy in social realities that does not exist. 
The multiplicity of realities not only means that interaction and co-operation across 
ethnic lines is possible despite ethnicised conflict. It also means that not all conflicts 
are ethnic in nature. There are status conflicts between high-caste and low-caste 
Tamils over access to land and temples, conflicts between Muslim farmers and 
fishermen or between high-caste and low-caste Tamils over access to aid, conflicts 
between owner-cultivators and encroachers over access to irrigation water, and 
many other conflicts and disagreements in the area. While the deafening sound of 
fighting between the army and the LTTE regularly made other conflicts inaudible, 
these conflicts need to be understood in their own right.  
The focus on arenas and sub-arenas has been useful to gain understanding of social 
interactions in their specific settings, as well as in a wider geographical, political and 
historical setting. It has made it possible to study what at first seem rather disparate 
forms of inter-ethnic interaction, and draw lessons from all these forms.  
Methodologically, I want to make a case for what is almost a non-methodology: 
drinking endless cups of tea with people when studying conflict (or ethnicity) and 
talking about a million things other than conflict (or ethnicity) when doing so. This 
non-foregrounding (Richards 2005) then needs to be combined with a critical 
analysis of secondary sources about the conflict (or about ethnicity) and the ‘million 
things other than conflict (or ethnicity)’. It is only so that one can gain a reasonable 
insight into the everyday realities of life in conflict while at the same time placing 
things in a wider context.  
 
9.5 Topics for further study 
From this research, a number of topics come up that are worthy of further 
exploration.  
First of all, my research was conducted in just one area within one country. Repeat 
studies in other multi-ethnic parts of Sri Lanka (such as Ampara District, Puttalam 
District or Vavuniya District, but – outside the conflict zone – possibly also mixed-
ethnic neighbourhoods in some of the big towns and the plantations in the middle of 
Bridging troubled waters?  
334 
 
the country), and in other parts of the world, will be useful to validate the outcomes 
of this research and further enrich conceptual understanding of everyday inter-
ethnic interaction.  
Within Kottiyar Pattu, an inquiry into other forms of inter-ethnic interaction will 
further enrich the picture. I have briefly mentioned the links between Tamil 
goldsmiths and Muslim jewellers, but I have ignored the fisheries sector almost 
entirely. Also, I have paid very little attention to inter-ethnic interaction on markets 
and in shops, and in public institutions like schools, hospitals and government 
offices. While I have mentioned their importance, I did not consider it safe enough 
for the people involved to delve in detail into the workings of local politics, of peace 
committees and of NGOs working on issues of peace and reconciliation. If ever the 
situation improves such that peace is no longer a sensitive topic, I am sure that a lot 
of valuable lessons can be learnt from the people involved. 
From the different chapters in this book, a number of other topics arise that are not 
directly related to inter-ethnic interaction but are also worthy of investigation.  
From chapter 2, the linkages between population movements and politics along the 
fringes of the Kandyan kingdom between 1505 (the arrival of the Portuguese) and 
1815 (the end of the kingdom) arise as a gap in knowledge. Related to this, it would 
be interesting to investigate temple histories and chronicles all along the East Coast 
to see if patterns emerge relating to local politics, the role of the Kandyan kingdom, 
the role of the colonial powers, and pre-colonial social configurations. 
From chapter 3, a wider investigation into the continued existence of kudi matriclans 
and the changes to the system will complement Dennis McGilvray’s work on 
Akkaraipattu. Another study worth doing in the context of small, formally 
endogamous Tamil caste groups, is a multi-generational inquiry into marriage 
patterns and trends in endogamy and exogamy. 
From chapter 6 comes the topic of long-term rainfall fluctuation and its 
consequences for struggles over the allocation of irrigation water at the levels of 
politics, policy, and farmers and officials within irrigation schemes. 
Another topic that warrants inquiry is what potential there is for further 
development to provide livelihoods for the expanding population of the AES (and 
other schemes) now that there is insufficient land for the next generation, and how 
this resource scarcity will fuel further complexities.  
Lastly, there is the topic of farmer representatives and wattai vidanes. As I have 
shown, mutual acquaintance and trust are essential for the functioning of networks 
of farmer representatives, particularly in times of crisis. However, under current 
ideologies on participative irrigation management, old boys’ networks are replaced 
by representatives who are to be elected annually. While this improves the 
accountability of farmer representatives to the farmers they represent, it breaks up 
networks of trust among the farmer representatives, and may thus be 
counterproductive when problems need to be sorted out at that level. Because of 
this, it would be interesting to critically review the effects of participatory irrigation 
management in its current form. 
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9.6 Implications for interventions in conflict-affected areas 
Within the scene of humanitarian aid and development aid, peace-building has been 
a hot topic since at least the mid-1990s and it may be so for some time to come. 
Terms like ‘Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment’ and ‘Building Local Capacities 
for Peace’ have by now sunk into the day-to-day vocabulary of NGOs, and there is a 
lot of attention for the topic among academics and donors. 
Particularly after the 2002 ceasefire, a large number of local and international civil 
society organisations in Sri Lanka got involved in activities related to peace-building 
(Orjuela 2004)284. The range of activities was enormous: it included seminars, 
trainings, advocacy, exchange visits, public rallies and festivals (including a kite 
festival that I once attended in Trincomalee), the setting up and support of local 
peace committees, tree planting campaigns, and even things like the construction of 
community centres and repair of irrigation channels. Apart from noting the obvious 
failure to prevent the vicious resurgence of ethno-chauvinism in public discourse 
from late 2005 onwards (which was very much encouraged by both the government 
and the LTTE and thus would have been hard to counter in any case), I am not in a 
position to make generic statements about the impact of all the peace-building work 
that has been done over the years. However, I do believe that what I learnt about 
everyday inter-ethnic interaction has strong implications for the effectiveness of 
grassroots-level peace-building work in a context of violent conflict. 
First of all, to understand the everyday implications of ethnicised conflict, a 
thorough understanding of everyday life and its multiple realities (of which 
ethnicised conflict is only one) is essential. Conflict assessments that are too much 
focused on conflict risk missing out on the room for manoeuvre that people find in 
alternative realities.  
As I have noted before, most forms of everyday inter-ethnic interaction in a context 
of present or expected violence stay ‘below the radar’, because the risk of retribution 
is too large. For the same reason, inter-ethnic interaction is largely a form of 
individual, not collective action – despite quite a lot of people engaging in it. In 
order to build peaceful relations across ethnic borders, it is essential that those 
engaging in these peaceful relations feel safe in doing so. This disqualifies any 
formal or public form of peace-building, because such activities pull the boundary-
crossing ‘above the radar’ and into the full view of those engaged in the surveillance 
of ethnic boundaries. There is another reason to be careful with forms of peace-
building that involve the explicit representation of ethnic groups in problem-solving 
platforms like for example peace committees. While I have met a number of people 
in such committees who were genuinely interested in the welfare of all, the risk is 
that – in the hands of people with the primary intention of defending their 
                                                 
 
284 The “Peacebuilding Directory” that was published by the Consortium for Humanitarian 
Agencies (CHA) in late 2005 contains details of as many as 123 organisations (CHA 2005). 
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community against other communities – peace becomes an ethnic bargaining game. 
While talking peace, such “fire-tenders” (Brass 1998: 16-17) actually harden ethnic 
boundaries and set the stage for future conflicts. In situations of long-running violent 
conflict, it is very important to create opportunities where particularly the younger 
generation can meet and build up relations. However, to paraphrase and invert a 
famous line from the television series Fawlty Towers: “don’t mention peace”.  
 
In closing, it is important to return one last time to what everyday inter-ethnic 
interaction means. Are the people in Kottiyar Pattu such peaceful people who just 
ignore the conflict and the ethno-nationalist rhetoric? By no means. Over the years, 
several thousand people from the area took up arms to defend their overlapping 
motherlands, and many of their friends and relatives quietly or openly supported 
them. Counter to what I originally expected, everyday inter-ethnic interaction is not 
necessarily proof that people do not subscribe to ethno-nationalist discourse. What it 
is proof of is that people are pragmatic enough to ignore the discourse when 
everyday life requires them to do so. In the long run, this can dull the sharp edges of 
what it is that separates people. To quote Amartya Sen,  
 
“[i]n resisting the miniaturization of human beings […], we can also open up the 
possibility of a world that can overcome the memory of its troubled past and 
subdue the insecurities of its difficult present” (2006: 185).  
 
What Sri Lanka needs is more opportunities for such pragmatism. Ethnic peace is 
not merely a situation in which ethnicised problems are solved, but one in which 
ethnic boundaries become irrelevant. 
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Summary 
 
This book is the end result of a research into everyday forms of inter-ethnic 
interaction in a context of violent ethnicised conflict, which I conducted between 
2003 and 2008 in Kottiyar Pattu, a multi-ethnic area in the war zone of North-East Sri 
Lanka. The objective of this research is to come to an understanding of everyday inter-
ethnic interaction in a context of violent ethnicised conflict, its implications for the everyday 
lives of those living with conflict, and its implications for peace-building interventions. 
Chapter 1 introduces the research. In Sri Lanka, ethnic identities are prominently 
part of everyday life. About three quarters of the Sri Lankans identify themselves as 
Sinhalese, a little under one fifth identify themselves as Tamils, and roughly seven 
percent identify themselves as Muslims; apart from these three groups there are 
several very small groups. During the twentieth century ethnicity increasingly 
became a source of conflict, particularly between Sinhalese and Tamils. In the course 
of time, Tamil nationalism and the response to it by Sinhala-nationalist governments 
reinforced each other. Although there were eruptions of violence earlier, the anti-
Tamil riots of July 1983 are generally seen as the beginning of a war that lasted until 
2009. In this war tens of thousands of people died or disappeared, and particularly in 
the (Tamil-dominated) north and east of the country the devastation has been 
immense. In this context that was dominated by ethno-nationalist discourses it was 
surprising to nevertheless come across everyday forms of inter-ethnic interaction. 
Since inter-ethnic interaction in a context of ethnicised conflict has hardly been 
studied (Ring 2006), this research has primarily been exploratory in nature. The 
research was conducted from a social constructionist perspective (Long 2001). Over 
the course of the research four conceptual notions became increasingly important as 
lenses to look at the research topic. The first is the notion that violence and everyday 
life are intricately interlinked. Despite the overwhelming presence of violence and 
the fear and suffering that this generates, everyday life more or less goes on. It is 
therefore not possible to understand the social reality of life in a context of violence 
by only looking at violence (Richards 2005). The second lens is the notion that life is 
played out in a wide spectrum of social realities that are not hierarchically organised. 
People define otherness and sameness not only by ethnicity, but also by caste, class, 
religion, and so on. This generates ambiguity: the other can be different according to 
one category of identification, but similar according to another. This ambiguity 
creates room for manoeuvre. Even though ethnicity is a dominant factor in everyday 
life and in public discourses, it is not possible to understand the social reality of 
everyday life by only looking at ethnicity. The third lens flows forth from the first 
two lenses: the notion that people are capable to more or less shape their own lives, 
and are not entirely determined by their contexts. Finally I consider the settings in 
which inter-ethnic forms of interaction take place. Here the notion comes up of the 
arena as a reality in iself, in which the wider context is reinterpreted and given a 
place. This research has primarily been ethnographic in nature, supported by 
elaborate literature study and archival research. 
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Chapter 2 is the first of three background chapters, which together sketch the context 
in which people in Kottiyar Pattu, the research area, live. In this chapter, the 
geography and history of the research area are described. Since time immemorial, 
the area has oscillated between a status of strategic frontier area (with related to this 
an influx of people and strategic investments by the rulers of the day) and a status of 
neglected hinterland (with related to this a reduction in population and a sinking 
into deep poverty). The rich history of the area (with ruins that are two thousand 
years old) and the influx of various groups of people in different periods of time has 
led to the development of very diverse climbs to the area, which are of great 
importance in current discourses. 
Chapter 3 describes the social complexity in the area. Where the threefold ethnic 
division of the population into Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims has already been dealt 
with in chapter 1, this chapter discusses further subdivisions: caste, class, 
employment, religion, gender, age, length of stay in the area, political affiliation, and 
military dominance. This chapter is not concerned with a conceptual analysis of 
these subdivisions, but the description of which categories people themselves use to 
divide the world around them into groups. Nobody is merely Sinhala, Tamil or 
Muslim; there is also a whole range of other elements that form part of his or her 
identity. Having such a multi-faceted identity is very important: people can stress 
one identity at one time, and another identity at another time, and that enables them 
to get around ethnic difference if they want to. 
Chapter 4 rounds off the contextualisation with a detailed chronological description 
of the violence that the area has gone through. From this descrption it becomes clear 
how much people have suffered: almost everybody has had to flee thrice or more; 
half of the people have lost their house on one or more occasions; and nearly five 
percent of the pre-war population has died due to the violence. It is however 
important to realise that the violence has been episodic in nature: between periods of 
intense violence there have also been long periods in which there were relatively few 
incidents, and in which people could pick up the pieces of their everyday lives as 
best as they could. On the other hand the experience of violence and threat involves 
a lot more than actual violence: remembered violence from the past and the 
expectation of possible violence in the future are very much part of it. 
Chapter 5 forms an intermezzo, in which four narratives from the research area are 
presented. In so doing, I enable the reader to go beyond my observations, and gain 
insight into the intensely complex mixture of stories and opinions that can be found 
in the area. The fact that people have such different perspectives makes living 
together even more complex, and makes it all the more remarkable that inter-ethnic 
interaction takes place nevertheless. 
In chapters 6, 7 and 8 three empirical case studies of inter-ethnic interaction are dealt 
with. Chapter 6 looks at how farmers cultivating paddy in the Allai Extension 
Scheme have, despite the violence, still been more or less able to keep cultivating 
their fields and to keep sharing irrigation water. During most of the war, the 
irrigated area remained about 80% of what it was before the war, despite a gradual 
reduction of water availability. Besides, the sown area varies with the security 
situation, but – with exception of a few periods of extreme violence and of drought – 
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farmers nearly always harvest what they sow. This points to the effectiveness of the 
methods that farmers, water masters and government officials used to more or less 
keep the irrigation system functioning. Irrigation Department staff avoided conflicts 
by letting the channels flow at or over full capacity, and in specific sites where 
conflicts over water existed by adjusting the infrastructure or making it altogether 
unmanageable.  Water masters, who on behalf of the farmers are responsible for 
managing irrigation water in tertiary units, were sometimes capable to find solutions 
for blocked channels in closed meetings. Finally, farmers did their bit by an ethnic 
exchange of fields, by hiring labourers of other ethnicity to work fields that were 
inaccessible to themselves, and by abandoning fields that were inaccessible to 
everybody (which concentrated the available water on a smaller area). This was not 
a neutral exchange; on all sides there were winners and losers. The spread of 
winners and losers among Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims was however 
comparatively equal. The functioning of the Allai Extension Scheme was made 
possible by the individual pragmatism of a lot of people, and only to a very limited 
extent by collective action. Very little could be done in groups because the risk of 
being seen as a traitor and being punished for it was very real. The forms of 
coordination that did exist were closed in nature, which made it possible to keep 
outsiders out. Particularly for the water masters a hugely important factor in this 
was the fact that most already knew each other for years and trusted each other. The 
belated introduction of modernised forms of water management in the Allai 
Extension Scheme, with as important element the annual election of farmer 
representatives who are to replace the water masters, may seriously undermine this. 
When farmer representatives are only in function for short periods of time, this 
means that they will only to a limited extent be able to establish personal relations of 
trust with other farmer representatives. This may lead to quicker escalation of 
conflicts between farmers. Another important aspect of the inter-ethnic interaction 
surrounding the irrigation scheme is its framing. In many cases, inter-ethnic 
interaction is not explained as the bridging of ethnic differences, but as co-operation 
between equals: farmers or water masters. Finally, it is also important to note that 
non-ethnic conflicts continue despite the war and despite the dominance of ethnic 
discourses: there are conflicts between high-caste Tamil farmers and low-caste 
Tamils who have gained status when they got access to land, there are conflicts 
between farmers who already lived in the area and settlers (mostly Sinhalese, but 
also Tamils and Muslims) who moved into the area with the development of the 
Allai Extension Scheme, and so on. By viewing such conflicts as non-ethnic in nature 
it is possible to keep them outside the domain of ethno-nationalist discourses, and to 
keep them manageable to a certain extent. 
Chapter 7 looks at what happens during periods of acute violence (using the 
example of riots between Muslims and Tamils in and around Muthur in April 2003) 
and during almost-riots, periods in which there is an acute threat of violence (using 
the example of a period of tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils in and around 
Serunuara between June 2005 and April 2006). In such periods inter-ethnic 
interaction is even more difficult than it normally is, because the risk of being 
punished for it is even bigger than normal. Still inter-ethnic interaction does take 
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place, and in some cases it plays an important role in the ultimate de-escalation. Both 
cases clearly show that violence only escalates when it is organised. The example of a 
small and vulnerable group of Tamils who were not attacked by a passing mob of 
furious Muslim youth is a further indication of pragmatism: these people were street 
sweepers, and the town would become a mess if they were attacked. Another 
important finding is that people find pragmatic solutions wherever possible to pick 
up their everyday lives again. The violence in April 2003 ended when people took a 
‘time out’ to let their children sit for their school exams, and to let farmers plough 
their fields. Just like in chapter 6, attention is again drawn to the fact that ethnic 
groups are not homogeneous. Even in situations of acute tensions and violence intra-
ethnic division continues to exist. 
Chapter 8 looks at inter-ethnic marriages. Here, I was particularly interested in how 
mixed-ethnic couples manage, and to what extent they fulfil a bridging function 
between the two ethnicities that the spouses represent. Although mixed-ethnic 
marriages are fairly rare, mixed couples can nevertheless be found in almost every 
village, and they are therefore very much part of everyday life. Particularly the 
increasing mobility of people means that the chances of meeting each other increase; 
the number of inter-ethnic marriages therefore increases. Despite initial (and 
sometimes long-lasting) opposition from close relatives, most couples are able to 
lead reasonably normal lives. They do this primarily by presenting themselves as 
normal couples and by not drawing attention to the inter-ethnic nature of their 
marriage. Children reinforce this identification as a ‘normal couple’. Most couples 
end up in the husband’s village after a few years, and in most cases the wife adopts 
the ethnic identity of her husband. Particularly in situations of violence and tension, 
the couples fulfil no bridging function: the couples are sometimes viewed as traitors 
by both sides. However, when the situation is calm small bridges are sometimes 
built informally between the ethnic groups that the spouses originate from. 
Chapter 9 rounds off the book by returning to the objective of the research and by 
looking at what the research has contributed to its objective. 
First of all it is noteworthy that all sorts of people are involved in inter-ethnic 
interaction: my estimate is that between a third and half of all households in Kottiyar 
Pattu is involved in inter-ethnic relations in everyday life. Inter-ethnic interaction is 
everywhere, despite the violence and the ethno-nationalist discourses. This is made 
possible in two ways: sometimes it is kept secret, but more often it is presented as 
irrelevant for ethno-nationalist discourses. This is done by means of a ‘swapping 
trick’: people step over ethnic difference by swapping to another category of 
identification in which the other is similar. Discourses of ethnic segregation and 
practices of inter-ethnic interaction can thus co-exist in “amiable incoherence” 
(Whitaker 1999). Mutual trust is crucial, and this draws attention to the younger 
generation, which much less than their parents has been able to meet people of other 
ethnicity. The longer a conflict lasts, the harder it thus gets to keep inter-ethnic 
interaction going. This, and the importance of staying ‘below the radar’, means that 
interventions aimed contributing to peace-building can only be successful if they are 
focused on people meeting each other and on addressing practical problems, and not 
explicitly on bridging ethnic differences. 
 Samenvatting 
363 
   
Samenvatting 
Bruggen bouwen? Alledaagse inter-etnische interactie in een context van gewelddadig 
conflict in Kottiyar Pattu, Trincomalee, Sri Lanka 
 
Dit boek is het eindprodukt van een onderzoek naar alledaagse vormen van inter-
etnische interactie in een context van gewelddadig etnisch conflict dat ik van 2003 tot 
2008 heb uitgevoerd in Kottiyar Pattu, een multi-etnisch gebied in de oorlogszone 
van noord-oost Sri Lanka. De doelstelling van het onderzoek is het begrijpen van 
alledaagse vormen van inter-etnische interactie in een context van gewelddadig etnisch 
conflict, van de consequenties die dit heeft voor het dagelijkse leven van de betrokkenen, en 
van de implicaties die dit heeft voor interventies die gericht zijn op vredesopbouw. 
Hoofdstuk 1 leidt het onderzoek in. In Sri Lanka zijn etnische identiteiten prominent 
aanwezig in het leven van alledag. Ongeveer driekwart van de Sri Lankanen 
identificeert zich als Sinhalees, iets minder dan een vijfde identificeert zich als Tamil, 
en ongeveer zeven procent identificeert zich als Moslim; naast deze drie groepen zijn 
er nog enkele zeer kleine groepen. Gedurende de twintigste eeuw is etniciteit steeds 
sterker een bron van conflict geworden, met name tussen Sinhalezen en Tamils. In 
de loop der tijd versterkten Tamil-nationalisme en de reactie daarop van Sinhalees-
nationalistische overheden elkaar. Hoewel er al eerder geweldsuitbarstingen hadden 
plaatsgevonden, worden de anti-Tamil rellen van juli 1983 vaak gezien als het begin 
van een oorlog die tot 2009 geduurd heeft. In deze oorlog zijn tienduizenden mensen 
omgekomen of verdwenen, en met name in het (door Tamils gedomineerde) 
noorden en oosten van het land is de verwoesting groot geweest. In deze door etno-
nationalistische discoursen gedomineerde context was het verrassend om toch 
alledaagse vormen van inter-etnische interactie tegen te komen. Aangezien inter-
etnische interactie in een context van etnisch conflict nauwelijks bestudeerd is (Ring 
2006), is dit onderzoek primair exploratief van aard geweest. Het onderzoek is 
uitgevoerd vanuit een sociaal constructionistisch perspectief (Long 2001). In de loop 
van het onderzoek werden vier conceptuele noties steeds belangrijker als lenzen om 
naar het onderzoeksonderwerp te kijken. De eerste is de notie dat geweld en het 
leven van alledag niet los van elkaar staan. Ondanks de overweldigende 
aanwezigheid van geweld en de angst en het lijden die dat teweegbrengt, gaat het 
alledaagse leven min of meer door. Het is daarom niet mogelijk om de sociale 
realiteit van het leven in een context van geweld te begrijpen door alleen maar naar 
geweld te kijken (Richards 2005). De tweede lens is de notie dat het leven zich 
afspeelt in een breed scala aan sociale realiteiten die niet hiërarchisch geordend zijn. 
Mensen definiëren verschil en gelijkheid niet alleen naar etniciteit, maar ook naar 
kaste, klasse, religie, enzovoort. Dit levert ambiguïteit op: de ander kan anders zijn 
volgens één categorie van identificatie, maar gelijk volgens een andere. Deze 
ambiguïteit levert speelruimte op. Ook al is etniciteit een dominante factor in het 
alledaagse leven en in publieke discoursen, het is niet mogelijk om de sociale realiteit 
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van het alledaagse leven te begrijpen door alleen maar naar etniciteit te kijken. De 
derde lens vloeit hieruit voort: de notie dat mensen in staat zijn om hun eigen leven 
tot op zekere hoogte vorm te geven, en niet geheel bepaald worden door hun 
omstandigheden. Als laatste beschouw ik de settings waarin inter-etnische vormen 
van interactie plaatsvinden. Hier speelt de notie van de arena als een werkelijkheid 
op zichzelf, waarin de bredere context wordt geherinterpreteerd en een plaats wordt 
gegeven. Het onderzoek is primair etnografisch van aard geweest, ondersteund door 
uitgebreide literatuurstudie en archief-onderzoek. 
Hoofdstuk 2 is het eerste van drie achtergrondhoofdstukken, die gezamelijk de 
context schetsen waarin mensen in Kottiyar Pattu, het onderzoeksgebied, leven. In 
dit hoofdstuk worden de geografie en geschiedenis van het onderzoeksgebied 
beschreven. Door de eeuwen heen heeft het gebied geschipperd tussen een status als 
strategisch ‘frontier-gebied’ (met daaraan gelieerd een influx van personen en 
strategische investeringen door de toenmalige machthebbers), en een status als 
genegeerd achterland (met daaraan gelieerd krimp in de bevolking en wegzinken in 
diepe armoede). De rijke geschiedenis van het gebied (met ruïnes die twee milennia 
oud zijn) en de toestroom van verschillende groepen mensen in verschillende 
periodes heeft geleid tot de totstandkoming van heel diverse claims op het gebied, 
die in hedendaagse discoursen van groot belang zijn. 
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft de sociale complexiteit in het gebied. Waar de etnische 
driedeling van de bevolking in Sinhalezen, Tamils en Moslims al is behandeld in 
hoofdstuk 1, worden hier verdere onderverdelingen besproken: kaste, klasse, werk, 
religie, gender, leeftijd, lengte van verblijf in het gebied, politieke affiliatie, en 
militaire dominantie. Het gaat hier niet om een conceptuele analyse van deze 
onderverdelingen, maar om een beschrijving van welke categorieën mensen zelf 
gebruiken om de wereld om hen heen onder te verdelen in groepen. Niemand is 
enkel Sinhalees, Tamil of Moslim; er is ook nog een hele reeks andere elementen die 
onderdeel uitmaken van zijn of haar identiteit. Het hebben van zo’n veelzijdige 
identiteit is van groot belang: mensen kunnen de ene keer de ene identiteit 
benadrukken en de andere keer de andere identiteit, en daarmee kunnen ze onder 
het etnisch onderscheid uitkomen als ze dat willen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 rondt de contextualisering af met een gedetailleerde chronologische 
beschrijving van het geweld dat het gebied geteisterd heeft. Uit deze beschrijving 
wordt duidelijk hoe zeer mensen te lijden gehad hebben: bijna iedereen is drie of 
meer keer op de vlucht geweest; de helft van de mensen is hun huis een of meer 
keren kwijtgeraakt; en bijna vijf procent van de vooroorlogse bevolking is door 
geweld omgekomen. Het is echter belangrijk om te realiseren dat het geweld 
episodisch in natuur is geweest: tussen periodes van intens geweld zijn er ook lange 
periodes geweest waarin vrij weinig incidenten plaatsvonden, en waarin mensen de 
stukjes van hun alledaagse leven zo goed en zo kwaad als mogelijk weer konden 
oppakken. Aan de andere kant omvat de ervaring van geweld en dreiging meer dan 
het daadwerkelijke geweld: herinnerd geweld uit het verleden en de verwachting 
van mogelijk geweld in de toekomst maken er evenzeer deel van uit.  
 Samenvatting 
365 
   
Hoofdstuk 5 vormt een intermezzo, waarin vier narratieven uit het 
onderzoeksgebied gepresenteerd worden. Hiermee geef ik de lezer de gelegenheid 
om voorbij mijn beschouwingen te kijken, en inzicht te krijgen in de intens complexe 
mengeling van verhalen en meningen die de ronde doen in het gebied. Het feit dat 
mensen zulke verschillende perspectieven hebben maakt samenleven nog 
complexer, en maakt het nog meer opmerkelijk dat er desondanks toch inter-etnische 
interactie plaatsvindt. 
In de hoofdstukken 6, 7 en 8 komen drie empirische gevalsstudies van inter-etnische 
interactie aan de orde. Hoofdstuk 6 kijkt naar hoe boeren die rijst verbouwen in het 
Allai Extension Scheme, ondanks het geweld, toch tot op zekere hoogte in staat zijn 
gebleven om hun rijstvelden te blijven bebouwen en irrigatiewater te blijven delen. 
Gedurende het grootste deel van de oorlog is het geïrrigeerde areaal ongeveer 
tachtig procent gebleven van wat het voor de oorlog was, ondanks een geleidelijke 
afname van waterbeschikbaarheid. Daarnaast varieert het ingezaaide areaal met de 
veiligheidssituatie, maar – met uitzondering van een paar perioden van extreem 
geweld en droogte – oogsten boeren vrijwel altijd wat ze zaaien. Dit wijst op de 
effectiviteit van de methoden die boeren, waterbeheerders en overheidsambtenaren 
toepasten om het irrigatiesysteem min of meer draaiend te houden. Personeel van 
het irrigatiedepartement omzeilde conflicten door meer water dan nodig was door 
de kanalen te laten stromen, en door op specifieke plaatsen waar conflicten over 
waterverdeling bestonden de infrastructuur aan te passen of onbeheerbaar te maken. 
Waterbeheerders, die namens de boeren verantwoordelijk zijn voor het waterbeheer 
in tertiaire vakken, waren soms in staat om in besloten vergaderingen oplossingen te 
bedenken voor de blokkade van kanalen. Boeren tenslotte droegen hun steentje bij 
door een etnische uitruil van akkers, door arbeiders van andere etniciteit voor 
henzelf ontoegankelijke akkers te laten bewerken, en door akkers die voor iedereen 
ontoegankelijk waren op te geven (waardoor het beschikbare water geconcentreerd 
werd over een kleiner areaal). Dit was geen neutrale uitruil; aan alle kanten waren 
winnaars en verliezers. De spreiding van winnaars en verliezers over Sinhalezen, 
Tamils en Moslims was echter relatief gelijkmatig. Het functioneren van het Allai 
Extension Scheme werd mogelijk gemaakt door het pragmatisme van een heleboel 
individuele personen, en maar zeer beperkt door collectieve actie. Er kon weinig 
overlegd worden omdat het risico van als verrader bestempeld worden levensgroot 
was. De vormen van overleg die wel bestonden waren besloten, waardoor het 
mogelijk was om buitenstaanders letterlijk buiten de deur te houden. Met name voor 
de waterbeheerders was het hierbij van groot belang dat de meesten elkaar al jaren 
kenden en elkaar vertrouwden. De verlate introductie van gemoderniseerde vormen 
van waterbeheer in het Allai Extension Scheme, met als belangrijk onderdeel 
jaarlijkse verkiezingen van boerenvertegenwoordigers die de waterbeheerders 
moeten vervangen, kan dit ernstig ondermijnen. Als boerenvertegenwoordigers hun 
rol maar kort vervullen, betekent dat dat zij maar beperkt in staat zullen zijn om 
persoonlijke relaties van vertrouwen op te bouwen met andere 
boerenvertegenwoordigers. Dit kan tot gevolg hebben dat conflicten tussen boeren 
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sneller zullen escaleren. Een ander belangrijk aspect van de inter-etnische interactie 
rondom het irrigatiesysteem is de framing. In veel gevallen wordt inter-etnische 
interactie niet uitgelegd als het overbruggen van etnische verschillen, maar als 
samenwerking tussen gelijken: boeren of waterbeheerders. Als laatste is het ook van 
belang dat niet-etnische geschillen gewoon doorgaan ondanks de oorlog en ondanks 
de dominantie van etnische discoursen: er zijn geschillen tussen Tamil-boeren van 
hoge kaste en Tamils van lage kaste die aan status gewonnen hebben toen ze land 
kregen, er zijn geschillen tussen boeren die al in het gebied woonden en nieuwe 
boeren (vooral Sinhalezen, maar ook Tamils en Moslims) die met de ontwikkeling 
van het Allai Extension Scheme in het gebied zijn komen wonen, enzovoort. Door 
zulke geschillen niet als etnisch te beschouwen is het mogelijk om ze buiten het 
domein van etno-nationalistische discoursen te houden, en ze tot op zekere hoogte 
beheersbaar te houden. 
Hoofdstuk 7 kijkt naar wat er gebeurt tijdens perioden van acuut geweld (aan de 
hand van rellen in en om Muthur tussen Moslims en Tamils in april 2003) en tijdens 
bijna-rellen, perioden met een acute dreiging van geweld (aan de hand van een 
periode van spanningen tussen Sinhalezen en Tamils in en om Serunuwara tussen 
juni 2005 en april 2006). In zulke perioden is interetnische interactie nog lastiger dan 
het normaal al is, omdat het risico ervoor afgestraft te worden nog groter is dan 
normaal. Toch vindt inter-etnische interactie wel degelijk plaats, en speelt het soms 
een belangrijke rol in de uiteindelijke de-escalatie. Beide gevallen laten duidelijk zien 
dat geweld alleen escaleert als het georganiseerd is. Het voorbeeld van een kleine en 
kwetsbare groep Tamils die niet werd aangevallen door een langslopende menigte 
woedende Moslim-jongeren is een verdere indicatie van pragmatisme: deze mensen 
waren straatvegers, en de stad zou een puinhoop worden als ze aangevallen zouden 
worden. Een ander belangrijke bevinding is dat mensen waar het maar mogelijk is 
pragmatische oplossingen zoeken om hun alledaagse leven weer op te kunnen 
pakken. Het geweld in april 2003 eindigde toen burgers een ‘time-out’ in acht namen 
om kinderen hun schoolexamens te kunnen laten doen, en om boeren hun land te 
kunnen laten ploegen. Net als in hoofdstuk 6 wordt opnieuw duidelijk dat etnische 
groepen niet homogeen zijn. Zelfs in situaties van acute spanningen en geweld blijft 
intra-etnische verdeeldheid bestaan. 
Hoofstuk 8 kijkt naar gemengde huwelijken. Hierbij was ik vooral benieuwd naar 
wat gemengde stellen doen, en of ze al dan niet een brugfunctie vervullen tussen de 
twee etniciteiten die ze vertegenwoordigen. Hoewel gemengd-etnische huwelijken 
vrij zeldzaam zijn, is het toch zo dat in bijna ieder dorp wel een of meerdere 
gemengde stellen wonen. Met name de toenemende mobiliteit van mensen betekent 
dat de kansen om elkaar te ontmoeten toenemen; het aantal inter-etnische 
huwelijken neemt daardoor toe. De meeste stellen kunnen, ondanks initieel (en soms 
langdurig) verzet van naaste familieleden, een redelijk normaal leven leiden. Dat 
doen ze primair door zich als een normaal echtpaar te presenteren en geen aandacht 
te vestigen op het inter-etnische karakter van hun huwelijk. Kinderen versterken 
deze identificatie als ‘normaal echtpaar’. De meeste stellen komen na een paar jaar in 
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het dorp van de man te wonen, en de vrouw neemt meestal de etniciteit van haar 
man over. Van een brugfunctie is, zeker in situaties van geweld en spanning, geen 
sprake: de stellen worden dan soms door beide kanten als verraders beschouwd. 
Echter, als de situatie kalm is worden soms op informele manier wel bruggetjes 
gebouwd tussen de etnische groepen waar de echtgenoten vandaan komen.  
Hoofdstuk 9 rondt het boek af door terug te keren naar de doelstelling van het 
onderzoek en te zien wat het onderzoek aan de doelstelling heeft bijgedragen. 
Allereerst valt op dat allerlei soorten mensen betrokken zijn bij inter-etnische 
interactie: mijn schatting is dat tussen een derde en de helft van alle huishoudens in 
Kottiyar Pattu inter-etnische relaties heeft in het alledaagse leven. Het is overal, 
ondanks het geweld en de etno-nationalistische discoursen. Dit wordt mogelijk 
gemaakt op twee manieren: soms wordt het geheim gehouden, maar vaker wordt 
het gepresenteerd als irrelevant voor etno-nationalistische discoursen. Dit gebeurt 
door een ‘wisseltruc’: mensen stappen over etnisch verschil heen, en benaderen 
elkaar als gelijken volgens een andere categorie van identificatie. Discoursen van  
etnische segregatie en praktijken van inter-etnische interactie kunnen zo bestaan in 
‘aimabele incoherentie’ (Whitaker 1999). Wederzijds vertrouwen is cruciaal, en dit 
vestigt de aandacht op de jongere generatie, die veel minder dan hun ouders in staat 
zijn geweest om mensen van andere etniciteit te ontmoeten. Hoe langer een conflict 
dus duurt, hoe lastiger het wordt om inter-etnische interactie in stand te houden. Dit, 
en het belang om ‘onder de radar’ te blijven, betekent dat interventies die aan 
vredesopbouw willen bijdragen alleen succesvol kunnen zijn als ze gefocust zijn op 
ontmoeting en op praktische problemen, en niet op het overbruggen van etnische 
grensen op zich.  
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